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 Summary  
Using Ruth Wodak’s Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, this thesis examines the ways in which French Republican ideas were 
synthesised with arguments relating to the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in 2011 
and 2013 to justify military intervention and international cooperation. Firstly, 
Nicolas Sarkozy had learned his lesson with Tunisia that the Arab Spring was more 
than just a minor wave of protests. Therefore, when the uprising began in Libya, 
Sarkozy relied on the Republican ideas of the universality of Liberty, Equality, and 
Human Rights. This was pitched perfectly to justify a military intervention along the 
lines of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, co-opting the support of the United 
States and the United Kingdom into the mission, as well as gaining the tacit approval 
of Russia. 
  
However Hollande, when approaching a similar situation in Syria, relied 
on a different side of the Republican ethos. In seeking to “punish” Syria rather than 
protect its citizens, Hollande fell succumbed to the more paternalistic trappings of 
French Republicanism, indulging in a more naked display of grandeur, designating 
France as a gendarme of the world. Ultimately, this was an inappropriate tactic 
to adopt. Hollande’s administration would antagonise Russia and misread the 
American intentions. This would lead to further embarrassment when events 
overtook President Hollande, and the United States and Russia organised their 
own agreement to deal with Syria’s chemical weapons. 
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Introduction 
Within the past sixty-five years, France has had to undergo significant adaptations. 
With the fall of Dien Bien Phu in Indochina, marking the beginning of the end of 
France as a colonial power, France has had to re-assess its position in the global order, 
as well as how it interacts with other states.  
The first adaptation occurred with the return of General Charles de Gaulle and the 
creation of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle recognised that France would need to change 
if it was to retain its influence in the world following decolonisation. De Gaulle 
introduced the concepts of grandeur and rang to the French political lexicon; these 
notions covered a broad range of policies, all designed to re-establish and reinforce 
French unity and French primacy after the ignominious setbacks suffered by France 
during and immediately after the Second World War. Based on a deeply romanticised 
notion of France’s history, with dreams of a great French destiny1, De Gaulle 
envisaged a France which was strong, independent, and respected. Rang can be 
interpreted as either rank or status, which is important to the understanding of France’s 
actions in the international order. It concerns France’s position within the international 
hierarchy; it is both a necessity and an expectation that France should sit amongst the 
great powers at the top of this heirarchy.  
Chapter 2 of Volume III of de Gaulle’s memoirs is titled “Status”, and discusses events 
between 23 October 1944 and 2 March 19452. In particular, this chapter concerns the 
build up to and the immediate aftermath of the Yalta Conference, as well as the 
position France held in the world at the time. The most illuminating of these was the 
conversation de Gaulle had with Harry Hopkins on 27 January 1945. Here, Mr 
Hopkins explained that relations between the US and France had deteriorated because 
America’s previous high estimation of France’s value and standing “was overthrown 
in an instant” following France’s collapse and surrender to Germany in 1940. 
Furthermore, many of the political and military leaders whom the US had trusted to 
                                                          
1 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre – L’appel Paris, 1954, english translation found in Daniel J 
Mahoney, ‘De Gaulle: Statesman, Grandeur and modern democracy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996) 
p. 16 
2 Volume III Salvation 1944-1946 (Translated by Richard Howard) in Charles de Gaulle, The 
Complete War Memoires of Charles de Gaulle (New York: Da Capo Press, 1984) p.716 
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rise to the challenge “did not show themselves”. Ultimately, “Judging that France was 
no longer what she had been, we could not trust her to play one of the leading roles”3. 
In summarising his conversation with Mr Hopkins, de Gaulle stated that “the French 
have the impression that you no longer consider the greatness of France necessary to 
the world and yourself”4. This perception of France’s position in the world led to its 
non-inclusion in the Yalta Conference, where the “Big Three” of the US, Russia, and 
the United Kingdom discussed the post-war reorganisation of Europe. Therefore this 
loss of rang (status) within the international hierarchy, and particularly amongst the 
other larger military powers in the Second World War, resulted in France playing no 
role in the Yalta Conference. In the concluding paragraph, de Gaulle argues that the 
result of the Yalta Conference, namely that France would join the “Big Three” in 
occupying German territory, and that she would sit with them in what would later be 
known as the Security Council, showed a belated recognition that France was still a 
significant power. De Gaulle concludes by predicting that the memories of France’s 
failure in 1940 would soon fade due to the role she played in the victory over Germany.  
However, the post-War period saw a host of new challenges to France assuming its 
position at the top of the global order. The Cold War had resulted in states banding 
together for safety. The world was effectively divided into two spheres: East and the 
West, Communism and Capitalism. To counter the perceived threats posed by the 
major extensions of Soviet and/or Communist power and influence in Europe and Asia 
between 1944 and 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created, an 
organisation of North American and Western European States, dominated by the 
United States. Other supranational entities such as the United Nations, and the various 
precursors of the European Community also emerged, potentially seeing France’s 
influence in the world diluted. 
During the Cold War, France sought to navigate these choppy waters, cooperating 
with nations and organisations where it served their interests, whilst maintaining a 
relative isolation. This was particularly typified by France’s withdrawal from the 
integrated command structure of NATO in 1966, whilst still remaining a member of 
the wider organisation. Instead, de Gaulle preferred the notion of European 
                                                          
3 Ibid. p. 760 
4 Ibid. p.763 
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cooperation (with the assumption of French leadership), with the aim of enabling 
France to act independently of the US and counter-balance American and Soviet 
primacy in, and influence over world affairs5. 
French Foreign and European policy for the next twenty years was dominated by 
subtle deviations from the path set forth by de Gaulle, with a very gradual 
rapprochement with the United States. This was somewhat accelerated by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Instability stemming from the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
catalysed or unleashed the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. This, 
combined with conflict in Rwanda, gave rise to new conceptualisations of conflict. 
Failures on these fronts led to the development of new doctrines encouraging and 
legitimising various forms of pre-emptive (or preventive) actions towards and 
interventions in humanitarian catastrophes, such as Liberal Internationalism, and its 
successor, the Responsibility to Protect. 
However, eight years ago a new dilemma emerged in North Africa and spread across 
the Middle East. Alain Juppé admitted that France had tolerated authoritarian regimes 
in order to prevent “chaos”, using them as bulwarks against extremism and terrorism6. 
On 17 December 2010, a street vendor named Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi 
from Tunisia self-immolated following harassment from authorities. One man’s 
desperate act would ignite protests in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Syria. Tunisia’s 
leader President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled the country following mass protests7. 
King Mohammed of Morocco responded to the protests by offering a referendum on 
constitutional amendments8. However, protests in Libya and Syria took violent turns, 
with both regimes responding to the demonstrations with force. In both cases, violence 
begot violence, eventually leading to civil conflicts.  
                                                          
5 A discussion on De Gaulle’s intentions following the withdrawal from the NATO command 
structure found here: Garret Martin. ‘The 1967 withdrawal from NATO – a cornerstone of de Gaulle's 
grand strategy?’ Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 9:3 2011, 232-243 
6 “Arab spring” symposium – Closing speech by Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to the Arab World Institute 16 April 2011 https://uk.ambafrance.org/Arab-spring-symposium-
Closing [accessed 30/09/2017] 
7 Angelique Chrisafis and Ian Black, ‘Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee Tunisia as protesters 
claim victory’ The Guardian 15 January 2011 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests [accessed 
11/06/2019] 
8 ‘Morocco’s King Mohammed unveils constitutional reforms’ BBC 18 June 2011 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13816974 [accessed 11/06/2019] 
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The conflict in Libya reached its peak on 17 and 18 March 2011. Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi’s forces advanced towards, amongst other cities, Benghazi. Benghazi had 
been one of the first cities to begin its protests9, and fear abounded there would be 
greater civilian casualties10. 
However, the UN decided to intervene by passing a Resolution which allowed the 
creation of a no-fly zone above the country to prevent Gaddafi from using his air force 
against civilian populations11. The resolution had been lobbied for by France, who also 
participated in the establishment and enforcement of the no-fly zone with the US and 
the United Kingdom until 31 March 2011, at which point NATO assumed control of 
the mission12. Despite the NATO intervention, the conflict continued for another six 
months until 31 October 2013, concluding eleven days after Colonel Gaddafi had been 
captured and killed by rebels in Sirte13.  
The Syrian conflict, on the other hand, was significantly more complicated, and at the 
time of submitting this thesis, is still ongoing. As with the Libyan conflict, the Syrian 
War began with anti-government protests in Damascus on 15 March 201114. Despite 
opening a “national dialogue”15, the reforms offered by the Assad regime were 
insufficient to satisfy the protestors.  
Protests continued, and were met by repression and bloody recriminations16. Seven 
officers who felt that the regime had gone too far in targeting civilians deserted their 
posts and created the Free Syrian Army, a group who would seek to bring about the 
                                                          
9 Ian Black, ‘Libya’s Day of Rage met by bullets and loyalists’ The Guardian 17 February 2011 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/libya-day-of-rage-unrest [accessed 02/03/2019] 
10 This was the reason given for passing Resolution 1973 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council as 
its 6498th meeting, 17 March 2011 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011) [accessed 30/09/2017] 
11 Ibid. 
12 ‘NATO takes command in Libya air operations’ Press release (2011) 040 NATO 31 March 2011 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71867.htm [accessed 11/06/2019] 
13 ‘UN Security Council votes to end Libya operations’ BBC 27 October 2019 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15481143 [accessed 24/11/2019]   
14 Elizabeth Flock, ‘Syria revolution: A revolt brews against Bashar al-Assad’s regime’ The 
Washington Post 15 March 2011 https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/syria-
revolution-revolt-against-bashar-al--assads-
regime/2011/03/15/ABrwNEX_blog.html?utm_term=.841572165a49 [accessed 11/06/2019] 
15 ‘Syria opens ‘national dialogue’ with opposition’ BBC 20 July 2011 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14096981 [accessed 11/06/2019] 
16 Salma Abdelaziz ‘Shallow Grave Yields several bodies in Syrian City marked by unrest’ CNN 16 
May 2011 http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/16/syria.bodies.found/index.html [accessed 
11/06/2019] 
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downfall of the Assad regime and “protect the people from the armoured killing 
machine of the system”17. From this point on, the conflict only escalated. In addition 
to the Free Syrian Army, other forces antagonistic to the Syrian regime also began to 
emerge, including the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, 
commonly known as the Rojava18, and various Islamist groups such as the Islamic 
Front and Al Qaeda. Opposition forces were able to secure significant victories until 
17 April 2013, at which point the Assad regime managed to slow the opposition’s 
offensive enough to begin its own counteroffensive19.  
The conflict entered a new phase on 21 August 2013, following a massive chemical 
weapons attack in Ghouta. This brought widespread international condemnation, 
though the Assad regime simply continued with its devastating offensives to clear the 
rebels from the Damascus suburbs20. Amongst the first to respond to the chemical 
weapons attack was France. Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius declared that the 
international community should react with “force”21, whilst President François 
Hollande stated that “France stands ready to punish”22 those responsible. 
France lobbied the international community to take decisive action. Despite the initial 
support for airstrikes by the US and UK administrations, a vote in the British House 
                                                          
17 Joshua Landis, ‘Free Syrian Army Founded by Seven Officers to Fight Syrian Army’ Syria 
Comment 29 July 2011 https://www.joshualandis.com/blog/free-syrian-army-established-to-fight-the-
syrian-army/ [accessed 11/06/2019] 
18 This group effectively achieved autonomy in 2012 when Assad’s forces retreated from Kurdish 
areas to deal with other insurgents. For some information on the region and its governance, see 
http://www.tangledwilderness.org/a-mountain-river-has-many-bends/ [accessed 11/06/2019] 
19 AFB Beirut, ‘Syria army closes in on Qusayr near Lebanon’ Al Arabiya 21 April 2013 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/04/21/Syria-army-closes-in-on-Quasar-near-
Lebanon-.html [accessed 11/06/2019] 
20 Sam Dagher and Farnaz Fassihi, ‘Syria Presses Offensive, Shrugs Off Gas Attach Claims’ The Wall 
Street Journal 22 August 2013 https://www.wsj.com/articles/syria-opposition-calls-on-un-
1377179398?tesla=y [accessed 11/06/2019] 
21 Donna Abu-Nasr, ‘France calls for force after Syrian gas attacks’ The Age 24 August 2013 
https://www.theage.com.au/world/france-calls-for-force-after-syrian-gas-attacks-20130823-
2sgzs.html [accessed 11/06/2019] 
22 21st Ambassadors’ Conference – Speech by M. François Hollande, President of the Republic. Paris, 
August 27, 2013 (https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article4855) [accessed 11/06/2019] 
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of Commons resulted in a military intervention being ruled out23. Shortly thereafter, 
President Obama also sought Congressional Support to authorise military action24. 
In reality, despite establishing a red line in August 2012 relating to the usage of 
chemical weapons, Obama had cooled to the idea of intervening militarily25. Instead, 
backroom channels between Israeli and Russian diplomats would provide a solution 
to de-escalate the situation and prevent military intervention26.  
However, despite the blatant coolness of Obama towards a military option, Hollande 
and France continued to advocate for a military solution up until agreement had been 
reached between Syria, the US, and Russia. Hollande later claimed that his threats 
were intended to bring about the diplomatic outcome reached, yet from his and 
America’s conduct, it was clear that they had not been included in the decision making 
progress. Hollande had to settle with proposing the UN Resolution which would ratify 
the agreement. On 14 October 2013, the Chemical Weapons Convention came in to 
force for Syria, making it the one hundred and ninetieth nation to sign it in to their 
national law.  
So what can be learned from these two examples about how France operates in this 
multipolar world in the twenty-first century? This thesis seeks to answer a specific 
question: To what extent did France’s rhetorical framing justifying military 
intervention in Libya and Syria affect the build-up and outcomes of French and 
International action in these two examples? 
Using Ruth Wodak’s Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as its methodology, this 
thesis explains the ways in which discursive practices by both Presidents Sarkozy and 
Hollande played a role in establishing the respective outcomes. It shows that the 
discourse of these two actors, and their respective administrations, synthesised two 
                                                          
23‘Syria Crisis, Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action’ BBC 30 August 2013 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783 [accessed 30/09/2017] 
24 Peter Baker and Jonathan Weisman, ‘Obama seeks congressional approval for Strike in Syria The 
New York Times 31 August 2013 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html?mcubz=0 [accessed 30/09/2017] 
25 ‘A history of the Syria chemical weapons ‘red line’ France 24 14 April 2018 
https://www.france24.com/en/20180414-syria-chemical-weapons-red-line-obama-macron-assad-
russia-usa-france-idlib [accessed 11/06/2019] 
26 Jodi Rudoren, ‘Israeli Helped Inspire U.S.-Russia Weapons Deal With Assad, Memoir Says’ The 
New York Times 15 June 2015 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/middleeast/israeli-helped-
inspire-us-russia-weapons-deal-with-assad-memoir-says.html [accessed 08/06/2019] 
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elements to make their arguments validating the need for military intervention: French 
Republicanism and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
When Sarkozy and Hollande made these speeches, in the context of arguing for 
military intervention, this thesis argues that they are attempting to achieve two goals. 
Firstly, the speeches are intended to act as an extension of diplomacy. In particular, 
whilst conferring the ability of states to intervene for the purpose of protecting a 
population from a state failing to abide its obligations to keep them safe from 
atrocities, the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine still requires agreement by the United 
Nations Security Council.  
This chapter opened describing how France has had to adjust its interactions with the 
wider international community in response to varying changes in the world. Part of 
this adjustment has seen France orient itself towards acting within multi/supra-national 
entities such as the United Nations/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation/ European 
Union. This thesis draws a line from de Gaulle’s notion of grandeur, and his opinion 
that, as Treacher puts it, France was one of “the only entities with the right to issue 
orders, and the power to be obeyed”27. France seeks then, wherever it can, to co-opt 
these larger political bodies to achieve policy goals and increase its rang.  
However, as high an opinion of France de Gaulle may have had, ultimately France still 
must convince the international community that a certain course of action is both 
required, and would be the best solution. This is especially the case with the Doctrine 
of the Responsibility to Protect, which may only be applied in very specific 
circumstances. Firstly, that the intervention has the right intention of halting or 
averting human suffering; secondly the proposed course of action is the last resort, 
after all reasonable non-military options have been explored; thirdly, the proposed 
military intervention is proportional to its aims; finally, that there are reasonable 
prospects that the proposed action will indeed stop or prevent the issue which justifies 
an intervention28. 
                                                          
27 Adrian Treacher, French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.27 
28 ‘Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ International 
Development Research Centre Ottawa 10 2001  
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf p. XII [accessed 27/09/2017] 
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Beyond the need to make an argument however, these speeches also serve another, 
more performative purpose. Again, de Gaulle believed that a country’s legitimacy 
stems from the support and respect its citizens give it29. Therefore, grandeur is as 
much about looking like a leader as it is being one. It is for this reason that when 
Sarkozy and Hollande made speeches regarding the victims of atrocities in Libya and 
Syria, they were framed within a specific French Republican concept. It is in reference 
not to international human rights, but to the founding principles of the Republic. The 
use of this language serves little to no purpose internationally in convincing other 
states to intervene. Indeed, if one were to try and convince another state, it would 
surely utilise cultural references relevant to the target audience. This is because French 
leaders30 are attempting to perform and consolidate French national identity on the 
world stage, primarily for the domestic market, i.e. the citizenry.  
Therefore, the first claim to originality this thesis makes is to explain the outcomes of 
these two examples based on the discourse used by the nation’s leaders. This thesis 
takes the basic premises of Davidson31 and Gaffney32, but builds a unique, more 
comprehensive understanding of these events together, explaining the similarities, 
differences, and continuities stemming from the Libyan intervention into the Syrian 
proposal. 
The way in which this thesis achieves this goal is via its methodology: the Discourse-
Historical Approach33. Using Wodak’s approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, this 
thesis looks to the origins and understood meanings of various Republican ideas. It 
then examines how those ideas then influence, modify, or reinforce the discourses 
relating to the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. The DHA, which has not been used 
in this way to discuss these circumstances, allows the interpretation of words and 
phrases by situating them historically and culturally. This methodology is ideal to 
                                                          
29 Philip H Gordon, A Certain idea of France: French Security and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993) p.10 
30 I use the term leaders as this thesis looks beyond just the discourse of the President, but also to the 
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Defence Minister. 
31 Jason W Davidson, ‘France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis’ 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013 Vol. 26, 310-329, 
32 John Gaffney. ‘Political Leadership and the Politics of Performance: France, Syria and the 
Chemical Weapons Crisis of 2013’ French Politics (2014) 12, 218–234 
33 Ruth Wodak, ‘The discourse-historical approach’ in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (ed) Methods 
of Critical Discourse Analysis (London; Sage Publications, 2001) 
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examine French political discourse, and certainly foreign policy discourse, as it so 
frequently harks back to historical cultural notions.  
This thesis finds that whilst the method of policy articulation and persuasion are 
similar in technique, Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande relied on very different aspects 
of both French Republicanism and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in order to 
justify the need to intervene. President Sarkozy and his administration utilised 
concepts relating to humanitarianism, linking the aspirations of the Libyan people to 
those of France, thereby conjuring notions of Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité. The 
Hollande administration on the other hand relied more on French supremacy, on its 
self-appointed role as gendarme in the international community. Much less emphasis 
was placed on the victims of the chemical weapons attack. Instead the arguments were 
more oriented towards deterring future attacks. The one exception to this being 
Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, who was more deft at conjuring sympathy. 
This thesis represents one of the few pieces of research which examines both the 
intervention in Libya, and the proposed intervention in Syria. Prima facie, the basic 
facts appear quite similar, thereby justifying a comparative analysis. As shown above, 
both conflicts stemmed from popular protests during the Arab Spring. Both regimes 
were/are led by authoritarian governments. Both involved attacks by the state against 
its civilians, which meant that parties arguing for intervention used the Responsibility 
to Protect Doctrine (R2P) as at least one of their justifications.  
However, there are a number of differences which must also be acknowledged. These 
events happened within two years of each other, but with different French 
governments, political parties and leaders in office. This difference is not necessarily 
problematic, as it allows for comparisons across political ideologies (though as is 
shown in Chapter 2, and with Hollande’s own words34, political differences are not so 
great in relation to foreign policy). 
More significant differences to be considered however are the specific geopolitical 
contexts of each country. Libya had very few positive links in the international 
                                                          
34 Interview between President Francois Hollande and Le Monde Le Monde 31 August 2013 
https://www.lemonde.fr.international/article/2013/08/30/francois-hollande-au-monde-il-ne-s-agit-pas-
de-renverser-le-dictature-syrien_3468865_3210.html [accessed 26/04/2019] 
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community, and one of its largest economic partners was France. France had been one 
of the first countries to open up economically and diplomatically to Gaddafi35. 
Therefore, intervention on an international scale was unlikely to be too disruptive to 
other great powers. 
The same cannot be said about Syria however. For one, Russia leases a naval base in 
Tartus, Syria, which gives Russian ships access to the Mediterranean. As of 29 April 
2019, Russia was finalising extending its lease by 49 years36. Furthermore, the 
aftermath of the intervention in Libya will also have been in Russia’s mind, who was 
the most resistant party (other than Syria) to military intervention. 
Following France, the UK and the US’ intervention in Libya, the three leaders wrote 
an op-ed in the New York Times arguing that Gaddafi should go.37 As will be shown 
in Part II, the military intervention taken by France, the US and the UK (before being 
taken over by NATO) was meant to be purely the establishment of a no-fly zone. 
However, Resolution 1973 was interpreted by these three countries more broadly, to 
allow bombers to strike armoured vehicles as well. With their printed admission that 
they sought the removal of Gaddafi from power, Russia would become more 
suspicious of the usage of this norm, as it felt it had been abused38. These two factors 
would mean that Hollande would have a significantly harder time convincing Russia 
to agree once again to a military intervention. This thesis does not argue that there is 
a specific set of words or phrases that will allow France to intervene. Rather the 
conclusion which is drawn from this thesis is that there are more effective 
combinations of arguments, synthesising the Republican and R2P discourses. 
This thesis is split into three Parts. Part I addresses the current state of the literature, 
and this thesis’ place within it (Chapter 1), before discussing in greater detail the 
                                                          
35 An analysis of Sarkozy’s dealings can be found here: Catherine Graciet, ‘Sarkozy/Kadhafi Histoire 
Secrète d’une trahison (Paris; Editions Du Seuil, 2013) 
36 ‘Moscow close to finalising deal to lease Syria’s Tartus Port for 49 years’ Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Free 21 April 2019 https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-damascus-near-deal-on-lease-
syrian-port-tartus/29894114.html [accessed 11/06/2019] 
37 Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy ‘Libya’s Pathway to peace’ The New York 
Times 14 April 2011 https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html?_r=3& 
[accessed 11/06/2019] 
38 Louise Riis Anderson and Tim Dunne, ‘In Defense of Liberal Intervention’ Danish Institute for 
International Studies 3 June 2014 https://www.diis.dk/en/research/in-defense-of-liberal-intervention 
[accessed 11/06/2019] 
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Discourse-Historical Approach (Chapter 2), then finally extrapolating in greater detail 
upon the histories and flexibility of Republican concepts (Chapter 3). 
More specifically, Chapter 1 looks at the literature concerning French foreign policy 
developments from de Gaulle to Sarkozy, as well as the literature surrounding 
interpretations of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and a discussion on the 
literature surrounding the interventions in Libya and Syria. This chapter is organised 
chronologically, following developments as they happened throughout the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries.  
Chapter 1.1 addresses the impact Charles de Gaulle had when becoming President and 
founding the Fifth Republic. It discusses the fundamentals of his foreign policy 
theories, as well the conceptualisation of rang and grandeur. The impact of Charles 
de Gaulle on the institutional psyche of France cannot be underestimated, and this 
thesis demonstrates how these ideas still resonate today. 
The next section deals with the ensuing results of Presidents attempting to navigate a 
rapidly decolonising and multipolar landscape (1.2). Specifically, this part is divided 
into two. The first section (1.2.1) deals with UN mandated interventions. The first sub-
part (1.2.1.1) looks to UN mandated missions such as Yugoslavia, Somalia, and 
Rwanda, as well as discussing the theory of Liberal Internationalism. Then, this 
section focuses on UN mandated missions authorised under Chapter VII (1.2.1.2), and 
in particular the Gulf War. The circumstances surrounding the Gulf War contain 
similarities to the situation in Libya which are discussed briefly. Finally, the second 
section (1.2.2) looks at France’s move towards supranational groupings such as the 
Western European Union, the European Union and NATO, as well as how France 
conducted itself during the war in Afghanistan. 
Chapter 1.3 then examines the literature analysing the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine. This chapter describes the development of the Doctrine, before explaining 
its parameters and limitations, as well as looking to the similarities and differences it 
has with Liberal Internationalism. Chapter 1.4 then looks to the literature analysing 
the foreign policy of President Nicolas Sarkozy. It is shown, in particular, how 
Sarkozy attempted to pivot France towards the US in finally re-joining the command 
structure of NATO, as well as his relative weakness in regards to foreign policy, with 
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a constant sense of improvisation and offensive comments. Finally, Chapter 1.5 
approaches the literature concerning the interventions in Libya and Syria. This section 
describes both what the literature has said regarding these two interventions, in 
addition to highlighting where the gaps in the literature exist in regards to these points, 
and thus how this thesis seeks to fill it. 
This thesis continues by discussing the methodology in Chapter 2, explaining the 
theoretical origins of the Discourse-Historical Approach within the context of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. The chapter then progresses to the practical aspects of the 
research. In particular, it explains the notion of topoi, and provides a list of the types 
used to analyse the texts found in Appendices 1 and 2. It also provides the logic for 
why those particular texts were chosen, and how this methodology helps the thesis 
create new and original work within the literature. 
Chapter 3 then defines the various aspects of Republicanism found in the speeches of 
the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations. In particular, it explains the historical 
origins of Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité, as well as the evolutions those terms have 
undergone to be reimagined in the modern setting (3.1). After this, there is a brief 
discussion of the French Constitution, and the powers which it conveys to the 
President (3.2). 
Once this establishing Part is concluded, the thesis moves on to its analysis. Part II 
will enquire into the situation in Libya. Part II is separated into two Chapters. Chapter 
4 contextualises the events prior to the intervention in Libya. The first section 
discusses the financial and other links France and Sarkozy had with the Gaddafi 
regime prior to the intervention (4.1), whilst the second section examines the Sarkozy 
administration’s initial reaction to the Arab Spring, showing how the administration 
lurched from one gaffe to another in misreading how wide ranging the protest 
movement would become (4.2). 
After establishing this background information, Chapter 5 advances into the analysis 
of the Sarkozy administration’s rhetoric. This is done in three parts. Firstly, the 
humanitarian case for intervention is investigated. In particular, this sees how, 
amongst other things, the topoi of humanitarianism, of threat, of burden, and of 
solidarity are mobilised to justify the need for humanitarian intervention (5.1). 
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Secondly, this part considers in particular at the arguments for the specific type of 
intervention, explaining the logic of why airstrikes were eventually settled upon, and 
how France advocated for a broader wording within the Resolution to grant it the 
greatest freedom for manoeuvre (5.2). Finally, this section scrutinises the way in which 
France engaged with different state and multinational entities in order to gain 
legitimacy for the airstrikes. This included liaising with the US, the UK, the UN and 
NATO (5.3).  
 
After discussing Sarkozy and the intervention in Libya, Part III then studies President 
Hollande and the situation in Syria. Again this Part is divided into two chapters. 
Chapter 6 concerns the relevant background information which helps us understand 
Hollande’s domestic situation and foreign policy position. The first section addresses 
Hollande’s domestic politics, and how the first year of his Presidency would set the 
stage for things to come. It finds a President who had defined himself as very much 
the anti-Sarkozy, but that this had been a more attractive proposition for his electorate 
as a candidate than as a President. As such, Hollande had lurched from one crisis to 
another (6.1). The next section (6.2) briefly discusses Hollande’s foreign policy. The 
first part tackles Hollande’s intervention in Mali (6.2.1), whilst the second part 
establishes how the situation in Syria had progressed to where it was (6.2.2). 
 
Chapter 7 then examines the Chemical Weapons crisis and Hollande’s attempts to 
resolve it. This Chapter is divided into four parts. Firstly, it appraises the general tone 
of Hollande’s reaction, focusing specifically on the notion of “punishing” the Assad 
regime (7.1). Secondly, this chapter probes the Hollande administration’s arguments 
as it relates to the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. This chapter enquires into the 
differences in how Hollande approached this matter compared to Sarkozy (7.2). 
Thirdly, this chapter reviews how Hollande and his executive attempted to convince 
other nations, and particularly the US, in intervening militarily (7.3). The final part 
looks at the aftermath of the G20 summit, in which America and Russia struck upon 
an agreement which would resolve the crisis (7.4). This part consider how Hollande 
sought to reframe events in a more positive light, arguing that his pressure had resulted 
in the confluence of events playing out as they did. 
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After these discussions the thesis concludes, summing up its findings and 
methodology. It also reiterates how this research adds to the existing body of academic 
work, before finally addressing the possible results of this thesis in regards to future 
research endeavours.  
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Part I 
Chapter 1 - Historical Context and Literature Review: French Interventions in 
the Twentieth and Twenty-First Century and International Norms 
The intervention in Libya by NATO has certainly proved to be fertile ground for a 
wide range of academic work. To a lesser extent, the proposed airstrikes in Syria in 
2013 have also produced a number of works. The aims and scope of the research 
conducted also vary widely, with some choosing to look into why the decision was 
made, and others attempting to work out the foreign policy implications as to what it 
means. This Chapter examines this body of work, picking out the strengths of the 
research which has been carried out, as well as some of its weaknesses. This helps 
contextualise the position this thesis holds within the body of academic work. 
Particularly, this thesis concerns French interventions, the rhetorical framing of said 
interventions, and the impact that these framings can have on other national and 
international actors when seeking to build coalitions. 
In order to fully situate this thesis within the literature, this chapter analyses five 
different aspects of the literature specifically relevant to the research aims of this 
thesis. It examines more broadly the literature concerning France’s military 
interventions in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Whilst this thesis focuses 
specifically on the French response to crises in Libya 2011 and Syria 2013, it is 
important to discuss the academic understanding of previous interventions, as well as 
the development of the logic of foreign policy. This thesis argues that the 
developments under Sarkozy and Hollande represent, for the most part, a continuation 
of the principles established under de Gaulle when founding the Fifth Republic (some 
of which can be traced even further back). However, in a post-Cold War international 
context, French policy has had to adapt. This is especially the case in places where 
France has less influence, such as the Middle-East, where it must deal with other 
powers (such as Russia in the case of Syria). 
Therefore, to give context to the present situation, this review also examines the 
academic treatment of foreign policy logic developments, to establish continuities and 
differences. Firstly, it establishes literature covering the impact of the election of 
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General Charles de Gaulle as President of France in establishing the foundations of 
the Fifth Republic, as well as originating many of the principles of France’s twentieth 
century Foreign Policy (1.1).  
The next section then looks at French foreign policy and multilateral military 
interventions including French forces through the prism of its interactions with other 
world powers and supranational organisations such as the United Nations and the 
NATO (1.2). It discusses briefly the conditions which drive nations, and specifically 
France, to consider military intervention. This section also analyses the contentious 
relationship France has had with each of these of these organisations as it attempted 
to assert control upon these organisations with the tools it has at its disposal. This is 
important to gain an understanding that France operates within a multi-polar world, in 
which it needs to take into account the intentions of numerous other actors, something 
which dominated both the interventions in Libya and Syria.  
Then, before examining foreign policy developments under Sarkozy, as well as the 
literature explaining interventions in Libya and Syria, there is first the need to briefly 
review the academic arguments surrounding the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
(1.3). This doctrine was a key argument in the justifications for the intervention both 
in Libya and Syria, with elements of it featuring heavily in the speeches and 
declarations of the Sarkozy and Hollande executives. Specifically, this part discusses 
the varying interpretations of the norm, regarding when it can be successfully used to 
justify international intervention, as well as how it came to replace Liberal 
Internationalism. 
We then progress on to an analysis of the foreign policy under Nicolas Sarkozy (1.4), 
taking a broader view of the changes and continuities he brought with him upon 
becoming President. This looks particularly at the literature surrounding Sarkozy’s 
attitude and amendments towards NATO, France’s operations in Afghanistan, and 
more generally an analysis of his broader foreign policy aims. 
Finally, we examine the literature surrounding these interventions themselves, which 
help to better understand the situations in Libya and Syria. This part conveys how this 
thesis’ approach differentiates and evolves previous discussions regarding those 
interventions. In particular, the methodological approach (as explained in Chapter 3), 
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utilising the Discourse-Historical Approach, allows for a different kind of analysis of 
the interventions which are both unique and novel (1.5). 
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1.1 Grandeur and rang: Gaullism and the birth of modern French Foreign Policy 
Adrian Treacher considers General Charles de Gaulle to be the most significant figure 
of modern France, based on his lasting influence both on the Fifth Republic as a whole, 
and France’s security policy39. 
For de Gaulle, two concepts were essential both for France’s domestic and security 
policy; rang and grandeur. These ideas were based on de Gaulle’s own vision of 
France’s history. Of course, as Treacher notes, his historical conclusions “only 
followed a long and illustrious line of French leaders in believing that France had a 
special right and duty to play the role of world power just because it was France”40. 
De Gaulle opens his memoir “Mémoires de Guerre” with the following passage: 
The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, like the princess in the stories of the 
Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. But the 
positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless in the 
Front Rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the divisive 
ferments which are inherent in her people. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France- 
without greatness41. 
This quote sums up quite a few ideas that he has surrounding the notion of France. 
Here he contrasts his romanticised notion of France, of something almost holy that 
needs to be protected, with his more pragmatic view that France must lead the field in 
order to be full actualised. This type of thinking is of course not uncommon for any 
nation. Every country’s leader imagines their own country as something special, as a 
world leader. This idea is not something which should be readily overlooked. It is 
certainly something which drove de Gaulle to be mistrustful of United States of 
America and NATO, as he felt that limitations on the sovereignty of France’s foreign 
policy would be against her best interests. 
Foreign policy, according to de Gaulle, ought to be “grounded in a concern for the 
independence, rank and greatness of the nation [and is] is linked to and necessarily 
                                                          
39 Adrian Treacher, French Interventions: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 2003) 
p.26 
40 Ibid. 
41 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre – L’appel Paris, 1954, english translation found in Daniel J 
Mahoney. ‘De Gaulle : Statesman, Grandeur and modern democracy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
1996) p. 16 
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entails an attitude of honourable self regard”42. Therefore, de Gaulle believed the 
domestic policy had an international element to it. He believed that the “patriotic 
ardour resulting from an enhanced standing in the world could heal the deep social 
divisions that so often plagued France”43.  
General de Gaulle viewed the international system as inherently competitive and 
hostile, and that it was a fundamental truth that states would consistently act in their 
own interest. Therefore, it would be logical for the nation-state to become the ultimate 
focus of people’s loyalty44. Treacher argues that de Gaulle viewed France as being 
“more equal than all the other [states]”45, and was therefore one of “the only entities 
with the right to issue orders, and the power to be obeyed”46.  
Grandeur itself had no specific definition as “de Gaulle nowhere bothered to explain 
with any precision just what a politics of ‘grandeur’ entailed”47. Despite this, there is 
some common ground between academics when they describe grandeur. Generally, 
grandeur implies the will to be a “player” and not a “stake”, and to be an “ambitious”, 
“universal”, and “inventive” actor on the world scene.48 
One of the most important elements for grandeur is that it tends to find strength in the 
fact that France does not become over reliant on any other power bloc. The basic raison 
d’être of France is to be a great power, at which point it can make its own terms. In 
the Cold War, it managed to stay relatively independent by creating “the greatest 
possible distance from the Atlantic Alliance without destroying or abandoning it…”49 
                                                          
42 Daniel .J. Mahoney, De Gaulle: Statesmanship, grandeur, and Modern Democracy 
(Piscataway;Routledge,2000) p.17 
43 Reed Davis, ‘A Once and Future Greatness: Raymond Aron, Charles de Gaulle and the Politics of 
Grandeur’ The International History Review, 33:1, 27-41, p.28 
44 Adrian Treacher. French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.27 
45 Ibid. 
46 Charles De Gaulle, quoted in Farah Nayeri, ‘Chirac takes his cue from de Gaulle’, Wall Street 
Journal Europe, 11 August 1995  
47 Ibid. p.29 
48 Daniel .J. Mahoney, ‘De Gaulle : Statesmanship, grandeur, and Modern Democracy’ 
(Piscataway;Routledge,2000) p.17 
49 R. Aron, Memoires: Fifty Years of Political Reflection (New York and London, 1990) p.260 
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This strain of self-sufficiency explains France’s decision to “reject the supranational 
and federalist models for the then still emerging EEC”50, instead proposing the 
Fouchet Plan which emphasised intergovernmental structures.  
Grandeur as an ideology makes the nation-state the most important aspect of 
international relations, both from France’s perspective, and other nations. De Gaulle 
sought continuity in nations, referring to its people instead of its regime. At the time, 
de Gaulle would refer to Russia, and not the Soviet Union51. Indeed, Kramer argues 
that that “unlike the other nations of post-war western Europe”, France continued to 
conceive of itself almost entirely in traditional nation-state terms”52. Furthermore, 
Hazareesingh describes this thinking as where “all states were primarily motivated by 
interests, and that grand ideologies such as communism or capitalism simply provided 
the language in which these conflicting interests were articulated. These interests were 
relatively constant, and were determined by national identity and character, 
geography, cultural attributes, and the legacy of past political experiences”53. 
Indeed, grandeur can cover quite a broad set of ideas and ideals. As well as 
representing de Gaulle’s worldview/understanding of nations and nationalities, it also 
served a domestic function. Cerny argues that grandeur was in part designed to “create 
a new and deeper sense of national unity that would enable the traditional cleavages 
in French political life to be overcome by reinforcing the consensus around a 
strengthened and dynamic state that incarnated the general interest within a stable 
political system”54. 
However, de Gaulle’s approach did not mark a considerable break from the previous 
regime under the Fourth Republic, and indeed kept with many of its strategic 
decisions. Treacher notes that de Gaulle maintained the force de frappe, NATO (he 
never withdrew France from the organisation as a whole), Franco-German 
                                                          
50 Adrian Treacher French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 2003) 
p.27 
51 Ibid. 
52 Steven Philip Kramer, Does France Still Count?: The French Rolein the New Europe, (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies/Praegar; Washington DC, 1994) p.94 
53 Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Decisions in Modern France (Oxford University; Oxford, 1994) 
p.276 
54 P G Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1980) p.18 
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rapprochement, decolonisation and the development of the EEC”55. Instead, Treacher 
argues de Gaulle changed the tone and style of foreign policy; “the fundamental 
choices open to France had not changed, de Gaulle just modified the way of dealing 
with them”56. 
Grandeur can therefore be seen as a codification of France’s post World War Two 
aspirations and policies developed under previous regimes into something which, 
according to Philip Gordon, formed “a crystallisation of the traditional French 
attitudes towards national security into a coherent, well-articulated and largely 
implemented doctrine”57. 
Grandeur can also be seen as a pragmatic approach for France to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Following the loss of much of its empire by this point, France had to 
adapt to the new global hierarchy, with her now occupying a middle power status. 
Treacher notes that de Gaulle “taught the French that they were no longer a great 
power in material terms, although a sense of moral predominance was instinctively 
retained”58. France moving forward would therefore seek to take leading roles in larger 
power structures, injecting said “moral predominance” into more powerful entities. It 
is for this reason that membership, and leadership of the EEC, was considered 
important to French national interests.  
This idea of grandeur was, by necessity, all encompassing. James F McMillan notes 
that de Gaulle was “… developing a renewed sense of national pride, to legitimise the 
Fifth Republic and to enhance the authority of French State”59. France’s international 
stature would therefore be improved by a growing social, cultural and political unity 
within France itself.  
Treacher argues that de Gaulle’s objective was always fixed on France’s international 
position, where “internal policies were hence only mechanisms for the pursuit of 
                                                          
55 Adrian Treacher, French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.27 
56 Ibid. 
57 Philip H Gordon, A Certain idea of France :French Security and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993) p.10 
58 Adrian Treacher, French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.28 
59 James F Mcmillan, Twentieth Century France, Politics and Society 1989-1991 (Edward Arnold, 
London; 1992) p.167 
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foreign policy. Economic, technical, scientific and even social progress was prioritised 
behind international progress”60, linking it to what he finds to be de Gaulle’s obsession 
with rank, or France’s relevant standing in the international pecking order. Treacher 
also argues that this remains “the pre-eminent and unswerving guiding principle in 
French security policy strategic planning today”61. This thesis seeks to understand, in 
part, the importance of this thought process in the policies and actions of both 
Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande.  
This thesis focuses on events and France’s position forty to fifty years after these ideas 
were introduced and expounded on. The context of de Gaulle’s comments are in a 
period of relative strength for France, even when considering decolonisation. 
However, as later sections of the Chapter show, the ability for France to dominate the 
international scene would become more complicated, especially within the post- Cold 
War setting. The research aims of this thesis deal with, in part, France attempting to 
utilise, and through its use increase its rang within the international order. However, 
this becomes increasingly difficult with multiple countries such as the US, Russia, and 
China all attempting to utilise the international order to achieve these same aims. As 
explained in the introduction, this thesis does not assume that Sarkozy and Hollande’s 
respective crises are the same. Each faced their own challenges, and in particular, other 
actors such as Russia had greater influence on the situation in Syria than were present 
in Libya. However, we can still seek to learn about the limits of France’s coalition 
building abilities within their own contexts.  
De Gaulle believed, as many leaders did and still do, that a country’s legitimacy 
stemmed from the respect and support the citizenry afforded their country, and the 
kinship they felt for the countrymen62. This is exemplified in Parts II and III in the 
rhetoric of the two Presidents. Sarkozy is shown to categorise those participating in 
the Libyan uprising as sharing the same values and aspirations as Frenchmen, 
effectively creating a brotherhood between them. Hollande also explains this, though 
more in terms of the responsibility of France to act in a certain way. Popular support 
                                                          
60 Adrian Treacher, French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.28 
61 Ibid. 
62 Philip H Gordon, A Certain idea of France :French Security and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993) p.10 
29 
 
for the Libyans was relatively high, whilst intervention in Syria proved to be less 
popular63. For this reason, Hollande found himself on the defensive in an interview 
concerning his support for the intervention64. 
De Gaulle would argue that France herself was on a historic mission, that its leadership 
and brilliance would drive humanity forward. This idea of course would be very 
popular in any country, but especially in one where its “belief system [was] given 
toward national exceptionalism”65. Philip Gordon concurs, noting that the French have 
historically believed themselves to be exceptional, whereby the world as a whole has 
held an interest in France’s culture and ideas66. This idea has historically, and 
contemporarily, been the driving force behind France’s international projection of its 
own culture. (For a recent example, see Emmanuel Macron’s drive to push French as 
the most commonly spoken language in Africa67.) This thesis demonstrates in explicit 
terms how these notions of French exceptionalism play key roles in the rhetoric of 
France, and its duty to intervene.  
De Gaulle therefore had in mind an idea that whilst France would not be a superpower 
in the new, bipolar Cold War order, it could and should still be a great world power. 
De Gaulle himself wrote that “France is not really herself unless she is first rank”68. 
De Gaulle was the one to take on this mission, and became the very embodiment of 
this idea to future French political figures.  
This quest for France to be considered by the international community as a great 
country would subordinate all other concerns. Klaus Schubert stated that “the 
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‘Grandeur’ of the nation is the most important national concern… National 
independence and maximum world status have been characteristic imperatives of 
French policy. Any asset or resource which promises to strengthen the nation, which 
seems suitable for improving the global status and glory of France, becomes a 
worthwhile policy device”69.  
France has always held this external outlook, and specifically “an inherent 
preoccupation with international standing and status and paranoia of what any loss of 
these would bring”70. General Michel Cot referred to France’s secular global 
evangelism71, and President Mitterrand himself felt that France’s position in the world 
was better appreciated outside of France than within72.  
This sentiment of course spread to its aid policy, and what it considered its 
humanitarian interventions. Grosser had a pragmatic view of France’s provision of aid 
to developing countries, seeing it as “the logical outcome of a national ambition to 
play a part wherever the future of the world is being decided”73. 
Indeed, the idea that France acts on behalf of those who have been disadvantaged is a 
powerful one, one which later chapters will show has been mobilised often in the 
modern context. Marie-Claude Smouts speaks of France, stating that “Her ambitions 
of grandeur still feed on the dreams of distant horizons. She cannot imagine herself 
powerful without a presence beyond her borders and an influence overseas”74. 
Grandeur, as Grosser points out, is not a policy instrument, but an end unto itself75.  
Moïsi includes France with a select few countries such as the United States of 
America, Russia, and China “which believes, rightly or wrongly, not only that the 
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world matters to them but that they matter to the world. For these nations, international 
identity is an essential part of national identity; they can and must make a difference 
on the international scene”76. Dominique David argues that due to France’s multiple 
frontiers, facing in multiple directions, the fact that it marked the endpoint of the 
historic migratory route across Europe from East to West, and because France acted 
as the intersection of the Latin, Germanic, and Anglo Saxon cultures, it inevitably led 
to a settlement of numerous people’s with an inherently internationalist perspective77.  
De Gaulle felt that pursuing a strong foreign policy was essential to France’s domestic 
strength, stating that “[u]nless France and its people are devoted to great enterprise 
abroad, they find themselves… always in “mortal danger”, susceptible to internal 
collapse or foreign domination”78. 
This explains why France’s diplomatic network remains one of the densest and 
extensive diplomatic corps in the world79. Furthermore, Treacher argues that this 
“national self-perception naturally raised the profile of the military as a foreign policy 
tool”80. Hence de Gaulle and his security advisors considered France’s military power 
to be as important as its economic power as an indicator of France’s autonomy and 
national sovereignty. This synergy between the French military and France’s domestic 
policy culture as a whole can be best seen in its military parades during Bastille Day; 
something most unusual in the West. 
Part of France’s keenness to exalt the power of the military can be linked to one of de 
Gaulle’s tactics, which was designed to aid France in its pursuit of grandeur and rang; 
that of its non-dependence. Throughout this thesis’ analysis, one finds a tension in the 
rhetoric of the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations. France seeks to act as part of a 
coalition, which would typically be assumed to be a weakness; France requiring the 
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aid of others to establish its goals. However, this is not necessarily as contradictory as 
appeared, if it is France who is driving others to act on her behalf. This, in many ways, 
could be seen as the greatest manifestation of France’s rang, and, as this thesis shows, 
is an integral part of how France seeks to operate in the post-Cold War world.  
The international world order established following the Second World War resulted in 
France holding a greatly depreciated position; considered a ‘great power’ in name 
only, as the Cold War made the international scene ever more bi-polar. France 
therefore reluctantly accepted an international framework which would, through its 
alliances and rules of solidarity, inevitably inhibit its independence.  
Therefore, the leaders of the Fourth and Fifth Republics devoted much of their time to 
finding ways for France to re-establish its national prestige, whilst also still abiding 
by the various agreements and treaties. France’s primary goal was of course to protect 
its national frontiers, both domestically and in its colonies, from foreign aggressors. 
Firstly, it was against potential German aggression81, before subsequently turning its 
focus to the threat of the Soviet Union82. 
However, a number of factors led to a shift in France’s foreign policy planning. During 
the course of the early Fifth Republic, with its rapprochement with the West German 
Republic and the seemingly decreasing risk of direct Soviet military intervention in 
France, war started to become less of a risk. With this increased security of the 
Hexagon, de Gaulle’s Administration could turn its attention from amassing a large 
conventional land army to defend its homeland in a European arena, and instead look 
to France’s outward goals, that being the re-establishment of its rank on the world 
stage. 
Whilst total independence within any geopolitical context would be impossible, de 
Gaulle wanted France to have as much autonomy as possible. De Gaulle reasoned that 
the best way to achieve this would be to work to circumvent the bipolar world order 
established at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. Therefore, a third European bloc 
needed to be established: one which would not only allow France greater freedom to 
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act independently, but also provide France a greater entity through which it could enact 
its wider security goals.  
Furthermore, France felt that every country needed to be responsible for its own 
defence83, and that France’s past defensive failures stemmed from it being tied into 
agreements limiting its own strategic freedom. Wendl argued that “[n]either the 
alliance system before World War I nor the attempt to construct a system of collective 
security between the wars, saved France from great suffering and a feeling that she 
had been used as an advance pawn and as a source of manpower in terms of the 
peripheral strategy of the Anglo-American powers”84.  
France felt that the fact that America had allowed her to suffer for three years before 
deciding to step in on her side during the First World War, that the alliances with 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia all proved ineffective in 
containing the rise of 1930’s era Germany, and the humiliation suffered at the hands 
of the British fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, were all indicative of the fact that France could 
not rely on other nations and alliances to keep itself safe.  
Post-World War II, France’s experiences with the United States did not inspire any 
further confidence. Both America’s perceived failure to support France in its conflict 
in Indochina in 1954, and its veto against the Franco-British intervention in Suez in 
1956 taught France that whilst America may be, in principle, an ally, it could not rely 
on its support.  
These experiences taught France that it needed to become non-dependent on other 
nations, and sought to utilise the détente between the two superpowers to carve out a 
position for itself. The threat of nuclear war restrained the US’s and USSR’s actions, 
allowing France to act with significant autonomy with minimal costs and risks.  
Further to this, France made little distinction between its own interests, and the greater 
interests for Europe. Indeed, Cole described France’s mission as such: “Europe was to 
be led to independence from American hegemony under France’s enlightened military 
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and political leadership. Only France, the lone continental European nuclear power, 
was strong enough to provide an alternative to American leadership”85. 
In promoting its grandeur and rang, as well as justifying its leadership and non-
dependence in Europe, de Gaulle would accentuate France’s ‘exceptionalism’. Pierre 
Lellouche argued that because of its history and culture, France would not be able to 
reject its founding principles of national independence86.  
Once France’s involvement with the Algerian conflict was concluded, de Gaulle 
sought to display France’s new autonomous foreign policy to the world. Between 1964 
and 1967, France pursued active engagement with Mexico and Latin America, 
attacked the dollar-dominated international financial system, visited the Soviet Union, 
condemned the American War in Vietnam, continued to veto the United Kingdom’s 
application to join the EEC, and withdrew from NATO’s integrated military 
structure87. 
These moves, whilst being beneficial to France, also showed to the world that France 
would not show deference to the US as self-styled ‘leader of the Western world’. 
Instead, it would resist America’s attempts to gain greater influence in Europe by 
attempting to create a European security identity.  
It is important to note that de Gaulle’s conceptualisation of French non-dependence 
did not mean that it could not join alliances, or work with other nations to achieve 
mutually beneficial goals. Instead, it meant that a nation had the freedom to act without 
undue limits. De Gaulle himself described his position in these terms: “[W]hat is 
independence? – certainly not isolationism or narrow nationalism. A country can be a 
member of an alliance, such as the Atlantic Alliance, and remain independent… To be 
independent means that one is not at the mercy (á la discretion) of any foreign 
power”88.  
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Menon argued therefore that de Gaulle’s defence policy: 
was not ideologically driven. Rather, it was based on a Machiavellian view of the nature 
of international politics and the duties of the state within an anarchic international 
system… Hence the philosophical underpinning of the need for national independence 
was simply the belief that reliance on another for security was inconceivable.89 
This is also reflected in a quote by Edouard Balladur, stating that a country’s 
“international influence is measured by its ability to carry its partners with it to the 
international stage. But its power to do this is very weak if it does not have the means 
and political will to act by itself”90. This Chapter shows many examples of France 
attempting to keep a balance with the US, between maintaining a level of 
independence whilst also seeking to build consensus. Indeed, the fate of the two 
interventions this research examines were, in part, linked to the management of 
Franco-American and Franco-British relations. Ultimately, one of the defining 
features of the Libyan intervention was the ability of France, the UK and the US to 
work together. Conversely, the failure to intervene in Syria is shown as a failure of 
understanding between the Hollande and Obama administrations.  
Goldstein argued that the French political elites no longer believed that an alliance-
based security policy would provide a reliable source of safety for France, nor that 
they were in a position to depend on the security patronage of a superpower91. This 
further enabled de Gaulle’s transition towards this more non-dependent foreign and 
security policy. 
As is explained in the next section, non-dependence would remain an important 
corner-stone of French strategic thinking. And yet, France would eventually end up 
re-joining the NATO command structure. The next section of this Chapter examines 
the development of French foreign policy from de Gaulle until Sarkozy as it pertains 
to France’s security policy as it interacts with other multinational bodies. 
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1.2 Between Independence and Influence: France and the International Order 
It is safe to say that France’s relations with NATO had been somewhat contentious 
under de Gaulle (as was discussed above), especially following France’s withdrawal 
from the NATO command structure in 1966. This next section charts how subsequent 
French Presidents sought to fulfil the principles set forth by de Gaulle, namely those 
of attempting to increase France’s prestige on the world stage, without interfering with 
the idea of non-dependence. 
The fundamental question from this period onwards for France is whether it could 
adapt to a new world order which was increasingly multipolar and inter-dependent. If 
France were to continue to export its power and values abroad, it would have to do so 
within a new framework. This thesis seeks to answer this question in the recent history, 
by seeing how Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande strove to exert its power and hold true 
to its Republican ideals, as well as encourage other members of the international 
community to either acquiesce or support France. Again however, we contextualise 
these developments by looking to how previous administrations sought to solve this 
problem, as well as examining historic interpretations to see whether they still apply 
to this day.  
This part is separated into two sections. Firstly, it shows how France attempted to use 
the United Nations to try and bolster its own rang, as well as the ways it attempted to 
wield influence, somewhat unsuccessfully, in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. It 
also examines Security Council mandated interventions, conducted under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the UN in the post-Cold War period, which would lead to a major 
rethink of French strategic planning (1.2.1). 
Secondly, we examine how France attempted to drive its own security through the 
Western European Union and European Union organisations in the post-Cold War 
setting. Upon failing to achieve its intentions, we see how France began to slowly 
move towards NATO once again (1.2.2). 
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1.2.1 UN Mandated Interventions and Humanitarian Intervention 
Before France’s humanitarian interventions are analysed, it is first important to 
understand why France would seek to intervene militarily at all. In its 1994 “Livre 
blanc sur la défense”, the French government addressed the interests which France 
must defend. Firstly, it referred to “les intérêts vitaux”, which are related to the very 
survival of the nation itself. If these interests are significantly jeopardised by any 
antagonistic force, then France is within its rights to mount “la défense ultime”92.  
These vital interests include “the integrity of its national territory, including the 
mainland and overseas départements, of its air and sea routes, the free exercise of [its] 
sovereignty and the protection of the population”93. 
Secondly, there are the “intérêts stratégiques”. The relationship between the vital 
interests and strategic interest had not been defined prior to the publishing of this 
White Paper. Suffice to say, the White Paper argues that both interests should be 
protected with the same vigour, and that it is for the government of the day to define 
what its strategic interests should be94.   
However, the White Paper does describe what some of the overlying priorities for 
France should be. Firstly, the maintenance of peace in the European continent, as well 
as on its southern and eastern borders, paying particular interest to the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East.  
Secondly, it relates to France’s economic interests. This includes France’s various 
airways and sea-routes. As the White Paper notes, 82% of France’s imports and 56% 
of its exports utilise shipping lanes, the majority of which use the Mediterranean, the 
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Therefore, because of France’s reliance on these routes, 
they would indeed be considered strategic areas. The strategic interests also include 
petrol and natural gas found in the Middle East and Algeria respectively.  
Ultimately, Paul-Marie de la Gorce argues that ‘peace’ represents a French national 
interest, that France pursues no territorial expansion or nor does it seek to dominate 
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using its military95. De la Gorce notes further that whilst worldwide peace is in 
France’s national interest, this does not necessarily mean that it will seek out to 
maintain the status quo. De la Gorce notes that the purpose of the French intervention 
in the Balkan conflict was not to maintain the Yugoslavian Republic. Similarly, whilst 
the intervention in the Gulf War was to maintain the territorial integrity of Kuwait, it 
did not maintain the status quo in relation to Iraq’s military or economic power96. 
Ultimately, France’s goal is to resolve conflicts in the most effective way, taking into 
account the specific circumstances of that conflict97. 
As was mentioned in the White Paper, geographical proximity indicates one of the 
criteria to establish whether an area represents a strategic interest for France. Such 
areas include of course North Africa, and de la Gorce discusses specifically the 
strategic significance of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. 
In his analysis of the situation in North Africa, de la Gorce predicted that the greatest 
risk to stability in Morocco and Tunisia, and therefore the greatest risk to France’s 
interests in the region, could be found in the prospective victory of “Islamism” in 
Algeria98. Specifically, de la Gorce argues that an Islamist victory in North Africa 
would threaten France’s cultural and linguistic influence in North Africa99. De la 
Gorce also notes that migration from North Africa across the Mediterranean would 
increase, whilst pragmatism would mean that the economic exchanges would have to 
continue.100101  
The findings of this thesis do not challenge this conceptualisation of what represents 
the strategic interests for France. In particular, both Sarkozy and (especially) Hollande 
made the argument that beyond the moral argument to intervene, there was also 
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pragmatic interest in France upholding human rights and achieving peace as swiftly 
as possible.  
In order to understand the interventions proposed and realised in Syria and Libya, it is 
first useful to examine the frameworks which allow for intervention. This part has 
been separated into three additional sections. The first section looks at UN mandated 
humanitarian missions (1.2.1.1). Taking into account all that has been stated above, it 
is therefore not surprising then that if peace were to be considered of strategic 
importance to France, it would seek to intervene when it could to encourage it. We 
then examine the various operations which were authorised under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the UN (1.2.1.2). The next section appraises the effect of the War on Terror 
on both the UN and NATO, and how America’s seemingly bullish attitudes placed 
France’s reintegration into NATO at risk. This section helps give insight as well into 
Franco-American relations in recent times, something of increased importance in a 
multi-polar world. This thesis finds that one of the defining factors for whether the 
proposed interventions in Libya and Syria was successful was the support of the US. 
In Libya, the US/NATO support granted legitimacy to the action, as well as limiting 
the resources required by France to conduct such an action. In Syria, Obama’s 
reticence led the US to find solutions beyond the use of force, effectively wrong-
footing the Hollande administration.  
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1.2.1.1 Humanitarian Missions Mandated by the UN 
Humanitarian intervention has become the focus of much literature of recent years. 
Specifically, the interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda 
signified that a new form of conflict, one based on humanitarian grounds with a largely 
international slant, was becoming more common.  
Firstly however, one must consider what humanitarian interventions are. General 
Claude le Borgne argues that conflicts for humanitarian reasons are not a new concept. 
In many ways, the concept of ‘just war’ as espoused by Hugo Grotius justifies a 
humanitarian intervention102. Indeed, in Le Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix, Grotius 
argues that the law of nature allows other states to intervene and exercise an oppressed 
people’s rights of collective self-defence on their behalf103.  
General le Borgne argues that such interventions for the cause of ‘humanity’, as 
recognised by the church, had historically been viewed as acceptable. These 
arguments later became central to Marxist-Leninist policy, and was later broadly 
adopted by the West104. In particular, this ideology, as adopted by the West, came to 
be known as Liberal Internationalism. Dunne and McDonald argue that this term is 
used far more by practitioners of International Relations than by academics, and is 
“underdeveloped both as a theory of global order and as a basis of foreign and security 
strategy”105. As a theory, it bridges the gap between normative and analytical, which 
McDonald finds to be both an appealing, and problematic aspect of the theory106. 
However contentious the theoretical and analytical aspect of this idea is107, the idea 
found political champions. Most notably perhaps was Tony Blair and the Labour Party 
of the United Kingdom. Two weeks after taking office, Foreign Minister Robin Cook 
gave a speech which stated that “the labour government does not accept that political 
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values can be left when we check in our passports to travel on diplomatic business. 
Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of 
other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves”108.  
This political idea would bloom into the notion of international community, most 
notably espoused by Tony Blair in his speech in Chicago in April 1999109. In this 
speech, Blair discussed a great breadth of topics, all linked by the common theme of 
internationalism; explaining how global factors affected economics and politics. 
Specifically, Blair linked the idea of spreading “the values of liberty, the rule of law, 
human rights and an open society” as being part of a country’s national interest110. 
Blair states that non-interference has been an important norm to the international order, 
and that it should not be dismissed. However, it also should not be used as a shield 
with which nations can protect themselves for any action. Acts like genocide and 
migration flows created by repressive policies cannot be seen as being internal 
matters111.  
The next issue to consider then is when should a state intervene militarily? For Blair, 
there are five questions which must be considered:  
First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian 
distress, but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, 
have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, 
as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the 
situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, 
are we prepared for the long term? In past we talked too much of exit strategies. But 
having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to 
stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large 
numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved?112 
Blair does not find these to be “absolute tests”, but merely questions to consider when 
looking at a situation113. As discussed in the later section (1.3), Liberal 
Internationalism has in many ways been replaced by the Responsibility to Protect 
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Doctrine. Yet, there are a great many similarities between the two principles, and 
arguments raised by Tony Blair in his Chicago Speech will emerge in the statements 
of Sarkozy and Hollande. 
This is understandable however, as the French at the time articulated the need for 
intervention in a similar way. General Bernard de Brassy de Guast argues that 
situations which would require humanitarian intervention can be defined by ‘chaos’114. 
The General utilises the Larousse dictionary definition of chaos as being situations of 
total confusion and general disorder115. General de Brassy de Guast argues that there 
are particular hotspots where these occur on the planet which are located in Africa and 
central Asia, spanning from the near east to the Great Wall of China116.  
General de Brassy de Guast argues that there are three questions any nation, but 
specifically France, must ask before undertaking an intervention into “situations 
chaotiques”: 
1. Is it necessary to intervene militarily?  
2. If the answer is yes, what is the goal? 
3. Finally, what kind of intervention is required?117 
Of course, General de Bressy de Guast argues that international law, as it currently 
stands, theoretically prohibits interventions of this type. Article 2 of the Charter of the 
United Nations argues against the interference of states in the internal affairs of other 
states118. Therefore, in theory, a state needs to permit an outside force to intervene in 
an internal conflict. However, as Part 1.3 demonstrates, international law can be 
malleable to certain arguments, and the increased prevalence of the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine adds some level of ambiguity to the situation.  
When considering an intervention, a decision will need to be made as to whether it 
needs to be direct or indirect. Indirect interventions involve supporting secondary 
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parties in conflicts, or enforcing trade embargoes. General le Borgne argues however 
that an indirect approach is not guaranteed to succeed (not that such a guarantee is 
granted with direct intervention). However, he does concede that blockades can, in 
certain circumstances such as Iraq, be useful if there is consensus in the international 
community119.   
General de Brassy de Guast also notes that any military intervention of this type risks 
appearing as a return to colonialism120. Often countries can be criticised as to where it 
does not intervene, as much as to where it does; the example given being the United 
States’ intervention in Somalia, where the situation in Liberia or Sudan seemed as dire 
at the time121.  
General de Bressy de Guast next discusses the goals which could justify a 
humanitarian intervention. Firstly, he argues that the protection of national citizens 
who are in danger could justify an intervention, such as what occurred with the Battle 
of Kolwazi in Zaire, or the Boxer Uprising122.  
Secondly, it can be to support or protect humanitarian organisations, be they state-run, 
or non-governmental, who are themselves seeking to assist civilians. Of course, there 
exists a risk that as a situation continually deteriorates, soldiers will start to replace the 
aid workers. Furthermore, the situation could deteriorate even further as soldiers are 
not well suited to this humanitarian work123. Finally, and linked to the second goal, 
according to General de Bressy de Guast, is if an intervention has been called upon by 
a UN Resolution. This will of course become a recurring theme throughout this 
analysis as France is often keen to demand multilateral responses to security issues. 
Practically, it is General de Bressy de Guast’s opinion that one of the most important 
approaches to obtain a more desirable outcome is to create as precise a mission 
objective as possible, both with a well-defined time frame, and mission locale (which 
he himself admits is often easier said than done)124. He also argues that politicians give 
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those on the ground a free hand to make strategic decisions; and that the initial 
engagement often signifies whether the rest of the operation will be a success or a 
failure125.  
De Bressy de Guast also argues that a more discrete approach to military intervention 
is preferable. In particular, the approach by the Americans in Somalia (UNISOM II) 
represented a significant failure; where operations taking place under the watchful 
eyes of the media resulted in the deaths of 22 American soldiers, and the ignominious 
withdrawal of all UN troops following their failed UN peacekeeping mission126. 
Indeed, de Bressy de Guast notes that in today’s world, the media are often the first to 
arrive on the scene of a major disturbance, and as such, they need to be taken into 
account when planning any military intervention127.  
A successful military intervention on the other hand requires preferably a “discrete 
intervention on the ground with highly equipped and armed mobile units who already 
understand the region, and its language”128. They should then remove themselves from 
the situation as soon as possible, so as to not become too entangled in the political 
causes of the ‘chaos’. This approach of ‘Go in slow, get out fast’ was used effectively, 
according to General de Bressy de Guast, by the French forces in Rwanda.  
Historically, France has given significant resources to the UN’s peacekeeping efforts. 
As of 31 August 1995 the total number of “blue helmets” deployed by all nations was 
68,894. Of this number, France had contributed 7,386 troops, only coming behind the 
United Kingdom with 10,257129.  
These peacekeeping efforts are also known as ‘Operations for the Maintenance of 
Peace’. Flory describes these as “military or paramilitary operations which are 
organised out of necessity, from a failure to implement the mechanisms in Article 
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43”130, which is to say, acting in the absence of special agreements which seek to make 
armed forces available to the UN in advance.  
As this would suggest, Ruzié notes that there are two different types of multi-national 
intervention. One type represents missions undertaken by states which have been 
authorised by the UN, but which are not specifically controlled by the UN; the other 
type representing the missions which fit more easily into the framework established 
by the UN131. 
One of the principle objectives of the UN is to act to promote/maintain global peace 
and develop international security. The Security Council is given this responsibility 
by Article 24 of the United Nations Charter132. However, as Article 24 suggests, the 
task of promoting and maintaining peace does not rest solely with the Security 
Council. Indeed, the General Assembly may submit its own recommendations to 
restore international peace and security under the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) Resolution 377A133 (also known as a ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution) where 
a lack of unanimity amongst the Security Council’s five permanent members has led 
to a failure to act.  
Indeed, the first usage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution was against the United 
Kingdom and France. Their voting against Resolution 119, relating to the Suez Crisis 
prompted the General Assembly to use its power to adopt Resolution 1001, which 
established the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), to secure and supervise 
the cessation of hostilities, as well as calling for a cease-fire between the parties, and 
calling for all nations to stop introducing military goods into the area134.  
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However, despite this example with the Suez Canal incident, France has been involved 
in a significant number of humanitarian interventions, either approved by, or led by, 
the UN. A brief history of these conflicts can help provide context for France’s 
intervention in Libya, and its proposed intervention in Syria, allowing us to view the 
trends for how France has undertaken such interventions. 
The first example to consider is the Korean War. The UN intervention began with the 
Resolution dated 7 July 1950. This initial Resolution requested that the member states 
of the UN render assistance to the Korean Republic, under the command of the United 
States135. However, Resolution 83, as passed by the UN Security Council, ensured that 
the operation was conducted under a unified command structure under the flag of the 
UN136. Amongst the twenty states involved in the action, France contributed a brigade 
of approximately 3,000 troops under the command of General Monclar. 
De Gaulle had been dismissive of the use of the United Nations as an international 
organisation137. He believed it to be another American instrument, designed to aid in 
the US’s march towards American hegemony138. This seemed to be supported not only 
practically, with it taking a leading role in the conflict in Korea, but also structurally, 
with the US transferring the remit over “Maintenance of peace issues” from the UNSC 
to the General Assembly, thereby negating the power of France’s Security Council 
veto (an important signifier of France’s rang)139. 
Tensions were further exasperated when the UN, emboldened by the transition of 
power to the General Assembly, started interfering in what France considered to be its 
internal affairs with decolonisation. Specifically, the supranationalist agenda of UN 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld led to much anger, with it becoming 
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particularly manifest during the UN’s intervention in Congo in 1960, whereby France 
refused to provide any financial contribution to the mission.  
Relations deteriorated further during de Gaulle’s presidency after the UN’s opposition 
to French military action in Bizerte, Tunisia140. De Gaulle was also suspicious of the 
UN as he believed that it had supranational aims141. 
However, de Gaulle learnt to adjust his thinking on the UN as he began to learn how 
to use the organisation to boost France’s standing in the international community. He 
firstly worked to champion the principle of non-intervention of the UN in a state’s 
internal affairs, giving legitimacy to his belief that France alone should be responsible 
for the decolonisation of its remaining imperial territories142.   
Once most of France’s colonies had gained independence, France needed to find 
another means of exerting its power and influence. The process of decolonisation by 
no means severed the links between the Hexagon and its former overseas territories 
(as mentioned above). Through its postcolonial links, France was able to rely on a not 
insignificant bloc of votes in the UN General Assembly, and other multinational 
organisations143.  
Confident in its position, both as a permanent member of the Security Council, and 
with the support of multiple nations in the General Assembly, successive French 
Presidents would encourage greater participation within the EU. Presidents Pompidou, 
Giscard, and Mitterrand all saw the UN as a mechanism to increase France’s rang in 
the world. Mitterrand himself regarded that “France today is country the best received 
and the most popular because people know that France seems to be the country the 
best understood and most liked by all Third World countries [sic]”144. 
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Mitterrand in particular increasingly sought French participation in UN missions as a 
means of increasing France’s international capital. In 1982, France had submitted 
troops to the UN’s mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Despite the mission requiring close 
co-operation with the US, Mitterrand felt that in these circumstances, France’s 
international credibility and regional influence would be better served by 
participation145.  
However, this became the first of many interventions France would become involved 
with in the 1990s. France viewed its position in a rejuvenated UN Security Council as 
a source of national pride, and thereby pursued an increasingly activist approach. 
France would use it as a means to make pronouncements in the major crises of the 
time146.  
It viewed the UNSC and its participation in UN missions as being part of France’s 
natural mission. Minister Léotard stated that: 
Within its means, France will participate in peacekeeping operations. It knows that its 
history, culture and language bestow upon it a singular responsibility; namely that of one 
of the few nations in the world with a global vocation. It is this will and certainty which 
testify to the durability of its rank as a great nature.147 
An increased involvement in UN missions by France, as well as its general trend 
towards multilateral missions, was also useful in tempering the US’s hegemonic 
position148. Indeed, France started to view itself as one of the principle humanitarian 
powers in the world. Alain Juppé affirmed, upon assuming office in May 1995, that 
through these humanitarian missions, France could increase its rank in the world. He 
stated that “through imagination, determination, and a desire to hold its rank in the 
world, France can affirm itself as it wishes to be – a great world power”149. 
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This thesis’ findings indicates that this idea remains true to this day. Both in the 
rhetoric of Sarkozy and Hollande’s administration, it is shown that France continues 
to stake its claim as an important power, whose role in the world is, at least in part, 
defined by its ability and willingness to intervene abroad to protect human rights. 
Throughout the early nineties, France was keen to be supportive of the UN and its 
missions. In September 1992, the then Foreign Minister Dumas announced that France 
was ready to make available a force of 1,000 men for peacekeeping missions150. Prime 
Minister Rocard promised that France, under the auspices of the UN, intended to 
always make itself available where international law needed to be upheld, or where 
lives were in danger151. 
Treacher argues that appearing to be committed and generous with its resources 
afforded France a number of advantages. Firstly, it allowed France to present itself as 
an important global figure, thereby affirming its place in the international community 
(or its rang) as one of the major powers which took its role in upholding the 
international order seriously; and secondly, it meant that French representatives could 
be present and participate in any peace negotiations which would take place, allowing 
France to protect and promote its own interests. Furthermore, any French casualties 
incurred during these missions would not only show France’s commitment on the 
international stage, but also afford it increased leverage “via an emotional hold on its 
international partners”152. 
Treacher goes further, suggesting that once France had realised that taking an active 
role in the UN’s peace support missions could be used to promote its own role in the 
international community, it made it a central tenet of its foreign policy153.  
This perception of its position in the UN leading to it being considered a major power 
resulted in it taking a largely disproportionate share of the UN’s peacekeeping burden, 
both financially and militarily. The early nineties saw France devote ever greater 
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resources to peacekeeping. In 1991, France was the fifteenth largest contributor to UN 
military operations. However, in 1992 France was contributing 10,000 of the 60,000 
strong UN contingent on operations around the globe. Of the thirteen operations under 
the auspices of the UN in 1993, France was involved in eight of them154. 
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1.2.1.2 Multinational Interventions based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN 
The use of multinational forces, as set out in Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN155 
has rarely been used by the Security Council. It effectively allows the Security Council 
to decide its approach in terms of how it will push for international security156. This 
section details France’s experiences of working as part of a multinational operation 
during the Gulf War. This section shows the initial difficulties France had in adjusting 
to the new post-Cold War order and multinational interventions. In many ways, the 
relationship between France and the US during the Gulf War can be seen as a mirror 
image to their relationship during the Syrian crisis. Furthermore, interesting parallels 
can also be drawn in comparing the relationships between France and Iraq at the time, 
and France and Libya. However, these parallels must not be overstated. 
Following Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait, the Security Council authorised military 
sanctions with Resolution 678, granting a grace period between its signing and 15 
January 1991 for Iraq to abide by the previous resolutions demanding its withdrawal. 
Otherwise, the Security Council would use “all necessary means to uphold and 
implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area”157. 
After Iraq’s failure to comply with the Security Council’s demands, Operation Desert 
Storm was launched, under the operational control of the United States. Around thirty 
countries made up the multinational force, which included 20,000 French troops, 
whose own part on the operation was known as Operation Daguet158. 
At the time, France had no significant legal or historical ties to Kuwait. Mitterrand had 
always pursued a high profile foreign policy, and so when the opportunity presented 
itself, his first action was to dispatch the Clemenceau, an aircraft carrier, to the Gulf. 
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This was justified on the basis that France had a responsibility to uphold international 
law as a member of the Security Council159. 
However, the Iraqi raid on the French Embassy in Kuwait City, as well as the 
abduction of a French diplomat, granted France a reason to significantly increase its 
contribution to the region. Furthermore, the fact that the United States had been 
building up its military presence in the region for a while, and that the United Kingdom 
(who had historically been France’s Middle East ‘rival’) had announced that it would 
be deploying an armoured brigade, meant that France could not be seen as being the 
“weak link in what was becoming a major international undertaking”160.  
Whilst France was building its military resources in the area, it also pursued more 
diplomatic solutions too161. As well as the obvious benefits to avoiding an armed 
conflict, establishing a diplomatic solution would also prevent what was going to be 
an American-dominated intervention. This would have the double benefit of building 
France’s own rang in finding a peaceful solution, and also proving its own 
independence from America in a very Gaullist way. 
However, France had a number of considerations to contemplate. Treacher notes that 
the Elysée has always considered its relations with the Arab World as a key part of its 
international spécificité, and France has a population of approximately three million 
magrébins. Also, France had lost its effective influence in Lebanon and Syria at that 
point, and needed to maintain the limited relationships it did have in the region162.  
Amongst these relationships, based on French trade (including arms trade), was theirs 
with Iraq. Arms trade had begun as political relations improved in 1975. Between 1977 
and 1987, France contracted to sell a total of one hundred and thirty-three Mirage F-1 
fighters. The first transfer took place in 1978, whereby France provided eighteen 
Mirage F-1 fighters, and thirty helicopters. In 1987, Le Monde estimated the value of 
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French arms sales between 1981 and 1985 as being US$5.1 billion, representing 40% 
of its total arms exports163.  
It was Mitterrand himself who decided to take the lead in the Gulf crisis. As has been 
explained previously, much of French foreign policy is articulated directly through the 
presidency and the executive. Mitterrand left his stamp by utilising a very personal 
style of diplomacy, calling on personal envoys like Michel Vauzelle (who at the time 
did not hold a position within the government) to conduct a lot of the negotiation164, 
rather than members of the Foreign Ministry. Mitterrand also preferred to use those 
like Admiral Jacques Lanxade and Maurice Schmitt to correspond with the military 
establishment, thereby circumventing a critical Jean-Pierre Chevènement (who, at the 
time, was Defence Minister and founder member of the Franco-Iraqi Friendship 
Society, and later resigned in protest against the conflict).  
The specific circumstances of the conflict meant that Mitterrand did not require 
parliamentary support; conscripts were not included, so Parliament did not need to 
authorise action, and as it was described as a policing on behalf of, and with the support 
of the UN, no declaration of war would be required.  
Mitterrand made many of his proclamations on the crisis on television, rather than 
before the Assembly, as he sought to be personally managing it. Barbara Balaj notes 
that at this point Mitterrand had been able to add crisis management as part of the 
executive’s remit165.  
Mitterrand’s approach to the continuing crisis was not only criticised by 
Chevènement; he also faced challenges on both the left and right sides of the political 
spectrum. Leader of the Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen felt that because none of 
France’s vital interests were at stake, France should not play the role of gendarme. 
Furthermore, because France was “not an ally of the country that was attacked; in fact, 
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most of our interests are linked to the country that was attacking”166, France should 
not involve itself. 
On the opposite side of the political spectrum, the Parti Communiste Français argued 
that in deciding to intervene in the Gulf, France was only serving to protect the 
investments of American oil companies167. Charles de Gaulle’s son, Philippe, led a 
faction of the Rassemblement pour la République to describe the whole crisis as an 
irresponsible American adventure168. There was also fairly uniform resistance from 
the Greens and ecological lobby169. There were also rumours of a general unhappiness 
at a French foreign policy which was content to send soldiers to support an 
authoritarian Kuwaiti regime, but not to support the Lebanese Christian Maronite army 
led by General Aoun as it was being driven from Lebanon by the Syrian regime170. 
Despite this criticism however, general support for Mitterrand’s policy remained at 
around 66%171. 
Whilst other Western European states submitted aircraft and ships to support the 
embargo and mine-clearing operations, only the United Kingdom and France 
contributed ground troops to the Gulf. Both these countries sought to distance 
themselves from any joint European Community response to the crisis. France in 
particular was keen to maintain control of the response within the UN Security 
Council, rather than encourage the involvement of the European Community. This of 
course had the effect of marginalising Germany. Indeed, the perception of the crisis in 
Paris was that of the rebirth of the idea of “Le directoire à trois”, a gaullian idea which 
suggested that the nuclear powers of France, the UK and the US work closely together 
to help sustain global security and co-ordinate nuclear strategy172173.  
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Both the United Kingdom and France felt that their position within the UNSC granted 
them a special responsibility to act in crises such as these174. Of course, the reverse 
could also be true, whereby the UK and France’s failure to act in this circumstance 
could also be construed as weakness175. This placed France in a position where if 
military force were to be taken, they had to be involved. Indeed, Mitterrand often 
spoke of France’s duty in this situation, stating that it “must be worthy of its 
responsibility as a major power”176. 
Operation Desert Storm represented France’s largest military deployment overseas 
since the Algerian conflict. Furthermore, 24 January 1991 marked the first time 
Mitterrand commanded french planes to bomb Iraq. There was a feeling that not doing 
so would have discredited them on the world stage. Howarth described the situation 
as being one “which spoke to the very heart of France’s world influence, in which the 
chaotic claims of history and geography, of rights and aspirations, of force and 
persuasion, of pragmatism and ideology were central”177. Lellouche concurred, 
finding that “to remain on the margins would be to make us [France] watchers of and 
not actors in history”178. 
Treacher notes that France’s drive for rang led it to involve itself in all aspects of the 
conflict, even after growing domestic economic issues had led France to shrink its 
defence budget179. Indeed, French strategic policy makers began to change their 
approach, feeling that France could maintain its rang on the global stage by taking 
leading roles in, and holding influence over, major international organisations like the 
EU or UN. 
Treacher also argues that France felt that it had to be seen to be acting following a 
perception that it had been inactive during the reunification of Germany and the 
revolutions in Eastern Europe, and that Mitterrand felt that a situation, such as what 
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was developing in Kuwait, afforded France an opportunity to be a global actor, at a 
time where it was becoming increasingly challenging to do so180.  
However, once the armed conflict began, France placed its forces under direct 
American control for the first time since the Second World War. Furthermore, France 
approved US tanker planes (used to refuel the B52 bombers) to fly over its territories, 
as well as use its airbases. Mitterrand justified this by stating that it was acceptable as 
France and America’s interests aligned, and that they were part of the same 
coalition181.  
Mitterrand, in deciding to side with the Western powers, risked alienating various 
Arab states, including those in North Africa. However, in this instance he felt that 
“France’s standing among the Western powers mattered a great deal more than 
sentimental links with the Third Worlds, even though France’s Arab links were one of 
the principal tenets of French exceptionalism”182. 
Yet, as has been suggested above, French collaboration with the United States and the 
United Kingdom did not mean passively surrendering to circumstances. France was 
seen to keenly seek out a diplomatic solution to the crisis, using what Mitterrand called 
the “logic of peace”183. In doing this, France was aiming to establish a wider solution 
to the crisis, creating a stable security structure spanning from Morocco to Oman. 
Indeed, France sought to differentiate its position from those in the alliance by 
attempting to delay military action to give greater time for the trade embargoes to have 
an impact. Beyond this, France also declared that it would not use chemical weapons, 
and that it would promote the UN to drive any subsequent peace settlement184. 
Mitterrand clarified that in its participation in the coalition, France “would fulfil its 
engagements loyally”, but after any ceasefire “we will once again be ourselves”185. 
                                                          
180 Ibid. 
181 François Mitterrand, during a televised interview, quoted in ‘L’épreuve cruelle de vérité aura lieu. 
Il faut que les Français y préparent leur esprit’ Le Monde, 9 February 1991  
182 Adrian Treacher French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.69-70 
183 François Mitterrand in a speech in Oslo, 28 August 1990, quoted in ‘Les positions de la France 
depuis le début de la crise’, Liberation, 10 January 1991 
184 Adrian Treacher, French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.70 
185 François Mitterrand, quoted in Patrick Marnham, ‘Not quite as American as pomme tarte’, The 
Indepandant, 26 February 1991 
57 
 
Mitterrand acknowledged that the US had been a principal actor during the conflict, 
but stated that France had been able to influence its actions. Playing up France’s 
importance in the conflict, Mitterrand stated that it had performed its role and held its 
rank186. Philip Gordon argues that “French participation in the (Gulf) war and 
cooperation with the United States can be explained as much by a French desire to 
avoid “marginalisation” as by any resignation to a minor or subordinate alliance 
role”187. Marginalisation would seem to have been a factor in France’s strategic 
thinking, but not just marginalisation from the Western powers. It has also been 
suggested that Mitterrand did not deploy more advanced aircraft to the theatre so that 
it had an excuse not to engage in raids deep into Iraqi territory, thereby absolving it of 
the responsibility for damage to Iraqi infrastructure and maintaining its standing with 
other Arab countries188.  
However, its attempts to appease both Arab and Western allies did not prove to be as 
effective as they had planned. France’s proposal relating to an international peace 
conference for the Middle East in exchange for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait was 
met with strong and immediate opposition from both Washington and London, who 
saw it as rewarding Iraqi aggression189.  
At the conclusion of the conflict, France and other European countries’ efforts were 
perceived to have been side-lined by the United States. In the aftermath of the fighting, 
Lellouche queried what role the French could expect to play in the post-conflict 
negotiations. France’s ground troops represented only three percent of the total ground 
forces deployed. Lellouche therefore found that France had attempted to buy its way 
to the negotiating table with only twelve thousand troops; something which damaged 
Mitterrand’s claim that France was the world’s third military power190. 
Indeed, the consequences of the conflict in Iraq and Kuwait were far more significant 
than had been originally anticipated. Laird argued that the lesson learned from the 
conflict meant that it had pushed “the French over the barrier to discussing the 
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necessity for change”191. Heisbourg credits the Gulf War as having as great an impact 
on French security and foreign policy as the Algerian War of Independence in the 
1950s and 1960s192. 
Much of the French political elite were still holding France’s nuclear deterrence as 
being the central focus of its defensive strategy. However, conflicts in the post-Cold 
War climate would require a different approach. Indeed, France’s efforts in the Gulf 
were restricted by a lack of military intelligence; an inability to project force 
sufficiently; outdated combat aircraft (especially with the Jaguar and Crusader aircraft, 
while the new Mirage 2000Ns had not been adequately prepared for conventional 
operations)193.  
Mitterrand also limited the French forces’ capabilities by not deploying conscripts to 
the combat zone. Whilst, as has been mentioned above, this carried the advantage of 
not having to gain authorisation from parliament, it pragmatically meant that its 
combat force needed to be drawn from forty-seven different regiments (including non-
frontline personnel like doctors). Indeed, despite the French Army consisting of 
280,000 personnel and having one of the largest defence budgets in the West, France 
could only contribute a maximum of 12,000 troops for Desert Storm. Treacher argues 
that only France’s naval showing could really be said to demonstrate its global rang194. 
France had not been adequately prepared for an overseas conflict against a well-
equipped opponent, and especially as part of a coalition of professional forces. The 
French seemed genuinely surprised at how effective the American and British forces 
were able to integrate effectively during operations. Treacher argues that this softened 
the attitudes in some influential circles towards NATO195. Marshall also observed that 
the Gulf War had led to “the jaw-dropping revelation that being outside NATO’s 
military structure limited France’s influence. That, plus the waning of the Soviet threat 
has helped bring it [France] back towards NATO”196. This decision was also helped 
                                                          
191 Robbin Laird ‘The renovation of French defence policy’ in Stuart Croft and Phil Williams (eds), 
European security without the Soviet Union (Frank Cass; 1992) p.102 
192 François Heisbourg, ‘La France et la crise du Golfe’ in Nicole Gnesotto and John Rober (eds), 
L’Europe Occidentale et la Golfe’, (WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris ; 1991) p.17 
193 Adrian Treacher, French Interventionism: Europe’s last global player? (Ashgate; Hampshire, 
2003) p.70 
194 Ibid. p.70-71 
195 Ibid. p.71 
196 Andrew Marshall, ‘Old Rivals unite in a military embrace’, The Independent, 5 June 1995 
59 
 
by the fact that whilst France had not been as well prepared as it perhaps should have 
been, it still proved to be popular domestically for President Mitterrand, with him 
receiving an approval rate for his handling of the crisis of seventy-three percent197.  
This conflict brought a number of things into focus for the French leadership. It 
reaffirmed de Gaulle’s notion that security policy needed to have global considerations 
to adequately protect France’s interests. It also woke political elites up to new threats 
in a post-Cold War global system, including the increased proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, and the increased availability and acquisition of 
ballistic missile technology. Furthermore, France’s reliance on its nuclear deterrent 
was of no use whatsoever in this conflict. Blunden argued that “[i]mplicit in the 
emphasis on threats from the South was the need to move closer to the ‘North’”198. 
The aforementioned cases show that even when France’s security was not directly at 
risk, it still felt the need to greatly involve itself in the affairs of other nations in order 
to protect its rang. It also provides an example whereby France seeks to intervene in 
the affairs of a country with which it shares business dealings. Chapter 4 will deal with 
the prior business engagements France had with Libya. However, Sarkozy chose to 
make a different choice with his engagement, seeking to create the circumstances in 
which Gaddafi would be removed from office by his enemies. This example also 
shows circumstances where a proposed intervention is complicated by differing 
objectives. As seen in Part III, the Gulf War represents, at least in terms of intention, 
a mirror image of the circumstances in Syria. In the Syrian example, however, it was 
France that pushed aggressively for a military option, and it was the US who pursued 
further diplomatic solutions due to other political pressures.  
The dysfunction between France and the other nations’ military also led to a serious 
change of thinking in Paris in its relations with NATO. The next part discusses in 
greater detail France’s further integration within other international security apparatus. 
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1.2.2 Towards a European Security Policy: WEU, EU, and NATO 
The immediate post-Cold War environment was dominated by the United States 
exerting itself on the international community, for example: ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and 
Somalia. France’s response to this was to try and counter these with shows of its own 
strength, as well as trying to draw Europe into closer coalitions with France to offset 
America’s power.  
France attempted to argue that since NATO had succeeded in its primary goal of 
deterring Soviet interference in the West, America would seek to withdraw from 
Europe. NATO was sixty-one percent funded by the US at the time, and was therefore 
a source of suspicion for French policy elites (France only provided nine percent of 
funding at the time)199. 
However, these attempts throughout the 1980s to draw the Western European powers 
away from just being the European pillar of NATO, and towards an alliance founded 
on European political union, were unsuccessful. Instead, a strategic shift began to take 
hold. Valance stated that there needed to be an “admission that we have transposed 
the ancestral dreams of French grandeur to the European level, and abandoned hope 
of a French dominated unified and powerful Europe”200. Vernet too noted that with 
the exception of some staunch Gaullists and the communists, there was consensus 
across the board that France should review its NATO status. The only thing holding 
them back was that no one wanted to be the first to come out against thirty years of 
security policy orthodoxy201.  
Ultimately, it would be Mitterrand who would step forth and broach this subject during 
a summit meeting with President Bush Senior at Key Largo in April 1990. At the same 
time, French officials were holding talks with their American, British, and German 
counterparts to explore the possibility of NATO reform and France’s ‘return’. 
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However, the report produced from these discussions was subsequently rejected by 
the Elysée202. 
Part of the reason Mitterrand felt the need to pursue new avenues was to contain the 
potential power of a newly reunified and resurgent Germany. However, the Key Largo 
initiative was swiftly rejected, in part due to a fear of the loss of French autonomy 
within an organisation dominated by America and Germany203. This then led to actions 
which seemed to indicate that France was returning towards a more ‘France-First’ 
approach to security.  
France began actively seeking to sabotage NATO’s efforts to broaden its areas of 
competence. Firstly, France challenged NATO’s attempt to extend its remit to include 
security initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe beyond the limits contained in 
Article V of the Washington Treaty. It opposed close cooperation between NATO and 
what was then known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Mitterrand spelled out his position clearly during the London NATO summit in July 
1990, and vehemently opposed an official role for NATO during the Gulf War, as well 
as refusing specific out-of-area missions for its Rapid Reaction Corps.  
France also stated that NATO reform should have no effect on the EU’s 
Intergovernmental Conference, where the EU was beginning to establish the European 
Security and Defence Identity. Therefore France argued that there should be no 
political element to NATO’s function, and that it should instead focus purely on the 
defence of Europe. France also objected to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council for 
similar reasons, arguing that it would create “a second pan-European security 
organisation that still left the continent without a fully functioning mutual defence 
organisation”204. France instead felt more comfortable at this point with a looser, more 
ad-hoc coalition-based approach to security as opposed to a fully collective approach, 
which would carry with it obligations for France to act. 
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France also decided at this time to withdraw the majority of its forces from Germany, 
refused to participate in the establishment of multinational and cross-stationing 
arrangements, as well as rejected a joint allied consultation on nuclear strategy. 
Mitterrand first announced that all fifty thousand French troops based in Germany 
would be withdrawn by 1994 (with the exception of those who were part of a dedicated 
Franco-German Brigade). This therefore meant that the French military needed to find 
a new role for these troops, one which would preferably not make them subordinate to 
NATO. Fortunately for France, the answer would arrive with the creation of the 
Eurocorps.  
The establishment of the Eurocorps was at least in part designed to rival NATO, 
though Defence Minister Joxe was keen to communicate that it was not intended to be 
considered a European army205. Despite this claim however, it quickly grew into a 
fighting force of forty-five thousand troops.  
France was keen for the Eurocorps to represent a European alternative to NATO. 
Beyond serving the purpose of taking responsibility for the security of Europe away 
from NATO, this was also tied the German military into a security apparatus which 
was itself beholden to the European Union206.  
However, France would not be able to keep the Eurocorps completely independent. 
Once lengthy negotiations over the terms of the functioning of the Eurocorps had been 
concluded, the agreement signed in January 1993 included terms which would make 
the force available to NATO in the event that one of the member states had been 
attacked207. This meant that they could therefore be deployed under Article V of the 
NATO Treaty as either a main defence force, or as a rapid response force. By this 
point, the force had already been used by the Western European Union and the UN for 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. 
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However, the Eurocorps could only be commanded by these supranational institutions 
if there had been a preliminary agreement by the various governments who contributed 
troops to the force and there had been established a mission plan which was then 
followed. The French in particular felt these terms were important as they were outside 
of NATO’s command structure208. However, despite these terms, it was difficult to see 
how France was not moving ever closer towards returning to NATO’s integrated 
command. France vehemently denied this, but as has been shown above, France had 
already been content to surrender some military control of its armed forces to the US 
in the Iraq War. Furthermore, the aforementioned Franco-German Brigade (which had 
joined the Eurocorps) was deployed in 1997 as part of NATO’s Stabilisation Force in 
Bosnia.  
France was soon to realise that its dream of the European centric defence strategy led 
by European nations would not be viable in the way they had imagined. The Germans 
seemed to be reluctant in replacing NATO with any EU body. Lellouche argues that 
there was a miscalculation by the Elysée that they seemingly positioned NATO in 
opposition to the WEU and ‘Europe’, thereby giving the impression in Bonn, London 
and Washington that it was attempting to destabilise NATO and drive the Americans 
away209. Furthermore, France failed to acknowledge how its actions would look to 
smaller European nations, who were more suspicious of a European security strategy 
dominated by UK-France-Germany than one which was dependent on the US210.  
Furthermore, there were budget concerns to be considered. No European country was 
willing to incur the significant additional costs which would be accumulated in 
creating a new security structure, especially as on the whole, the defence budgets of 
EU members were declining211. Generally, France had underestimated the hunger for 
European nations to take a greater share of the Security burden to supplant American 
military presence; indeed Baurmel acknowledged that “we desire the emergence of a 
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European security and defence pole, but were virtually the only ones who really want 
it”212. 
Indeed, as has been mentioned above, France in the 1990s had suffered for not being 
present at the NATO decision-making table. France’s consistent declarations against 
reintegration in NATO had reduced her influence in security policy. It also meant that 
the Allies could not reliably discern France’s intentions, and therefore became more 
drawn to a relative clarity being produced by America.  
As France was also becoming increasingly involved in peacekeeping missions, it 
would also require further coordination with its allies. French officials became ever 
more aware of the need to reintegrate as, despite its efforts otherwise, it was clear that 
only NATO had the capability to organise an international response to an attack on the 
integrity of one of its members. However, Mitterrand could never completely 
reintegrate France into the military structures of NATO during his presidency, despite 
his softening approach towards the organisation213. This approach was carefully 
thought out so as to be supportive enough of NATO so that the organisation and its 
allies would not feel that France was attempting to destabilise it, whilst not so 
supportive as to preclude the possibility of another entity replacing it, be it the WEU 
or something else214. Treacher argues that part of the reason for this could have been 
that Mitterrand did not want to “leave a legacy as having betrayed a supposedly basic, 
if illusory, tenet of Gaullist security policy – autonomy from American hegemony”215. 
Therefore, Mitterrand was only willing to take marginal steps at reintegration with 
NATO, as he felt that the arrangement as it stood was suitable enough (as evidenced, 
according to him, by the experiences in the Gulf War)216. 
Opinion on full reintegration at this point was rather split. Mitterrand’s policy towards 
NATO ran contrary to the advice of the Defence Ministry, who, with the support of 
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the armed forces, believed that greater reintegration with NATO would be beneficial 
(based on the army’s own experiences in the Gulf and Bosnia)217. However, as has 
been suggested above, others argued that NATO was a product of its time, and that 
after having won the Cold War and resisted Soviet aggression in Europe, it would 
disband. American withdrawal from the continent would swiftly follow, and Europe 
would need to stand on its own two feet to develop its own security policy with its 
own security apparatus218. 
It arrived as quite a shock to some French observers when NATO reinvigorated and 
reinvented itself in the post-Cold War security climate. As early as May 1991, NATO 
established the Rapid Response Force, made up of British, Dutch, and German Troops 
after having given itself an ‘out-of-area’ role.  
With NATO giving itself additional roles and capabilities, it seemed unlikely to the 
French at this time that a successor or parallel European security would emerge. 
Lansford argued that the effective ways in which NATO had adapted to the changing 
environment, and the ineffective nature of both the WEU and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, meant that the likelihood of a new, effective 
security organisation emerging at this point in time was slim. Instead, the newly 
incoming President Jacques Chirac would have to operate France’s security policy 
within the global security framework as it stood.219 This would mean that as 
international military interventions grew, French security planners would have to take 
account of the possible interactions with NATO. Freedman argued therefore that this 
would mean that “Gaullist notions of a dignified independence would have to be 
qualified by the logic of alliance”220. 
Therefore, France would slowly draw itself into the day-to-day functions and policy-
making apparatus of NATO. France would be increasingly supportive of NATO 
declarations which affirmed the European defence and security identity within the 
organisation (London 1990, Rome 1991, Brussels 1994, Berlin 1996). The French 
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even acknowledged that in order to offset the potential rise of German power, it would 
need to draw itself closer to the US and the UK221. 
In March 1991, France announced that it would be participating in NATO’s Strategy 
Review Group, though the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas was quick to argue 
that this did not mean there had been a change in France’s dealings with NATO222. 
Mitterrand had earlier announced that France would be allowed to participate in 
NATO’s Air Command and Control System, though once again French officials were 
keen to confirm that “this does not modify our general doctrine of staying out of the 
integrated command"223. In 1993 and 1994 France established three permanent 
missions at standing NATO commands. Furthermore, French troops had been put 
under the control of NATO. These changes had meant that it was essential that the 
French Defence Minister sit on and be heard in the NATO meetings which could 
decide the fate of French military units.  
In September 1992, the then Defence Minister Pierre Joxe hinted that France might 
take a more active role in NATO’s politico-military activities, possibly even a return 
to the Defence Planning and Military Committees224. Also in 1992, the Elysée also 
acknowledged that NATO was indeed capable of undertaking actions of collective 
security on behalf of either the UN or the Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe. As has been mentioned above, the Eurocorps units had been authorised for 
usage in the event of a member of NATO having been attacked, (France had only 
previously accepted the principle of ‘operative control’)225. Then, following the 
NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Seville in October 1994, the Balladur 
government produced a Livre Blanc which would state that the Chief of Staff could 
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participate in NATO’s Military Committee whenever French troops are to be deployed 
or whenever France’s interests are a factor226.  
Based on the situation as it stood, including the aforementioned lack of appetite that 
Europe supplant NATO with its own security organisation, France needed to be 
pragmatic in this situation. As Quatremer explained the situation: “the “European 
defence identity” will be built within NATO or will not be built at all”227. The 
leadership in Paris began to acknowledge NATO as being essential for the 
development of the European Security and Defence Identity into something more 
defined. In order to achieve a more robust ESDI, France would need to engage in a 
more wide-ranging and less antagonistic European Security dialogue. Indeed, “French 
negotiators had to help forge Europe’s new security shapes via NATO reform before 
France’s favourable strategic position of the Cold War was finally eroded”228. Vernet 
explains that “France, which had for a time entertained the notion of a European 
defence identity that was allied to and complimented the United States, but which was 
independent, has just made a double acknowledgement: the Europeans have neither 
the financial means nor the political will to be independent. With our principal partners 
integrated in NATO, it is in NATO that the “European defence identity” has to be 
asserted”229. Indeed the Chirac/Juppé administration felt that in order for France to be 
effective on the European stage, it needed to act within the organisation, and not 
outside of it. During the Cold War, France’s status as an independent ally of NATO 
had been useful, but changes in the post-Cold War climate meant that it had to adapt. 
Chirac realised that France would need to sacrifice some measure of what they 
perceived as national sovereignty so as to be more effective on the global stage. This 
so-called loss of sovereignty would not however, as de Montbrial noted, be at the cost 
of its European objectives: “Europe will exist only if it is self-defined, and if it acquires 
the means to be autonomous. Hence, Paris earnestly desires its preservation of a strong 
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Atlantic alliance, but one whose European pillar is on equal footing with the American 
pillar”230. 
The next step in France’s slow reintegration with NATO came in December 1995, 
where Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette declared that France was fully returning to 
all non-integrated military bodies of NATO (with the exception of the Nuclear 
Planning Group), as well as committing to improve its working relations with Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Chirac did posit however that Europe should take 
some form of leadership role within the organisation so as to produce a more equal 
partnership. Prime Minister Balladur was open with his frustrations, asking in 1994: 
“must the Europeans constantly wait for an American decision in order to know what 
they can do in the area of security? ... The Europeans must be able to take decisions 
and act on their own”231. The Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Jacques Lanxade 
reiterated this point regarding European parity within the organisation: “[t]he matter 
at issue today is not to set up a military organisation responsible for Europe’s defence 
instead of NATO, but to establish the structures required to allow us Europeans to act 
in an autonomous way if need be”232. 
Europeans would be given some greater autonomy however through the Combined 
Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This was a European force which would be able to use 
NATO’s communication, intelligence and logistics capabilities within the 
organisation’s command structure. As has been stated again and again above, America 
dominates NATO, so what was really on offer here was the ability for Europe to 
construct its own response to international crises where America would prefer not. 
However, it was argued that due to America’s dominance within the organisation, 
France felt that it would instead effectively result in American vetoes, and not the 
development of a distinctly European security identity.233  
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Resistance to this idea was much stronger within the Mitterrand camp than it was with 
Balladur, but yet, both parties began to come round to the idea that NATO should be 
able to undertake military operations outside of its own area234. As both parties began 
to warm to the idea, France began to intimate that it would join the command structure 
of NATO. This was partially so that it could push the Combined Joint Task Forces 
(CJTF) idea, thinking that it had the potential to give the Europeans increased freedom 
and autonomy when dealing with out-of-areas situations. The French used the CJTF 
concept to justify its growing closer to their allies, without having to transgress the 
gaullian notion of not completely reintegrating into the NATO command structure.  
France promised its cooperation in NATO’s core functions, its signature for the 
organisation’s New Strategic Concept, and its reluctant agreement to the creation of 
the NACC, in exchange for America’s acknowledgment of an increasing European 
defence identity. Paris reasoned that NATO integration would eventually dissipate, 
thereby justifying its short term movement towards the organisation. The French 
preferred initiatives such as the CJTF precisely because it emphasised cooperation 
over more formal integration235. It was this argument which Chirac used to justify his 
actions before his domestic audience. Furthermore, he was able to argue that any 
‘retour’ to NATO would not be problematic as the organisation itself had significantly 
changed, and it was moving towards the “French vision of the global security 
environment”236. 
The July 1996 NATO summit where the CJTF was formerly ratified also marked the 
further movement closer towards NATO’s military structures by France. The French 
were keen to argue that a real European security would emerge from NATO, where 
Europe would be able to undertake operations independent of North America. 
However, Treacher notes that there was no real guarantee of this happening. Many of 
the French negotiating team were hoping that the developments within NATO would 
result in their desired outcome. Indeed, many political elites did not see why they had 
to surrender so much sovereignty to NATO when they felt they had already secured 
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recognition of a separate European Security identity from NATO237. The former 
Defence Minister Paul Quilès felt that there was some way to go in terms of exploring 
the possibilities for the ESDI within the EU/WEU framework238.  
Indeed, Chirac’s critics felt that France would have had a greater influence on the 
outside of NATO than within it. Quilès went further, arguing that instead of 
representing the Europeanisation of NATO, it effectively made the United States a 
member of the European Union239. Pierre Debezies felt that France had lost an 
essential part of its spécificité240, and Hubert Védrine argued that but for France’s 
nuclear deterrent at this point, France would have been completely trivialised241. 
Treacher noted that at the time, there seemed to be little consensus between Paris and 
Washington as to what this most recent agreement meant. France portrayed NATO as 
moving more towards a “looser collective security organisation with the capacity for 
variable geometry”, and not what the Americans imagined, which was a 
“traditional[ly] integrated military format”242. 
Furthermore, France was content to push for political, rather than military controls 
over NATO’s missions, advocating for a greater say in its operations by national 
governments and the NATO Advisory Council. However, doubts began to emerge as 
to whether America would be willing to allow NATO assets to be used in European 
operations where it would not control the headquarters (authorisation for said 
operations would require unanimous support in the NAC, effectively giving each 
member state a veto over the operations)243. This would also mean that America would 
have complete control over European CJTFs, in both determining the mission and 
allocating its resources.  
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There was also some dispute between the US and Europe regarding the allocation of 
NATO commands. This debate also gave insight into France’s approach to its own, 
and European Security, when Foreign Minister de Charette stated: 
[w]hen leaders of influential European countries like Germany or France travel around 
the world, they carry Europe on the soles of their shoes, so to speak. I do not mean by 
that that every time France speaks, it expresses the point of view of Europe. France has 
its own foreign policy, which it alone defines, but like the other European countries, it 
bears part of Europe’s collective responsibility.244 
As has been mentioned above, the rapprochement with NATO was seen as being 
controversial. However, closer examination showed that this was not the case. The 
Defence Livre Blanc 1994 made the same demands as was claimed in 1966; i.e. the 
right for France to deploy its troops as it saw fit, the existence of an independent 
nuclear policy, the maintenance of national control over its territorial integrity, and the 
freedom to define what security means to France, and act accordingly at a time of 
crisis245. 
Furthermore, Chirac’s approach to NATO seemed logical when understood in the 
context of French security policy from the 1980s onwards under both Socialist and 
centre-right administrations. Moïsi justified Chirac’s approach, in stating that:  
In pursuing a normalisation of relations between France and NATO, Jacques Chirac is 
only prolonging, in a more spectacular fashion, a stance and policy already practised by 
his predecessors. It certainly does not represent a revolutionary rupture or violation of a 
taboo, but rather a gradual, legitimate and realistic revolution.246 
The conflict in Yugoslavia changed France’s perception of both its own ability to 
project power, and of Europe’s security architecture, vis-à-vis NATO’s. France 
realised, as Beylau suggests, that “NATO [wa]s in full evolution, and France cannot 
allow itself to remain too far to the margins of a military tool which is indispensable 
for the crises in which the French are involved”247. 
Treacher argues that at this point, rang and grandeur were the dominant driving forces 
for France’s security policy, and not independence. Indeed, he argues that 
independence, or non-dependence as it was described, was only ever used as 
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justification for certain circumstances. He argues that it was rational for France to 
downplay its non-dependence in the context of the era248. Pfaff asserts that this was 
simply an “old policy in a new guise… France has come back to NATO because 
NATO has been reactivated as agent of Western policy in Bosnia. Since 1990 the 
alliance had lacked a post-Cold War mission. Now it provides the only game in 
town”249. This of course did not rule out future shifts in policy regarding NATO, but 
at this particular point in time, it made sense in this particular set of circumstances. 
The findings of this thesis indicate that this balance between collaborating as part of a 
coalition and acting independently continues to play an important part in the security 
considerations of French foreign policy, but that, at least in the two examples this 
research analyses, attempting to drive its security policy via coalition seems to be the 
most dominant force. This is particularly the case in relation to Syria, where France 
was offered many opportunities to develop and implement its own approach to the 
crisis, but was ultimately reluctant to act on its own and ended up following the US 
lead in resolving the situation. Of course, circumstances outside France’s control also 
had an impact on how the crisis was resolved. Hollande’s inability to act unilaterally, 
coupled with his eventual capitulation to the US/Russian plan and his dutiful 
proposing of the Resolution in the Security Council (in an attempt to save face), all 
point to a foreign policy dominated by an attempt to maintain some element of French 
prestige and by desperate endeavours to maintain France’s rang amongst the nations 
in the Security Council.  
France’s attitude towards Germany in the early post-Cold War period was one 
dominated by suspicion, unsure of what role it would take in its newly reunified state. 
However, France need not have been so suspicious of its neighbour. Indeed, Germany 
was keen to appease its Western neighbour, as well as seeking to maintain the support 
of the United States. This balance was best typified with the adoption of the common 
Franco-German strategic concept in Nuremburg in December 1996. Here, France 
accepted that in the short term, the European defensive identity would be housed 
within NATO, so long as measures were implemented to put greater emphasis on 
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NATO’s European element. For this, Germany agreed that the Western European 
Union, working with the European Council, would become the judicial base for the 
future ESDI, as well as supporting France in its attempt to europeanise the Alliance. 
France also began to soften its approach towards the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, with some French policy makers seeing it as a preferential 
option for pan-European security. Treacher attributes this to an attempt to tie Russia 
into the European security community (a traditional goal for French European 
policy)250. This proposal suggested that the organisation should have a greater role in 
European security, but also, in a break from previous proposals, allowed continued 
American and Canadian influence. This could be interpreted as an attempt by France 
to limit an American-led expansion of NATO’s European remit, both concerning its 
activities and physical reach. President Chirac himself spoke of how the OSCE’s 
capacity to act as a pan-European security organisation had grown, as well as its 
acquisition of an international judicial character251. Furthermore, the pre-existing 
opposition to the OSCE’s Conflict Preservation Centre gaining more than its technical 
role, was withdrawn, so it did not become a future European Security Council. 
However, the election of a new, Socialist-dominated coalition to the Assembly in June 
1997 was to add doubts to France’s ever-closer relations with NATO. The new Prime 
Minister, Lionel Jospin, was wary of any potential subordination of the nation’s 
nuclear forces under the Alliance. Furthermore, it was clear that there was still some 
distance between France and the other NATO nations, as exemplified in the Madrid, 
July 1997 NATO summit. France had been lobbying for Romanian and Slovenian 
membership, which was staunchly vetoed by America. This showed the dearth of 
France and Europe’s influence in the organisation. Simultaneously, France and 
America were also at odds regarding the allocation of a senior European military 
officer to the head of NATO’s Southern Command in Naples. France’s recent election, 
and the period of cohabitation had made these matters significantly more difficult.  
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France, and specifically Chirac and his advisors, had greatly overestimated France’s 
welcome, and the types of concessions it believed it could obtain. Menon argued that 
it was not only France’s lack of potential leverage which inhibited its ability to deal 
with the organisation. He also argued that because France had spent decades on the 
outside of NATO’s Military Committee, it had lost track of the negotiating culture. 
France’s tactics of relying on French exceptionalism and drawing sharp distinctions 
between itself and others within the Alliance with ‘grand gesture politics’ would carry 
very little favour once operating within the organisation252. 
However, for France there was no real alternative other than to become closer to the 
Alliance. France had committed itself to maintaining its military role in the former 
Yugoslavia, which would necessitate remaining within NATO’s operations. The 
Socialist Defence Minister Alain Richard agreed with the Chirac administration that 
France would have to reintegrate with the NATO command structures eventually253. 
However, Paris was describing the insertion of French forces into the Alliance, rather 
than integration, and that France’s membership would be solitaire, but solidaire254. 
However, it is difficult to see whether there was any real distinction in effect other 
than rhetorical. Vernet wondered aloud how France could simultaneously be inside 
and outside of the organisation at the same time255. Whilst France may have not seen 
the development toward an ESDI within the Alliance that it would have liked, 
Treacher notes that “economic and geopolitical imperatives dictated that NATO was 
the best and only viable multilateral option for the furtherance of rang and grandeur, 
not only within Europe but also in the wider world”256. This certainly would have been 
the thinking of those with a more pessimistic disposition who were following the EU’s 
attempted implementation of a European Security Policy, as suggested under the 
Maastricht Treaty.  
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However, there was universal agreement, both on the right and the left, to maintain a 
dialogue with NATO regarding its reintegration. Nor did they reverse their policies on 
having the Defence Minister and the armed forces’ Chief of Staff attend the NATO 
military committees. Whilst this did not specifically rule out a future change of policy, 
France seemed to be throwing its support behind NATO, especially during the 1998-
99 Kosovo crisis. Unlike with the Gulf War or Bosnia, France did not portray its 
exceptionalism, or make a big show of pursuing its own agenda. Instead, it quickly 
fell into line with NATO’s mission objectives, even in the absence of a specific UN 
mandate.  
Shortly before the conclusion of the Kosovan conflict, France also had another event 
which would draw a shift in its security policy. During the Cologne meeting in June 
1999, the European Council approved a document which would formally pledge the 
EU to a common policy on security and defence, giving it the capacity for autonomous 
action when a crisis may occur, backed by a credible military force. To facilitate this, 
fifteen foreign ministers announced their intent to absorb the WEU into the EU, 
thereby committing to assume peacekeeping and conflict resolution responsibilities. 
Then, six months later, the Helsinki European Council went on to launch a Franco-
British driven process which was planned to have 50,000-60,000 personnel by 2003. 
This force was designed to operate under the principles of the UN Charter, and be 
capable of deployment within sixty days, and remaining in a single location for at least 
one year. Furthermore, the member states formally committed themselves to provide 
assets, both material and budgetary. This Rapid Reaction Force was not to be a 
standing army, but would have its own planning staff. 
This of course meant that the relations between the EU and NATO would be important. 
This was especially the case for France. Following the Council meeting at Helsinki, 
French negotiators were reluctant to allow NATO a major say in the development of 
the CSDP. However, in April 2000 the Jospin government proposed that there be 
meetings between officials of the EU and NATO to discuss the development of a crisis 
management capability. With this move, it appeared that the EU was moving from a 
purely rhetorical idea of a ‘common defence policy’ as indicated in the Maastricht 
Treaty, to something a little more concrete. It appeared that France’s European 
partners were also starting to back this idea as well. Gnesotto pointed out “[t]hat all 
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countries of the Union – whether large or small, from the north or south, NATO 
members or not belonging to a military alliance, having an interventionist tradition or 
not – now subscribe to the political and operational aims set out at Cologne or 
Helsinki, is certainly a major political revolution”257. 
However, whilst France may have attempted to claim this new European movement 
towards a common security policy, forces outside its control had driven the other 
European nations to the same conclusion. French rapprochement had had an impact 
of course, but changes in approach in Germany and the UK were also significant. The 
experiences with the Gulf War and Bosnia had led Germany to a substantial change in 
its constitution which would allow the deployment of troops abroad. Furthermore, 
Treacher notes that France’s rapprochement with NATO served to ease tensions with 
Germany, where German policy-makers were now reassured that France’s ambitions 
for the ESDI was not to be a direct challenge to NATO itself. They provided the 
assurances required for Germany to move forward with a European Defence 
Cooperation because the Germans felt that it would support the Alliance’s mission258. 
Britain also had come to similar conclusions. Following the Bosnian War and shifting 
American priorities, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a reorientation of Britain’s 
European Defence Policy in October 1998. Then, two months later the Franco-British 
St Malo summit declaration was made, stating that “the Union must have the capacity 
for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to 
use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”259. In 
May of the following year, the British Foreign Minister Robin Cook went further, 
arguing that the EU should be able to mount its own peacekeeping and humanitarian 
missions without relying on the United States260.  
The fruits of this summit declaration were to be found in Operation Artemis, a UN-
backed peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (12 June 2003). 
This was the first test of the European Security and Defence Policy. On paper, this 
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was an EU mission, featuring a number of personnel from different member states. In 
reality, this was a French dominated mission (90% of the ground troops were French 
with only one special operations contingent from the UK), and had already been in 
preparation as a French mission before it was co-opted by the EU261. This operation 
represented not just a small step in the EU entering into peacekeeping missions as a 
wider force (if only nominally), but also as an example of France driving military 
intervention through a supranational body to achieve national goals. 
The Kosovo conflict, and Europe’s minimal contribution to the air and ground 
operations, acted as the spark for EU leaders to opt into the Helsinki agreement, and 
establish a European autonomous force. Graham argued that there was a general 
feeling within Europe that it must “move rapidly to acquire the means to act 
independently of the US since the EU has increasingly different priorities from that of 
Washington and may become willing to intervene where the Americans are 
reluctant”262. This new settlement produced results quickly, with Eurocorps being 
deployed to Kosovo in Spring 2000 as the military part of the allied peace and 
reconstruction operation. This was the first instance of non-NATO forces taking over 
a NATO mission.  
However, whilst this marked a significant step in the relations between Europe and 
America in developing a security policy in Europe, where EU forces could begin to 
take control of its own destiny in the continent, another event was to change the view 
of world security once again. The next section therefore looks at France’s security 
position following the attacks of September 11th 2001, and the ensuing War on Terror. 
The attacks of September 11th 2001 in the United States led to a significant refocusing 
of Western strategic planning, and therefore starting the War on Terror. In this section, 
we compare two of the major conflicts in the 2000’s relating to the War on Terror: 
Afghanistan and Iraq. These two conflicts, and particularly the change in approach 
from Chirac to Sarkozy, are important to establish the state of France’s strategic 
policy, and specifically its relations with its Western Allies at the start of 2011. They 
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are also an important indicator of the level of influence France was able to wield, or 
not wield, at this time. France played subordinate roles in the Western interventions in 
Afghanistan, due to its lack of historical and influential links to the region which could 
allow it to enact large-scale operations. As shown, the aim at this time was not 
necessarily to play a great role during this conflict. Yet it would also indicate the 
difficulties it would face in conducting operations in Syria, and why it limited its 
potential actions to airstrikes and support to various rebel groups. 
Shortly after the September 11th attacks, blame was placed on Al Qaida and the US 
began to seek its leader, Osama bin Laden. He had been tracked to Afghanistan, and 
the US demanded that the Taliban hand over the Al Qaida leader. The Taliban refused, 
requesting proof of bin Laden’s guilt. Dismissing this as a delaying tactic, the United 
States launched on 7 October 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom with the United 
Kingdom to dislodge the Taliban from the region and attempt to capture or kill 
members of Al Qaida.  
Operation Enduring Freedom was the first of two separate missions taking place in 
Afghanistan (OEF-A). This operation (or the Afghan element of this mission) was led 
by the US and UK, though other nations did join. It is interesting to note that before 
France offered to send ground troops in support on 16 November 2001263, Turkey, 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands had already offered its 
support/troops264.  
Chirac justified French military intervention with two reasons: firstly to “neutralise” 
Al Qaida and their Taliban support; and secondly to establish a safe zone to deliver 
humanitarian aid265.  
Notably, this initial military intervention was carried out without specific UN 
approval. Throughout much of the build up to the invasion, President George W Bush 
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and the American administration portrayed the conflict as one of self-defence. Indeed, 
the Joint Resolution authorising the use of military force specifically references this266. 
Instead, for legal justification, the US drew upon Article V of the Washington Treaty. 
It had been initially invoked on 12 September, 2001, but that it would not be fully 
implemented until confirmation had been obtained that the attack was the result of a 
foreign actor. Upon America’s investigation establishing that Al Qaida were to blame, 
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson declared that NATO was regarding Article 
V as being activated267.  
It is important to note that when France decided to send ground troops, the Taliban 
was already on the back foot after a series of American and Northern Alliance 
offensives had driven the Taliban from major cities. France had already been involved 
in the conflict in a more limited role, with Opération Héraclès being launched on 21 
October 2001. Here, France used twenty Mirage IVPs and twenty C-135FRs from its 
air base in Al Dhafra to provide air surveillance over the country.  
In November 2001 however, the conflict entered a second phase with regards to 
international involvement. On 14 November 2001, the UN passed Security Resolution 
1378, effectively retroactively justifying the US’ intervention in Afghanistan by 
ascribing blame on the Taliban for providing support to Al Qaida268. It is no accident 
therefore that France only intervened after the UN had provided its tacit approval of 
the intervention. Indeed, in his speech announcing the deployment of French troops to 
the region, Chirac spoke of the importance of as many actors as possible being 
involved, saying that “this fight will be led in the national setting, in the European 
Union setting, and in that of the United Nations”269. 
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In this speech, Chirac was also keen to add that both France and the UK had lobbied 
the UN to find a political solution to the crisis, and that it had produced a resolution to 
form an interim Afghan government to represent the needs of the Afghan people270. 
Firstly, on 5 December 2001, the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions 
(Bonne Agreement) was signed271. This provided a route map for how the country was 
to proceed following the withdrawal and eventual defeat of the Taliban. To support 
the consolidation of power with a new Interim Authority, the Agreement envisaged 
the establishment of an International Security Force; with this in mind, Resolution 
1373 created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)272. This was a NATO 
led force, whose initial task was to secure Kabul and its surrounding areas from the 
Taliban, Al Qaida, and any other factions, thereby providing a stable base for the 
Karzai government to establish itself in the country.  
On 2 January 2002, the first soldiers operating within the International Force arrived 
in Kabul, including 500 French troops whose job was to secure the city, and help train 
the Afghan forces to stabilise the country273. Much of France’s role in the conflict in 
2002 and 2003 involved playing a support role, relying heavily on its Air Force and 
Navy. On 18 February 2002, France reported suspicious activities near Gardez using 
its Helios satellites. The resulting reconnaissance by American Special Forces and 
French spy planes led to the launching of Operation Anaconda.  
Despite the limited nature of France’s interventions (when compared to America and 
the United Kingdom), George W. Bush was still mindful to thank the French for their 
role in the conflict. Indeed, in his remarks in March 2002, Bush noted that: “There are 
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many examples of commitment: our good ally France, has deployed nearly one-fourth 
of its navy to support Operation Enduring Freedom”274. 
However, the relations were to change significantly following a schism between 
Presidents Bush and Chirac regarding the Iraq War. This example shows that even in 
the early mid-twenty-first century, France, under Chirac, was keen to maintain the UN 
Security Council as the sole legitimate means of authorising the use of force. We also 
begin to see, as the situation plays out, France recognise the ultimate supremacy of the 
US, whilst also trying to maintain a level of independence. This, it is argued, once 
again has, at its heart, France’s sense of rang. This being especially important due to 
France’s historic attempted pivot towards the Middle East, and its large domestic 
Muslim population. 
Plans for an American invasion of Iraq had started to be drawn up as early as 
September of 2001275, and the nation was wrapped up into the US’ War on Terror 
when Bush announced that Iraq under Saddam Hussain constituted part of the ‘Axis 
of Evil’ in his 2002 State of the Union Address276. Bush then made the case for an 
intervention against Iraq in front of the United Nations, arguing that Saddam Hussain 
“continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be 
completely certain he has a – nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We 
owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from 
coming”277. However, the evidence finding that Iraq had continued its Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) programme was somewhat lacking, with Major General 
Glen Shaffer revealing that “Our knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is 
based largely - perhaps 90% - on analysis of imprecise intelligence… Our assessments 
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rely heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than hard evidence. The 
evidentiary base is particularly sparse for Iraqi nuclear programs"278.  
This dearth of evidence led both France and Germany to reject America’s proposal for 
the invasion of Iraq. A compromise was reached with Resolution 1441, which, 
amongst other things, authorised Weapons Inspectors to enter Iraq to discern whether 
the country had continued/restarted its WMD programmes279. There would be serious 
consequences were the Iraqi government to inhibit the inspectors in their job; however 
both French and Russian diplomats were clear to explain that these consequences 
would not be the overthrow of the Iraqi government280, a concession both British and 
American Ambassadors agreed281.  
Saddam Hussain accepted the Resolution on 13 November 2002, and allowed an 
inspection team to enter the country, under the direction of United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission Chairman Hans Blix and the International 
Atomic and Energy Agency Director General Mohamed El Baradei.  
Following four months of inspections, the IAEA “found no evidence or plausible 
indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq”. Certain items were 
found which had the potential to be used in nuclear enrichment centrifuges, but that 
they were content that the items were being used for other purposes282. By March 
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2003, Blix advised that UNMOVIC investigation had also made progress, and that 
they had not found any evidence of WMDs at that point283. 
Despite these findings, or lack thereof, America pushed ahead with its invasion plans. 
In October 2002, the US congress passed a resolution allowing the US to “use any 
means necessary against Iraq”284. Secretary of State Colin Powell then took the US’ 
case to the UN on 5 February 2003. Following his presentation of evidence, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, Denmark, Spain, Japan, and Australia all 
proposed a resolution to authorise force against Iraq. However, Canada, France, 
Germany and Russia were all opposed, instead urging a diplomatic solution. It seemed 
likely that the US and its allies would face a vote defeat and veto, and therefore decided 
to withdraw the resolution285. 
Instead, America and its allies by-passed the United Nations altogether, looking to 
their domestic settings to justify the proposed military intervention in Iraq. On 17 
March 2003, George W. Bush addressed the nation, demanding that Saddam Hussain, 
and his two sons Uday and Qusay, step down from office and leave Iraq, giving them 
a 48-hour deadline to do so286. The following day, the United Kingdom Parliament 
held a vote on whether to go to war with Iraq; and despite some significant 
governmental resignations, Parliament voted in favour of war 412 to 149287. Upon 
gaining authorisation, the invasion began on 20 March 2003. 
Of course, throughout this time, France and the Chirac administration had been largely 
critical of the US’s militaristic approach to the Iraqi situation. Dominique de Villepin 
in January of 2003 argued that at that point in time, military intervention “would be 
the worst solution”, clarifying that France “will not join in [a] military intervention 
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that did not have international support”288. This sentiment was echoed by Chirac 
himself, who in threatening to use France’s veto, stated that “My position is that under 
these circumstances, France will vote ‘no’ because tonight we do not think that a war 
would help achieve the objective we have decided upon, that being the disarmament 
of Iraq”289.   
France’s non-support of the US’ military intervention was treated as a great betrayal 
in the United States, and marked a significant low-point in US-French relations in the 
post-Cold War period. As had been shown above, France’s relations with America had 
steadily been improving over the 1980s and 1990s. However, there are a number of 
factors which need to be taken into account to understand why France acted in the way 
it did. In explaining France’s justifications for this policy at the time also helps to 
provide greater understanding for Sarkozy’s actions in Syria, both in terms of the 
similarities between the situations, and the critical differences. 
The first bit of background information concerns France’s historic ties to Iraq. These 
ties are based on the twin pillars of oil and trade. Iraq was one of the principal countries 
within both the Arab Mashreq290 and the Gulf, and France had built strong ties with it 
throughout the twentieth century. The roots of the French oil industry can be traced to 
its acquisition of a 22.5% stake in the oil concessions in Mesopotamia following the 
conclusion of the First World War. These concessions were jointly owned with Anglo-
Dutch Shell and some American companies, which together were known as the Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC). The French stake of this group became known as the 
Compagnie français des pétroles (CFP), a precursor to Total291. This company, whilst 
cooperating with the major British and US companies in Iraq, was able to become a 
major oil producer by the 1960s, competing with other British and French companies 
throughout the Middle East and Africa. 
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Prior to the founding of the Fifth Republic, France’s popularity in the Arab World was 
harmed by both its war in Algeria, and its relationship with Israel. However, the 
election of President de Gaulle and the creation of the Fifth Republic, as well as the 
end of the Algerian War, led to a reorientation of France’s foreign policy and its 
treatment of the Arab World. David Styan notes that France’s improved relations with 
Iraq, facilitated by CFP/Total’s existing position in the region, became “integrated into 
De Gaulle's broader vision of France as a champion of independent African, Arab and 
Asian nations”292. 
De Gaulle softened France’s approaches in a number of different ways to open 
relations with the Arab World, scaling back arms sales to Israel in the mid-sixties, as 
well as criticising Israel in 1967 and participating in the subsequent arms embargo. 
France held a state visit for the then Iraqi President in 1968, where further oil and arms 
sales concessions were discussed. Despite the Ba’athist coup in July 1968, France’s 
relations with the country grew from strength to strength. France was able to benefit 
from playing on the anti-American/British sentiments of the younger Arab leaders to 
secure favourable terms from leaders in the region. Specifically, 1972 saw Iraq and 
France become inexorably closer. Despite the nationalisation of the oil industry, 
France secured favourable prices for Total for oil from the region. Saddam Hussain 
himself visited Paris twice in June 1972. France became a favourable economic partner 
to Iraq, and placed Baghdad at the centre of its new regional policy. After meeting 
with Saddam Hussain, President Georges Pompidou’s Foreign Minister Maurice 
Schumann stated: “within the policy framework of France’s friendship with the Arab 
world in general, there is now a specific Franco‐Arab policy”293.   
In the subsequent years, trade with the Arab world became extremely important. 
During his presidency, Giscard d’Estaing was closely involved in all areas of foreign 
policy with the exception of one region: the Middle East. Here, his young Prime 
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Minister Jacques Chirac was given freedom to implement France’s foreign policy294. 
An agreement was signed between France and Iraq in 1975 regarding economic 
cooperation between the two countries. To facilitate this, Chirac visited Baghdad in 
November 1974 and January 1976, hosting Saddam Hussein back in France in 
September 1975. In addition to the oil deals secured for French companies, there were 
also contracts signed for military and nuclear services. As has been mentioned above, 
the first order for France’s Mirage F-1 fighter planes was made in 1976. In September 
1975, Hussain was invited to the Cadarache nuclear facility in Provence, with an 
agreement being signed in November for France to supply Iraq with a nuclear 
generator295. 
In opposition, the Parti Socialiste had been critical of the arms sales to the Arab world 
under d’Estaing296. However, when Mitterrand assumed power in 1981, he was keen 
to reassure the Arab world that he was not hostile to future business by bringing in 
two ministers with both the experience of, and pedigree in, the Arab world, with 
Claude Cheysson as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Michel Jobert as Minister of 
External Commerce. 
The Iraq-Iran War seemed to be an excellent opportunity for French arms dealers. Iraqi 
military expenditure between 1980 and 1985 reached $15 billion297, with France’s 
state-owned arms industry benefitting more than most other nations. However, its 
support for Iraq obviously created tension with Iran. Furthermore, as the conflict 
ground on, Iraq’s economy began to suffer, meaning that arms sales were becoming 
increasingly difficult to manage. When the conflict finally reached its conclusion, 
many Western countries were keen to profit from the post-conflict reconstruction. 
However, trade was limited by the extent to which Iraq had indebted itself to continue 
the war, as well as COFACE’s reluctance to grant credit guarantees.298 
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As has already been discussed above, France reluctantly entered the Gulf War 
following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The trade relations discussed above should go 
some way to explain France’s reticence to engage militarily in the region until every 
other possible avenue had been explored. However, the conflict did not mark a sharp 
cessation of relations between the two nations. Slowly and quietly, French and Iraqi 
diplomats and businessmen sought to re-establish the pre-war links which had been 
mutually profitable299. Whilst these back-room deals were being argued, Chirac took 
a public role in arguing for sanctions to be lifted, or at the very least rolled back. 
Indeed, in his speech in Cairo in April 1996, he argued that: “if Iraq has conformed to 
all resolutions, then the sanctions must be lifted. The international community cannot 
remain indifferent to the worsening of the humanitarian situation in this country”300. 
Their efforts were mostly successful, with the introduction of the ‘Oil-for-food’ UN 
programme proving particularly profitable for French oil companies301. In June 1996, 
Iraq’s Petroleum Minister Amer Rachid praised the “positive and important” role 
France had played in securing Resolution 986, and suggested that France would be 
favoured in deals conducted under the ‘Oil-for-food’ programme302. 
However, divisions did emerge in the nineties which would act as a preview to the 
split in 2003. Firstly, the oil companies in the strongest position at the time, and the 
ones who had signed pre‐contract agreements for post‐sanctions oil development in 
Iraq, were Elf and Total, along with China's CNPC (China National Petroleum 
Company) and the Russian group Lukoil.  
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Another issue which emerged was the fact that Iraq was becoming increasingly 
dismissive of the regulations placed on the country by the UN. One such example 
involved Saddam Hussain’s refusal to allow the UN’s inspections of the ‘presidential 
palace’ sites in February 1998. Though the issue was eventually resolved with an 
agreement between the Iraqi government and Kofi Annan, the agreement itself had at 
least in part come around because of French diplomacy, something for which Chirac 
was to consider a major victory, as well as proof that France’s policy to cultivate a 
relationship with Saddam Hussain yielded tangible results on the international stage. 
This seemed to bolster France’s international standing at the time, allowing it to show 
that it was an important part of the UN Security Council (though of course there was 
some acknowledgement that the threat of further American interference had also been 
useful)303. 
However, this was only to be a temporary solution. In November of 1998, the US 
deployed additional troops to the region, and UNSCOM reported a lack of cooperation 
once more on 16 December 1998, leading US and British forces to bomb Baghdad in 
‘Operation Desert Fox’. In response to these actions, France completely halted its 
participation in surveillance and disarmament operations in Iraq. 
Divisions between the US/UK and France over Iraq crystallised in 17 December 1999; 
France abstained in the Security Council vote over Resolution 1284, which sought to 
streamline oil for food deliveries in exchange for a tougher surveillance regime. The 
two other nations to abstain in the vote were Russia and China, foreshadowing the 
Security Council’s divisions in 2003.  
Further bombings by American and British aircraft on sites outside of the no-fly zone 
in February 2001 continued to drive a wedge between Washington and Paris, as well 
as drawing condemnation from the wider French public in France. Generally, France 
became increasingly hostile to the sanctions imposed against Iraq, with Foreign 
Minister Hubert Védrine describing them as “more and more cruel and intolerable, 
and less and less effective”304. Styan notes that, as had been the case in the 1980s, 
there was a broad consensus on France’s policy towards Iraq across the political 
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spectrum, and was therefore not held hostage to cohabitation305. This is corroborated 
by Tarik Aziz, stating that “in the case of Iraq, there is a unanimity between the right 
and the left… there is no difference between the Elysée and Matignon”306. 
Chirac used his September 2002 trip to the United Nations, and an interview he had 
made with the New York Times on 9 September 2002, to explain France’s policy, and 
its theoretical underpinnings, towards Iraq.  
Firstly, Chirac explained that France would be resistant to any unilateral action. 
Instead, any military action would need to be enacted multilaterally via a UN 
resolution, thereby granting the intervention legitimacy and ensuring it was compliant 
with international norms. Secondly, France was supportive of moves to ensure that 
arms inspections were faster and more detailed. This became enshrined in Resolution 
1441, giving weapons inspectors a wider mandate. Thirdly, France wanted to ensure 
that non-compliance, or perceived non-compliance, would not automatically result in 
a military solution by the UN Security Council, instead trying to introduce a two stage 
process307. Finally, France wanted to ensure that the endgame for the resolutions was 
the disarmament of Iraq, and not the overthrow of the Ba’athist government. 
In his interview with the New York Times, Chirac stated that he would be promoting 
a new Security Council Resolution to deploy arms inspectors to Iraq within a few 
weeks. Chirac and de Villepin were keen to portray themselves as being tough on Iraq, 
whilst still making the argument that “if the inspectors cannot return, there will have 
to be a second Security Council resolution to declare if there is a basis for intervention 
or not”308. 
There seemed to be an agreement with this proposal too in Washington, when Bush 
declared the US support for further efforts in the UN to find a diplomatic solution. 
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Indeed, there was some relief in Paris when Iraq agreed, in principle, for the return of 
arms inspectors on 16 September 2002. 
A key element of France’s position at this point was not to categorically rule out its 
participation in a military intervention (thereby distinguishing itself from Germany’s 
rejection of any military solution including German troops). To make this point clear, 
Chirac took the unusual step of holding a National Assembly debate on its foreign 
policy on 8 October 2002. This was once again used as an opportunity for France to 
show its unity between political parties regarding its approach. Whilst there were calls 
by some left-wing deputies to rule out military intervention altogether, Prime Minister 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin was keen to clarify that all options were on the table, including 
military options if necessary309.  
Upon the successful unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002, 
France believed that its strategy had been successful, achieving all that it had wanted: 
confirming the pre-eminent role of the UN, as well as adopting a multilateral approach 
to compel Iraq to cooperate and reject a unilateral military intervention by the US. At 
this moment in time, it appears that France had been able to work together to secure a 
peaceful resolution, with de Villepin stating that the Resolution showed “that the 
Americans have chosen to work with the UN, that they’ve chosen the route of 
responsibility and collective security”310. 
In addition to this, de Villepin reassured the US (and Iraq) that it would “assume its 
responsibilities”311 during the implementation of the Resolution, a phrase which would 
feature prominently in both the discourse of de Villepin and Chirac between 
September and February, implying that France would be forced to act if Iraq were to 
ignore its own responsibilities under the Resolution. 
In addition to these public declarations and the Resolution itself, France was keen to 
call upon its Arab allies to try and apply pressure to Saddam Hussain. France believed 
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that the combined pressure of the UN, the implied threat of military intervention, and 
the support of its Arab allies would result in Iraqi compliance, as it had in 1998.  
France used its Francophonie Summit in Beirut in October 2002, as well as stopovers 
in Damascus, Cairo and Amman to touch base with its various Arab allies, as well as 
warn against the threat of a new regional conflict312. Defence Minister Michelle Alliot-
Marie was sent to Saudi Arabia to gain assurances of their pressure on Iraq. French 
and Arab diplomats attempted to co-ordinate efforts throughout November and 
December 2002, with Chirac personally visiting President Bashar al Assad of Syria on 
18 December 2002. All of this was in an attempt to coordinate a unified French/Arab 
stance to pressure Saddam Hussain to avert conflict313. 
However, as was mentioned above at the beginning of this section, this united UN 
approach was not to be maintained. As early as January 2003, France became wary of 
America’s increasingly militaristic rhetoric, stating that “today nothing justifies 
envisaging military action”, and threatened the use of the veto to prevent the US using 
a ‘military short-cut’314. In order to try and delay matters further, de Villepin made 
proposals on 5 February 2003 to increase the number of arms inspectors and 
inspections, devoting French Mirage-IV spy planes to the search. French diplomats 
also lobbied the three African non-permanent members of the Security Council to 
ensure any vote would be defeated. A similar approach was also taken by Russian 
diplomats.  
Then, in order to avoid an inevitable defeat in the UN, the US and the UK abandoned 
their efforts to push a Resolution authorising military force on 18 March 2003. Jean-
Marc de la Sablière, French Ambassador at the UN confirmed that during “the last 
days members of the Council repeatedly stated that, and it is a majority in the Council, 
that it would not be legitimate to authorize the use of force now while the inspections 
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set up by the resolution are producing results”315. Following their withdrawal, France 
felt that it was being scapegoated for the US and UK’s diplomatic failures316. 
France’s stance against military actions were the consequence of a number of factors. 
Firstly, there seems to be the obvious factor that France (as well as Germany, and a 
considerable portion of the British public) were unconvinced of the evidence of the 
existence of an Iraqi WMD programme. In an interview with The New York Times, 
President Chirac advised that he had yet to see any evidence of there being a concerted 
effort to build a WMD programme. In this interview, he also reiterated that he was 
“totally against unilateralism in the modern world. I believe that the modern world 
must be coherent and consequently, if a military action is to be undertaken, it must be 
the responsibility of the international community, via a decision by the Security 
Council”317. 
Beyond that, there is of course the aforementioned political and business ties with 
Baghdad. However, it is important not to overstate these elements. France had 
intervened during the Gulf War previously (though reluctantly), and it seems likely 
that had a WMD programme been discovered, and Iraq not acquiesced to the UN’s 
demands to dismantle it, that France would have approved military intervention. 
David Styan also points to another aspect of Gaullist foreign policy which also played 
a factor: France’s reorientation towards Arab nations. This is specifically true of 
Chirac, who under previous governments, had formed close relationships with various 
Arab leaders. Hubert Védrine explained that “he [Chirac] had kept a closeness with 
the third world based on personal connections. He is one of the few active leaders to 
know the five or six people most important people in about a hundred countries”318. 
Olivier Guitta also notes that France’s foreign policy under the Fifth Republic, and 
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especially under Chirac, had placed great importance on its relations with the Arab 
world319.  
Historically and culturally, Guitta links this to a number of factors. Obviously, 
France’s links to its former empire are particularly important, both in terms of the 
historic cultural links provided, but also through the connections remaining with its 
policy of françafrique320. The post-World War Two reconstruction and waves of 
decolonisation also led to significant population flows from its former colonies to 
France. As of 2016, estimates by the Pew Forum stated that Muslims accounted for 
8.8 per cent of the population321, which constitutes a significant portion of the 
electorate. The same demographic research cited above also estimates that this 
population will increase significantly in Europe, so it will therefore continue to be a 
factor for the foreseeable future. 
As was explained above, the Gaullist tradition saw a move away from support of Israel 
and reoriented towards the Arab world. However Guitta believes that this undertook a 
significant increase under Chirac. Guitta argues that whilst the two aforementioned 
points are to be considered as reasons for Chirac’s Arab policy, the main driving force 
was to build France’s prestige, to the expense of the United States322.  
This prestige seemed to be called into play, both during the Franco-African summit in 
February 2003, and during Chirac and de Villepin’s trip to Algiers on 2-4 March. 
Chirac also explained his concerns during an interview with Time recorded on 16 
February 2003. Here he warned of the wider effects of an intervention in Iraq on the 
wider Middle East, that it would help build animosities, leading to greater terrorist 
threats like that posed by bin Laden. He also feared the effects of a war on the dialogue 
between the West and the Middle East, and between Muslims and Christians. He 
acknowledged that Iraq possessing WMDs would be dangerous, but that it was 
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important to give the inspectors time to complete their search, as well as providing 
resources to aid them in their search323.  
This approach proved popular with those on the right and the left of the political 
spectrum who had been arguing for further interaction with the Arab World. It also 
seemed popular at home, with an Ipsos poll in March showing that 69 per cent 
approved of France using its veto to prevent UN intervention324.  
Despite the clarity with which Chirac had set out France’s position towards an armed 
intervention in Iraq, France’s approach was still considered a bitter betrayal in the US. 
John Gaffney325 provides an explanation as to France’s conduct in the build up to the 
Iraq War, and why it had such a stark effect on the US administration as well as the 
culture as a whole. Gaffney seeks to understand how the diplomatic falling-out 
occurred between France and the US, using the analysis provided by Kagan326 as a 
starting point. 
Firstly, Kagan conceptualised America as one Hobbesian entity in these 
circumstances, and Europe as a separate, Kantian entity. However, Kagan does 
acknowledge some differences between some of the European states which gives them 
a particular character. For example, France’s strategic culture is influenced generally 
by Gaullism. Kagan argues that, paradoxically, French foreign policy was able to 
develop a distinct style based on France’s independence, precisely because of the 
protection that the US afforded Europe and the Western World. Kagan argues that 
such a foreign and security policy would not have been possible without American 
protection. However, Gaffney has argued that, even with regard to those principles 
forwarded by Kagan with which he would agree, he would place the emphasis 
differently. Namely, that there were greater French domestic factors at play in the 
development of France’s strategic culture, but also that a significant factor shaping 
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French attitudes towards the US was the understanding that most of America’s 
influence in Europe had been primarily to serve its own economic and strategic 
interests327.  
Gaffney goes further, arguing that Kagan does not place enough significance on 
France and other European countries’ differing ‘thresholds for tolerance’, i.e. that 
historical circumstances in Europe have created a set of attitudes and discourses which 
mean that the use of force is either intellectually or emotionally seen as more 
unnecessary or dangerous, or as more shocking or shameful. He refers here to the 
slogan of “Shame” being utilised in anti-War protests in 2003. Indeed, Gaffney argues 
that at a moral level, interventions such as Iraq would be considered as akin to 
bullying328.  
Gaffney describes the fundamental issue with Kagan’s analysis as being that it does 
not allow us to see the “contours”329 of Europe, and the various nations acting within 
it. France has very specific cultural and strategic logics which drive its actions which 
distinguish it from the actions of other nations. As has been mentioned above, 
Germany took a firmly anti-war line in regards to the international community’s 
comportment with Iraq, whereas France allowed for a more nuanced approach to 
enable it to play as large a role as possible, if circumstances were to change. This thesis 
also shows that France acts based on its own strategic rubric. This may correspond 
with the strategic designs of other European allies, or it may not. 
The second major issue relating to Kagan’s work it that he argues that the UN, and the 
use of the UN by its members, is used as a substitute for the power its members lack330. 
Gaffney argues that here, Kagan undermines the realist approach by arguing that the 
countries were able to exercise power without power, which is to say that countries 
would use the “perceptions of power and influence, and the protocols that accompany 
them, that really constitute the fabric of political exchange in international 
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relations”331. However, this hard distinction between having power and not having 
power seems rather simplistic, totally dismissing the concepts of hard and soft power. 
To argue that European nations have no power outside of the UN, and especially in 
the case of France, dismisses the relations that France has in the Arab world and sub-
Saharan Africa. Instead, the UN, and membership of the Security Council, should be 
seen as a power multiplier for its members. This also provides for a means to indirectly 
affect or limit the activities of other nations. France considers this usage of the Security 
Council as an extension of its own power, and not merely the perception of its power. 
Whilst France was unable to prevent the conflict in Iraq, it was able to prevent the 
UN’s approval of the conflict. 
Alan Henrikson332 also has criticisms of Kagan’s Hobbesian/Kantian distinctions. 
Instead, Henrikson argues that both Europe and the US constitute a political, 
economic, and cultural system, which exists as more than just a question of competing 
brute forces. He argues that Kagan’s interpretation of the power dynamics is too 
simplistic; instead Henrikson argues that European attitudes are as influenced by its 
self-perceptions of power as it is by power itself. Under Henrickson’s 
conceptualisation, there are three types of power: firstly, power as physical coercion; 
secondly, that of “articulated threat and promise” (i.e. the carrot and stick); and thirdly, 
“emanated power”, which is essentially constituted by the symbols of a nation’s 
power. Henrikson cites the example of the World Trade Center in New York as a 
powerful symbol of American capitalism. These symbols can either repel or attract 
others. In the case of the World Trade Centre, this was repulsive from the viewpoint 
of Al Qaida333.  
Gaffney uses this conceptualisation of “emanated power” to argue that the rupture 
between the US and France had stemmed from a miscalculation of America’s 
tolerance for France to act in such a way. For Gaffney, “much of France’s post World 
War II behaviour has been based on the idea that it, France, was the one Western 
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country “allowed” to behave in this way, diplomatically above its station”334. In 
addition, France had misperceived America’s own self-perceptions at this point 
(namely, that it had suffered a profound assault on 9/11); and to interfere with the US 
response to this trauma (the development of the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’), was a great 
insult which would inevitably lead to friction335. 
Gaffney seeks to distinguish these two positions by arguing that the reason France and 
the US’ rupture was so severe was that the miscalculations and misperceptions were 
“in large part, culturally conditioned”336. Effectively, he argues that circumstances 
beyond strategic aims and objectives dictate how policy is created and enacted. Whilst 
being keen not to overstate the argument, Gaffney highlights that the cultural baggage 
feeding into the decisions made by both the US and France led to the schism. 
Whilst the totality of Gaffney’s arguments regarding the falling out with America need 
not be discussed for the purposes of this thesis, he does provide some clarifications 
regarding the reasons behind France’s policy decisions in this period. He describes 
how France’s post-World War Two character is comprised of a “dual 
righteousness/defensiveness”, to which was added “a third element: an arrogant, 
although not militarily aggressive mission civilisatrice”337. Whilst there may be some 
dispute as to whether France’s policies are militarily aggressive (this thesis shows that, 
in their current form, they are), what Gaffney is describing is a form a French 
exceptionalism which developed in the second half of the twentieth century, moving 
from “pretensions to equality with the US (through its presumed leadership of Europe) 
to a recognition of the US’ mighty superiority”338, throughout which France 
maintained its sense of responsibility/mission. 
Once again, in his analysis Gaffney argues that France became obsessed with 
increasing its rang and its grandeur through a use of its foreign and security policy. 
However, for Gaffney, France’s self-image is illusory, that it is not as great in 
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international player as it imagines. Furthermore, he argues that France was aware of 
this fact, and, as Treacher and Philip Cerny has argued, used grand gestures to mask 
its national decline339. This awareness is therefore also a source of great anxiety for 
France. Gaffney points to its military parades during Bastille Day as such an example 
of France attempting to bolster its own ego340. 
Gaffney therefore argues that France’s conduct in the build up to the UN vote 
regarding military intervention in Iraq was, as all foreign policy has been, a very 
personal act. The argument stands that as foreign policy under the Fifth Republic is so 
tied up with the President, it is almost inevitable that it would assume this personal 
approach. Here, the line is blurred however between the President (the person), and 
the Presidency (the office). Certainly it can and is argued that historic and cultural 
policies established by de Gaulle are certainly inherent in the policies enacted by 
subsequent Presidents. 
It is important to note however that throughout this period, France continued its 
presence in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF forces. It also continued to work with and 
participate in NATO. In August 2003, NATO took control of ISAF, effectively placing 
French troops under its command. However, France by that point had minimised the 
amount of troops in that theatre, with 750 troops in 2005, and 1500 by the end of 2006, 
which was much smaller than most European contingents, and much smaller than what 
France could have produced if it had so wanted341. France also restricted the use of its 
forces so they could only be deployed in Kabul, and not the surrounding areas342.  
Auerswald and Saiderman argued that France was keen to manage the use of its troops, 
attempting to prevent them from participating in operations which could lead to bad 
PR, such as counter-narcotics or crowd control exercises. There was also a strict 
oversight of troops, reporting any “action that could possibly appear in the press”343 
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up the chain of command, through the French Joint Staff to the Chief of Defence, then 
on to the President. The one caveat to this however was the deployment of French 
Special Forces in and around Spin Boldak. This too was hedged with limitations 
though, as they were not allowed to undertake long-term counterterrorism missions 
which would involve trailing insurgents for extended periods, or accompany Afghan 
advisors during missions344. The Special Forces troops were also told that they could 
not disclose that they were currently on mission, as public knowledge could infer a 
long term commitment or increase the political costs at home345. 
However, Chirac had not totally rejected France’s role in the conflict, but was rather 
pursuing other avenues to suggest a French role. Instead, in February 2004 Chirac 
suggested that the Eurocorps be used to bolster forces in Afghanistan346. The force 
would be authorised for deployment twice in Afghanistan, once in 2004-2005, and 
again in 2012347. It is important to reiterate at this point though that Eurocorps, as it 
was originally conceived, comprised of troops from France, Germany, Spain, 
Luxembourg and Belgium, so French troops would only constitute a fraction of the 
troops348. 
Certainly the above information would suggest that France was keen to be seen 
undertaking international peacekeeping missions, but as compared with figures in the 
nineties above shows, are far more reluctant to supply significant portions of 
resources. This lends credence to the idea that much of France’s peacekeeping 
missions under Chirac were performative. However, following his various health 
problems, Chirac announced in 2007 that he would not stand for a third term as French 
President. Following national elections, Nicolas Sarkozy acceded to the presidency, 
and with him came some new developments in how France would conduct itself on 
the world stage. 
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1.3 The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
Many of the justifications provided in launching airstrikes and implementing a no-fly-
zone over Libya, as well as intervening in Syria, revolve around the notion of there 
being a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Therefore, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of the literature surrounding the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and 
how it pertains to France and the current situation. 
Following the atrocities of Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, it was clear that the 
international community needed to find a new way to act to help prevent genocide 
from occurring again. In September 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan set a 
challenge for the international community to find a way of cooperating to prevent such 
occurrences again349. 
A report named “The Responsibility to Protect” was published in 2001 by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Security. This publication argued 
that the primary responsibility for the protection of people primarily rested with the 
State. However, a ‘residual responsibility’ lay with the broader international 
community, which “activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or 
unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes 
or atrocities”350. 
After some modification, it was eventually adopted in 2005. Paragraphs 138, 139, and 
140 of the 2005 World Summit document A/RES/60/1 adopted the measure as 
follows: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
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139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility 
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need 
for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and 
its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We 
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out. 
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide.351 
Put simply, the Responsibility to Protect relies on three pillars: 
- Pillar One: The protection responsibilities of the State 
- Pillar Two: International assistance and capacity-building 
- Pillar Three: Timely and decisive response352 
Pillar One represents the responsibility on the state itself to neither perpetrate nor allow 
atrocities to occur on its own territory. This is considered the primary responsibility. 
Pillar Two declares that other states and intergovernmental organisations have a 
responsibility to assist states in discharging this primary responsibility, if they are 
willing to be helped. Finally, Pillar Three states that if the primary responsibility is 
failing to be discharged, and a state is failing to protect its own people, then other 
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states are to provide that protection by every means permitted by the United Nations 
Charter353. 
At the time, the Responsibility to Protect proved to be quite controversial as there were 
serious misgivings about the nature of the responsibility, and whether it would affect 
the principle of sovereignty. How would the third pillar be interpreted? Would a state 
lose some of its rights to other states if it was felt that it was failing to discharge the 
first pillar?  
Under the letter of the law, the answer appears to be no. As Simon Chesterman notes, 
“the significance of RtoP was never, in a strict sense, legal. Rather, it was political—
and, importantly, rhetorical”354. Indeed, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter remains the 
same, prohibiting the use, or threat, of force against other member states except for 
times of self-defence and action authorised by the Security Council355. 
Indeed, there was a fear when the Responsibility to Protect was introduced that states 
would use it as a justification to push their own objectives. In 2005, there were two 
examples whereby a Responsibility to Protect claim was rejected. Firstly, in May 
2005, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Jouchner asked for the Responsibility to 
Protect to be used in relation to Myanmar. Three months later, Russia also attempted 
to justify its invasion of Georgia using the same reasoning. Both claims failed as 
France and Russia were unable to gain any support in the Security Council, even from 
their own allies. As Badescu (now Stefan) and Weiss note, it ironically served to 
become an example of the difficulty of abusing the system356. It also had the additional 
effect of persuading member states, who had been cautious of this newly developing 
norm, of its defence against abuse. 
However, because the Responsibility to Protect does not confer any additional legal 
obligations, it does not mean that it serves no purpose. Anne Orford has argued, that 
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despite the lack of legal rights/obligations, one can still interpret the Responsibility to 
Protect as conferring public power and allocating jurisdiction357. It is an attempt to 
gain some buy in from the UN member States to take responsibility for the welfare of 
its own citizens, as well as being conscious of the welfare of others in states around 
them, and taking responsibility for them too if the situation arises.  
Chesterman notes that the way that the Responsibility to Protect is written is 
reminiscent of Article 99 of the UN Charter, which allows the UN Secretary-General 
to bring before the Security Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten 
the maintenance of international peace and security”358. Indeed, much of the push for 
Responsibility to Protect comes from the Office of the Secretary-General359. 
Ultimately, it would appear that the true purpose is the encouragement of Member 
States to act to assist other populations, or at the very least, to make it more difficult 
to do nothing in the face of atrocities. 
Responsibility to Protect has been used successfully on very few occasions, and yet it 
was successfully implemented in the case of Libya. Chesterman believes it was due to 
the “unusual clarity of the situation in Libya”360. Indeed, with Colonel Gaddafi 
explicitly declaring his plans for anyone who stood against him, the decision was made 
clear for many world leaders. “Within a twenty four hour period the United States 
pivoted from scepticism about intervention in Libya to forceful advocacy”361. 
Where a Responsibility to Protect exists, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty set forth some guidance as to when military 
intervention may be appropriate. There are four things to consider:  
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives 
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is 
                                                          
357 Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 22-27 
358 UN Charter, art. 99 Chapter XV http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xv/index.html 
[accessed 27/09/2017] 
359 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), pp. 46-51 
360 Simon Chesterman, "Leading from Behind': The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, 
and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya" New York University Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Papers. 2011 Paper 282. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/13553130.pdf p.8 [accessed 
27/09/2017] 
361 Ibid. 
104 
 
better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the 
victims concerned.  
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option 
for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable 
grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.  
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military 
intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection 
objective.  
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or 
averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of 
action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.362 
When President Obama justified his decision for the United States intervention, he 
was keen to explain the specific nature of the circumstances in Libya: 
America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and 
risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action. 
But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right. In this particular 
country—Libya—at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence 
on a horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate 
for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea 
for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to stop Qaddafi’s 
forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground.363 
Within this quote one finds a number of things to analyse. As mentioned above, 
Obama is quick to mention how exceptional this case was (with the continual mention 
of the word ‘particular’). Obama is also keen to describe the multi-lateral nature of the 
intervention, with support from Arab countries. And obviously, in a post-
Afghanistan/Iraq US, Obama also feels the need to mention that the intervention was 
done without having to deploy ground troops, thereby minimising the apparent risk to 
American lives. He is also clear to display that they were fighting with the right 
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intention, and that there was a reasonable prospect of success. When discussing the 
discourse generated by the Sarkozy government in Part II, these justifications are 
examined in much greater detail. 
However, a brief appraisal of the Responsibility to Protect reveals a number of 
similarities with the aforementioned Liberal Internationalism. Specifically, when 
comparing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
criteria for R2P intervention364 with Tony Blair’s own criteria for Liberal 
Intervention365, these similarities are laid bare. To a certain extent, the intervention 
having the right intention, that it is a last resort, that it involves proportional means, 
and that it has a reasonable chance at success, are all present in both definitions. The 
main difference being that Tony Blair is explicit that national interests must be 
involved. However, as has been mentioned above by General de la Gorce, establishing 
peace and stability is often within a nation’s best interests366. 
These similarities exist despite the fact that R2P was designed, in part, to address the 
criticisms of humanitarian intervention, such as the risk of generating a backlash from 
former colonised states who were wary of the supposedly altruistic motives of a 
military force367, that it relied too heavily on political will which could change368; or 
that it oversimplified, either accidently or by design, situations where the options 
presented were inaction or military action369.  
Philip Cunliffe however understands the development of R2P in a slightly different 
way to these criticisms, which draws a crucial difference between R2P and Liberal 
Intervention. Instead, the distinction lies in the fact R2P reinforces the importance of 
the State, instead of transcending it370.   
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R2P, according to Cunliffe, is a process of “norming the exception”371. By this he 
means that R2P, as conceptualised by Kofi Annan, “seeks to close the gap between 
the norm and the exception” in relation to a state’s right to its sovereignty, and the 
obligations put upon said state to protect its citizens from humanitarian 
emergencies372. More broadly, it does not create exceptions in certain cases, but rather 
in certain types of cases, e.g. “he is not concretely discussing the need for intervention 
in Rwanda or Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for intervention in circumstances of ‘a 
Rwanda’ or ‘a Srebrenica’”373. Cunliffe uses the work of Huysmans to explain that the 
R2P doctrine is a decisionistic rather than normative exceptionalism, in that “While 
normativist visions of international political order seek to limit the assertion of 
arbitrary exercise of power as much as possible … decisionist visions make the 
arbitrary exercise of power [i.e. the transgression of norms] a permanent and immanent 
condition of normative order”374.  
Whilst R2P has been established as constituting a norm, or rather a decisionist 
exception to the norm, it does not mean that the outcome is necessarily guaranteed. 
Indeed, the doctrine still requires a Security Council vote in order to succeed. The 
norm was found to be appropriate in the case of Libya in 2011, and a protective no-fly 
zone was allowed to be established to protect civilians, without a Russian veto. 
However, a joint op-ed by Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister 
David Cameron, would later blur the intention behind the authorising resolution, with 
the world leaders arguing that Gaddafi must step down375.  
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This meant that the R2P doctrine would be treated by some academics, and President 
Putin, as being an imperialistic doctrine376. This argument would therefore be used by 
Putin as an excuse to resist the notion that the R2P norm had been triggered in the 
situation in Syria, and cautioned the US that there should be no armed intervention 
because of this377.  
An important element which this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature at large is 
to show how two French Presidents, Sarkozy and Hollande, sought to synthesise 
French Republican and R2P ideas together to form a cohesive argument for 
intervention. Based on what has been explained above, France has adapted to the 
advent of the multi-polar, international community. For it to be able to intervene 
militarily, it needs to obtain support from its allies, and needs to convince other 
members of the Security Council that it is acting in good faith. This is the clear 
limitation of the R2P doctrine which state actors must seek to address. This thesis 
shows in detail the ways in which both Sarkozy and Hollande sought to obtain support 
and built trust (or not, as was the case with Hollande). 
After discussing the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, the next section discusses the 
foreign policy developments under President Sarkozy. It examines, amongst other 
things, the extent to which he represented a change or continuation of the foreign 
policy principles set forth by previous presidents, as well as examining more generally 
how Sarkozy acted within the international community at large.  
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1.4 Foreign Policy Under Nicolas Sarkozy 
Sarkozy’s early presidency marked some seemingly significant changes in France’s 
approach to its allies. Most noticeably, after decades of seemingly being drawn 
towards the organisation, Sarkozy would finally be the one to formerly reintegrate 
France into the NATO command structure. In the 2008 White Paper setting out 
France’s foreign policy, France declared its intentions regarding NATO. In this 
document, it describes that the “renewal of NATO and strengthening of the European 
Union are two aspects of a single approach. Each of these two organisations, with its 
own characteristics, aims, and dynamics is essential to the security and action of 
France on the international stage.”378 The White Paper also acknowledged that 
“relations between the European Union and NATO have suffered from a number of 
misapprehensions and genuine misunderstandings. It is important to dispel these”379. 
Therefore, it was here in this document that the arguments for reintegration were laid 
out. Whilst maintaining that de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from NATO was 
necessary to “restore their completely national character to [France’s] armies”, as well 
as resisting the subordination of French forces to any foreign power, or having any 
foreign military presence on French territory380, a number of changes in both NATO’s 
post-Cold War mission and France’s involvement within it had meant that there was 
“call for a rethink of their practical implications 40 years on”381. 
However, any rapprochement would need to meet a number of criteria. Firstly, France 
would need to have complete freedom to assess situations and decisions, in so far as 
France would need to have the final say in the usage of its assets in any NATO 
intervention. However, the Paper is keen to reassure the reader that as the Alliance 
was a “group of sovereign nations in which political decisions are taken by 
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consensus”, and “France will therefore retain its full independence of judgement and 
decision in all circumstances”382.  
Secondly, France needed to retain its nuclear independence, and that its assets and 
deterrence strategy would remain outside of the NATO framework. Finally, France 
would need to be able to have the final say in when and how its forces are utilised, and 
specifically that no force would be “placed permanently under NATO command in 
peacetime”383.  
Sarkozy was confident that joining NATO would not jeopardise any of these freedoms, 
so France formally re-joined the central military command structure of NATO in 2009. 
This was of course met with some controversy from both within his own party, and 
from the opposition. Martine Aubry, leader of the Socialist Party, argued that “nothing 
today justifies returning to NATO’s military command… There’s no hurry, no 
fundamental need, except this Atlanticism that’s becoming an ideology”384. 
Atlanticism here is to be understood as pro-American sentiment.  
However, France under Sarkozy did seem keen to play a much greater role in military 
interventions. This can be seen in Sarkozy’s change in approach to French troops in 
Afghanistan. Auerswald and Saideman note that key differences emerged in the 
freedom afforded to France’s troops in conducting operations. Indeed, the key 
differences they found between the conduct of Chirac and Sarkozy was that: “Where 
Chirac was motivated to limit most French behavior in Afghanistan, Sarkozy seems to 
have been motivated to achieve particular outcomes on the ground and with regard to 
the NATO alliance”385.  
Interviews conducted by Auerswald and Saideman suggest that practically, this meant 
not only a significant increase in the number of troops situated in the country386, but 
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also redeploying its troops to RC-East and Eastern Afghanistan387. France also assisted 
in Southern Afghanistan when requested, deploying observer, mentor, liaison teams 
(OMLTs) outside of Kabul. These OMLTs were twice the size of normal OMLTs, as 
requested by the French themselves, because of the distance between the OMLTs and 
the rest of its forces, thereby making logistical support significantly more difficult388. 
Sarkozy was keen in these circumstances to be seen as being helpful to the ISAF 
mission, removing the constraints which had previously been placed on the Afghan 
forces by Chirac. 
As has been mentioned above, foreign policy within the French system takes an 
incredibly personal element. Sarkozy, as shown throughout this thesis, was keen to 
accentuate this element. This attitude can clearly be found in his foreword to the 2008 
White Paper: “As Commander in Chief of the French armed forces, I have the duty to 
protect the vital and strategic interests of our nation. It is my responsibility to choose 
the strategy and assets France needs…”389 
However, whilst Sarkozy was keen to place his stamp on French foreign policy, did 
his presidency actually mark a significant change in policy? As has been seen above, 
a common trait shared by many pieces of literature concerning France’s modus 
operandi in regards to military intervention in the modern day setting is that it attempts 
to co-opt other organisations or nations into potential military intervention. For many 
commentators, this has been particularly brought into focus under the presidency of 
Nicolas Sarkozy.  
For Cumming, “the Sarkozy Government endeavoured to move from unilateral 
towards UN, EU or African-backed military interventions”390. Indeed, this is a 
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sentiment which has been echoed throughout the literature (J Bucher et al.391, 
Rowdybush and Chamorel392). Rowdybush and Chamorel note that Sarkozy, early 
during his Presidency, made pledges to do a number of things to help bring this about: 
Sarkozy said that there would be a “return of France in Europe”; a full and complete 
return to NATO’s command structures; a reconciliation with the United States, marked 
in particular by sending additional troops to Afghanistan; an initiative for a Union for 
the Mediterranean; and a renewed relationship with Africa as well as the Middle 
East”393.  
This was of course the opposite of what de Gaulle had done when he withdrew from 
NATO’s military structures in 1966. As was mentioned above, NATO and the 
domination of the United States within it was viewed as a threat to France’s own 
power. However, circumstances had changed in the interim. France had always viewed 
its ability to deploy its expeditionary forces abroad to defend its national interests, and 
especially in Africa, as being intrinsic to its sense of grandeur. Furthermore, due to its 
historical ties and continual interactions with Africa, France “recognises that its 
activism there is the most influential [sic] it can exercise on the international stage”394. 
Rowdybush and Chamorel note that by taking an active role in conflict resolution 
internationally, France aims to demonstrate to the world its ability to use hard power, 
as well as strengthen its political ties with key allies like the United States of 
America395.  
However, with Sarkozy’s decision to move away from unilateral action, France was 
instead seeking to relieve itself of the significant cost of its interventions, whilst still 
enabling it to participate in such interventions. As France viewed itself as a great 
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power, it felt that it had an obligation in international affairs396. According to Article 
24(1) of the UN Charter, the Security Council enjoys “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of the international peace and security”, and as a permanent member of 
the Security Council, France “uses these obligations whenever it suits its interests”397.  
As has been shown consistently above, Security Council Resolutions and other forms 
of political legitimisation are important to France when it is intervening abroad in a 
nation with which it does not already have a defence treaty. This forms a major part 
of this thesis’ argument, and is borne out in the comparative case study between the 
situation with Libya, and that of Syria.  
However, what were the longstanding implications of Sarkozy’s change in approach, 
and did it actually constitute a veritable change in policy? Or, was Sarkozy’s supposed 
reform programme actually more an example of style over substance? 
For Cumming, it is certainly the case that some of Sarkozy’s reforms were more 
limited than had been previously suggested, whilst others were redundant. An example 
of a redundant reform was that of the need to break from, or renegotiate defence 
agreements. In an interview Cumming conducted, many agreements were already 
“defunct, inapplicable or ignored”398. France’s refusal to intervene militarily to 
support Laurent Gbagbo (the President of Côte d’Ivoire) in the early 2000s showed 
that the agreements were not binding. Furthermore, the idea of renegotiating the 
bilateral agreements at a time when France was advocating an EU-Africa strategy was 
doubtful399.  
Sarkozy also had a complicated relationship with the promotion of democracy in 
Africa. In later chapters we specifically treat the complicated dealings surrounding 
Libya and Tunisia. This thesis shows how Sarkozy’s support for democracy was often 
conditional400. However, beyond these there are many other examples of Sarkozy’s 
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inconsistency. In 2008, Sarkozy gave a speech in Benin declaring that he would 
engage in dialogue with African leaders as “equal, responsible partners”, and that he 
would respect efforts to “build democracy”, “respect individual freedoms” and “refuse 
coup d’états”401. 
During his infamous speech in Dakar in 2007, Sarkozy had seemingly planned to 
foster a sense of partnership and celebrate an African renaissance, but he ended up 
actually saying that “The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered 
into history ... They have never really launched themselves into the future”402, before 
going further and declaring that “the African peasant only knew the eternal renewal of 
time, marked by the endless repetition of the same gestures and the same words… In 
this realm of fancy ... there is neither room for human endeavour nor the idea of 
progress”403. 
In this instance, Sarkozy may have been attempting to be offering a form of apology 
for previous crimes committed by the French Empire, retarding national development 
in certain areas. However, this ignores the decades of progress made, and maintains a 
rather condescendingly patriarchal view of Africa. Indeed, Alpha Oumar Konare, 
(Chairman of the African Union Commission) condemned the content of Sarkozy’s 
speech as the “declarations of a bygone era”404.  
Confusion and contradiction formed part of Sarkozy’s foreign policy. Some level of 
improvisation is inevitable, but Sarkozy often announced policies which he had no 
intention of following, or would vacillate between contradictory policies. For 
example, in 2008, Sarkozy proudly forwarded the notion that he would be engaging 
with the French Parliament in regards to its African Policy. However, he had created 
an unrealistic notion about the type of coordination which would be happening. This 
notion was quickly dispelled, with Bayart noting that the Sarkozy government “took 
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France to war in the Sahel without… so much as informing her Parliamentary 
representatives”405. 
The chaos and confusion within diplomatic circles became so pronounced that a group 
of irate diplomats known as the ‘Marly Group’ wrote to Le Monde to complain. They 
described the foreign policy produced by Sarkozy as ‘impulsive’, as being too 
‘mediatised’, as well as being ‘amateurish’406. They also stated that Sarkozy’s frenetic 
style concerned African leaders, who interpreted it as a lack of respect407.  
As was mentioned above, there was the particular humiliation of Sarkozy’s speech in 
Dakar. However, Sarkozy was also rather impulsive. An example of this was the 
decision to recognise the National Transitional Council as the legitimate government 
of Libya. Seemingly, much of Sarkozy’s interactions with the Libyan rebels were 
organised through the philosopher Bernard Henri-Lévi. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, it would seem, had not been consulted on the decision, and it is possible that 
it may have been at least in part motivated by Gaddafi’s withdrawal from promises of 
contracts worth ten billion euros408. 
Sarkozy, and his personal advisor, Henri Guaino, were both accused of being anti-
intellectual. Guaino wore this on his sleeve as a badge of honour. In response to the 
massive backlash against the Dakar speech, Guaino, the person who authored the 
speech, responded by saying that “if intellectuals are protesting, it’s clear proof that 
we are right”409. 
This attitude was clearly on display when Sarkozy neglected to consult with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the recognition of the National Transitional Council. 
This was also the case when Sarkozy closed down the Haut Conseil de la Coopération 
Internationale (HCCI), whose job it was to analyse and try to ensure clarity of France’s 
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aid policy. The scrapping of the HCCI could therefore be seen as further action to 
remove oversight of government departments, which already had only very limited 
oversight by government and other Non-Governmental Organisations410. 
Another reason that Cumming feels that Sarkozy’s policy was mired by incoherence 
was due to his inability to establish a vision for Africa411. As a result of this, Cumming 
interprets most of Sarkozy’s foreign policy as moving from one crisis to another, 
searching for “alternative logics and sources of legitimacy”412.  
In the context of this thesis, Cumming’s appraisal of the Sarkozy presidency certainly 
rings true. When comparing Sarkozy’s reaction to the Arab Spring, he flip-flopped 
between attempting to support the existing regime in Tunisia, to only a couple of 
months later launching airstrikes and supporting a rebel faction against the leader of 
Libya. And as Cumming mentioned above, in absence of any vision or doctrine for 
foreign policy, it makes it difficult for people outside of the Elysée bubble to get any 
coherent understanding, (though if the Marly Group are to be believed, this was also 
an issue within the Foreign Ministry). 
Bayart also argues that France invited some trouble onto itself in the Sahel, by agreeing 
with the United States of America that direct intervention was required to prevent areas 
from becoming al Qaeda strongholds. As such, Bayart claims that by targeting a 
relatively little known group called Al Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), France 
gave them a credibility that they would not have otherwise had413.  
When factoring all of the information above, the question becomes to what extent was 
Sarkozy truly an agent of change? For Cumming, the answer is yes, he was a genuine 
agent of change, but with some significant caveats414. As was mentioned above, 
Sarkozy seemed to be moving towards a reorientation of policy in terms of fully 
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reintegrating France into the NATO command apparatus. But as was also seen, the 
extent of his reforms was far more limited than they originally seemed.  
In terms of relations with America, the findings of this thesis do suggest that there was 
significant improvement in Franco-American relations sufficient to enable successful 
missions over Libya. Furthermore, this relationship would factor in heavily during the 
Syrian crisis, though Hollande is shown to have been unable to mobilise or rely on this 
friendship in the way that Sarkozy had. 
This thesis also shows the more improvisational and less focused aspects of Sarkozy. 
In particular, this thesis presents how quickly he adapted France’s position in relation 
to the regimes in North Africa when circumstances seemed to change. Continuity 
however can also be found in the Republican narratives and tropes relied on to justify 
the need for intervention. What Sarkozy was able to do effectively, however, was 
combine these concepts with arguments relating to the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine, to formulate a single, cohesive argument. 
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1.5 Interventions in Libya and Syria 
In order to situate this current thesis within the literature, there first needs to be an 
examination regarding what has been written about France’s interventions in Libya 
and Syria. This will therefore be conducted in two parts. The first part addresses the 
literature concerning Libya (1.5.1), whilst the second takes a close look at that which 
has been written about Hollande’s failed attempt to intervene in Syria (1.5.2). 
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1.5.1 France’s 2011 Intervention in Libya 
There are a number of questions surrounding the intervention in Libya. Why did 
France intervene? Does France’s reaction constitute a change in foreign policy? This 
thesis takes as its objective the analysis of the difference between interventions in 
Libya and Syria, and what this can teach us about France’s foreign policy in regards 
to when it will intervene militarily. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
circumstances in Libya, something which this section seeks to interrogate. 
Jason Davidson proposed a method of understanding the Libyan intervention415. In his 
article, Davidson argues that existing theories of international relations, constructivist, 
defensive realist, or liberal, were insufficient on their own to explain France’s and 
Great Britain’s intervention. According to Davidson, a constructivist interpretation of 
the intervention places the emphasis on the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm, as well as 
the UN Security Council resolution416. A defensive realism approach would emphasise 
the refugee flows and risk of terrorism for the intervention417. Finally, liberalism 
would focus on Sarkozy’s need to minimise electoral risk associated with a 
humanitarian intervention418. 
However, Davidson argues that this situation is too complicated to apply a single 
theory, and that as such, one needs to use an integrated model.  
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Figure 1. Jason Davidson’s integrated model of Intervention decisions419. 
Davidson’s integrated model (as above) initially breaks down events along the lines 
of when they happened, and what types of events they were. On the far left is what he 
considers to be the three causal links. The first causal link being the Responsibility to 
Protect Norm existing. A constructivist reading of the scenario would suggest that if 
an international norm exists, it will play a significant role in a decision as to whether 
military intervention is appropriate420. As discussed above, the Responsibility to 
Protect norm is designed to apply when a state has abdicated its role in protecting its 
citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and other crimes 
against humanity. Furthermore, the international community has a responsibility to 
take ‘timely and decisive’ action on behalf of the affected population421.  
The second causal link regards a threat, perceived or otherwise, to a nation. This refers 
to the defensive realist literature, which would predict a nation intervening in a 
situation if it felt that the nation or any of its interests were under direct or indirect 
threat. This includes the citizenry, its territorial integrity, its “economy or any natural 
resource of major economic or security significance”422. In this case, Davidson argues 
that this was the threat of migrant flow across the Mediterranean Sea, thereby forming 
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a threat to France’s territorial sanctity423. Furthermore, the greater the migrant flow, 
the greater the threat presented. 
Davidson then brings in a third initial factor, that of Prestige424. Prestige is defined by 
Robert Gilpin as the social recognition of a state’s power.425 Prestige in this context 
has multiple theoretical interpretations. A realist would argue that a state wants other 
states to see it as strong so that it can survive, or achieve other objectives426. Indeed, 
this is the approach that Howarth takes, whereby he argues that France gains prestige 
by taking the lead in the Mediterranean when the European Union and NATO had 
been reluctant427. 
A constructivist reading concerns social expectations. An example of a constructivist 
interpretation is Larson and Shevchenko’s analysis of Chinese and Russian responses 
to American Primacy. According to Social Identity theory, both Russia and China 
modified their behaviours in response to the way in which the countries were 
perceived428. 
Once again, placing prestige as a potential causal factor means that we would expect 
to see states more likely to intervene if their prestige is at play, and certainly if a nation 
has historical ties with a nation in question429. That would certainly be the case with 
Libya, and specifically with Sarkozy as he was one of the first world leaders to 
welcome Gaddafi back into the fold after a period of being persona non-grata due to 
the Lockerbie bombing430. 
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The next step in the model is attempting to establish whether the course of action, 
military intervention in this case, will be effective, and what the costs would be. Again, 
as was mentioned above, military intervention can only result from a Responsibility 
to Protect case if there is a genuine feeling that the intervention itself would be 
successful. Therefore, France would have to consider whether they could achieve their 
goals through military action, before they should.  
Once a course of action is decided, then it must be implemented. The next step 
therefore is seeing if international consensus is with the nation pushing for action. 
Within the UN, military action is only possible in cases of self-defence, or in cases 
where there is a Security Council Resolution authorising force.  
In order to see if consensus is there, the first step could be to condemn an actor. Taking 
the first step, Davidson argues, makes intervention more likely to occur. Firstly, 
because in condemning a state, one burns bridges with them for the foreseeable future, 
and makes the threatened state an even greater threat to one’s own safety. Secondly, 
by acting first, a state is also putting even more prestige at risk. If after making a threat 
it then backs down, it can make a leader look weak (see analysis on Hollande and Syria 
literature below)431.  
The final step for Davidson before using force is to judge whether there is public 
support. Liberal International Relations theory advises us that the executive 
democratic states will often act in a way to maximise the party’s fortunes432. Military 
intervention is rarely a vote winner, so then the case becomes working out what will 
gain the party in power the best net gain. Davidson sets out the gambit as such:  
If the public supports intervention and the opposition does not, there will be no angry 
voters for the government to lose. If the opposition supports intervention and the public 
does not, the government knows that angry voters cannot take out their policy frustration 
by voting for the opposition433. 
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With his Model in place, Davidson then seeks to explain the decision to intervene in 
Libya. He notes from the beginning that due to the proximity to the event, and the lack 
of interviews in his case, his article does have limitation, and as such, is better aimed 
at theory development and explanation.  
As was mentioned in the outset, Davidson finds that one reason alone is insufficient, 
and sets out to demonstrate this. A major justification given in favour of the need to 
intervene was the siege of Benghazi, and the threat of significant casualties. However, 
Davidson finds that this is not a sufficient reason for the intervention, as both the 
British and the French had been advocating for a no-fly-zone long before Gaddafi’s 
threat434. 
Davidson opines that the second issue, that of a threat to France’s borders, must have 
played some part in his decision, as there was indeed some concern of large numbers 
of migrants crossing the sea435. However, if this were such a significant issue for 
Sarkozy, he could have decided to side with the Gaddafi regime to defeat the 
opposition, or invested more significantly in border controls436. 
Finally, Prestige is offered as the final causal factor. France had been slow to react to 
the Arab Spring, being caught out offering support to the Tunisian leader when 
protests broke out437. Davidson argues that due to this, as well as an expectation for 
France to take leadership in the situation due to France’s history in Africa, this made 
intervention more likely438.  
France had made the calculations regarding the cost of intervention, and had decided 
that an air-only intervention via the no-fly-zone would be a relatively low cost solution 
that they felt could work. Alain Juppé felt that Gaddafi’s air superiority and his 
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willingness to use it against military and civilian targets was the only reason Libya 
had been able to regain the upper hand439.  
France would also have had to have expected to be at the front of the coalition, as the 
United States had already indicated that it did not want to take a long term leading 
role440.  
With all of this in mind, the French decided that they would indeed take the steps 
towards military intervention. Once they had made the decision to intervene, France 
pursued it. France announced early that it would be working on sanctions with the EU 
against Gaddafi441, and two days later had demanded that he leave office.442 They 
burned all their bridges with the Gaddafi regime by recognising the National 
Transitional Council.   
Davidson’s approach to the issue of how the Libyan intervention came about is 
certainly an interesting one, and based on a surface-level reading of events, it seems 
accurate. It would certainly seem the case that in the mind of Sarkozy, there would 
have been multiple causal factors to consider. However, it is unclear how much value 
this theory actually brings. Davidson notes that the article exists mostly to generate 
more theories, and his approach certainly appears novel. However it is unclear how 
the model plays out in other circumstances. Prima facie, it would appear to work in 
the Syria situation, as when it came to the International Consensus stage, this is where 
Hollande’s request for airstrikes failed. However, Davidson notes in his article that 
there were suggestions that the airstrikes may have still gone ahead even without a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution443.  
What this thesis brings, which Davidson’s account does not, is two-fold. Firstly, this 
thesis has the benefit of time to look back and gain greater perspective. Secondly, this 
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thesis also takes a more historically minded approach, and specifically in using the 
Discourse-Historical Approach. Davidson’s approach does not take into account 
historical policy factors, nor does it contextualise the decision to intervene militarily.  
This is a limitation which is also picked up on by Ostermann444. Ostermann does not 
seek to necessarily dispute that there were multiple reasons for the intervention, but 
he also feels that there must be something else at work. Or else, why would a 
“discourse so fundamentally invoking democratic norms closely tied to the French 
foreign policy identity have been engaged for rhetorical reasons only if French 
interests were supposedly so clear”445? 
What Ostermann argues instead is that the military intervention in Libya was 
intentionally articulated in a way so as to create a strong identification between the 
plight of the Libyan people and France’s historical narratives of democratic 
universalism. As such, “these discursive performances made intervention the 
culturally only appropriate choice”446. 
From his analysis, Ostermann manages to pull a number of narratives from the texts 
he has examined. The key point that is made in favour of the intervention is that, in 
his sample, the word ‘protection’ is mentioned in “more than 200 separate paragraphs 
in 59 of the 91 documents”447. Furthermore, he notes that the other most common 
discursive element is that the Arab Spring is consistently framed as a progress for 
democracy and human rights448.  
Of course, these messages are also provided in contradistinction to how Gaddafi and 
the Libyan government is portrayed. Words such as ‘barbarie’, ‘genocide’ and 
‘terreur’ are used to evoke not just negative emotions, but also to create a sense of 
urgency to the plight of the Libyans suffering under Gaddafi and his forces.  
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Ostermann also argues that by portraying Gaddafi and his regime in such a light, 
“objectifying him as a war criminal, insane or villain”449, it means that for anyone to 
oppose Sarkozy’s plans, they would also have to work somewhat to negate the 
narrative surrounding Gaddafi himself.  
Furthermore: 
throughout the case, democratic universalism and its value-commitments to human rights 
or freedom (liberté) play multiple political and fantasmatic roles:  
(1) in interpreting the Arab Spring as an advent of a new democratic age. These statements 
employ predications like a historic moment of change, a revolution, a wakeup call, or the 
metaphor “wind of liberty” (Sauvadet, NC, Assemblée nationale 2011- 03-22, Juppé, 
FgAff, Assemblée nationale 2011-03-30), which establishes a comparison between the 
upheaval and a strong force of nature you cannot withstand;  
(2) in affirming democracy as a common denominator of the intervening subjects and the 
Libyan people (or other peoples); and  
(3) in framing the intervention as a means to strengthen democratic developments and 
help others to achieve their natural democratic and human rights450 
Throughout much of the discourse Ostermann analyses, the French executive try to 
blur the lines between the Libyans who are seeking democracy, and the French451. 
Sarkozy also seems keen to draw a distinction between Libyans and the Libyan 
government, which further helps simplify the conflict down from a political conflict 
to a simple democrats versus dictator452. 
Finally, Ostermann notes that Sarkozy also wraps narratives surrounding self-
determination into the arguments. He is keen to mention that everything that France 
and its allies do is based on the wishes of the Libyan population; they are asking for 
French help. But also, that the help will be limited to removing Gaddafi, and then 
leaving the Libyan people to build their new democracy453. 
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What is interesting to note is that this research is somewhat supported by another as 
well, that by Bucher et al.454. In this research, Bucher et al. compared the media 
coverage and arguments in regards to the intervention in France and Germany. They 
found that the media in France tended to mirror the political classes as they became 
more pro-intervention. Bucher et al. refrain from drawing any conclusions as to the 
causality, whether the media influenced the political classes, or whether the political 
classes influenced the media455. However what they did find was that the debates 
occurring in Germany and France were very similar, and it was the domestic context 
which mattered456. 
Ultimately, Ostermann argues that his research affirms Davidson’s arguments that the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine was important457. However, his analysis goes much 
deeper into the explanation of how it portrayed itself in the discursive practices of the 
French executive. It also downplays the prestige argument, and Howarth’s argument 
that the intervention was to re-establish regional leadership458.  
However, it would appear that the research still downplays the historical element of 
France’s foreign policy. It does not really take into account the circumstances leading 
up to the Libyan intervention. When taken in context, and certainly in contradistinction 
with France’s experience of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, this change in approach seems 
to be severe. This thesis plans to plug this hole by providing an analysis which takes 
into account the proceeding events to ensure that the events in Libya and Syria are 
properly contextualised. Indeed, as was noted in the Bucher et al. study, it was the 
domestic politics which enabled the French to intervene459. This is why this thesis 
discusses in Chapter 3 the history of French Republican ideals, to better contextualise 
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the declarations made by the political elites in the build up to potential military 
intervention, as well as understanding how these ideas can be worn to seek to justify 
policies (as this thesis does). 
Whilst we have examined the potential reasons and justifications for the interventions, 
the next thing to discover is whether Sarkozy was indeed an agent of change, and to 
what extent the actions in the lead up to, and during the Libyan conflict, were part of 
a coherent policy.  
For Cumming, as already mentioned above, the answer is yes, but with some pretty 
large caveats460. Sarkozy seemed to be moving towards a slight reorientation of policy 
in terms of fully reintegrating France into the NATO command apparatus. But as was 
also seen, the extent of his reforms was far more limited than they originally seemed. 
However, one development which is noteworthy was France’s integration back into 
NATO. Whilst in many ways this had been on the cards for over a decade, it was 
Sarkozy who had been the one to finalise proceedings. This would seemingly begin a 
new chapter in Franco-American relations. This would be especially key in the 
implementation of the no-fly zone over Libya. As is shown in Parts II and III, US 
support can play a vital role in dictating whether or not military intervention takes 
place. 
Now that the literature concerning Sarkozy and his intervention in Libya has been 
discussed, it is time to move on to the literature concerning François Hollande and 
Syria, as well as the literature which has begun to emerge comparing the two. It is 
important to note however, that unlike with Sarkozy’s adventures in Libya, there is 
very little literature surrounding Hollande’s misadventure with Syria. 
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1.5.2 Syrian Intervention and Hollande 
As was mentioned above, the main justification by a number of different nations in 
regards to why there should be an intervention in Libya revolves around the 
Responsibility to Protect. This argument has also been made in regard to the situation 
in Syria, and yet there was no intervention. Why? 
One such piece of work which tries to answer this question comes from John 
Gaffney461. In his article Gaffney takes the growing literature born of the United 
Kingdom regarding political performance and celebrity politics, and applies it to 
François Hollande’s attempt to gain support for military airstrikes in Syria.  
Gaffney shows three elements in relation to President Hollande’s ‘performance’ of the 
presidency. Firstly, he argues that Hollande’s policy decision was driven by domestic 
issues regarding his public image. Secondly, Gaffney argues that the presidency itself 
is a ‘persona’ which must be seen to perform effectively. And finally, Gaffney 
describes how Hollande’s performance was made rhetorically to create the “highly 
personalised presidential persona”462 which was expected. 
Gaffney notes that since becoming President, Hollande’s popularity had steadily 
begun to drop. He linked this to the fact that Hollande was seen as “indecisive, 
undynamic, incompetent and unpresidential”463. The only time that it appeared to 
relent was when Hollande had announced in January 2013 that France would be 
intervening in Mali.  
As has been discussed above, the President is the director for France for all Foreign 
Policy actions. If a military conflict were to be started, then the right is solely reserved 
within the presidency. Indeed, France is unique among her allies in this regard. 
Gaffney describes how this lends itself toward a “character of individual self-
assertion”464. However, in the case of Hollande, he had little to no experience with 
foreign policy, and little to no experience with the United States. This, for Gaffney, is 
what led him to make the mistake of pushing to attack Syria. Had he had more 
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experience, then this “would have allowed Hollande to see that the American 
administration did not actually want to attack Syria – a point the Russians realised to 
their own great advantage”465. 
The study of ‘celebrity politicians’ is essentially a form of discourse analysis, 
analysing various performative behaviours to gain a better understanding of the 
subject themselves. According to Corner466 “‘political personhood’ is projected in 
three ways: iconically (for example, photo opportunities); vocally (for example, an 
increasing self-referentiality in public address); and kinetically (for example, 
presidential announcements)”467. Together, the iconic, vocal and kinetic enhance the 
‘personal’ within political culture and institutions. Each of the types of projections 
carry with them both positives and negatives. 
For Gaffney, the executive centric nature of the Fifth Republic confers a tremendous 
amount of power, and responsibility onto the shoulders of the sitting president. In 
Hollande’s case, he had won the presidency on the idea that he was not a media 
president, like President Sarkozy had been before him. However, as Gaffney notes, 
the role had evolved to such a state that one needed to be somewhat media savvy468. 
Gaffney argues that “– the Syrian crisis is constructed in French political rhetoric by 
the French presidency, with Hollande projected as the protagonist of a heroic 
narrative”469. As such, this puts tremendous pressure on the President, as the President 
is constitutionally pushed in to making large displays of boldness. Of course, if the 
President gets it right, then the rewards are huge. However, if the President gets it 
wrong, then there will be nowhere to hide. The irony of this situation, at least for 
Gaffney, was that it was Hollande who pushed for airstrikes to make himself seem 
presidential, but yet when it failed, it resulted in the opposite effect.  
In his research project, Gaffney analyses two ‘performances’ of François Hollande; 
one of the Ambassador’s Conference, and then an interview he did with TF1. The 
Ambassador’s Conference speech was where Hollande had announced to the world 
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that he would punish the Syrian regime for the chemical weapons attack at Ghouta. 
However, between this point and the television interview, a whole series of events had 
taken place to completely undermine Hollande’s position. After this announcement, 
talk began of another no-fly-zone being established. This time, however, it was put to 
a vote in the British Parliament. Here, the motion proposed by the Government to 
intervene was defeated by the Opposition. After this, the United States slowly backed 
away from talk of airstrikes. Ultimately, Russia was able to capitalise on the situation 
and broker a deal whereby Syria would hand over all of its chemical weapons.  
During his interview, after all of these events had taken place, Hollande attempted to 
play it off as though the confluence of events had gone exactly to plan. He suggested 
that France’s threat had pushed Russia into pressuring Syria into submitting its 
chemical weapons. However, this submission was unconvincing. 
Gaffney’s work provides an interesting lens through which one can analyse a leader. 
However, there are a few points to raise. Whilst the President is indeed constitutionally 
important, especially in regards to foreign policy and the decision to take military 
action, there are others who must also take some responsibility, and are equally liable. 
Laurent Fabius, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was also highly active during the 
weeks after the chemical attack, as too was the Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault. 
Whilst the President does tend to generate the push for foreign policy, there are others 
who also have important roles in this.  This thesis takes this broader approach to 
analyse the level of continuity and difference between the different political actors. 
However, there is a middle ground to be had, as during the investigation, this thesis 
finds that the behaviours and language used is universal across Hollande, Fabius and 
Ayrault, though their styles are different. 
So in that regard, it is indeed possible that Hollande’s performance or influence on the 
others in his cabinet was at least partially to blame for what happened. It is certainly 
the submission of this thesis that Hollande’s decision to go down the path of 
paternalistic gendarme was not correct. It is important to note at this time that this 
thesis is not saying that if Hollande had played the circumstances differently, there 
would have been a different outcome, just that the conceptualisation that Hollande 
worked with was insufficient.  
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Similar to the above work, there has also been little work done in the area of comparing 
the conflicts in Libya and Syria, and specifically surrounding France’s involvement. 
The first work of note comes from Charles Simpson470. Simpson produced a 
compilation comparing different International Organisations’, United Nations 
Security Council Permanent Five’s, and then notable non-permanent United Nations 
Security Council members’ positions on Libya and Syria. Whilst not including a 
tremendous amount of information, it is still a useful starting point and resource for 
anyone who wants to know a particular state’s/international body’s position on Syria 
and Libya. The analysis that was done shows that in the case of Libya, the Western 
nations (US, UK, France) were quick to support action against the Libyan regime, 
whilst the non-Western nations (Russia and China) abstained. Then in regards to Syria, 
the Western nations were far more hesitant, save for France, and the non-Western 
nations vetoed any Resolution brought forth. 
Another piece of comparative work was done by Stelios Stavridis471. Stavridis 
compared the attitudes and arguments had within the French Parliament concerning 
the conflicts in Libya and Syria. Stavridis noticed a gap in the literature concerning 
the diplomacy conducted by the French Parliament, and thus decided to fill it. This 
was due to, at least in part, the Constitutional Reform conducted on 23 July 2008, 
which modified Article 35 of the French Constitution, stating that government must 
notify Parliament within three days of launching a military intervention, as well as 
provide an explanation as to its course of action (though as was mentioned above, a 
vote is not required at this point). Furthermore, if an intervention lasts beyond four 
months, then there must be a vote by the Parliament to continue to approve the use of 
armed forced (as aforementioned, if Parliament is not in session, it will wait until they 
return).  
Stavridis also brings up that despite the French Parliament having a limited role in the 
creation of foreign policy, there is still some power contained within the parliament, 
                                                          
470 Charles Simpson, ‘Assessing the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria: A compilation of Varying 
Statements from Key Actors Connections’, The Quarterly Journal, Gamisch-Partenkirchen 11.1 
(Winter 2001): 55-67 
471 Stelios Stavridis, ‘The French Parliament and the Conflicts in Libya and Syria’, Mediterranean 
Quarterly 2016 Volume 27, Number 4: 21-41 
132 
 
or outside, as some Members of Parliament may also be members of other sub-state 
bodies472.  
In the case of Libya, a vote was held on 12 July 2011 in order to continue the airstrikes 
against Gaddafi. 482 Members of Parliament and 314 Senators voted in favour of 
continuing military action, whilst 27 MPs and 24 Senators opposed it.473 For the most 
part, the meeting was just an affirmation of the agreement in the UN-backed mission. 
There was repeated mention of the Responsibility to Protect. The day of the debate 
was the sixteenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre474. Bernard Caeneuve 
(member of the Socialiste, républicain et citoyen, SRC group) used the debate to bring 
up that the Syrian situation was worsening, and that the new Article 35 allowed them 
to debate it. He also made a point to criticise the government’s slow reaction to the 
Arab Spring475. 
The debate surrounding the Syrian intervention was of a slightly different character. 
Instead of discussing the Responsibility to Protect, it focused on whether to promote 
an existing treaty banning the use of chemical weapons. The debate therefore broke 
down along two lines; with one party believing that Syria should indeed face sanction 
via airstrikes, and another faction arguing that that would not solve the issue as it 
would have little effect on the ground476.  
However, it is important to note that there was no real decision to make by this point. 
The vote had already occurred in the British Parliament whereby the United Kingdom 
had rejected the call for airstrikes, and the US/Russian agreement had already started 
to be implemented to dispose of the Assad regime’s chemical weapon stockpile477. 
In his conclusion, Stavridis argues that the national parliaments “complement and 
strengthen state diplomacy by becoming its “legitimizing” brand at the national 
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level”478. However, it is difficult to see how this is the case. To a certain extent, the 
vote affirming the continuing airstrikes in Libya needed to be held. And yet, the vote 
was more or less a foregone conclusion as the outcome was never in doubt. 
Furthermore, there was nothing to vote on or for with the Syrian debate, and therefore 
there was no action to legitimise. 
Due to the lack of comparative analysis concerning the intervention in Libya and 
Syria, this thesis fills this space by using the Discourse Historical Approach (this will 
be explained in more detail in the next chapter) to conduct a comparative analysis of 
the Libyan and Syrian interventions. This thesis considerably adds to the literature 
surrounding the articulation of French foreign policy, as well as more generally the 
literature regarding the argumentation and implementation of the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect. This thesis takes as its aim the understanding of the 
relationship between the use of Republican ideas and justifications, synthesised with 
the argument for the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. In answering the question: To 
what extent did France’s rhetorical framing justifying military intervention in Libya 
and Syria affect the build-up and outcomes of French and International action, this 
thesis argues that the two discourses of Republicanism and R2P can, when utilised 
appropriately, be successfully united into a single, cohesive argument.  
This thesis does acknowledge the slight differences between the examples in Libya 
with that of Syria. However, through the Discourse Historical Approach one can see 
that the arguments put forward by Sarkozy have a more consistent logic which allows 
for the two strands of arguments to complement each other. However, the opposite is 
true of Hollande, whose one-dimensional application of grandeur-style architypes 
regarding the punishment of the Syrian regime undermined the argument of the 
Responsibility to Protect to such an extent that Hollande was excluded from the 
conversations which led to the (albeit short term) resolution of the crisis. 
Before continuing on with the analysis, the next chapter explains in greater detail the 
origins, strengths, and limitations of the Discourse Historical Approach, as well as 
how the documents have been chosen, and how they will be examined. 
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Chapter 2 - Methodology  
Having set out to understand to what extent there is continuity between the rhetoric in 
policies of President Sarkozy and President Hollande in regards to their willingness to 
intervene in foreign conflict, and why the scenarios played out differently, it is 
important to undergo an explanation as to how this thesis approaches this.  
This chapter examines and explains the methodology utilised in three sections. Firstly, 
this thesis looks critically at the Discourse-Historical Approach, explaining its 
historical links with broader Critical Discourse Analysis and appraising its conceptual 
underpinnings (2.1). This chapter then looks specifically at topoi, and how they can 
assist in the understanding of how certain positions are argued. This part will also look 
at the specific topoi used for the purposes of this research (2.2). Finally, this chapter 
describes the specific texts relating to the interventions in Libya and Syria that forms 
the basis of this thesis’ analysis (2.3). 
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2.1 The Discourse-Historical Approach and its origins in Critical Discourse 
Analysis. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis relies on upon a methodological 
framework based upon the notion of Critical Discourse Analysis. Firstly however, it 
is important to note that Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) does not exist 
as a single entity, though the methodology’s basic aims and raison d’être are unified. 
CDA is multi-disciplinary, and as such draws on a host of different ideas, including 
“Louis Althusser’s theories of ideology, Mikhail Bakhtin’s genre theory, and the 
philosophical traditions of Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School”479. This form 
of analysis can be seen as critical in two ways.  
Firstly, it draws from the writings of Jürgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School. For 
Habermas, critical science has to be self-critical, in the sense that it must “reflect the 
interests upon which it is based – and it must take account of the historical contexts of 
interactions”.480 (As will be seen further on, Fairclough’s conceptualisation of CDA 
draws heavily upon this reflexivity).  
Secondly, CDA also draws on the traditions of critical linguistics, which emerged as 
counterpoints to contemporary pragmatics such as speech act theory and the 
quantitative-correlative sociolinguistics of William Labov481. The arguments of Kress 
and Hodge that “discourse cannot exist without social meanings, and that there must 
be a strong relation between linguistic and social structure, was subsequently accepted 
by researchers from different traditions…”482 However, before advancing to display 
how this thesis uses these concepts to achieve its aim, it is first important to unpack 
some of the methodological foundations and assumptions founded within CDA. 
Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter argue that the main theoretical exponents, with 
the exception of Michel Foucault, are neo-Marxist483. Indeed Norman Fairclough 
argues that CDA can be seen as the “application of the sort of critical analysis which 
has developed within ‘Western’ Marxism… [which] highlights cultural aspects of 
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social life, seeing domination and exploitation as established and maintained culturally 
and ideologically”484. Specifically, CDA draws on notions of ‘hegemony’, developed 
by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, hegemony is used to talk about 
power and the struggle for power, and depends specifically upon gaining the consent 
of a group. “The hegemony of the dominant social class or class-alliance depends upon 
winning the consent (or at least acquiescence) of the majority to existing social 
arrangements.”485 Furthermore, Gramsci argues that this struggle permeates through 
all aspects of social life, be that political, economic or social.  
However, CDA draws upon more Marxist ideas. One of the fundamental 
underpinnings of CDA relates to how it treats language and the construction of 
meaning. The French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser argued that ideologies were 
not characterised by the notion of ‘ideas’, but rather as “material social practices in 
social institutions”486. Pecheux took this concept and applied it to ‘discourse’, which 
he argued was “language from an ideological perspective, language in the ideological 
construction of subjects”487.  
The final element which Fairclough argues provided the theoretical origins of CDA 
concerns the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who argued that “linguistic signs (words and 
longer expressions) are the material of ideology, and that all language use is 
ideological”488. Furthermore, Bakhtin argues that texts have dialogical properties, or 
are intertextual. Indeed, “as Kristeva (1986) puts it: the idea [is] that any text is 
explicitly or implicitly ‘in dialogue with’ other texts (existing or anticipated) which 
constitute its ‘intertexts”489. It is this intertextuality which is important to understand 
how narratives are constructed.  
However, these elements only cover the fundamental elements of CDA. As mentioned 
above, there are a wide variety of styles of CDA. Whilst each have their own merits, 
the thesis uses the form known as Discourse-Historical Approach, created by Ruth 
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Wodak and Martin Reisigl. As Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter note, “CDA sees 
itself as politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement: it seeks to 
have an effect on social practice and social relationships” and “the research emphases 
which have arisen in pursuit of these goals include language usage in organizations, 
and the investigation of prejudice in general, and racism, anti-semitism and sexism in 
particular”490. For Wodak, the Discourse-Distorical Approach manages to adhere to 
this socio-political orientation. She argues that it follows a: 
“complex concept of social critique which embraces at least three interconnected aspects, 
two of which are primarily related to the dimension of cognition and one to the dimension 
of action:  
1. ‘Text or discourse immanent critique’ aims at discovering inconsistencies, (self) 
contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal 
structures. 
 
2. In contrast to the ‘imminent critique’, the ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ is concerned with 
the demystifying exposure of the – manifest or latent – possibly persuasive or 
‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices. With socio-diagnostic critique, the 
analyst exceeds the purely textual or discourse internal sphere. She or he makes use of 
her or his background and contextual knowledge and embeds the communicative or 
interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of social and political 
relations, processes and circumstances. At this point, we are obliged to apply social 
theories to interpret the discursive events… 
 
3. Prognostic critique contributes to the transformation and improvement of communication 
(for example, within public institutions by elaborating proposals and guidelines for 
reducing language barriers in hospitals, schools, courtrooms, public offices, and media 
reposting institutions (see Wodak, 1996a) as well as guidelines for avoiding sexist 
language use (Kargl et al., 1997)).”491 
Ultimately, Wodak argues that CDA does not concern itself with whether a certain act 
or utterance is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, but rather make choices which are inherently 
transparent, and that it should “also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of 
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discursive events seem more valid than others”492. The means by which this can be 
made possible is through the process of triangulation. The Discourse-Historical 
Approach is designed to work with different approaches and methodologies. It 
contextualises the discourse studied within its historic, political and social 
backgrounds. It allows the integration of “a large quantity of available knowledge 
about the historical sources and background of the social and political fields in which 
discursive ‘events’ are embedded. Further, it analyses the historical dimension of 
discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are 
subject to diachronic change”493. 
However, an issue remains as to what exactly is meant by ‘discourse’, and how it is 
distinguished from ‘narratives’ or ‘text’. Discourse is closely linked to what is often 
described as the post-structuralist school of thought, and specifically the literature 
produced by Michel Foucault494 and Jean François Lyotard495. However, whilst 
Foucault’s work discusses discourse in great length, a precise definition of discourse 
is left rather ambiguous. Boswell tackles this problem head on, suggesting that 
"discourses lack the narrativity in the common-sense understanding of the term, in 
that there is no clearly articulated overarching plot"496. Instead, Boswell argues that 
discourses are the "constellations of ideas that, though never recounted in full, order 
people's perspectives"497. These create what in Foucauldian language are called 
'regimes of truth', described as "the historically specific mechanisms which produce 
discourses which function as true in particular times and places"498. Boswell argues 
that discourses are "fluid, rather than fixed, with individuals able to exercise some 
agency in the sense that they sustain, challenge and modify discourse through their 
                                                          
492 Ibid. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. (New York: Pantheon Books 1978) 
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interactions"499. Wodak finds the best way to describe this as referring to a ‘macro-
topic’500.  
Boswell distinguishes this from ‘anecdotes’, which are "stories in the more everyday 
sense of the term... they play a critical role in helping people make sense of their 
world and their place in it"501.  
Thirdly, one has ‘narratives’, which Boswell describes as a "chronological account 
that helps actors make sense of and argue about a political issue"502. Boswell 
concludes that:  
narrative cannot be entirely distinguished from discourse and anecdote... indeed they are 
richly interrelated. On the one hand, narratives are constrained by, and must draw on, the 
discourses that structure our thinking about the world and our place in it... On the other 
hand, narratives are also built up, modified or undermined by the anecdotes that 
individuals share with each other over time...503  
In addition to these elements, one can also find ‘texts’ which are generally conceived 
as “materially durable products of linguistic actions”504. Genre is described as “the 
conventionalized, more or less schematically fixed use of language associated with a 
particular activity, as “a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a 
particular type of social activity” (Fairclough, 1995: 14)”505. Finally, there are fields 
of action, which constitute “segments of the respective societal reality, which 
contribute to constituting and shaping the ‘frame’ of discourse”506. (The example used 
by Wodak describes Law making procedure as field of action, and things such as laws 
and bills as genre.) 
 
                                                          
499John Boswell ‘Why and How Narrative Matters in Deliberative Systems.’ Political Studies. 61.3 
(2013): 620-636, pp.622-623 
500 Ruth Wodak, ‘The discourse-historical approach’ in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (ed) 
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London; Sage Publications, 2001), p.66 
501 Ibid. p.623 
502John Boswell, ‘Why and How Narrative Matters in Deliberative Systems.’ Political Studies. 61.3 
(2013): 620-636, p.622 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ruth Wodak, ‘The discourse-historical approach’ in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (ed) 
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London; Sage Publications, 2001), p.66 
505 Ibid.  
506 Ibid. 
141 
 
The triangulatory contextual approach advocated by Wodak consists of four layers: 
1. The immediate, language or text internal co-text; 
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and 
discourses; 
3. The extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific 
‘context of situation’ (middle range theories); 
4. The broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are 
embedded in and related to (‘grand’ theories).507 
The research for which Wodak initially developed this methodology concerned the 
emergence of an anti-Semitic stereotyped image during the 1986 Austrian presidential 
campaign of Kurt Waldheim. She started by formulating five questions which would 
help in the analysis of different linguistic and rhetorical means and/or forms of racism. 
Similarly, this thesis adopts this approach when examining the arguments used to 
justify French use of airstrikes in Libya and Syria. This triangulatory approach is 
effective in gaining a fuller understanding of where a text is ‘located’ within society. 
This means understanding what is the objective of the text, what it is attempting to 
influence, and from what other texts/themes the specific text being examined is 
drawing.  
Before providing the questions which this thesis examines, the most contentious 
elements of the Discourse-Historical Analysis (DHA) will be addressed. 
One of the major criticisms of DHA relates to its usage of the term ‘topoi’ or ‘loci’. 
These can be described as parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, 
either explicit or inferable premises. They are the content-related warrants or 
‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion”508. 
Put simply, the topos refer to the themes of specific arguments which lead to the 
conclusion or response being articulated, e.g. the topos of culture: the nature of a 
certain culture is X, therefore specific solutions are required. 
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However, the notion of topoi, which finds its origins in the writings of Aristotle, has 
been argued to be misapplied in its usage in DHA. Whilst not defining it themselves, 
Zagar509, Ietcu-Fairclough510, Fairclough and Fairclough511 have argued that Wodak’s 
usage goes beyond its original meaning/context.  
However, Salomi Boukala argues that a classical interpretation can be utilised to 
effectively synthesise the notion of topoi and DHA512. However, first there will need 
to be an examination of the different understandings of the term ‘Argumentation’. 
According to Toulmin, argumentation is an attempt by any speaker to justify a 
statement513. In the development of his own model, Toulmin argues that the validity 
of the argument needs to be considered. Toulmin reconstitutes Aristotle’s elements of 
argument (minor premise, major premise and conclusion), referring instead to data and 
warrant, which are used to establish a claim (conclusion). Toulmin also provides a 
more comprehensive model which also mentions backings, qualifiers, and rebuttals 
(conditions of exception). However, Kienpointer points out that this comprehensive 
model is more representative of complex argumentation linked more closely to 
Cicero’s ratiocination (επιχείρημα) argumentation scheme514.  
Modern scholars argue that argumentation carries with it an everyday life dimension, 
that both oral and written argumentation form significant parts of our daily routine515. 
Van Eemeren et al. define argumentation as the following: 
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A verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability 
of a controversial standpoint for the listener of reader, by putting forward a constellation 
of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.516  
However, the Discourse-Historical Approach is not the only methodology to share an 
interest in various argumentation strategies. According to van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser, the pragma-dialectic theory of argumentation “enables the analyst of 
argumentative discourse to make a normative reconstruction of the discourse that 
results in an analytic overview of all elements that are pertinent to a critical 
evaluation”517. Effectively, pragma-dialectics is described as a means of systemically 
dealing with exchanges in verbal communication and interactions518. Classical 
Aristotelian argumentation theory is used for inspiration to introduce the author’s own 
concept of strategic manoeuvring, and specifically its three aspects: topical potential, 
audience orientation and presentational devices519. 
Amossy defines argumentation as “the use of verbal means to ensure a partial and 
fragile consensus on what can be considered reasonable by a group of people, or by 
what a society would define as a reasonable person… the analysis of arguments deals 
with the ways in which agreement is achieved in discourse in a communicative 
framework”520. 
As Boukala notes, argumentation exists in social interactions and communication, 
including in the media or political discourse, “insofar as it aims to persuade the 
audience of the validity of a statement… For this reason, the DHA cannot ignore 
argumentation strategies, which are manifested via the use of topoi”521. 
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But what specifically is the purpose of the topoi? For Keinpointer, they act as “search 
formulas which tell you how and where to look for arguments. At the same time, topoi 
are warrants which guarantee the transition from argument to conclusion”522. He 
clarifies this point further by stating that: 
The Aristotelian topos has two functions, a selective function and a probative function. 
Hence topoi are devices for finding relevant arguments within the set of possible 
arguments and on the other hand probative formulas which grant the plausibility of the 
step from the argument to the conclusion.523 
Walton agrees with this assessment that topos “is a device to find arguments that can 
be used to prioritize their strategic strength”524. Rubinelli also reiterates, saying “topos 
refers to a dynamic and pragmatic concept; indeed topoi are, in terms of their genus, 
strategies of argumentation for gaining the upper hand and producing successful 
speeches”525.  
However, there can be some variation in the interpretation of what topos is, and what 
it refers to. Grimaldi notes that the ordinary use of the term topos refers to the thoughts 
of Plato and Isocrates, and is often conjoined with place (χώρoς)526. However, as 
Boukala mentions, the approaches mentioned above can lead to complications as they 
will often combine the Aristotelian concept of topoi with Cicero’s concept of loci527. 
Therefore, let us examine the Aristotelian formula for topos. The main concepts found 
within Aristotle’s dialectics are endoxon(a) and syllogisms. Aristotle describes a 
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syllogism as “an argument in which, when certain things are laid down, something 
other than these necessarily comes about through them”528. 
However, as Reisigl and Wodak note, it can be difficult to distinguish between 
reasonable and fallacious argumentation529. As Boukala notes, fallacies can be an 
important element in argumentation schemes, especially when attempting to justify 
discrimination530. However, this section will focus on endoxon. When describing 
topoi, Reisigl and Wodak state that it “can be described as parts of argumentation that 
belong to obligator, either explicit of inferable, premises”531. Endoxa are the subjects 
of topoi’s examination.  
The term endoxa is not specifically defined by Aristotle in his work. In Ethics, he 
states that they are views which are held by many learned men and those who hold 
eminent positions, “and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely 
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least one respect or even in most 
respects”532. In Topics, they are described as opinions “which are accepted by 
everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers (the wise)”533.  
Whilst this term can be defined broadly, Aristotle advises that expertise is important 
when discerning endoxa, “for people are likely to assent to the views held by those 
who have made a study of these things, e.g. on a question of medicine they will agree 
with the doctor, and on a question of geometry with the geometrician; and likewise 
also in other cases”534. Similarly, Aristotle limits those who can contribute towards the 
endoxa:  
                                                          
528 Aristotle, Topics, Translated by W A Pickford-Cambridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1928) 100a25 
529 For example: M Reisigl and R Wodak Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and 
Antisemitism (London: Routledge, 2001), M Reisigl and R Wodak The discourse historical approach 
in R Wodal and M Meyer (eds) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd edn. (London: Sage, 
2009) pp. 87-61, M Reisigl and R Wodak The discourse historical approach in R Wodak and M 
Meyer (eds) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 3rd edn (London;Sage, 2016) pp.23-61 
530 S Boukala, ‘Rethinking topos in the discourse historical approach: Endoxon seeking and 
argumentation in Greek media discourses on Islamist terrorism’,  Discourse Studies 2016, Vol 18(3) 
249-268 p.251 
531 M Reisigl and R Wodak, Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism 
(London: Routledge, 2001) p.74 
532 Aristotle Ethics Translated by W D Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928) 1098b25 
533 Aristotle Topics, Translated by W A Pickford (Cambridge Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928) 
100b20 
534 Ibid. 104a 30 
146 
 
To examine then all the views held about happiness is superfluous, for children, sick 
people, and the insane all have views, but no sane person would dispute over them ; for 
such persons need not argument but years in which they may change, or else medical or 
political correction—for medicine, no less than stripes, is a correction. Similarly we have 
not to consider the views of the multitude (for they talk without consideration about 
almost everything and most about happiness); for it is absurd to apply argument to those 
who need not argument but suffering.535 
Factoring in everything suggested up until this point, it would seem that endoxa can 
sometimes refer to the opinions of those in power, and at other times be the opinions 
of experts in a given field. However, there are a number of caveats in relation to what 
forms endoxa. Braet argues that endoxa “are principles which, while they are accepted 
by a more or less expert, or quite large groups of people, are not necessarily true or 
universally valid”536. Kienpointer notes that endoxa are not to be considered as axioms 
or absolute truths537. Finally, Van Eemeren argues that endoxa are commonly held 
beliefs which are normally conceived as being acceptable to the audience538. 
Aristotle says on the matter: “reasoning is ‘contentious’ if it starts from opinions that 
seem to be generally accepted, but are not really such, or again if it merely seems to 
reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For every opinion that 
seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted”539. This therefore 
privileges the opinions of a wider general public over those of one or two individuals, 
even if they do form “the most notable and illustrious of them”540, thereby taking a 
more democratic approach to how endoxa are created. As Boukala notes, the endoxa 
therefore need to be challenged via “dialetic syllogism and especially through the use 
of topoi… [this] dialetic syllogism (διαλεκτικός συλλογισμός)…  is related to human 
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thought, and its expression on the level of a ‘dialectical horizon’, which consists of a 
number of dialectic elements that Aristotle calls ‘predicables’541. 
Before continuing, an important point needs to be made when discussing any text 
which has been translated. Simpler notes that translating the term endoxa itself can be 
problematic542. For example, in Theodore Buckley’s 1851 translation of On Rhetoric, 
he uses the word “probabilities” for endoxa. For Simpler, he would argue that whilst 
endoxa are “probabilities”, there is not enough emphasis placed on the fact that these 
probabilities are opinions543. 
Furthermore, many translations do not adequately distinguish the difference when 
Aristotle uses the term endoxa, from the term doxa. Doxa, when used in the works of 
Gorgias and Plato mean the persuasive force in rhetorical argument, which carries with 
it a much broader interpretation than endoxa, which refers to the opinions of 
experts/persons in positions of authority544. An example of this is to be found in 
George Kennedy’s 2007 translation of On Rhetoric. In Book 1, Chapter 7, Aristotle 
claims “[t]hings related to the truth [are greater] than things related to opinions”. Here, 
Aristotle is using the broader term doxa rather than the more limited set of opinions 
inferred by endoxa. However, at the beginning of On Rhetoric, “Aristotle claims that 
the true and just are stronger than their opposites, but since even the most exact 
knowledge would not make persuasion easy, “it is necessary for proofs (pisteis) and 
speeches as a whole to be formed on the basis of common [beliefs]” (Rhetoric 
1355a)”545.  
This passage clearly references endoxa, however, unlike his treatment of the word 
endoxa, Kennedy’s translation of 1356b does not clarify that those opinions being 
mentioned are doxa. As such, this risks displaying contradictions within Aristotle’s 
writings where none exist. 
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However, as was mentioned at Rhetoric 1355a, truth can be an important part of 
argumentation, but is not required. Amossy illustrates this fact when she says the “all 
that is considered true, or at least probable, by a majority of people endowed with 
reason, or by a specific group, can be called doxic” 546. Utterances with this doxic 
characteristic are still opinions, which do not necessarily mean they are factually 
accurate, however they can carry with it an equivalent persuasiveness to that of truth 
in any analytical reasoning. Furthermore, Amossy is also reiterating that endoxic 
elements are normally confined to specifics groups of classes of individuals.  
The issue of translation is also what leads to the use of the term “predictables”. 
Rubinelli describes them as “terms introduced at the logical level of propositions. They 
have to do with the relationship between subjects and predicates as codified by human 
cognition”547. Boukala uses Rubinelli’s translation of διαλεκτικό κατηγορούμενο for 
lack of a better one, as does this thesis. 
When examining any line of argumentation Aristotle examines the relationship 
between four predictables. They are definition (ορισμός), genus (γένος), property 
(ίδιον) and accident (συμβεβηκόν)548. Aristotle describes the definition (ορισμός) as a 
“phrase signifying a thing’s essence”549. W A Pickford-Cambridge further emphasises 
this by saying: 
Establishing a thing’s essence under Aristotle’s schema is mostly concerned with 
questions of sameness or difference… For if we are able to argue that two things are the 
same or are different, we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines 
of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have shown that they are not the 
same we shall have demolished the demolition. Observe, please, that the converse of this 
last statement does not hold: for to show that they are the same is not enough to establish 
a definition. To show, however, that they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow 
it550. 
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Property (ίδιον) “is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet 
belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it” 551 
This is elaborated on further by Aristotle, whereby he describes how “it is a property 
of man to be capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man, then he is capable of 
learning grammar, and if he be capable of learning grammar, he is a man”552. However, 
he uses the example of sleep as being something which would not be classed as a 
property as it is not something which would belong solely to man.  
Genus (γένος) is “what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things 
exhibiting differences in kind”553.  
Finally, accident (συμβεβηκόν) is: 
(1) Something which, though it is nine of the foregoing—i.e. neither a definition 
nor a property nor a genus—yet belongs to the thing: (2) something which may possibly 
either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the ‘sitting 
posture’ may belong or not belong to some self-same thing.554 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Aristotle favours the second of these two descriptions as “if he adopts the first, any 
one is bound, if he is to understand it, to know already what ‘definition’ and ‘genus’ 
and ‘property’ are, whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential 
meaning of the term in question”555. 
Boukala notes that the “four predictables shape the dialectical syllogism and different 
categories of topoi, which are necessary to dialectics”556. Each predictable carries with 
it a corresponding topoi. Kienpointner addresses this, stating that he: 
established a complex typology of topoi with four major classes and hundreds of 
particular topoi (about 400) that can be criticised because they rest on the problematic 
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distinction between essential and accidental properties of persons and objects and are not 
carried through consistently.557 
The concept of topos in Aristotelian dialectic carries with it many meanings, and has 
developed in relation to his classifications. The topoi are arguments used to establish 
the ‘truth’, and are related to both endoxa and predictables. They act as the means to 
verify endoxa using the various predictables.  
One final logical element to consider is the enthymeme. Aristotle, it would seem 
defines enthymemes in contradistinction with examples, where he states that: 
With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof, just as in dialectic 
there is induction on the one hand and deduction or apparent deduction on the other, so it 
is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a deduction, and the 
apparent enthymeme is an apparent deduction; for I call a rhetorical deduction an 
enthymeme, and a rhetorical induction an example.558 
Aristotle clarifies that compared to an example, an enthymeme carries with it “few 
propositions, fewer than those which make up a primary deduction”559. This is because 
the enthymeme will rely on “familiar facts”560, which means that the hearer of any 
utterance will deduct the context of the statement themselves. Aristotle uses the 
example of an individual who wins a crown as a prize for a competition, whereby it 
would be sufficient to say that they had been victorious in the Olympic games, as it is 
common knowledge that a crown is the prize561.  
Kienpointner puts it another way, stating that an “enthymeme is a rhetorical argument 
that starts from merely plausible assumptions which are accepted by almost everybody 
in the audience, which need not be completely explicit and which sometimes are not 
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logically valid”562. Therefore, enthymemes rely on deduction from endoxa (publically 
accepted opinion). 
An additional concept to consider when dealing with enthymemes is species (είδη)563. 
This is differentiated from topoi as they refer to special occasions and arguments, e.g. 
the concept of good and the definition of what of good564, whereas the topoi guides 
the speaker as to how to organise an argument. 
Rubinelli describes topoi as “argument schemes, they are all devices for arriving at a 
certain conclusion about a case. While they are not all of universal applicability, they 
can be applied to every rhetorical case. In other words, they are universal in the field 
of rhetoric”565. 
Aristotle provides both lists of topoi, and explanations for them. Boukala explains that 
a topos “is indeed not only an argumentation scheme, but also a syllogism that leads 
the orator to a ‘conclusion’ that can always be rejected or defended”566. Kienpointner 
puts it another way, describing topos as both search formulae to discover relevant 
arguments within a set of possible arguments, namely the endoxa, but also as a 
probative formula to examine the reasonableness of the arguments in relation to the 
conclusion567. 
Topos is therefore conceptualised by Aristotle as both a rhetorical and a dialectical 
scheme. Toulin argues that “warrants can be observed, [they] correspond to the 
practical standards or canons of argument”568. Wengler569 takes Toulmin’s concept of 
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warrant forward, arguing that an enthymeme “is a prototypical part of argumentation 
within the scheme of argument – warrant and conclusion. Hence, general topoi are 
patterns of conclusion from cause to result”570. 
Many academics have sought to classify the various topoi. Amossy breaks them down 
into two categories: “those that rely on logicodiscursive patterns believed to be 
universal and those that build on social and cultural beliefs pertaining to a given 
ideology. The first correspond to Aristotle’s rhetorical topoi (koinoi); the second, 
rooted in specific topoi”571. However, Amossy later admits that “in most cases it is 
difficult, if not impossible to draw a clear-cut difference between the two”572.  
Wengeler takes a different approach, differentiating context-specific topoi, which are 
only applicable within context-specific areas, from general topoi. These are patterns 
of conclusion which do not rely on its specific context.573 
Rubinelli argues that Rhetoric B23 contains four distinctive types of argument 
schemes, which all vary in their level of applicability: 
1. Topoi which have universal applicability and also appear in Topics; 
2. Topoi which can still be universally applied, but are not found in Topics; 
3. Less abstract versions of the topos of the more and the less; 
4. Topoi which focus mainly on emotional aspects of human relationships or on 
considerations valid in rhetorical contexts only.574 
Boukala uses the typology of Rubinelli to present some the most common Aristotelian 
topoi, based on the distinction between ‘topoi of probative/real enthymemes’, and 
‘topoi of fallacious enthymemes’. Found in the table below (Figure 2), you will find a 
table of the topoi which Boukala considers to be the most connected to the Discourse-
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Historical Approach. Here Boukala uses the terms Aristotle uses, rather than 
Rubinelli’s: 
 
Topos Principle and example 
Topos of opposites 
B23 1397a 
(Topos of real enthymeme that 
also appears in Topics) 
If the contrary of a predicate 
belongs to the contrary of a subject, 
then this predicate belongs to the 
subject. 
Topos of the consequential 
B23 1399a 
(Topos of real enthymeme that has 
universal applicability, although is 
not found in Topics) 
If an act has both good and bad 
consequences, then on the good/bad 
consequences this act can be 
exhorted/blamed. 
Topos of definition 
B23 1398a 
(Topos of real enthymeme that 
also appears in Topics) 
 
 
 
 
 
It is by definition and the knowledge 
of what the thing is in itself that 
conclusions are drawn upon the 
subject in question 
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Topos of better option 
B23 1400b 
(Topos of real enthymeme that 
focuses mainly on interpersonal 
and emotional aspects of human 
relationships or on consideration 
valid in rhetorical contexts only) 
 
It consists in examining whether 
there was or is another better option 
than that which is advised. 
Topos of the logic of the further 
and the less 
B23 1397b 
(Topos of real enthymeme) 
If a predicate does not belong to a 
subject to which it is more likely to 
belong, then it does not belong to 
the one to which it is less likely to 
belong 
‘If not even the gods know 
everything, then human beings can 
hardly do so’ 
 
Topos of induction 
B23 1398b 
(Topos of real enthymeme that has 
universal applicability, although it 
not found in Topics) 
A syllogism that starts with 
something specific and concludes 
with something general. 
If some human beings do not trust 
their horses to people who do not 
protect the horses of other human 
beings, then they cannot trust their 
salvation to people who do not 
succeed in saving other human 
beings. 
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Topos that accepts as a cause 
something that is not a cause 
B23 1401b 
(Topos of fallacious enthymeme 
that focuses mainly on 
interpersonal and emotional 
aspects of human relationships or 
on consideration valid in rhetorical 
contexts only) 
‘Dimadis considers the 
Demosthenes’ politics was harmful 
because after his governance the 
war began.’ 
Figure 2. Selected topoi of Aristotle’s Rhetoric575 
Another adaptation of Aristotelian Rhetoric can be found in the work of Perelman and 
Olbrect-Tyteca, developing what is called ‘New Rhetoric’576. In their theory of 
argumentation, they distinguish between the loci of quantity and the loci of quality. 
The loci of quantity justifies why a particular action is to be preferred because most 
people would benefit from it; the loci of quality explains why an action should be done 
because it is the best course577. 
The next section of this thesis explains how topos is utilised more specifically within 
the Discourse-Historical Approach. 
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2.2 The Discourse-Historical Approach and the application of topos 
As mentioned above, many of the academics who have written about and study 
Toulmin’s argumentation theory argue that a warrant is an essential part of 
determining the validity of argumentation. As Boukala states, it “explicitly indicates 
that the step from data to claim is justified and why this is so”578. Following 
Wengler579 and Kienpointner’s580 work mentioned above, Reisigl and Wodak define 
topoi as: 
… parts of argumentation which belong to the required premises. They are the formal or 
content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument with the 
conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument to the 
conclusion. Topoi are not always expressed explicitly, but can always be made explicit 
as conditional or causal paraphrases such as ‘if x, then y or y, because x’.581  
The Discourse-Historical Analysis defines topos as a warrant which connects an 
argument with a conclusion582. Furthermore, the DHA draws no distinction between 
topoi and Cicero’s loci. Rubinelli argues that Cicero applies topos by means of a rule 
of Roman law, something which Aristotle refers to in Rhetoric A2 1358a as a 
principle. This is not an endoxon since it forms part of an already established body of 
Roman law, therefore the argument is not rhetorical, but stems from the law583. 
Rubinelli compares Cicero’s locus to Aristotle’s topos. She shows that Cicero 
approaches topoi as warrants with the locus: “if someone has not been freed by either 
having his name entered into the census roll or by being touched with the rod or by a 
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provision in a will, then he is not real”, thus illustrating Cicero’s emphasis on Roman 
law584.  
Rubinelli contrasts this with the topos “if not even the gods know everything, human 
beings can hardly do so”, which is applied via the endoxon that the gods themselves 
do not know everything, thereby challenging tradition585. 
However, Boukala argues that significant differentiation can be drawn between the 
argumentation schemes of Aristotle and Cicero, stemming not only from their different 
philosophical schools, but also their different historical and political contexts. 
Aristotle developed his dialectical syllogism and argumentation theory against the 
backdrop of Athenian democracy. (Boukala explains here that they are referring to 
democracy as a regime, drawing from Castoriadis’ work586 describing Athenian 
democracy as somewhere philosophy had been developed to challenge pre-existing 
traditions and established ‘truths’). This is why therefore, Aristotle emphasised 
endoxon and the importance of the majority’s opinions, claiming that endoxa should 
be challenged where possible. Cicero’s loci however was developed in, and 
emphasises the importance of, Roman law, within the context of its autocratic form of 
governance.587 
Following Wengler’s approach to topos, Reisigl and Wodak produce a list of topoi 
which were used to analyse the arguments relating to discrimination588. In Figure 3 
below, one finds some of the most commonly used DHA topoi. 
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Topos Warrant 
Topos of threat or topos of 
danger 
If there are specific dangers or threats, one should 
do something about them. 
Topos of responsibility If a state or a group of persons is responsible for the 
emergence of a specific problem, it or they should 
act in order to find a solution to that problem. 
Topos of humanitarianism If a political action or decision does or does not 
conform to human rights or humanitarian 
convictions and values, then one should or should 
not perform or take it. 
Topos of numbers If numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action 
should (not) be performed or carried out. 
Topos of burden or 
weighing down 
If a person, institution or country is burdened by a 
specific problem, one should act in order to 
diminish that burden. 
Topos of history Because history teaches that specific actions have 
specific consequences, one should perform or omit 
a specific action in a specific situation comparable 
with the historical example referred to. 
Figure 3: Selected DHA topoi 
Boukala notes that DHA’s topoi are often more specific than Aristotelian topoi, most 
of which tending to relate to the Aristotelian topos of the consequential589. However, 
this can be seen as a good thing. Topoi can be used to analyse and illustrate how 
arguments are formed. Rubinelli notes that “what is more appropriate in a specific 
context is still a matter of [a] scholar’s creativity and understanding of the interlocutor. 
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Clearly the selection of the scheme is influenced by the questioner’s general 
knowledge of the subject”590. 
This of course means that there can be differentiation when different academics apply 
topoi in their research. Instead, a series of bespoke topoi emerge from the author’s 
arguments concerning their topic of study to help understand and explain systems of 
argumentation. This thesis agrees with Boukala’s arguments that Aristotelian topoi 
“provide a holistic classification of topoi that can be used by interlocutors to persuade 
the audience, but might be named differently, in relation to their arguments”591.  
Indeed, because of this, topoi are useful in systematically analysing various discourses, 
providing opportunities to examine stereotypes and assumed knowledges. Therefore, 
this thesis utilises the Aristotelian topos in DHA’s argumentation strategies to show 
the argumentation schemes used by Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande to justify their 
positions to utilise French military force to assist opposition forces in Libya and Syria 
during the Arab Spring. 
The topoi used in this thesis draws not only from the works of Reisigl and Wodak, but 
also from the literature regarding French Republican history. As was mentioned 
above, the most effective utilisation of topoi is by tailoring them to the specific 
context.  
The topoi established for the purposes of this research have been drawn from previous 
analysis of the French political system, mentioned above in the literature review. They 
cover a wide timeframe, spanning from the early days of the Republic in the eighteenth 
century, up until the modern day, and specifically surrounding the events of the Arab 
Spring. They include ideas which are standard to most Western democracies, as well 
as those which apply, or have particular meaning within a narrower French Republican 
context. These topoi are utilised to draw from the endoxon, or the generally accepted 
opinions which help to reinforce various argumentation schemes.  
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They are as follows: 
Topos Warrant 
Topos of threat or 
topos of danger 
If there are specific dangers or threats, one should 
do something about them. 
Topos of 
humanitarianism 
If a political action or decision does or does not 
confirm with human rights or humanitarian 
convictions and values, then one should not perform 
of taking it. 
Topos of burden or 
weighing down 
If a person, institution or country is burdened by a 
specific problem, one should act in order to 
diminish that burden. 
Topos of history Because history teaches that specific actions have 
specific consequences, one should perform or omit 
a specific action in a specific situation comparable 
with the historical example referred to. 
Topos of 
cooperation 
An action may only be taken with the consent of the 
primary party, and of the international community. 
Topos of Solidarity 
or Topos of 
Fraternité 
One should act to aid or support activities which 
meet one’s own moral code, and act to guarantee 
others against injustice. 
Topos of 
Universality 
A response by France will also be shared by the rest 
of the international community. 
Topos of 
Responsibility to 
Protect 
If the criteria for the Doctrine of the Responsibility 
to Protect is met, then it should be acted upon. 
Topos of Liberté Respect should be given to the aspirations of those 
who seek to change or be free of a repressive state. 
Topos of Grandeur Because of France’s unique experiences, either 
historical, or practical, its arguments should be 
given greater consideration. 
Figure 4: Topoi developed for the purposes of this thesis. 
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Specifically, we shall see in this thesis how both Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande 
utilised different types of topoi to varying effect.  
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2.3 Texts subject to the Discourse Analysis  
The final matter to discuss therefore is what texts have been looked at and subjected 
to these questions. This thesis analyses a total of twenty-one texts (more will be 
referenced of course, but the main focus will be on the twenty-one specifically 
mentioned). They are: 
Speeches concerning the intervention in Libya, made by President Sarkozy and Alain 
Juppé, Francois Fillon and Gérard Longue 
 
1. Situation in Libya – Communiqué issued by the Presidency of the 
Republic. Paris, 21 February 2011 
 
2. Statement issued by President Sarkozy at the Council of Ministers 
meeting.  Paris, 23 February 2011 
 
3. Security Council - Libya - Statement by Mr. Gérard Araud, Permanent 
Representative of France to the United Nations 26 February 2011 
 
4. Interview given by Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign 
and European Affairs, to “TF1” (excerpts) 1 March 2011 
 
5. Statements by Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and 
European Affairs, at his joint press conference with William Hague, 
First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 3 March 2011 
 
6. Libya – Reply given by Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of 
Foreign and European Affairs, to a question in the National Assembly 6 
March 2011 
 
7. Press Conference with Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, President of Republic, 
particularly about the European Union’s position in relation to the 
political and humanitarian situation in Libya, Brussels, 11 March 2011 
 
8. Hearing of Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and 
European Affairs, before the National Assembly Foreign Affairs 
Committee (excerpts)  Paris, 15 March 2011 
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9. Security Council - Libya - Statement by Mr Alain Juppé, Ministre 
d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs (UN Translation) 17 
March 2011 
 
10. Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People – Statement by 
Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic 
 
11. Intervention by the armed forces to implement UNSCR 1973 – 
Government statement in the National Assembly – Speeches by 
François Fillon, Prime Minister; Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister 
of Foreign and European Affairs; and Gérard Longuet, Minister for 
Defence and Veterans (excerpts)  Paris, 22 March 2011 
 
Speeches and Interviews with François Hollande and Jean-Marc Ayrault and Laurent 
Fabius 
 
1. 21st Ambassadors’ Conference – Speech by M. François Hollande, 
President of the Republic, Paris, 27 August 2013:  
 
2. Joint Declaration of Mr François Hollande, President of the French 
Republic, and Ahmad Al-Assi Al Jarba, President of the Syrian National 
Coalition, on the Situation in Syria. Paris 29 August 2013 
 
3. Interview between President François Hollande and Le Monde Le 
Monde 31 August 2013 
 
4. Déclaration by Prime Minister, M. Jean-Marc Ayrault 3 September 
2013 
 
5. Syria/Syrian chemical programme – National executive summary of 
declassified intelligence¹ Paris, 3 September 2013 (Eng translation by 
French Defence Ministry)  
 
6. Syria/government declaration and debate at the National Assembly and 
Senate - Speech by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 
the Senate 
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7. Government statement and debate in the National Assembly and Senate 
– Speeches by M. Jean-Marc Ayrault, Prime Minister, and M. Jean-
Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defence (excerpts)  
 
8. Introductory remarks by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
during his press conference  Paris, 10 September 2013 
 
9. Interview between Mr François Hollande and TF1 on the situation in 
Syria, and on government policy, 15 September 2013 (Extracts)  
 
10. Speech by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs (excerpts)  
New York, 27 September 2013 
 
Upon looking at this collection of twenty-one texts, one will notice a couple of things. 
Firstly, one of the most used resources in obtaining the official transcripts and 
translations of speeches was from the “FranceintheUS.org” website.  
Secondly, one will notice that the texts, eleven concerning the intervention in Libya, 
and ten regarding the proposed intervention in Syria, are chronological. For both case 
studies, texts were chosen from a month around the event, the signing of the UN 
Resolution in the case of Libya, and the failure of the proposed intervention in the case 
of Syria. The rationale was to see how the discourse would change throughout the 
process of attempting to achieve international support for a military intervention. One 
of the aims of this thesis is to understand whether the arguments would begin to evolve 
over time. 
As such, when the texts were being chosen, there were a number of different criteria 
they had to meet. The texts could not be too short, otherwise there would be 
insufficient raw data to analyse. It also became clear that it would be useful to compare 
the discourses of various members of the executive so as to see if the same points are 
made, or whether differences would begin to emerge. There was also an attempt to try 
and make them as equidistant as possible, again to try and help analyse the 
development of arguments over a fixed period of time. 
This methodology represents one of the original contributions to the literature 
surrounding the articulation of foreign policy, and in particular when seeking to apply 
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the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect. This methodology enables the 
understanding of the cultural significance of words and actions, as well as better 
interpret their true meaning when seeking to justify a certain action. This methodology 
allows us to contextualise certain events and actions so that they may be better 
understood. As was mentioned in the introduction, this thesis recognises the different 
contexts which Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande found themselves. Yet, by taking into 
account their respective contexts, in combination with the language used to make their 
arguments, it becomes easier to compare the approaches between the two leaders, 
seeing where there were points of similarity, and points of difference. 
Now that there has been an explanation as to how the data has been collected and how 
this thesis will analyse it, the next chapter examines in greater detail the various 
different ideas which constitute French Republicanism, including their origins, their 
development, and how they manifest in the modern day. 
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Chapter 3 - Defining Republican Ideals 
This section investigates the specific nature of French Republicanism. It examines the 
uniqueness of the French formulation of Republicanism, looking specifically at its 
origins as a Revolutionary Universalist ideology, as well as some of the distinctive 
component concepts, such as Liberté. It shows not only how the idea has grown over 
the past two centuries, but how it is interpreted now within the context of the modern 
Republic, within a modern, multicultural society. This chapter discusses the most 
important constitutional concepts, including those famous three values contained 
within the constitution: Liberté (Freedom), Égalité (Equality), and Fraternité 
(Brotherhood) (3.1). This Chapter then briefly discusses the French Constitution’s 
effect on Foreign Policy and Military Intervention (3.2). 
This Chapter does not however discuss the notion of grandeur, which is also of 
paramount importance to this thesis as it is specifically linked to France’s experiences 
in its Foreign Policy, because a full examination of the origins and meanings of the 
term has already been conducted in Chapter 1.1. Therefore, to avoid redundancy, this 
Chapter will focus on Liberté, Égalité and Fraternité. 
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3.1 Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité 
These three words exist as almost a form of mantra for the French national 
consciousness, ingrained deeply within the psyche of France’s understanding of its 
own civic nature. It is essential therefore that this thesis gets to grips with the historical 
and modern day understandings of each of these elements.  
Firstly, let us consider the meaning of ‘Liberty’. It is important to know firstly that all 
the terms mentioned above and below have considerable fluidity with regard to their 
definition. In 1819, Benjamin Constant spoke of a distinction between two separate 
forms of liberty; one ‘ancient’, and one ‘modern’592. The modern form of liberty is 
associated with freedom to go about one’s life and business as one chooses, and to 
practise religion or express beliefs free from outside constraint. The ‘ancient’ liberty 
concerns itself more with what is considered to be full participation in the public life, 
“combined not only with a disregard for the virtues of private life, but also with the 
complete subjugation of the individual to the authority of the community”593. In 
explaining these different forms of liberty, Constant was seeking to explain how 
French Republicanism so swiftly degenerated into tyranny, soon after the French 
Revolution. He noted that within French Republicanism there was a tension between 
these two conceptualisations of liberty, and that the great challenge, and the most 
preferable outcome would be to bring these two conceptualisations together.  
Of course, this tension between two conceptualisations of liberty (on deciding whether 
the individual or the community should be the primary focus) is not a uniquely French 
issue. Nor, as this thesis shows, is the question of individual/community liberty 
particularly limited to an individual moment in time. However, these debates 
surrounding the referent object of liberty will inform other ideals of French 
Republicanism, as well as specifically monolithic ideals of what a Frenchman/woman 
is meant to be, and what French ideals are.  
Indeed, the development of French Republicanism can be seen as an oscillation 
between these two conceptualisations. Jean-Fabian Spitz notes that initially, “with 
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regard to the liberty of the subject within the State, it consists of the exercise of rights 
guaranteed by the law but does not entail any active participation in the government 
of the state”594. Indeed, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen can be 
seen as seeking to protect the rights of the individual against the imposition of an 
arbitrary government, thus representing a movement towards a more modern 
interpretation. However, Jennings notes that this initial thought process was almost 
immediately challenged when attempting to form a government which could protect 
these rights595. Jennings argues that the modern conception of liberty was most closely 
associated with the English system of government, which many philosophers of the 
time, including Montesquieu, believed was propped up by the Aristocracy. The 
Revolution was meant to act as a complete break from the ancien regime, which 
included the Aristocracy who were seen as one of the major offenders under the ancien 
regime. Thus, members of the Constituent Assembly immediately dismissed this idea 
out of hand, fearing that this stood in opposition to the Revolution’s fundamental 
goals.  
Instead, there was a movement towards this ancient liberty. For Jennings, it was 
Rousseau who was at the head of this charge towards ancient liberty. Debates 
concerning constitutionality after 1789 became dominated by a reference towards the 
‘general will’. According to Rousseau, the “conception of an unerring general will was 
transposed onto the nation, whose sovereignty (i.e., power and authority), the 
revolutionaries said, lay in the unity of its members”596. The argument, simply put, 
was, why would individuals need protection from a government when they themselves 
had become part of the government? The abuses of the previous government were laid 
solely at the feet of the aristocrats and monarchy. Robespierre expressed this in clear 
terms, by stating that “the good individual was the good citizen, and the good citizen 
was the good patriot”597. As is shown throughout this thesis, this is the attitude taken 
by political elites to justify a number of policies and actions. Whilst not articulated in 
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such overtly nationalistic terms, this narrative forms an important part in obtaining and 
maintaining public consent, as well as producing a unified political will behind the 
foreign policy produced by the executive.  
Jenkins argues that as the Third Republic began to develop, notions of liberty began 
to embody what can be considered to be a more individualistic conceptualisation of 
liberty – one based on the person being a separate entity from the state. According to 
Jules Barni, “Liberty is, in essence, the capacity that allows man to direct his own 
actions, to dispose of himself, in a word, to be his own master rather than the property 
of another”598. Barni described the characteristics of liberty as being: hard work, 
sobriety, chastity and the sanctity of family. He argued that central to liberty was the 
right to property, and that connected to this, individuals (not governments) were the 
ones who had to solve issues of poverty. The idea of liberty being linked to 
individuality became predominant from 1870s onwards.  
The experience of Bonapartism had convinced Barni that for political liberty to grow, 
administrative decentralisation was required599. Jules Ferry went further, calling for 
the establishment of an independent judiciary and the abolition of a standing army600. 
Ferry advocated a move away from the original Jacobian ideal of a strong centralised 
state, instead relying on “…forms of governance that the Jacobins had rejected as a 
regime of aristocratic corruption”601. However, one idea from that Jacobian 
Revolution remained – that of secularism. For Jules Ferry, “intellectual Caesarism” 
needed to be banished, and only a secular state could protect this individual liberty 
from “perpetual Roman occupation”602. Henceforth, the idea of secularism, or laïcité, 
would become strongly linked with liberty.  
As with any of these concepts, equality can be a slippery concept. For most, the idea 
of complete or formal equality is either impossible or undesirable. Étienne Cabet 
argued for a completely egalitarian society, whereby there would be no private 
ownership of property, and labour would be given on equal terms, with necessities 
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being taken as and when required from a centralised storehouse. Everyone would wear 
the same clothes, and live in the same houses603. Egalitarian ideologies such as this 
have not attracted much support. Nevertheless, they do pose an important question: 
what kind of equality are we talking about? Equality of opportunity, or equality of 
outcome? Which types of equality should take precedence: economic, social, or 
political? And how does this type of equality interact with liberty?  
According to both Roederer and Tocqueville604, the Revolution of 1789 placed 
equality, and not liberty as its guiding philosophy. Its quest was to eliminate what it 
saw as unjust privilege. This was most epitomised in the totemic Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 (DDHC), proclaiming that “All men are born 
free and equal in their own rights”. Article 6 declared that “all citizens… are equally 
eligible for all public positions, places and employments, according to their capacities 
and without other distinction than that of their virtues”. This was certainly an 
honourable goal, to create a purely meritocratic society. Article 13 targeted what were 
considered to be the tax privileges which the nobility and clergy enjoyed, in stating 
that taxation “be equally apportioned among all the citizens according to their means”. 
This established that legality would be the root of and means by which equality would 
be enforced within French society. Charles Renouvier argued that “the law of the 
Republic admits of no distinction of birth among citizens or of any hereditary 
power”605. This was taken to mean that individuals were to be equal before the law, 
but would not guarantee equality of circumstances or outcome, for fear of infringing 
upon liberty. Jules Barni in his Manuel Républicain of 1872, argued that liberty ought 
to be the “first principle of republican government”, with equality being a “necessary 
consequence”606.  
However, it would appear that Barni’s conceptualisation of equality was not as 
internally consistent as his words may have suggested. At the time, his 
conceptualisation of equality was limited to men only. He took the rather paradoxical 
view that women were equals of men as “moral persons”, yet “in general the life 
appropriate to women is not the life of politics but that of private life”, further adding 
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that “their true place is not at the forum but at the domestic hearth”607. It would take 
until the Constitution of 1946 before women’s suffrage would be enshrined in law. 
It would seem therefore the French conceptualisation of equality is more interested in 
formal equality than in any true equality. Even now, whilst women can and do vote in 
France, they are still underrepresented in the French Parliament608, and persons from 
immigrant backgrounds often find themselves disadvantaged both in terms of 
educational attainment and unemployment609.  
As such, any conceptualisation of equality outside of the basic notion of “equality 
before the law” is clearly not accurate, and this thesis shows in its later chapters how 
it becomes very clear that when French political elites use these Republican ideals to 
justify policy or defend France or Frenchness, they are using them in a very limited, 
and limiting manner.  
Another Republican ideal to consider is the notion of fraternité. Ambroise-Rendu 
notes that fraternité attracted little notice when it was first introduced in 1791610. 
Indeed, of the three concepts of Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité, fraternité may seem 
to be the least influential. However, the notion of fraternité certainly plays a significant 
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role within this thesis. Indeed, one sees that when discourses concerning the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine are introduced, they include similar 
conceptualisations.  
The notion is ignored in the Constitution of 1793 and the Charter of 1830, only 
reappearing in the Charter of 1848611. However, for Ambroise-Rendu fraternité only 
truly emerged following the Revolution of 1848. “With the triumph of the Republic it 
at last became possible for fraternity to make its official entrance… rather than a 
government of fathers taking their children in hand, the Republic was portrayed as a 
band of brothers.”612  
The new Republic saw itself as more humanitarian due to its introduction of, for 
example, the Decree of the Abolition of Slavery [in its colonies] 27 April 1848 (for 
the second time). The Second Republic enshrined these ideas in the Preamble of its 
Constitution, stating that “It is the duty of the citizens to love their country, serve the 
republic, and defend it at the hazard of their lives… to cooperate for the common 
welfare by fraternally aiding each other”613, as well as “it is also its duty, by fraternal 
assistance, to provide the means of existence to necessitous citizens, either by 
procuring employment for them, within the limits of its resources, or by giving relief 
to those who are unable to work and who have no relatives to help them”614. In order 
to realise this vision, limitations on the hours of work, a guarantee of the right to work 
and the creation of a council of ombudsmen to hear workers’ complaints were all 
proposed615. 
Constitutional mentions of this sense of fraternity has continued into the modern day. 
Both the Preamble and Article 2 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 state that France 
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shall work towards the ideal of “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity”616. But what 
meaning does fraternity serve in this modern context?  
The idea of fraternity saw a development with the creation of Léon Bourgeois’ 
Solidarist movement. Similarly situated within the realm of social rights, it removed 
the “near monopoly”617 the fraternal conception had. Solidarism sought to implement 
the progress promised by the 1789 Revolution. As Hayward notes, “…Joseph de 
Maistre had been right to affirm that "the French Revolution legislated for man as an 
abstraction", in the course of the nineteenth century, the need to secure a closer 
approximation of reality to this abstraction had gradually dawned on those who had 
been groping their way towards the provision of social guarantees as a social 
responsibility”618. Bourgeois therefore “conceived Solidarism as an extension of the 
fraternitarian French Revolutionary tradition from civil and political to social 
rights”619. 
For Bourgeois, Solidarity “sought to achieve social justice by a reparation of the evils 
engendered by a blind and amoral natural solidarity”620. This would mean adding to 
the rights enshrined in the DDHC 1789 with new duties, intended to invoke social 
justice. These duties were described by Bourgeois as debts, which he imagined 
vertically, and horizontally. By virtue of inheritance from one’s forebears, one would 
owe a debt to previous generations, which would be paid unto future generations. 
However, one would also owe a debt to those within the same generation. "Each 
person should agree to guarantee all others against the injustices, the evils, the risks of 
all kinds which arise at the same time from this solidarity."621 The extent to which the 
state would play a role in the enforcement of these debts was left vague. This led to 
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the ideas of Bourgeois being attacked by both laissez-faire economists and 
revolutionary socialists as being a “thinly disguised form of its opposite extreme”622. 
This miniature case study goes to show how even relatively innocuous terms such as 
fraternity can become hotly contested, able to serve a number of masters. Ambroise-
Rendu notes that during the 2002 Presidential elections, two candidates used the word 
“Fraternity” in their campaign posters. One was Christine Taubira, a candidate 
representing the Centrist Radicaux de Gauche. The other being Bruno Mégret, founder 
and candidate for the ultranationalist Mouvement National Républicain, a splinter 
group of the Front National623.  
However, one can also see the guarantees included within Bourgeois’ quote above624 
as sharing many characteristics. The arguments mobilised to justify intervention based 
on the Responsibility to Protect Docrtine are based upon a similar logic; that citizens 
of a country have an expectation that their State will protect them from 
atrocities/humanitarian crises. If a state fails to act in such a way, then other states may 
step in to protect them. In this way, France, in seeking to intervene on behalf of 
civilians in Libya or Syria, is giving them solidarity. 
Whilst the maxim of “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” continues to be the maxim of 
France as a nation, it does not form the entirety of French national identity. Indeed, 
the next section of this thesis briefly looks to the French Constitution, a body of text 
which confers the rights and responsibilities to both government and citizen alike.  
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3.2 The French Constitution 
The Fifth Republic emerged, like the Third and Fourth Republics, due to an 
international crisis. The Algerian War had been raging for years, and de Gaulle was 
invited back from political exile, becoming President of France. The new Constitution 
which followed was an opportunity to establish the executive as the predominant 
power. The Constitution of the Fourth Republic had placed the balance of power with 
Parliament, resulting in relative instability. To avoid this instability, the new Republic 
would place the power with the Executive.  
De Gaulle had a hand in writing the constitution, and there is no greater example of 
his handiwork than that of Article 5 of the 1958 Constitution, whereby the role of the 
President is described as being “the guarantor of national independence, territorial 
integrity and due respect for Treaties”625. In addition to this, Article 15 makes the 
President the “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He shall preside over the 
higher national defence councils and committees”626. 
The Prime Minister’s role in regards to Foreign Policy is also defined by Articles 20 
and 21. Article 20 states that “The Government shall determine and conduct the policy 
of the Nation”627; and Article 21 tasks the Prime Minister with directing “the actions 
of the Government. He shall be responsible for national defence”628.  
However, the most important article in regard to the centralisation of power in the 
hands of the President is Article 35: 
A declaration of war shall be authorized by Parliament. 
The Government shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces 
intervene abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention. It shall 
detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may give rise to a debate, 
which shall not be followed by a vote. 
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Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government shall submit the 
extension to Parliament for authorization. It may ask the National Assembly to make the 
final decision. 
If Parliament is not sitting at the end of the four-month period, it shall express its decision 
at the opening of the following session. 
As can be seen above, the President need not ask for approval from Parliament to 
engage in a conflict. Nor does the President even need to inform Parliament military 
action has occurred until three days after the fact. The only time that Parliament may 
be required is if the action exceeds four months, but even then, if the four months fall 
when Parliament is not sitting, the Parliament is not recalled. 
This centralised power indicates the importance of the President in the decision for 
military intervention. This is why this thesis seeks to primarily examine the discourse 
generated by the President, as it is the President who ultimately holds all of the power. 
The only time this power is diluted, is during a period of ‘Cohabitation’, whereby the 
Prime Minister would be able to exert some influence over the decision making 
process. However, in the case of this case study, both Sarkozy and Hollande were not 
in ‘Cohabitation’, and therefore had a dominant hand in developing policies, at least 
domestically. This is especially the case as neither President was proposing a military 
intervention which was planned to last any significant period of time. 
Based on the principles mentioned above, a picture emerges from the traditions and 
norms founded throughout France’s 330 year Republican history. These ideas have 
stemmed from official sources, for example the Constitution or Declaration des Droits 
de l’Homme et du Citoyen 1789 (DDHC).  
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Part II President Sarkozy and 
Intervention in Libya 
Following a series of protests in Tunisia, a wave of discontent began spreading across 
North Africa and the Middle East. In Libya, the initial site for the protests was in the 
city of Benghazi. The protests steadily became more violent as protesters began 
clashing with security forces on 15 February 2011629. As the protests began to spread 
across the country, its leader, Colonel Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 
and the security forces became increasingly violent.  
However, some of the Security forces defied their orders and joined with the 
protesters630. Deserters from the army, as well as former members of the Gaddafi 
administration, academics and clerics met in Bayda to discuss what should happen 
next. It was here that the National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed631. 
Recognising the increasing bloodshed as Gaddafi became more and more desperate, 
an initial United Nations Security Council Resolution, Resolution 1970, was passed. 
Its purpose was to freeze the assets of Colonel Gaddafi and his associates and restrict 
their ability to travel632. Throughout March, Gaddafi’s forces started to gain the upper 
hand, making their way east and retaking several cities. At this point, Resolution 1973 
was passed, establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, as well as allowing UN member 
states to take “all necessary measures” to ensure the protection of civilians633.  
The “necessary measures” as interpreted by several NATO states included bombing 
campaigns. On 19 March 2011, French, British and American military forces began 
Operation Odyssey Dawn, which was a mission to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya. 
More than 110 Tomahawk missiles were fired from American and British ships and 
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submarines, striking around 20 Libyan air and missile defence targets in western 
Libya634. Five days later, NATO agreed to assist in enforcing the no-fly zone635, before 
taking sole command of the air operations on 31 March 2011636. 
Talks around the possibilities of ceasefires were discussed, but did not produce any 
lasting resolution. The African Union worked tirelessly to try to bring the conflict to 
a close, but the rebels rejected these proposals as they involved retaining Gaddafi in 
power637.  
Throughout May and June, the EU and several other countries such as Germany began 
to recognise the NTC as the legitimate representatives of Libya638. Militarily, the rebel 
forces began to make progress in August, taking back the coastal cities they had lost 
to Gaddafi’s previous assault. They were also able to capture the capital city, 
Tripoli639.  
On 16 September 2011, the UN finally recognised the National Transitional Council 
as the legal representative of Libya640. This was after the UN Security Council had 
released $1.5 billion of frozen assets to the rebel government on 25 August 2011641.  
Muammar Gaddafi remained on the run until 20 October 2011, when he was captured 
and killed in his home town of Sirte642. The National Transitional Council declared 
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the official end of the war three days later643, with the UN formally declaring the end 
of NATO’s mandate in the country, and NATO declaring the successful completion 
of Operation Unified Protector on 31 October 2011644.  
This conflict was relatively short-lived, and involved a considerable amount of 
solidarity within the international community regarding the aims and outcomes of their 
operations. However, despite this seemingly multilateral contribution, there were three 
nations driving forward these Western interventions: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France.  
Part II of this thesis examines France’s role within this conflict. Specifically it analyses 
the common terms and phrases used by Nicolas Sarkozy and his administration to 
justify his intervention in Libya. What is displayed are references to France’s own 
history and traditions, as well as the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, making the 
case that it is France’s duty to intervene to help foster democracy in this region. This 
is therefore covered in Chapter 5. 
However, in order to fully appreciate the circumstances in which France found itself, 
it is first necessary to examine France’s previous links to and engagements with Libya, 
as well as events across the globe which directly preceded the protests in Libya 
(Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 4 - Contextualising Sarkozy’s Position at the start of the Libyan Civil 
War 
 
As mentioned above, there were a number of historical and political factors outside of 
the conflict which contributed to France’s intervention in Libya. These contexts were 
the sum of decades of French Foreign, Security, and Trade Policy, colliding with (and 
potentially contradicting) France’s own self-image. In order to explain the rhetoric 
used by the Sarkozy administration in support of military intervention in Libya, as 
well as to assess the veracity of French claims, this thesis first needs to examine the 
various decisions and policies leading up to this event. 
This chapter addresses two mitigating factors which certainly had some impact on the 
decision for France to intervene militarily. This is by no means an argument that the 
other considerations, such as the threat to life of civilians in Benghazi, were not the 
primary reason for the intervention. Rather, it is an example of the complicated 
position that Sarkozy and his administration found themselves in, whereby pragmatic 
considerations would come up against its historical universalist claims to promoting 
Liberté, Égalité and Fraternité abroad. 
Firstly, this chapter discusses the various financial and business relationships which 
had been formed between France and the Gaddafi regime, partly to explain how some 
of these dealings impacted on the situation to intervene militarily (4.1). Secondly, it 
examines France’s conduct prior to its intervention in Libya (4.2). This section shows 
how France’s slow reactions and diplomatic blunders led to much embarrassment, 
especially the series of French gaffes in relation to the protests in Tunisia. 
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4.1 Financial Ties 
 
In 2007, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi touched down in Paris, his first visit to France in 
thirty-three years. It was also his first visit to a Western nation since his renunciation 
of terrorism. Gaddafi was treated to a lavish five-day stay, which included providing 
a large heated Bedouin-style tent for receiving guests in the garden of the Paris 
mansion which accommodates visiting dignitaries.  
The visit was immediately controversial, with Rama Yade, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs and Human Rights and member of Sarkozy’s own government, 
condemning the act, saying “Colonel Gaddafi must realize our country isn't a doormat 
upon which a leader, whether terrorist or not, can come to wipe off the blood of his 
crimes”645. The criticism was not limited to a single cabinet member however; 
Ségolène Royal described it as being "odious, shocking, and even inadmissible", 
before accusing the President of "stomping on traditional French defence of human 
rights". Perhaps the most damning condemnation came from France’s Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Bernard Kouchner, who could muster little more enthusiasm than to say, "I 
am resigned to hosting him. It was necessary"646. 
One of the main goals it seemed for Colonel Gaddafi’s visit was to sign a series of 
trade agreements. Specifically, he was buying twenty-one Airbus aeroplanes, as well 
as signing a nuclear co-operation accord647. This accord in question was designed to 
produce a nuclear reactor to power a de-salination plant, which proved to be 
controversial with the German government. The company that would be producing the 
nuclear reactor was Areva, which at the time was the world’s biggest nuclear reactor 
manufacturer. However, the German engineering company Siemens had a 34 per cent 
stake in Framatome, a nuclear power joint venture with Areva648. Due to Gaddafi and 
Libya’s history, Germany had some misgivings about selling nuclear technology to 
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such a ruler, especially as the sale would fall under the auspices of the European 
Union, thereby linking the two entities. 
This was not however the largest source of controversy which came out of the 
interactions between the two leaders. Prior to the meeting, six healthcare workers were 
released from prison in Libya and returned to Europe. These healthcare workers (one 
Palestinian doctor, 5 Bulgarian nurses) had been arrested in 1999, accused of 
intentionally infecting 426 Libyan children with HIV. They had previously all been 
sentenced to death, but their sentences had been commuted following a deal with the 
European Union involving, amongst other things, compensation payments to the 
children649. Sarkozy, and his wife Cécilia, had been involved in the negotiations, and 
evidence emerged that arms sales had formed part of the deal to have the workers 
released. Sarkozy had previously denied that arms sales had formed part of the deal. 
However, the European defence and aerospace company EADS announced that it had 
signed a €296m (£200m) deal with Libya, and Sarkozy was accused of facilitating this 
deal in favour of the release of the prisoners. The finalisation of this deal came only 
two days after Gaddafi’s son, Saïf al-Islam, had suggested that they had been promised 
arms650. Leading the criticisms at the time was François Hollande, who was the leader 
of the opposition. Whilst admitting that the arms deals were, of course, legal, he felt 
that the deal had been conducted improperly. In a French Radio interview, he argued 
that:  
We were told there was no bartering… Then we learn the there was a civil contract over 
a nuclear reactor. I questioned the foreign affairs minister about this and a vague 
memorandum was given to us, but nothing about an arms contract… There's a real 
problem with method here. How can we, in a democracy, accept that Nicolas Sarkozy 
wants to be transparent when it's Gadafy's son who announces an arms contract has been 
signed, when the minister of foreign affairs knows nothing and the defence minister is 
still talking about a letter of intent.651 
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However, the Sarkozy administration were keen to portray these deals as being worked 
out independent of the French state’s own activities. Sarkozy's spokesman, David 
Martinon, justified the deal by telling Le Parisien newspaper that “if commercial 
contracts have been signed between Libya and French companies, we can only 
congratulate them… Should we reproach national firms for winning business with a 
partner, Libya, which respects its international obligations?”652 
Whatever the case as to the origin of this deal, the mere possibility to have these sorts 
of deals with the Gaddafi regime can be traced to before Sarkozy’s Presidency. Three 
years earlier, Jacques Chirac had travelled to Tripoli to visit Colonel Gaddafi; this had 
been the first trip to Libya by a French leader in fifty-one years. This trip formed part 
of accelerating trade talks between France, and to a larger extent the EU, and Libya. 
Of course, French companies had had a presence in Libya for decades653, but this latest 
opportunity signified a considerable opportunity for wider ranging economic ties 
between Europe and Libya. 
This had, in part, come about following a recent development in Gaddafi’s policy 
towards the West; he had agreed to stop developing weapons of mass destruction, as 
well as to denounce terrorism and acknowledge responsibility for the Lockerbie and 
UTA plane bombings in the 1980s654. 
At stake were potential trade deals concerning the sales of weaponry, oil, and 
infrastructure. Gaddafi was searching for potential partners in both Europe and the 
United States, seeking to play one party off another. Indeed, whilst the US may have 
been a more profitable trading partner, Gaddafi had been critical of the US’ role in the 
Iraq War. Engaging Europe in these discussions was therefore intended to obtain the 
best deal possible out of the competing parties655.  
Chirac was keen to engage with Libya, hence his visitation to Libya. At the time, 
France was Libya’s fifth-largest supplier of imports, with exports of €272 million in 
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2002. French imports from Libya were worth €756 million in 2003 and consisted 
almost entirely of oil656. Chirac was keen to look beyond Libya and Gaddafi’s past 
transgressions, arguing that Libya had undergone “heavy turbulence. This difficult 
period is now happily completed”657. Indeed, Gaddafi praised France, stating that 
“President Chirac has taken some very positive positions on Palestine and the Iraq 
War. And as France feels its presence in Africa is a kind of obligation and as Libya is 
an important African country... our two countries can combine their efforts to help 
Africa”658. Chirac reciprocated, stating that he hoped France would be able to embark 
upon a “deep and trusting political dialogue” with Libya regarding the Maghreb, the 
Mediterranean and Africa659.  
Beyond political and diplomatic ties, France was keen to maintain and grow its 
“economic involvement in the country”, pursuing further development in “strategic 
sectors [such] as energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, transport, water and 
environment”. Chirac also added that France would support Libya’s “reform 
movement and the opening up of businesses” to the outside world660. Indeed, he 
admitted to reporters that “It is a promising market - we must do the maximum to 
support it”661. 
Most indicative of this attempt to open up Libya to Western business was Chirac’s 
lobbying of the EU to withdraw its ban on the sale of arms to the country. This formed 
part of a general strategy on France’s part to have a number of arms embargos 
withdrawn, including those against China662. At the time, the US announced that it 
was resistant to the idea of the EU lifting the embargo663, but a year later George W 
Bush announced that the US would also lift its own trade embargo in Libya664. 
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The benefits of the lifting of this embargo were immediately apparent for France. For 
example, on 17 February 2005, the Defence Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie met with 
Gaddafi to discuss the sale of modern weaponry to his regime. The French package 
promised an update to Libya’s Air Force, which included Mirage fighters which had 
been purchased from France during the 1970s, as well as overhauling several patrol 
boats from the same era. Gaddafi also discussed the potential purchase of two of 
France's newest combat aircraft, the newest iteration of the Rafale Aircraft, as well as 
the Eurocopter Tiger attack helicopter. Between 2005 and 2010, France would issue 
one hundred and eighty-seven arms sales licences to sell a mix of bombs, torpedoes, 
rockets and missiles; large calibre guns; fire control equipment; military aircraft and 
components, all of which accumulated to a total value of €381,688,627, a greater value 
of sales than any European nation665. 
However, France’s dealings with Libya allegedly involved more than just commercial 
transactions. Accusations began to emerge that the Gaddafi family had paid €50 
million into Sarkozy’s presidential campaign. Whilst the rumour had existed for a 
while, it began to gain traction when Ziad Takieddine, a French-Lebanese 
businessman came forward and stated that Gaddafi had contributed to the Presidential 
campaign, and specifically, it was he who had handed over the money to Sarkozy’s 
then Chief of Staff, Claude Guéant666. 
For a more comprehensive breakdown of the allegations that Sarkozy and his 
associates were having some form of underhanded relationship with the Gaddafi 
regime, Catherine Graciet’s Sarkozy/Kadhafi667 is a good place to start. One 
particularly eye-popping story concerns Claude Guéant, Ziad Takieddine and 
Gaddafi’s son Saïf al-Islam. The interview with Graciet describes how, after Sarkozy’s 
election victory, they were tasked with organising a meeting between Claude Guéant 
and Saïf al-Islam. The plan was to invite Saïf to the Elysée. Instead, and without 
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warning, Saïf and a few others were picked up, and dropped off at Ziad Takieddine’s 
home. This was where the General Secretary of the Elysée first met Gaddafi’s son668. 
Graciet later tells us that, once they had grown to trust each other a little more, 
Takieddine introduced Guéant to Abdallah Senoussi, a man implicated in the DC20 
UTA plane disaster669. 
Of course, it is important to note that all of these things that Sarkozy and Guéant 
allegedly did, or the people they allegedly met, have not been substantiated in a court 
of law, and therefore cannot definitively be said to have happened. Guéant disputed 
the evidence that supposedly links him to some of the backroom deals. However, an 
independent court did rule that some of the documents were authentic, implying that 
investigations would continue670.  
And indeed, investigations into potentially improper campaign finance continued 
whilst this thesis was written. In March 2018, Sarkozy was questioned for two days, 
and charged by investigators regarding these alleged payments671. More recently, 
Alexandre Djouhri lost his appeal against extradition to France, in relation to allegedly 
improper payments from the Libyan regime to Nicolas Sarkozy. Djouhri is a 
businessman who is accused of selling a villa in the south of France for an inflated 
price of €10m to officials connected to the Libyan regime through a sovereign wealth 
fund based in Switzerland, the Libyan African Portfolio (LAP). He then allegedly 
funnelled €500,000 of the proceeds of the sale into an account held by Mr Sarkozy’s 
then Chief of Staff, Claude Guéant672. 
Whilst the maxim of “there is no smoke without fire” should not be used as a means 
of ascribing guilt, it is certainly true that this background rumbling of potentially 
improper connections did hurt Sarkozy’s standing in France at the time. It certainly 
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provides an explanation as to why Sarkozy was so willing to take the punishment for 
having invited Gaddafi to Paris, especially considering that it must have been 
foreseeable. Indeed, in a not so subtle attack against his predecessor, François 
Hollande wrote in his book A President Shouldn’t Say That: “as President of the 
Republic, I was never held for questioning […] I never spied on a judge, I never 
asked anything of a judge, I was never financed by Libya”673. 
Both of these aforementioned financial links certainly paint a complex picture of 
relations between the Libyan regime and the Sarkozy administration. However, let it 
be made clear that this thesis does not argue that the sole reason Sarkozy intervened 
in Libya was to dispose of a potentially problematic individual in the event that the 
investigation of his dealings with the regime were to continue. Indeed, Mediapart 
journalist Fabrice Arfi warned against interpreting Sarkozy’s role as being strictly 
personal: “I don’t believe that Sarkozy brought France and other countries to war in 
Libya exclusively to whitewash himself”. However, he added that “It’s difficult to 
imagine that there wasn’t some kind of personal or private dimension to Sarkozy’s 
pro-war activism in 2011”674. 
Indeed, there would certainly seem to be a strong motivation to distance oneself as 
much as possible from an individual with whom one may have had inappropriate 
financial dealings, especially if one had spent the previous three years cultivating a 
strong relationship with them. Joe Penney argues that it would therefore be tempting 
to seek to remove Gaddafi from the situation, especially once it became clear that the 
US and most of the Arab states were also happy to be rid of the Libyan leader675. In 
his article, Jalel Harchaoui argued that “Once the war was triggered, [Sarkozy’s] 
attitude is deeply impacted by the scandal that he is the only one aware of at the time. 
So, it gives rise to a very uncompromising France pursuing a scenario where 
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everything would be destroyed and everything related to the Gaddafis would be 
discredited”676. 
However, Adam Holloway, a British Conservative MP dismissed this potential 
personal reason for intervention, stating that: “if Mr. Sarkozy had taken money 
from Gaddafi, you might expect it to make him less likely to intervene, if anything. 
For this reason, I don’t really think this is a factor. … Indulging in regime change 
had nothing to do with intelligence (which should have said ‘Don’t do it’), but with 
David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy’s need to ‘do something”677. 
Whether or not Sarkozy’s decision to intervene military was partially in response to 
personal issues, it is still important to show that up until the military intervention, 
Sarkozy and France had been broadly supportive of the Gaddafi regime. Viewed in 
this context, the change from commercial crony to mortal enemy was certainly stark. 
The next part of this Chapter considers the beginnings of the Arab Spring, and how 
Sarkozy misjudged the mood of the nation.   
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4.2 The Arab Spring in Tunisia and the wrong side of history 
 
The Arab Spring began with the self-immolation of a market vendor named Mohamed 
Bouazizi outside the provincial governor’s office in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. His actions 
were in protest against what he considered to be widespread corruption. Bouazizi had 
had his cart, from which he sold fruit, confiscated. However, what could drive a man 
to cover himself with flammable liquid and set himself alight in front of a government 
building? We are told that “the breadwinner in a family of eight, Bouazizi argued with 
a policewoman who took away his goods and scales. The policewoman gave him a 
slap in the face and a slur against his father, who died when he was three”678. 
Corruption was rife throughout the country, and we are told that this single act ignited 
in many people a building animosity against those who had seemingly abandoned the 
poorer regions of Tunisia to their fate. “In the absence of clear leaders in Tunisia's 
uprising, Bouazizi has captured the imagination of millions and inspired copycat 
burnings in neighbouring Algeria, Mauritania and Egypt.”679 Protests broke out across 
Tunisia, and by 14 January 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had fled to Saudi 
Arabia. Waves of protest rapidly spread throughout the rest of the region too, with 
some successes. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power for thirty 
years, resigned on 11 February 2011 after 18 days of massive protests, including the 
now iconic occupation of Tahrir Square and the infamous “Battle of the Camels”, 
where supporters of Mubarak clashed with protesters, riding into Tahrir Square on 
camels and horses, beating people with sticks.  
A common refrain from academics and political actors from the early 2010s is that 
they felt that the Arab Spring could not have been predicted. And certainly in that early 
phase, events unfolded very rapidly. There were only twenty-eight days between the 
self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on 14 December 2010680, and the resignation 
and flight of President Ben Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia681.  Whilst some 
were surprised with the speed of the results, as well as how quickly they seemed to 
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spread across the MENA area, others were surprised with how slow other countries, 
especially France, were to react682.  
Alain Juppé has certainly been frank when looking back at these events, especially 
regarding the extent to which France was caught off guard by the Arab Spring. In a 
symposium on the Arab Spring, he sought to justify this by saying “no research centre, 
chancery or specialist could have predicted the scale or timing of this ‘Arab Spring’, 
even though there were warning signs”683.  At another event, Juppé also sought to 
explain why they were slow to react to the changing landscape: 
Our vision and our policies with respect to the Arab world have for years been inspired 
primarily by a concern of stability… But at the same time, we often saw the authoritarian 
regimes as bastions against extremism, safeguards against chaos. We allowed ourselves 
in the name of security and the fight against terrorism to demonstrate a certain level of 
tolerance for the governments that were flouting human rights and curbing their countries’ 
development. We turned a blind eye to certain abuses as if this region of the world didn’t 
have the right to freedom or modernity684. 
And this was certainly the case in Tunisia. When the protests began, and the Ben Ali 
regime began to feel the pressure, France was caught attempting to sell them tear gas 
to help control the protesters. In a letter obtained by Reuters from François Fillon to 
Jean-Marc Ayrault, the Prime Minister admitted that permits were issued, authorising 
the sale of tear gas to the Tunisian government as late as 12 January, two days before 
President Ben Ali fled. Fillon clarified that they had not been exported, but that the 
export authorisations would have required the blessing of the Foreign Ministry. The 
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authorisations thus were suspended on 18 January, following customs checks on 14 
January.685. 
However, this was not the only source of embarrassment for the Sarkozy government 
in its handling of the Tunisian uprisings. In addition to the authorisation of tear gas 
sales to the country, the Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie herself provoked 
strong condemnation in the French Parliament when she offered the expertise of 
French Security Forces to help with the crowd control on 12 January (just two days 
before Ben Ali’s flight from the country)686. Alliot-Marie was equally embroiled in 
controversy when it became known that not only had she holidayed in Tunisia in late 
2010, at which time the protests had been occurring, but also that she and her family 
(including her partner Patrick Ollier, also a government minister) had used the private 
jet of a businessman who was allegedly close to Ben Ali. The jet, alleged the satirical 
newspaper Le Canard Enchaîné, belonged to Aziz Miled, who was a close associate 
of Belhasan Trabelsi (brother-in-law to Ben Ali). Michèle Alliot-Marie admitted that 
it was his jet, but denied the closeness of the relationship between Miled and Tabelsi, 
who she argued had been a victim of the regime687. However, despite her protestations, 
the scandal became too great and Alliot-Marie eventually resigned. In her resignation 
letter, Alliot-Marie stated that she felt that she had done nothing wrong and lashed out, 
arguing that she had “been the target of political attacks” and that the media had used 
this “to create suspicion, counter-truths and generalisation”. She then became more 
accusatory, stating that "For the last two weeks, it is my family's private life that has 
been suffering real harassment at the hands of certain media… I cannot accept that 
some people use this [campaign] to try to make people believe in a weakening of 
France's international policy"688. Alliot-Marie would be replaced by the veteran 
politician Alain Juppé as Foreign Minister.  
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Whilst these multiple missteps by the Foreign Ministry forced Alliot-Marie to fall on 
her sword, she was not the only member of the administration to make proclamations 
which, in time, would be viewed unfavourably. The French Culture Minister, Frédéric 
Mitterrand, argued that the Ben Ali administration had been unfairly criticised, stating 
that “to say that Tunisia is a one-man dictatorship seems to me quite exaggerated”689, 
whilst the Agricultural Minister Bruno le Maire also praised some of Ben Ali’s 
achievements690. Nicolas Sarkozy himself admitted that he had underestimated the 
popular anger against the Ben Ali administration. Indeed, in a peculiar admission that 
attempted to justify France’s inaction, Sarkozy declared that “Behind the emancipation 
of women, the drive for education and training, the economic dynamism, the 
emergence of a middle class, there was a despair, a suffering, a sense of suffocation. 
We have to recognise that we underestimated it”. During this press conference, 
however, Sarkozy appeared defensive; when asked whether French silence had 
contributed to an increased number of deaths, he “looked riled and said that was an 
exaggeration”691. Sarkozy’s advisor Henri Guiano justified France’s non-intervention 
differently, telling RTL Radio that “It's not for France to be the gendarme of the 
Mediterranean”692. 
However, Sarkozy’s critics were eager to condemn the French President. Opposition 
member and former Cabinet Minister Pierre Moscovici stated that "we really have a 
diplomacy without courage and without dignity. I am ashamed of what I have seen”. 
Another EU official pointed out that "Overall the French have been agnostic”, 
suggesting that it was effectively a policy “along the lines of 'better the dictator you 
know than the dictator you don't”693. 
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This reluctance to act was also felt on the European level, with EU diplomats reporting 
that the French, Spanish, and Portuguese were all pressing for caution rather than 
decisive action. It was only after Ben Ali had fled the country to Saudi Arabia that 
French statements started referring to ‘democracy’ in Tunisia as being something 
worth supporting694. 
It was at this point that the Marly Group launched their scathing attack on Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s foreign policy695. The Marly Group consisted of a group of French diplomats 
who had become disaffected with Sarkozy’s foreign policy. In particular, they argued 
that France was losing influence in the world, not because of its diplomats, but because 
of the policies that were being pursued. Indeed, they laid the blame on the government, 
which they claimed did not draw upon the expertise of foreign policy practitioners. It 
was for these reasons that France continued to support the Ben Ali and Mubarak 
administrations. They claimed that had the Élysée listened to the advice being 
provided, France would not have found itself on the back foot. The Marly Group 
accused the Sarkozy administration of amateurism, impulsiveness, and a preoccupation 
with the short-term effects a policy would have on media coverage. Indeed, because of 
this, foreign policy under Sarkozy often felt spontaneous and improvised, with an 
inconsistent foreign policy at work. The group therefore called on Sarkozy to heed 
their advice, and seek to produce a more stable foreign policy based on the counsel 
offered by his diplomatic corps696. 
This had been a rather unprecedented intervention by foreign policy practitioners in an 
attempt to correct and rescue the country’s foreign policy. The extent to which this 
article had a direct impact on Sarkozy’s foreign policy is unclear; what is clear, 
however, is that France did become significantly more decisive in its treatment of 
Libya at the point when protests turned violent. 
As has been mentioned above, it is not the purpose of this thesis to assess the extent to 
which any single factor catalysed France to intervene in the way that it did. However, 
the information provided here does certainly highlight significant reasons for France 
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to act. A chance to correct the international community’s perception of France, as well 
as the possibility of discrediting anything Gaddafi could say in relation to the two 
leaders’ former relations, would certainly be important motivators.  
Furthermore, establishing Sarkozy’s former policy positions aids us in understanding 
the language used by President Sarkozy to justify intervention, allowing motivations 
to be interpreted from the words and phrases spoken, and the doxa utilised. The next 
Chapter analyses and assesses the various arguments deployed, and what the language 
used tells us about French Foreign Policy. 
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Chapter 5 - Intervention in Libya 
 
As has been mentioned above, France played significant roles in driving forward the 
humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011. The purpose of this part is to examine the 
arguments utilised to justify the intervention. This section therefore discusses the 
various stages of the intervention, to better examine how the French administration 
made its arguments to intervene. 
This section examines the intervention in three separate parts. Firstly, this section deals 
with the justification for the intervention (5.1), how it was argued, and what kind of 
imagery they were drawing upon, both from the modern and from the historical 
context. Secondly, we discuss the nature of the intervention (5.2). Specifically, what 
the purpose of the no-fly zone was, and how the French were able to interpret it more 
broadly so as to go well beyond what the UN Security Council originally intended. 
Finally, we discuss the importance of the consent of the wider international community 
and multi-lateral support (5.3), particularly with regard to the question of whether (and 
in what forms) the use of force should have been allowed because both the Libyan 
citizens and the international community were supportive of it. In conducting an 
analysis of the texts that have been selected for this Discourse-Historical Approach, 
the various speeches and interviews provided will be contextualised against France’s 
cultural and historical foreign policy tendencies, as well as observations concerning 
the build up to and initial conflict with the Gaddafi regime in Libya.  
Ultimately, the French were able to successfully convince the international community 
that the conflict in Libya triggered the UN’s Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. It is 
important to reiterate that the four criteria to legitimise an argument for the 
Responsibility to Protect are: those demanding intervention must have the right 
intention, that it must be the last resort, that the intervention itself must be proportional, 
and that there must be a reasonable chance of averting the crisis or atrocity which 
would otherwise trigger the norm697. It is therefore important to note that the various 
declarations made by the Sarkozy administration would also be seeking to set out how 
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the four aforementioned criteria would be met (once military intervention had been 
chosen as the appropriate course of action).  
This chapter therefore examines consistent themes which emerge within the texts, 
relating to France as an entity, as well as explaining how they metamorphosed into an 
argument enabling the implementation of a no-fly zone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
201 
 
5.1 Justification of Intervention – The Humanitarian Case 
 
One of the major justifications given for the interventions by France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States in Libya was that they needed to act in order to avert 
a humanitarian catastrophe. When discussing the humanitarian issues, a number of 
themes and topoi would appear. This section breaks down some examples which 
appear within the sample of texts analysed.  
The first is the most-straight forward, namely describing the violent situation in which 
the Libyans were living. This is done by referencing a mix of actual atrocities which 
had already occurred, with the threat of new ones occurring were France not to act. 
This of course reflects primarily the topos of humanitarianism, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2.  
The protests against Gaddafi were meant to begin in Benghazi on 17 February 2011, 
when there would be a “Day of Revolt/Rage”. In fact, protests began two days earlier, 
with the protests of 17 February being far more wide-ranging than had been 
anticipated. Protests were occurring in Ajdabiya, Darnah, Zintan, and a few other 
cities. Dozens were shot and killed in the opening days of the protests, and there were 
reports of Gaddafi having individuals (including former prison inmates) bussed in to 
act as counter protestors698. In the ensuing three days, hundreds more would die, and 
Benghazi would fall to the protestors. The defining moment in this initial conflict came 
with the fall of the Katiba, a stronghold containing much of the city’s arms stocks. It 
was at this point that soldiers under the Gaddafi regime began to abandon their posts, 
either joining in the protests, or simply withdrawing from the city699.  
Benghazi became an important symbol in the West in relation to the uprising. This 
was where many of the protestors’ key victories over the Gaddafi regime occurred. 
This was heightened when the National Transitional Council set up its headquarters in 
the city700. As a result of this heightened profile for the city, it became an essential 
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target for Gaddafi’s forces, as not only the second most populous city in Libya, but 
also one which had become a symbol of the newly organised opposition. 
In the initial few weeks of the uprising, however, knowledge of the killings which had 
been committed was very limited. As such, the first declarations regarding the 
uprisings do not contain specific pieces of information. Instead, they refer to abstract 
and generalised threats to the population. These first statements tended to limit 
themselves to a more factual appraisal of the situation, just including one or two 
adjectives to give a phrase or sentence a little more bite or flavour.  
The first public communiqué by Nicolas Sarkozy on the issue denounced “the 
unacceptable use of force against Libyans, who are simply exercising their 
fundamental right to freedom of assembly and expression”701. In this communiqué, he 
also gave his condolences to the bereaved and expressed sympathy for those who had 
been injured. Finally, he called for “an immediate halt to the violence and for a 
political solution in order to respond to the Libyan people’s aspiration to democracy 
and freedom”702.  
There are two main points to be made in relation to this initial communiqué. Firstly, 
we see the obvious references to ‘fundamental rights’, related to freedom of assembly 
and freedom of expression, covered more broadly within the spectrum of democracy 
and freedom. Here we find the first example of Sarkozy using the topos of liberté, 
arguing that as a simple expression of their democratic rights, the citizens should be 
allowed to protest. Secondly, this statement seems carefully worded so as to not place 
too much blame on the regime. Sarkozy condemned the government for the 
“unacceptable use of force”, but ended the statement with a general call for a “halt to 
the violence”. It would therefore seem that President Sarkozy was, at this point, not 
seeking to place all of the blame on the government. One could of course surmise at 
this point that no decisions had been made by the administration in terms of a policy 
towards the regime.  
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It is clear, however, that over the next three days, following the battle in Benghazi and 
protests across the rest of the country, President Sarkozy adopted a different approach. 
The first sentence of President Sarkozy’s statement to the Council of Ministers on 23 
February 2011 stated that: “The continuing brutal and bloody crackdown against 
Libyan civilians is horrifying”703. Now, of course, much of the sentence is redundant; 
it goes without saying that a crackdown is violent and brutal, and that the images 
would be horrifying. But opening statements like this are not about subtlety, but rather 
creating an image to set the tone for the rest of the statement/speech. In this case, this 
was one of the first proclamations by Sarkozy on what would become the Libyan Civil 
War, and it set a clear tone for how his government would respond to the crisis. 
What is most interesting about this statement is that, whilst the first sentence makes it 
implicit that Colonel Gaddafi’s administration were the ones committing the violence, 
it never mentions him by name. Nor does it name any individuals involved in the 
violence. Instead, it lays the blame more generally against the administration, in saying 
that the use of force “against one’s own people is contemptible”704. There could of 
course be a number of reasons for this. Based on France’s economic ties to the country, 
refraining from personalising this crisis would allow France to continue to deal with 
Gaddafi had he called a halt to the conflict and enacted some reforms. Once again, 
Sarkozy called for an “immediate end to the violence in Libya” and urged the leaders 
of that country to “immediately engage in political dialogue to put an end to the 
ongoing tragedy”705, thereby placing the emphasis on all parties to stop fighting and 
reach a consensus.  
In the final two paragraphs of this statement to the Council of Ministers meeting, 
Sarkozy asked that the Council of Ministers consider possible sanctions, something 
which could be interpreted as a gentle threat of coercion at the end of a statement 
mostly characterised by an appeal to reason. Gentle, that is, because he only asks that 
proposals be made and that there be a consideration of measures relating to “economic, 
commercial or financial relations with Libya”706. It may not have been in Sarkozy’s 
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mind at the time, however the Doctrine of R2P does require that all reasonable 
measures be considered before resorting to the use of force.  
Another method utilised by President Sarkozy in his statement to the Council of 
Ministers on 23 February was to attempt to close the gap between the listeners, the 
French public, and those whose plight he was describing (Libyans). This was done by 
drawing a comparison/connection between the two things. He stated that “France and 
the French people are following these events with shock and compassion”707. This 
argument that the French people were looking to the Libyan people echoed the ideas 
discussed in Chapter 3.1 relating to Bourgeois’ concept of Solidarism, linked of course 
to topos of fraternité.  
In his press conference on 11 March 2011, these fraternal themes emerged once again, 
for example when he said: “Because the values put forward today by the Arab people 
are the values which the European nations had endorsed long ago”708. Unlike the 
previous example, here the sense of fraternité was broadened to encompass not just 
France, but the entire West. To see why, one must note where this press conference 
took place, and what the purpose of Sarkozy’s visit was. This press conference was 
held in Brussels, following a meeting of the EU to formulate a response to the situation 
in Libya. When analysing these texts, it is important to note the audience of the 
discourse to better understand what was being argued for, and who the texts were 
seeking to convince. In this case, it was in France’s best interests not to alienate 
European leaders by essentialising France’s experience at this time. Therefore, 
Sarkozy broadened the notion of we to include other Europeans (more on this is 
discussed in 5.3 when elaborating upon the requirement for multilateral solutions).  
This topos of responsibility was raised once again when Sarkozy was asked about 
collaborating with the United Nations, the Arab League, and the African Union in 
responding to this crisis: “But in the end, Europe is the big neighbour; we share the 
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Mediterranean. The Arab peoples have decided to fight for their freedom and for 
democracy. Our duty is to respond to that aspiration”709.  
Once again, the closeness of France and North Africa is drawn out, both in geography, 
but also now in aspiration. Indeed, now that the Arab people were fighting for 
democracy, it was the responsibility of France to “respond to the aspiration”. This 
combines the topos of responsibility and the topos of fraternité once again, crafting 
links between the ideas of those sharing values with the French with a responsibility 
on the French to act to help them continue along this path.  
One of the decisions made following the meeting of the European Council was to 
allow humanitarian agencies to travel to safe havens (whose locations had yet to be 
decided) throughout the region. There were already plans to send them to Tunisia and 
Egypt, and the European Council was hopeful that a humanitarian area would also be 
established in Libya. This was especially required for Libya, where the European 
Council wanted to establish areas to provide healthcare, schools, and a means to 
provide refuge for the tens of thousands of people who had been displaced. It is 
interesting to note that the prepared segment of this press conference was far more 
factual than other pieces of discourse we later examine. There was little use of emotive 
language to portray the situation. When discussing attacks against the civilian 
population, Sarkozy stated that the European Council expresses “its deep worry on the 
subject of the attacks, which includes airstrikes against non-violent Libyan 
civilians”710. Here, the emotive terms “deep concern” and “non-violent Libyan 
civilians” were subdued, especially when taken in the context of the rest of the press 
conference. This also lays the groundwork for the R2P Doctrine, clearly showing that 
the Libyan state was not fulfilling its responsibility to protect its citizens from 
humanitarian dangers, and was indeed inflicting them upon the population. 
These arguments can also be combined to strengthen the case for some sort of 
intervention. Consider, for example, this sentence from the Paris Summit for the 
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Support of the Libyan People, where he says that in Libya, “peaceful civilians who are 
demanding nothing more than the right to decide their future for themselves are in 
mortal danger. We have a duty to answer their anguished plea”711. The word order in 
this section is both very important and very persuasive. Firstly, we have the term 
“peaceful civilians”; obviously, the use of ‘peaceful’ here is intended to suggest that 
they are undeserving of the current conditions in which they find themselves. 
‘Civilian’ is also chosen to intensify this sense of victimhood, arguing that they are 
incapable of defending themselves. This sense of injustice is strengthened by the fact 
that they are “demanding nothing more than the right to decide their future for 
themselves”. Here again, the topos of fraternité is invoked, the idea that their striving 
for liberty is something that everyone should be able to relate to. Then of course is the 
fact that they are in “mortal danger”, drawing attention to the stakes of the situation, 
as well as adding a layer of immediacy.  
Next, it makes a direct call to action in stating that “we have a duty to answer”. There 
are a number of points which explain why this statement is effective. Firstly, we 
encounter both the topos of humanitarianism and the topos of threat, in stating that 
there is a threat to the individuals’ lives and rights, and that there is something France 
can do to prevent this. It is also suggestive of France’s mission, that France is in a 
position to help resolve the situation itself through its action (topos of burden). This 
also lends itself towards broader arguments of French exceptionalism (which is 
addressed later in this chapter). Finally is the “anguished plea” phrase, which once 
again adds a dramatic layer of immediacy, conveying emotions surrounding the 
unfairness and injustice of the situation, personalising the Libyans to the listeners.  
Put simply, the situation being presented was that of a reasonable request for freedom 
from the Libyan population being brutally and violently denied, and France having the 
opportunity to rectify it. 
Specifically, on this point, Sarkozy sought to distinguish the situation in Libya from 
the situations that had arisen in Tunisia and Egypt, thereby clarifying why Libya 
required international intervention. Sarkozy acknowledged that whilst there was also 
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brutality under the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes in Egypt and Tunisia respectively, 
he distinguished this type of violence by describing it as “civiles”. Here, he argued that 
because the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes did not use armed forces such as soldiers 
or airplanes, the two scenarios cannot be compared to the more existential threat that 
the Gaddafi regime poses. Indeed, he argues that both in Tunisia and Egypt there was 
a refusal by the Army to fire upon protestors, in a way that the Army had not refused 
to do so in Libya.  
As argued in Chapter 4, France had reacted too slowly to events in Tunisia, and had 
remained supportive of the Ben Ali regime until just before Ben Ali himself fled the 
country. It is also true that the Egyptian Army were not involved in many violent 
skirmishes with protestors. Instead, pro-Mubarak supporters were given free rein to 
attack protestors with bricks and firebombs712.  
Therefore, the relatively high level of threat that Gaddafi posed the protestors was 
what obliged the self-appointed guardians of the wider world to intervene. He himself 
admitted that if the army had said they would not fire upon protestors, then that would 
have created a different scenario which would have required radical rethinking of the 
situation. However, Gaddafi and the Libyan regime effectively committed “actes de 
guerre” against their own people, certainly necessitating additional consideration and 
pressure by the international community713.  
It is interesting, however, that throughout the press conference on 11 March 2011, 
Sarkozy emphasised that, whilst military force was an option on the table, it was only 
to be used as a last resort. Whilst he was open to the use of force, the diplomatic 
solution was always seen as the preferred option. Whilst he had effectively ruled out 
working with Gaddafi himself, he reasoned that it was indeed possible to work with 
those who had formerly worked for the regime, but were now working to enact a 
transition towards democracy. This is an essential part of the R2P framework, as force 
may only be authorised if no other option is capable of working. He was also able to 
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side himself with those whom he had considered to be true representatives of the 
Libyan people due to their desire to enact democratic norms. 
By 15 March however, Alain Juppé was arguing that instead of enacting a no-fly zone, 
which would be difficult to manage, the type of intervention the international 
community should be looking to conduct was airstrikes on key airports to prevent 
Gaddafi from using his air force714. Alain Juppé’s argument was significantly stronger 
than had previously been articulated. Juppé was clear to differentiate the nations 
undergoing the Arab Spring once again, arguing that the action to be taken needed to 
be tailored to the individual nation. For Libya, he argued that “our main concern being 
to protect the civilian population”715. Much of the content of this speech is discussed 
in sections 5.2 and 5.3; however one striking element in relation to this speech is the 
confirmation that “without wishing to dwell on the recent past, I can’t resist the urge 
to recall the fact that France was the first country, along with Britain, to say Colonel 
Gaddafi must be prevented from using violence to restore his authority”716. Here, he 
establishes France as being at the forefront of the protection of human rights, 
reinforcing France’s status as a protector of human rights, and bestowing upon it a 
sense of leadership (topos of grandeur). 
Three elements will be discussed in relation to this passage. Firstly, one has the basic 
idea that ‘violence’ is not a legitimate means to regain authority over the country. 
Obviously, this suggests that he would be likely to use violence to achieve his goals, 
which when combined with the previous mention of protecting the “civilian 
population”, one is asked to assume that this is whom the violence will be used against.  
Secondly, it is also important to note that implicitly, France’s position at this point was 
to consider the National Transitional Council (NTC) to be the legitimate 
representatives of the Libyan people, and not the Gaddafi regime. However, Juppé’s 
phrasing here suggested that if Gaddafi were to use other means to restore his authority 
in the country, then this would be acceptable. However, based on the facts, France’s 
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prior support for the NTC meant it would have been unlikely for France to support 
Gaddafi again in the short to medium term.  
Thirdly, Juppé was keen to accentuate France’s leadership in attempting to prevent 
violence against civilians. Again, he relied on both the topos of danger (against the 
civilians) and the topos of humanitarianism to justify France’s position, but was also 
seeking to increase France’s rang by taking a position of leadership in seeking to 
resolve this crisis. It is striking too that this message came from Alain Juppé, who had 
replaced Alliot-Marie in the role of Foreign Minister. Alliot-Marie’s time as Foreign 
Minister ended because of her support of the repressive Tunisian regime. It was 
therefore important for France to reclaim the narrative of its role in the Arab Spring. 
From this point on, one would see a far more assertive French discourse regarding its 
own conduct in Libya. 
A particular example of the stronger rhetoric used by the Sarkozy regime can be found 
in Sarkozy’s statement at the Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People on 
19 March 2011. Between Juppé’s speech at the National Assembly Foreign Affairs 
Committee and Sarkozy’s speech at the Paris Summit, Resolution 1973 authorised the 
creation of a no-fly zone and demanded a ceasefire (amongst other things)717. The 
Summit was therefore a means for a number of world leaders to meet and discuss a 
joint policy for the implementation of the Resolution.  
Here, Sarkozy took a much stronger and emotionally engaging line than he had done 
previously. The opening three paragraphs consider what had been decided regarding 
the implementation of Resolution 1973, the practicalities of using French aircraft to 
implement the no-fly-zone and attack any armoured vehicles which threatened 
unarmed civilians, and reiterated the global consensus of these actions (to be discussed 
in greater detail in part 5.3). Again, the topos of humanitarianism and the topos of 
threat were called upon, similar in tone to what had been discussed previously 
regarding the threats to unarmed civilians, and the warning issued by the international 
community against Gaddafi. In the fourth paragraph, he advised that Gaddafi “has 
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completely disregarded this warning. Over the past few hours, his forces have 
intensified their deadly offensives”718. 
From this point on, Sarkozy’s rhetoric became significantly more emotive; it was at 
this point where we began to see more naked examples of France’s Republican 
ideology at play. He started the fifth paragraph, stating that “Arab peoples have chosen 
to free themselves from the servitude to which they have felt bound for far too long. 
These revolutions have given rise to immense hope in the hearts of all those who share 
the values of democracy and human rights”719. Again, we have this idea that the “Arab 
peoples”, in seeking to reject their former authoritarian leaders and embracing 
democracy, were moving towards liberty by freeing themselves from “servitude”. 
Whilst this statement had the specific purpose of reporting the decisions made in order 
to implement Resolution 1973, it also served a broader purpose for France to announce 
its position regarding the Arab Spring. Sarkozy was keen to re-write France’s own 
history in this regard, for only a few months prior, France was offering to support 
regimes who were keeping Arab peoples in “servitude”. 
More broadly, he deflected the blame away from France and other Western nations 
who were content to maintain the status quo; instead, he placed the blame on the 
individuals rebelling, since it was they who “felt bound” to the old systems. This was 
a consistent position for Sarkozy, who made the infamous gaffe in a speech in Dakar 
in 2007 that “The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history 
... They have never really launched themselves into the future”720.  
Of course, this idea presupposed that nations such as France exist in this future of other 
nations; namely, that nations should have sought to be more like it in order to progress. 
In these circumstances, this meant democracy and human rights, ideas which are 
enshrined within France’s Republican ideals. The France conjured by Sarkozy’s words 
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acts almost as a proud parent, when speaking of the “immense hope in the hearts of all 
those who share the[se] values… ”721. 
These paternalistic themes continue when Sarkozy noted: “But they are not without 
danger. The future of these Arab peoples belongs to them. In the midst of the 
difficulties and trials of all kinds that they must face, these Arab peoples need our help 
and support. It is our duty”722. 
Here Sarkozy displayed the topos of burden, or in other words, France’s mission. 
France has historically held an opinion of itself as a nation whose role has been to 
spread its culture and ideas to the rest of the world, sometimes articulated as its ‘besoin 
de rayonnement’723. France was founded within revolution and has historically been 
supportive (when in its own interests) of revolutions similarly modelled from the early 
days of American Independence. This French exceptionalism was a founding element 
for the Republic, and informed much of its policy. De Gaullian notions of grandeur 
can be seen as another element of this, namely, France seeking to increase its rang to 
achieve its rightful place in history and the international order. Therefore, when 
France’s foreign policy is understood in this way, it is clear to see that intervening in 
this way could be seen as their ‘duty’. 
Throughout this statement (and others), Sarkozy was keen to point out that any 
intervention by France was not to be interpreted as an imposition of French values, 
and that the Arab peoples’ future was their own. Specifically, in the seventh paragraph, 
he noted that French intervention “is not to impose a final outcome on the Libyan 
People but in the name of universal conscience, which cannot tolerate such crimes”724. 
Sarkozy concluded his statement with a summation of the state of events as they stood, 
accompanied by an appeal to Gaddafi. He firstly stated that the aim of the intervention 
was to “protect civilians from the murderous madness of a regime which, in killing its 
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own people, has lost all legitimacy… They cannot be deprived of their rights through 
violence and terror… Our determination is total”725. 
Here we find a distillation of all of the techniques used thus far; Sarkozy once again 
brought attention to the spectre of civilians’ deaths, whilst making the strongest 
critique until this point of the Gaddafi regime. Again, Sarkozy invited his audience, 
which predominately can be seen to be the remainder of the international community, 
to associate with the Libyan people, in contradistinction to the “murderous” Gaddafi 
regime.  
The declarations made by the Sarkozy administration consciously attempted to build 
an association between the ‘Libyan people’ and ‘civilians’. Of course, there were 
many civilians who participated in the protests and uprisings, but the opposition forces 
were also made up of those who had deserted Gaddafi’s army726.  However, the 
conflict was instead conceptualised as one which was between a powerful state, ruled 
by an unpopular authoritarian leader, and a downtrodden civilian population, yearning 
to become free and democratic. 
It was this day, 19 March 2011, on which France’s Air Force began to enforce the no-
fly zone. The executive, and specifically Prime Minister François Fillon, Foreign 
Minister Alain Juppé, and Minister for Defence Gérard Longuet explained the decision 
before the National Assembly on 22 March 2011.  
These statements open with an explanation of the Arab Spring, describing how “a wind 
of democracy and freedom has been blowing through the Arab world. The Tunisian 
people, then the Egyptian people, have expelled their leaders and abolished the 
authoritarian regimes in place since decolonisation”727. Of course, France’s actions, or 
lack thereof in relation to the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, went unmentioned. 
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However, we are once again offered the notions of “democracy and freedom”, acting 
as a reason to support the uprisings. Relying on this topos of fraternité, this seeks to 
make those on whose behalf France has acted seem more deserving, thereby also 
feeding into the idea of France’s mission. 
When the no-fly zone was first implemented, and the French carried out missions 
against advancing ground forces, French leaders were quick to publicise what they had 
been able to achieve, and remind people of what had been saved. The aforementioned 
combined speeches of the executive from 22 March 2011 were keen to accentuate 
France’s achievements. Indeed, when Libya began its own protests, they hoped that it 
would resolve itself equally quickly. However, “the Gaddafi regime decided to drown 
in blood the revolt that threatened it. In the space of two weeks, the Libyan People’s 
hopes turned into a nightmare”. 
These two sentences set up the stakes and suggested the consequences of French 
inaction; that democracy and liberty would not have been able to take hold as Gaddafi 
killed those who stood against him. Both the topos of danger and the topos of 
humanitarianism acted as powerful motivating factors for action. Specifically, it was 
argued that “Last Thursday, Benghazi – the last bastion of freedom in Libya – seemed 
condemned to fall into the hands of the troops loyal to Gaddafi. The revolution seemed 
to be living through its final hours”728. 
Sentences like this seek to dramatise events, framing the events as a battle between 
good and evil. Similarly, like with any such tale, when all seems lost, the hero finds a 
way to save the day. Here, we are told that: “Two days later, hope was reborn in 
Benghazi. They waved French flags and they waved the flags of another Libya, with 
its dreams of democracy and modernity”.729 
The heroic France therefore came to intervene and save the revolution. Patriotic 
images were conjured with the waving of French flags, seeking to elicit images of 
Bastille Day celebrations and foster solidarity between the French and those in 
Benghazi.  
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This statement acknowledged the risks of armed intervention. However, notions of 
France’s damaged prestige through inaction were raised: “But wouldn’t the moral and 
political doubt be more profound and devastating it we’d done nothing? Wouldn’t we 
be burdened by a huge sense of guilt if- through caution and weakness- we’d stood by 
and witnessed the repression of an unarmed people?”730 
France’s sense of rang and grandeur was challenged here, attempting to imagine a 
world in which France felt unable to act to support its very own values through its own 
weakness. As discussed in Part I, French foreign policy remains the reserve of the 
President of the Republic. Unlike in the United Kingdom, the National Assembly does 
not need to give its consent for military action before it is enacted. Furthermore, 
foreign policy, and specifically the use of military assets, tends not to be too 
contentious an issue, with only limited criticism normally being faced. It is therefore 
submitted that this entire speech was less an attempt to convince the assembly 
members to support the action (though this may have been a secondary aim for those 
who were sceptical) but as an act of national unity. It offered France a chance to enact 
a performative patriotism, to celebrate France’s uniqueness and leadership in this 
crisis.  
Indeed, it gave the standing administration a chance to reiterate its own Republican 
credentials, affording an opportunity to show France’s power in upholding its mission.  
The final two paragraphs emphasised this, stating that:  
France hopes a new era will begin tomorrow in the Mediterranean region, free of 
colonialist baggage and outdated attitudes; a new era based on the notions of respect and 
dignity, in which the fear and rejection of others give way to the sharing of common 
values. (…) 
At a time when France is engaged militarily, when our armed forces are bravely fulfilling 
their mission, I know, ladies and gentlemen deputies, that I can count on your sense of 
national unity. 
In Benghazi the tricolore flag has been raised, and this gesture compels us to accept our 
duty. As I stand here I know you, the nation’s representatives, are concerned to uphold a 
certain idea of France and liberty. Today there is neither Right nor Left, there is only the 
Republic, which commits itself from the heart, courageously but also with clarity and 
moment.731 
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Here he described a vision of the Mediterranean region after the Arab Spring; one 
which emulates the values that the French Republic was built upon. Moreover, 
France’s mission was laid bare, to support the Libyans struggling against a repressive 
regime to build a new society mirroring France’s own. Indeed, the fact that those in 
Benghazi are flying the tricolore creates almost an obligation for France to intervene 
on their behalf. The final sentence accentuated this, arguing that there were no political 
divisions, only unity under the banner of the French Republic who must act. 
Having discussed the humanitarian argument surrounding the French intervention and 
how Republican ideas are mobilised to reinforce French exceptionalism through its 
own commitment to uphold these values, I now further discuss the logic behind the 
specific usage of French air power to inhibit Gaddafi’s ability to effectively use his 
own air power. 
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5.2 Instruments of intervention – UN Resolutions and the decision to implement a 
no-fly zone 
 
As has been chronicled above, France, and the rest of the world, was slow to react to 
the outbreak of protests throughout the MENA region. Despite the embarrassment of 
being caught supporting Tunisia’s Ben Ali, the reaction from the Sarkozy 
administration was still one of caution.  
A number of factors needed to be taken into account before France would be able to 
make a decision. Protests had broken out in Tunisia in December 2010, following 
which President Ben Ali fled on 14 January 2011732. Protests in Egypt broke out in 
earnest during the Day of Anger on 25 January 2011, with President Mubarak 
resigning on 11 February 2011733.  
Both of these resignations had occurred within a month of the protests, and without 
the need for intervention by outside forces. It would therefore seem that France was 
keen to monitor how the Libyan regime would react to protests before issuing a 
declaration on it, and beginning to consider the need for air strikes.  
It is for this reason that both the statements on 21 February 2011734 and 23 February 
2011735 did not commit France to any specific action. The statement on 21 February 
2011 only contained a general call for a more peaceful response to the protests736. The 
Statement on 23 February went further, once again calling for an end to the violence, 
but also arguing that “the international community cannot stand by in the face of these 
massive human rights violations”737. He advanced, asking his Foreign and European 
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Affairs Minister (at this point still Michèle Alliot-Marie) to propose sanctions against 
Libya which related to, inter alia, “the possibility of bringing them to justice, 
prohibiting access to EU territory and monitoring financial transactions”738. 
Similar attitudes had emerged with other member states of the Security Council, 
leading to the passage of Resolution 1970 in the UN on 26 February 2011739. This 
resolution was adopted with unanimous consent by all members of the Security 
Council, and sought to levy a number of different sanctions against the Libyan 
government. The Resolution opened with a demand for there to be a cessation to the 
violence, and for steps to be taken to “fulfil the legitimate demands of the 
population”740. It moved on to the Security Council urging the Libyan authorities to 
respect human rights and international humanitarian laws, as well as allowing 
international human rights monitors to enter the country; ensuring the safety of all 
foreign nationals and their assets, as well as facilitating their safe passage from Libya 
if they so wish; ensuring the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and 
humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country; and lifting the restrictions on all 
forms of media in the country741.  In addition to this, the resolution also referred the 
situation to the International Criminal Court for an investigation into potential 
international crimes742.  
This Resolution also implemented an arms embargo to prevent any trade being 
conducted with the regime, in addition to a travel ban and asset freeze on Colonel 
Gaddafi and his family members. This marked the first step in what would be a careful 
escalation of measures seeking to pressure Gaddafi into ceasing hostilities. Following 
the adoption of this Resolution, Gérard Araud (Permanent Representative for France 
in the UN) stated that the decision by the Security Council: 
recalls the responsibility of each State to protect its own population and of the 
international community to intervene when States fail in their duty. We hope that the 
responsible parties of the Libyan regime will hear the message of the international 
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community and put an end to the unacceptable violence committed against their own 
people, who have the right to democracy, freedom and justice.743  
Here, the topos of humanitarianism is employed, describing the legitimacy of the 
protestors’ cause in seeking to have “democracy, freedom and justice”. This also 
explains that the Libyan authorities should have done all that they could in order to 
end the “unacceptable violence”, something which was made all the more 
unreasonable due to the apparent reasonableness of the opposition’s demands. 
However, this statement also started the process of making the justifications for action 
under the Responsibility to Protect framework. 
As explained in Chapter 1.3, the Responsibility to Protect norm was established 
following a report in 2001, making the argument that whilst the primary responsibility 
for the protection of people rested with the state itself, a residual responsibility also 
rested upon the international community as a whole, if the individual state in question 
failed to live up to its responsibilities744. 
In the implementation of this idea, the UN advocated a three-stage system. The first 
stage concerned the primary responsibility of the state itself to not commit, or allow 
to be committed, atrocities within its own territory. Secondly, other states and the 
international community (i.e. intergovernmental organisations) had a responsibility to 
assist states in enacting this primary responsibility, if they were willing to accept this 
outside help. Finally, step three indicated that if this primary responsibility was not 
being honoured, and the state, either through action or inaction was failing to protect 
its own people, then other states would be permitted to step in and use means provided 
by the UN Charter745. 
The first sentence in the aforementioned Araud quote specifically invoked this point 
in describing how the responsibility fell with the state to protect its own people, and 
that if it ceased doing this, it was the role of the international community to do so 
instead. However, it should be understood that this was not necessarily a precursor to 
military intervention, as the quote again offered an opportunity for the Libyan Regime 
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to prevent further international intervention by ceasing hostilities and succumbing to 
the rebel’s demands.  
Alain Juppé was keen to articulate that all options remained on the table in his 
interview with TF1 on 1 March746. Firstly, he was keen to emphasise his hesitation at 
utilising military intervention. He argued that “when you’ve embarked on a military 
operation, you’ve then got to plan for its consequences”. Instead he emphasised the 
diplomatic avenues and international embargoes implemented, stating that “we’re 
trying to increase pressure to bring down Gaddafi”747.  
When pressed on French military intervention, Juppé deflected, reiterating that all 
options were on the table. When the interviewer suggested that the United States were 
potentially gearing up to intervene following its decision to send ships to the region 
and asked Juppé whether France would follow suit, Juppé stated that the decision to 
intervene ultimately rested on the existence of a mandate provided by the UN Security 
Council. However, when asked whether France would veto military action, he stated 
“I didn’t say that. We must discuss it and see, also, how the situation is going to 
develop… we must see how the situation develops. Depending on that, we’ll adapt. 
No option is definitively ruled out, particularly the idea of imposing a no-fly zone”748. 
When pushed further on whether France was in favour of the no-fly zone option, Juppé 
responded “We’re in favour of it being studied, of course”749. 
This attitude continued to be present for Juppé, when during a joint press conference 
with William Hague, he stated that “We also agree about thinking and even acting to 
plan a no-fly zone over Libya, if the threat Gaddafi is making to use force against the 
Libyan people materializes in the coming days”750. When asked again whether he felt 
that there would be military action in Libya, Juppé stated that “given the threats being 
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brandished by Colonel Gaddafi, we have to get ready to act and this is why we’ve 
given our agreement to planning for a no-fly zone above Libya”751.  
Here, Juppé also specifically name drops the idea of Responsibility to Protect in 
response to the offer by Hugo Chavez to act as mediator to diffuse the crisis:  
I remind you that, a few years ago, the United Nations adopted a new concept, namely 
the responsibility to protect: governments must protect populations against war crimes, 
and when they don’t do it the international community has grounds to take their place. 
That’s where we are today, so obviously no mediation aimed at enabling Colonel Gaddafi 
to remain in power is welcome.752 
 
Juppé here was specifying France’s line of arguments moving forward: that if the 
attacks against the general populace continued, then the international community 
would need to intervene. This is reflected throughout every further statement by 
representatives of the Sarkozy administration. 
Juppé further accentuated France’s position in responding to a query posed by an 
Assembly Member on 6 March 2011. He confirmed that, provided the existence of a 
UN mandate, France would be “prepared to intervene, with others, to protect the 
people by blocking Gaddafi from using his aircraft”753. He also signalled a move 
towards more aggressively pursuing this as a policy option, saying that “That’s what 
we’re working on. At the European Council on Friday, which will be devoted 
exclusively to the situation in Libya and south of the Mediterranean, France will make 
strong proposals”754. 
These proposals were continuing to be explored during a meeting with the EU, as 
explained by Sarkozy. He reiterated France and the rest of the European community’s 
desire for a diplomatic solution to the Libyan crisis. He also acknowledged 
reservations regarding the implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya, and 
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specifically putting into practice a no-fly zone over a territory approximately three 
times larger than France.755 
Unlike previous statements, Sarkozy was keen to explain in greater detail what France 
would not be doing, stating that “France’s position has never been an option involving 
ground troops, nor a military option involving NATO, and France has always had 
reservations about the no-fly zone, even if it hasn’t decided to rule that option out”756. 
His preferred option instead, was for there to be “strictly defensive operations aimed 
at a few military targets, in the event of defenceless civilian populations being 
massacred in a large-scale military action against them”757. This, of course, had the 
advantage of being a much easier objective to achieve, as targets would have already 
been established, and France would not have had to continually monitor, as he had 
already explained, a massive land mass. 
However, there were key elements which France had required before military 
intervention would be allowed: in the case that diplomatic options failed, and where 
the Libyan air force were launching air strikes against defenceless protestors, they 
would require “a clear judicial basis – [following] a decision by the United 
Nations…”758. 
There are political reasons for France’s requirement for authorisation from the United 
Nations (as discussed in section 5.3). However, there are also legal ramifications to 
this; as explained in Chapter 2.4, the Responsibility to Protect was only a relatively 
newly-established norm, and did not create new rights for nations to step in to protect 
the populations of other nations. Therefore, the UN’s legal framework would still have 
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needed to be used to justify any intervention, i.e. a Resolution authorising the use of 
force. 
It is clear that the points raised above by Sarkozy became specific talking points for 
the administration, because we find them repeated by Alain Juppé in his hearing before 
the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee four days later759, in which he 
reiterated that France was not supportive of the idea of implementing a no-fly zone. 
He found that “even though certain members are hostile to it; for our part, we consider 
it obsolete”760. Indeed, he explained again that upholding a no-fly zone over such a 
vast country would be difficult to maintain, and that France’s preference would be, 
“on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution, targeted strikes on military 
positions, because it’s air bombardments that enabled Colonel Gaddafi to upset the 
power balance with the rebel movement”761. 
However, despite France’s hesitation regarding the effectiveness of a no-fly zone, 
France went on to propose its inclusion, amongst other things, in the draft Resolution 
placed before the UN on 17 March 2011. In his Security Council statement, he 
summarised the Arab Spring up until that point, drawing distinctions between what 
had occurred in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, with Libya, where “the will of the people 
has been crushed by the murderous repression led by Colonel Al-Qadhafi’s regime 
against his own people”762. He then described the attacks against civilians, and its 
effect in driving the UN to pass, unanimously, Resolution 1970. However, Juppé 
lamented that “these measures have not been sufficient. Throughout the country, 
violence against the civilian population has only increased”763. 
Indeed, the conflict between the Gaddafi regime and the rebels had escalated into a 
civil war the month proceeding the Day of Rage. As the fighting became more intense, 
the regime had begun to attack both military and civilian targets indiscriminately. 
Initially, it had started with soldiers firing on protesters in Benghazi, killing more than 
                                                          
759 Hearing of Alain Juppé, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, before the National Assembly 
Foreign Affairs Committee (excerpts), Paris 15 March 2011 
https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article2244 [accessed 08/03/2019] 
760 Ibid. 
761 Ibid. 
762 Statement by Mr Alain Juppé, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to the UN Security 
Council (UN Translation) 17 March 2011 https://onu.delegfrance.org/17-March-2011-Security-
Council [accessed 08/03/2019] 
763 Ibid. 
223 
 
a hundred participants764; it was then reported to be occurring across the country, with 
Libya’s own Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Omar Al Dabashi, stating that 
“The regime is killing whoever gets out to the street. He [Gaddafi] has his mercenaries 
everywhere on the streets and whenever any demonstrator appears they just kill 
them”765. It also became apparent that the assault against civilians was becoming more 
concerted, with warplanes being used to implement what one resident of Tripoli 
described as “a policy of scorched earth”766.  
As more defections occurred and the rebel forces became stronger, so too did 
Gaddafi’s resolve to survive. The breaking point, which drove the international 
community to intervene, was the precursor to the Second Battle of Benghazi. 
Gaddafi’s loyalist forces had steadily been marching eastward towards Benghazi, 
having driven rebels from Brega on 15 March, and capturing Ajdabiya on 17 March. 
The ultimate goal of this offensive was, undeniably, the capture of Benghazi. As has 
been mentioned previously, Benghazi had become symbolic of the uprising, and was 
also coincidentally the headquarters to the Libyan National Transitional Council; not 
to forget, it was also still home to a large number of civilians. It was therefore feared 
that Gaddafi would target all indiscriminately in his advance into the city. 
Gaddafi did little to dissuade the international community that this was not his 
objective. On 17 March, Gaddafi sent the warning to the residents of Benghazi that 
“We are coming tonight… You will come out from inside. Prepare yourselves from 
tonight. We will find you in your closets”767. However, following news of the 
upcoming UN vote on a potential no-fly zone, Gaddafi was also quick to fire warnings 
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at the international community more widely, threatening military and civilian targets 
in the region:  
Any foreign military act against Libya will expose all air and maritime traffic in the 
Mediterranean Sea to danger and civilian and military facilities will become targets of 
Libya’s counter-attack… The Mediterranean basin will face danger not just in the short-
term, but also in the long-term.768 
This belligerent attitude on the part of Gaddafi, as well as his actions up until this 
point, served to justify the international community’s decision to act. Therefore, the 
draft resolution sought to first implement the no-fly zone; however, as has been stated 
above, this was not France’s preferred option. Juppé therefore left it to “the members 
of the Arab League and those Member States that so wish to take the measures 
necessary to implement its provisions”769. However, aspects of the Resolution were 
suitably vague for the purposes of France, whereby the Resolution also “authorizes 
these same States to take all measures necessary, over and above the no-fly zone, to 
protect civilians and territories, including Benghazi, which are under the threat of 
attack by Colonel Al-Qadhafi’s forces”770. 
Juppé finalised his statement with a call to action:  
We do not have much time left. It is a matter of days, perhaps even hours. Every hour and 
day that goes by means a further clampdown and repression for the freedom-loving 
civilian population, in particular the people of Benghazi. Every hour and day that goes by 
increases the burden of responsibility on our shoulders.  
If we are careful not to act too late, the Security Council will have the distinction of having 
ensured that in Libya law prevails over force, democracy over dictatorship and freedom 
over oppression.771 
 
Here, he relied on all of the topos mentioned in section 5.1 above, depending on the 
idea of solidarity between the member states of the United Nations Security Council 
(all of whom, bar China, were democracies) and the “freedom-loving civilian 
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population”. He called upon the topos of threat when describing how “every hour and 
day that goes by means a further clampdown and repression”, and also triggering the 
topos of responsibility, by stating that “every hour and day that goes by increases the 
burden of responsibility on our shoulders… if we are careful not to act too late, the 
Security Council will have the distinction of having ensured that in Libya law prevails 
over force…”772. 
However, these topoi provide the justification for military interventions under the 
Responsibility to Protect norm. As stated above, much of the discourse being 
generated by the French administration was based along the lines of the Libyan 
government attacking its own population, and that it was the responsibility of France 
and the international community to seek to protect this population. 
However, the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine also suggested rules surrounding the 
application of military force. As was described in Chapter 1.3, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty produced guidance on when 
military intervention under this norm may be appropriate773.   
Firstly, they proposed that the intervention must have the “right intention”, that of 
seeking to halt or avert human suffering. According to the Commission, this “is better 
assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the 
victims concerned”774. This is discussed in greater detail in the next section; however, 
it is key to point out at the moment that statements provided by both Sarkozy and 
Juppé were keen to emphasize that the Libyan people were the drivers of the process, 
and that any intervention would require regional support. Indeed, as seen above, the 
implementation of the no-fly zone was to be delegated to members of the Arab League. 
Secondly, the intervention needed to be considered the last resort, after every non-
military option had been explored, and that there were reasonable grounds to believe 
that any “lesser measure” would not have succeeded775. With every speech, diplomatic 
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options are always emphasized over any other option, with the idea that only after 
these options were no longer viable, would France seek a multilateral intervention. 
Thirdly, it was advised that proportional means were to be utilized, meaning that the 
minimum level of force would be used to secure the objective. It was important, 
therefore, that for this to be effective, the objective must be very clearly defined. Here, 
the objective was articulated as being the protection of civilian life, and not regime 
change (though this was the inevitable outcome of the intervention as enacted). In fact, 
the no-fly zone, the pre-emptive strikes against airfields and pro-regime armoured 
units articulated as defensive measures, were all evaluated to be proportional. This 
benefitted the rebel forces in their fight against the pro-regime forces, however the 
principle of double effect was employed to argue that this was just a side effect. 
Finally, there had to be a reasonable prospect that the action taken would have resulted 
in the desired effect: protection of civilians. Since most civilians were situated in urban 
areas, and this was where Gaddafi’s indiscriminate attacks were occurring, it was 
argued that preventing the use of Gaddafi’s more destructive tools in his arsenal would 
sufficiently protect civilians. This argument also stated “the consequences of action 
must not likely be worse than the consequences of inaction”776. Much of the arguments 
articulated by Sarkozy and Juppé claimed that inaction would lead to catastrophe. 
Resolution 1973 was passed on the very same day, with ten votes for, and five 
abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russian Federation)777. Following 
Gaddafi’s continued advance on Benghazi and other cities, France launched Operation 
Harmatten on 19 March 2011778. French, British and American forces were involved 
in the larger airstrikes, however French fighter jets were the first to strike, destroying 
four tanks at 4:45pm (local time)779.  
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Sarkozy spoke this same day at the Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People 
regarding the intervention. Despite having already obtained the authorisation of the 
UN, he strove to again reiterate the key arguments justifying the intervention, drawing 
particular attention to the fact that France was still demanding that Colonel Gaddafi 
call a ceasefire, and announce the “withdrawal of the forces that have attacked civilian 
populations in recent weeks” to avoid military intervention. This ensures that Gaddafi 
had one final opportunity to prevent such action, which fulfils the last resort element 
of R2P. Instead however, “Colonel Gaddafi has completely disregarded this warning. 
Over the past few hours his forces have intensified their deadly offensives”780.  
He highlighted the multilateral nature of the operation, stressing that “The future of 
Libya belongs to the Libyans. We do not want to make decisions for them. Their fight 
for freedom is theirs. If we intervene alongside [emphasis added] Arab countries, it is 
not to impose a final outcome on the Libyan people but in the name of universal 
conscience, which cannot tolerate such crimes”781. This helped to serve the purpose of 
accentuating the fact that he had obtained regional support in working “alongside” 
Arab countries. It also addressed the potential post-colonial optics of the intervention. 
This is also reiterated in his conclusion, where he stated that “Everyone must now 
shoulder their responsibilities. It is a grave decision that we have had to take. 
Alongside her Arab, European and North American partners, France is determined to 
assume her role in history”782, thereby portraying that the operation was proceeding 
with the right intention.  
Sarkozy was also keen to reiterate that even at this late stage, there could still have 
been a diplomatic solution available: “There is still time for Colonel Gaddafi to avoid 
the worst by meeting all the international community’s demands, immediately and 
without reservations. The door of diplomacy will be re-opened once the attacks 
cease”783. This further cemented the idea that the intervention was reasonable and 
proportional.  
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Furthermore, Sarkozy suggested that the intervention was already having positive 
results, that “Our aircraft are already preventing air attacks on the city. Other French 
aircraft stand ready to intervene against any armoured vehicles that threaten unarmed 
civilians”784, therefore already achieving its primary goal of helping protect civilians 
from Gaddafi’s pro-regime military advances.  
This success was accentuated during the Prime Minister’s statement before the 
National Assembly, stating that: “the aim of our air force’s action is indeed a total 
cessation of the violence and of all attacks and atrocities against the Libyan civilian 
population. And proof of it is that on Sunday, when our fighter planes failed to detect 
any Libyan units attacking the civilian population, they did not make use of their 
weapons”785. 
Fillon was also clear as to the limits of France’s involvement in the conflict, when 
stating that “By depriving the Gaddafi regime of its military superiority, we want to 
offer the Libyan people a chance to regain their confidence, define a political strategy 
and decide their future, because, ladies and gentlemen deputies, it’s not our role to 
replace them”786. Of course, there are also more pragmatic reasons for limiting this, 
beyond the obvious post-colonial overtones of an intervention involving land forces. 
Indeed, the risk of servicemen and women dying, and pictures of coffins with flags 
draped atop them is minimised when the main part of your force is based in a fighter 
plane on a ship in the Mediterranean.  
It can be seen from the wording of Resolution 1973, that France and other Western 
nations favoured an ambiguous wording which would allow for a number of different 
actions. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973 (2011) states that it: 
Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the 
Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of 
resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
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attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member 
States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take 
pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council787. 
This allowed France the capability to intervene as it saw fit; this could include the 
imposition of the no-fly zone, ‘defensive’ air strikes against Gaddafi’s air bases and 
armour, or, potentially, a more robust military response, if required. However, Juppé 
could be confident in that France’s contribution would probably need to be minimal 
in order to complete the mission, and that it could achieve this without losing any 
planes. Juppé noted that Libya might have bought around 400 fighter jets over the 
previous forty years, but probably fewer than twenty were actually operational788. 
The use of air power could therefore be seen as an effort by France to have as large an 
impact on the Libyan crisis as possible, whilst also devoting as few resources as 
possible. In many ways, the ability to obtain a multilateral consensus in relation to the 
crisis was itself the greatest victory they could have achieved. The next section of this 
chapter discusses the process by which France sought to, and actually obtained, 
multilateral cooperation, as well as how this was discussed in in their public 
declarations.  
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5.3 Sources of Legitimacy – consent and multi-national support 
 
As has been discussed extensively in Chapter 1, France’s foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era has consisted of attempting, wherever possible, to obtain multinational 
support in international interventions. There are a multitude of political and pragmatic 
reasons for pursuing such a policy; Chapter 1 explains some of these, for example, 
affording a means for smaller countries to exert a larger influence over international 
affairs than would otherwise be granted, but for their membership of an organisation 
such as the UN. Pragmatically, military interventions are expensive endeavours, 
therefore co-opting the resources of other nations/organisations to work together and 
achieve a common goal seems sensible.  
However, as has also been explained in the previous section, there is a requirement for 
there to be an international consensus for the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine to be 
employed. It is for this very reason that the idea of coalition building and gaining 
consent played a massive part in the justification of airstrikes against Gaddafi’s forces. 
This section therefore examines how this consent agreement was described 
discursively, paying particular attention to the way in which France played up its own 
role in establishing and leading said cooperation. 
Early into its response to the anti-government protests, France was keen to show the 
unanimity of its opinion with a number of different multinational organisations and 
nations. For example, in his address on 23 February, Sarkozy opened with criticisms 
of the government’s actions against Libyan civilians, stating that “France and the 
French people are following these events with shock and compassion”. He then stated 
that “the UN Security Council and Secretary-General, the League of Arab States, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and almost all States in the world have 
denounced these unacceptable actions”, before stating that “France again calls for an 
immediate end to the violence in Libya…”789. 
Here Sarkozy sought to use the number, variety and prestige of each of the 
organisations mentioned to reinforce the notion that France’s approach was indeed 
correct, since it had near universal support from the international community. In 
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particular, Sarkozy was eager to note that the League of Arab States and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference were also against the actions of Gaddafi, these 
being groups who represent regional interests. One can also see that France centres 
itself within these sentences. Firstly, he suggested (without explicitly saying) that 
France has been highly critical of Gaddafi’s actions. He then stated that a number of 
other organisations had also done so, thereby suggesting that they had followed 
France’s leadership in doing so. This was done before referring back to France in 
stating that they are ‘again’ calling for an end to the violence, thus suggesting to the 
listener or reader that some time had passed since the first request, and thereby 
suggesting that France was the first, or, at least, among the first to do so. 
The theme of France seeking to drive international opinion continued into the 
penultimate paragraph, where he stated that the French Foreign and European Minister 
went to the European Union to advocate for sanctions against those involved in 
violence. As was discussed in Chapter 1, France had long seen the EU as one of the 
potential or preferred receptacles for a unified European Security policy, one which 
France itself sought to dominate. But also, as was shown in Chapter 4, Gaddafi had 
built up significant trading relations with a number of European nations, in particular 
France, the United Kingdom and Italy. Therefore, a European-wide approach would 
be particularly devastating to the Gaddafi regime. Sarkozy therefore indicated that he 
was willing to take the first step in considering suspending France’s own trading 
arrangements with Libya790. 
The next step in the multinational condemnation of the Gaddafi regime came with the 
passage by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1970. Gérard Araud opened his 
statement following its passing with that fact that the Resolution passed with 
unanimous support from all fifteen Security Council members791. As part of the 
Resolution, the situation was referred to the High Commissioner for Human Rights as 
there was evidence that human rights abuses were being carried out, which needed 
investigating. This, of course, acted once again as a sign that an international response 
was required in response to the crisis. 
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The statement also served to follow up on Sarkozy’s comments on 23 February, that 
France would pursue trade sanctions against the Libyan Regime. Here, Araud 
announced that the decision had been taken to place an embargo on arms sales, as well 
as sanctioning those at the top of the Gaddafi regime for their role in attacks against 
civilians792. France, being the driving force behind developments by the international 
community, as well as referring to previous statements, became an important tool in 
the portraying the situation as being resolved under the leadership of France. 
Part of the efforts to keep the solution as being a predominately French affair was to 
resist the involvement of NATO. As was mentioned previously, France during the 
Fifth Republic had viewed NATO with suspicion, assuming it to be dominated by the 
United States. France’s approach to a military intervention would be to keep it as a 
Franco-British operation, with support of the US. Early on, when discussing potential 
military options, Alain Juppé warned that “it’s worth thinking long and hard about 
this, quite simply because I don’t know how the Arabs on the street, how Arab people 
throughout the Mediterranean would react if NATO forces were seen landing on 
southern Mediterranean soil. Let’s think carefully about it; I believe it could be 
extremely counter-productive”793. This statement played towards the rather 
controversial legacy the United States’ intervention in Iraq had left, with many nations 
and organisations in the region viewing the United States (even under President 
Obama) with suspicion. The suggestion that the UN would be the only good faith actor 
in these circumstances sought to maintain France’s influence on the confluence of 
events. 
In the meantime however, Juppé hoped that the internationally-implemented trade 
embargoes would result in Gaddafi stepping down from power. This, in Juppé’s mind, 
seemed certain, with him stating that “he’s going to be brought down. He’ll be brought 
down because he’s already very isolated in Tripoli. He’s lost control of the greater part 
of Libyan territory”794. This delegitimisation of the regime, followed by France’s 
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subsequent support for the NTC one week later would be used to establish that there 
was support for France and its approach in Libya. 
In this interview, Juppé pushed his vision of how a different entity could help the 
situation, that of the Union for the Mediterranean. The Union had been conceptualised 
as part of the Barcelona Process in 1995, which called for greater cooperation between 
Europe and the Mediterranean nations, with a particular focus on peace and security 
in the region. However, it would not come into being until 2008, with President 
Sarkozy signing on behalf of France (who had co-presidency of the organisation with 
President Mubarak of Egypt)795. Obviously, it had been established under the previous 
status quo, which Juppé recognised as he calls for a “restructuring” whilst still 
“remaining open to these governments and people”796. 
These aforementioned themes were continued by Juppé into his joint statement with 
William Hague on 3 March 2011, in stating that the two foreign ministers had 
discussed a relaunching and restructuring of the Union for the Mediterranean, as well 
as integrating it into the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, to deal with the new geo-
political scenario797. The Union for the Mediterranean, of course, represented another 
organisation that France may have felt that they could go on to dominate. 
In this Press Conference, Juppé had slightly conflicting comments regarding the 
potential role of NATO; he spoke of having general approval for NATO’s planning 
project for the implementation of a no-fly zone over the country, but was still adamant 
that the actual decision to intervene would require additional information on the 
ground, and that in order to do so “we absolutely need the governments of the region 
and other participants to take part in such an operation”798. He also stated that “France, 
as far as she’s concerned, doesn’t think in the current context that a military 
intervention of the NATO powers would be well received in the southern 
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Mediterranean. It could be counter-productive”799. However, Juppé acknowledged the 
need for NATO’s involvement by arguing that the circumstances necessitated 
preparations to act quickly if Gaddafi were to follow through with his threats800.  
Juppé also repeated his previous statement that France’s position in relation to Gaddafi 
was that he no longer represented the Libyan people, arguing that he “has discredited 
himself by using violence against his people… So we’re very clearly demanding that 
he go”801. Of course, this pre-empted France’s declaration that it considered the NTC 
the true representative of Libya. However, it also served to justify any action taken 
against the Gaddafi regime on behalf of what Paris and the wider international 
community would come to argue was actually representing the will of the Libyan 
people. 
However, before any military intervention, both the United Kingdom and France were 
keen to use all diplomatic means first, arguing that “We also envisaged stepping up 
the pressure that must be exerted on the Gaddafi regime to get him to step down”802. 
Throughout this statement, as one would expect with a joint statement, Juppé referred 
to “we”. France and the United Kingdom have a long history of defensive co-
operation, something which had been strengthened under Sarkozy and Cameron with 
the Lancaster House Treaties, signed on 2 November 2010803. Whilst the treaty had 
not come into force by this point, it was a clear indication of the potential partnership 
between the two nations, one which would be sought to enact the no-fly zone. 
Despite the relatively warm words towards NATO when speaking with William 
Hague, Juppé was far more critical when speaking to a French audience. He reiterated, 
when speaking responding to a question from an Assembly Member, that when 
considering the situation: “It’s now a question of stopping the bloody crackdown being 
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pursued by Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. France has taken a very clear position: NATO 
isn’t the right organization to do it”804. 
Instead, Juppé was clear to highlight both the need to gain the support of other nations 
and organisations, and that it was France’s job to drive the case forward. He pointed 
out that France had done much to contribute positively to the situation:  
France was one of the first powers to tell him this so clearly. We then worked at the United 
Nations and in Brussels to ensure swift and robust sanctions were imposed… We also 
mobilized major humanitarian aid with our partners: two French convoys have already 
arrived in Benghazi, and we’re taking part in the airlift that is enabling Egyptians to be 
taken back to their country of origin805. 
But also, France still had much work to do. Indeed, if they were to intervene to protect 
civilians, they would need a UN mandate, but this would need to have been done in 
conjunction with the African Union and Arab League. He admitted that this was “what 
we’re working on. At the European Council on Friday, which will be devoted 
exclusively to the situation in Libya and south of the Mediterranean, France will make 
strong proposals”806. 
In his press conference on 11 March 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy would reiterate once again 
the points that Juppé had raised in the prior weeks. Sarkozy imagined a hypothetical 
situation in which a group of protesters were struck by one of Libya’s warplanes: what 
would be France’s reaction? Sarkozy reiterated what is needed in order to legitimise 
military interventions: “a clear judicial basis- a decision by the United Nations – and 
support regional – regional support are the political authorities like those in Libya 
[National Transitional Council] and the Arab League, nobody is wishing for it, but it 
is clear that Europe sends a message, and doesn’t want to exclude this option”807. 
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The Sarkozy administration sensed that the protests starting in Tunisia, and spreading 
across North Africa would continue. At the 11 March 2011 Press conference, Sarkozy 
stated that: 
Now, of course the process isn’t complete yet. We, the French, are convinced that this 
process will gradually, one way or another, impact all the States in the region and that 
this is only the start of a process whose future direction or ending nobody knows.808. 
This statement also showed that the Sarkozy administration was acknowledging that 
this was forming part of a larger movement. This obviously significantly increased the 
importance of intervention as this could spread across the region, leading to significant 
issues later. Because the area being affected, North Africa and the Middle East, were 
closely linked to France’s own strategic interests, it was essential for France to involve 
itself. This, however, was framed also as a European issue. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, France had in the post-Cold War period attempted to embed some of its own 
strategic policy within a wider European framework. It is for this reason that in a later 
sentence, Sarkozy brought up the spectre of Bosnia, and referred specifically to the 
“fingers pointed at Europe” for its failure to intervene sooner in the crisis. However, 
he was confident that the approach taken by the European Council was very strong, 
whilst still admitting that there were slight differences of opinion within the member 
states809.  
France had, it seemed, also successfully managed to convince the EU as a whole to 
agree to back the National Transitional Council as the current representatives of Libya. 
The National Liberation Council had begun to coalesce on 24 February 2011810. 
However, just a few short weeks later, France had officially recognised this as the 
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808 Original: « Alors, bien sûr, le processus n'est pas abouti. Notre conviction à nous, Français, c'est 
que ce processus impactera petit à petit, d'une manière ou d'une autre, l'ensemble des Etats de la 
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legitimate government of Libya811. This, at the time, caused much consternation 
amongst the other European leaders; Baroness Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated that “we cannot 
unilaterally rush into recognising groups”812. Both the Foreign Ministers of Italy and 
Spain were unmoved in offering their own opinion, instead saying that they wanted 
the European Union to make a decision so that they could act with one voice813; Franco 
Frattini stated that "Italy wants a European decision that everyone shares unanimously 
because that's how we act credibly," whilst Spain's Trinidad Jiménez affirmed that 
"The possibility of this recognition must be the result of agreement among all of the 
countries of the European Union”814. 
Yet the following day, when Nicolas Sarkozy took a Press Conference following a 
meeting with EU members, he was able to announce a number of approaches that the 
EU had taken. Firstly, that the European Council “unanimously requests that Colonel 
Gaddafi and his henchmen leave”, and had wanted to “clarify that there is no way in 
which Colonel Gaddafi can be recognised as a representative”815. This can certainly 
be seen at the time as evidence that the European community had turned against the 
Libyan Regime, and Gaddafi particularly. Indeed, the usage of the term “henchman” 
was a strong indication that Europe now considered Gaddafi and those who worked 
for him to be criminals, and thereby not a person with whom they should be treating. 
Secondly, the Europeans, despite their earlier criticism of Sarkozy, were now content 
with whom they should be supporting in this conflict: “The European Council has 
decided… to greet and support the National Transitional Council, based in Benghazi, 
[and] that it from now on be considered the political representative”816.  
Sarkozy was very clear in his statement that France, or anyone else, were not there to 
override the will of the people in stating that: “What will they become and evolve in 
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Union’s position regarding the political and humanitarian situation in Libya, in Brussels, 11 March 
2011 http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/117000613.html [accessed 03/03/2019] 
816 Ibid. 
238 
 
to? That is for the Libyans to decide, not us”817. This fed both into the idea that France 
was to try and only play a supporting role in the establishment of a new Libya, and not 
be the main actor; this would be useful in attempting to justify that its intervention, if 
required, would be in good faith, and not subject to any challenge nor would it 
compromise their arguments using the Responsibility to Protect norm.  
In many ways, Sarkozy’s statement here could be seen in large part as an attempt to 
broaden the scope of his Republican arguments. Here, he extended concepts typically 
associated with France, and the French Republic, to the entire EU. As mentioned 
above, France sought to drive its own defence policy through the EU, so it would only 
make sense that it would view the EU, when fulfilling this role, as an extension of 
itself. “But finally, Europe, it is the great neighbour, we have the Mediterranean in 
common. The Arab peoples have decided to fight for their liberty and for their 
democracy. Our duty, is to respond to this aspiration”818. Once again, the topos of 
responsibility and of solidarity was utilised to draw Europe into acting. It universalised 
France’s values to the broader European Union, conceptualising France’s aspirations 
and European aspirations as one and the same.  
The spirit of partnership (led by France) is key in all of the statements made by the 
Sarkozy regime. This is particularly the case of Alain Juppé who stated, when speaking 
before the National Assembly, that “We must take this new scenario into account in 
our approach to the southern Mediterranean region, not in order to teach lessons or 
export our standards but in order to support our partners in their democratic transition, 
in a spirit of trust, friendship and openness”819. It is therefore for this reason that France 
ought to be allowed to intervene, in order to assist the local populace in achieving their 
aspirations. Years earlier, France had been critical of the US’ intervention in Iraq for 
invading for its own reasons, without the support of the international community or 
placing the citizens of that country’s needs first. Therefore, France wanted to 
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accentuate that this international intervention was different, in so far as the Libyans 
were willing them to intervene.  
France, however, and the work of Alain Juppé, was key in establishing the 
international consensus which had begun to emerge. He stated that he “had a lot of 
trouble securing agreement among the participants in the G8, which, while not being 
a decision-making body, nevertheless brings together four members of the Security 
Council”820, placing France in the driving seat of efforts to establish “measures aimed 
at exerting sufficient pressure on Colonel Gaddafi”821.  
However, his efforts also reached other organisations, and Juppé was honest regarding 
the struggles which still faced the French in establishing a common policy moving 
forward amongst multiple organisations. “The second point of agreement was the 
necessary involvement of the Arab countries. To enter Libya under the NATO banner 
would be the best way of turning Arab opinion against us. The Arab League called for 
a no-fly zone, but our Russian friends pointed out that this declaration was a little 
ambiguous and accompanied by reservations; as for the African Union, it doesn’t take 
entirely the same line. President Sarkozy is working to organise a summit between the 
European Union, the African Union and the Arab League”822. Therefore, compromises 
would need to have been achieved in order to obtain sufficient consensus for a 
Resolution in the UN. 
As was mentioned in Chapter 5.2, France itself was not particularly supportive of the 
idea of a no-fly zone, as it opined that it would be of limited use over such a large 
country; instead preferring a more direct approach involving airstrikes against military 
targets. Yet, in order to maintain the support of the Arab League, the no-fly zone 
remained part of the proposed resolution823. However, this was left to others to “take 
the actions necessary to implement”, whilst France had also obtained what it truly 
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desired, that which allowed it to take “all measures necessary, over and above the no-
fly zone” to inhibit Gaddafi’s ability to attack civilians824. 
One of the strengths of the proposal put forward by Juppé was the fact that the 
“international community has reacted in near unanimity”. However, Juppé centered 
the efforts of France as being the one to drive forward the resolution text, which 
combined the requests of all of the disparate groups: “France sought to contribute its 
utmost to the international momentum by working alongside the United Kingdom, the 
United States and others to prepare the draft resolution before the Council”825. Here, 
Juppé effectively subordinated the efforts of the other nations below its own, thereby 
demonstrating France’s rang on the international scene, acting as a leader, as other 
nations, including the UK and the US in these circumstances, are portrayed as 
followers. 
Following the successful adoption of Resolution 1973, Sarkozy was keen for France 
to capitalise on its diplomatic success by holding a Summit in Paris for the Libyan 
People. Those in attendance included, inter alia, Ban Ki Moon for the UN; Herman 
Von Rumpuy and Catherine Ashton on behalf of the EU; Hillary Clinton of the US; 
David Cameron for the UK; Angela Merkel for Germany; Amr Moussa for the League 
of Arab States; Hoshyar Mahmoud Zebari representing Iraq; Sheikh Abdullah Bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan for the United Arab Emirates; and Mr Taïeb Fassi-Fihri of 
Morocco826. 
Here, Sarkozy reiterated the fact that there had been a United Nations Security Council 
decision made, and that it was their responsibility to enforce it. Here, we see who 
Sarkozy saw as the most important allies at this juncture, when saying that “Yesterday, 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Arab countries issued the 
following warning to Colonel Gaddafi and the forces he is using”827. However, in light 
of Gaddafi’s rejection of the demands, Sarkozy was clear that in order to prevent the 
further deaths of civilians, and “to enable the Libyan people to choose their own 
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destiny”, “we [France] are intervening in Libya, under a mandate of the United Nations 
Security Council, with our partners and in particular our Arab partners”828. 
Many of the arguments made by Sarkozy and Juppé were predicated on gaining the 
support of Arab nations to legitimise their role. France yearned to be seen as standing 
side-by-side, as evidenced by the closing remarks of the statement, that: “Alongside 
her Arab, European and North American partners, France is determined to assume her 
role in history”829. A key theme is therefore displayed, that all parties are equal in this 
endeavour, but that France is standing in front. 
France’s desire to gain support of Arab nations could also be interpreted as a means 
to address any post-colonial image one could interpret from this form of intervention. 
The government’s statement at the National Assembly addressed this when it said: 
“France hopes a new era will begin tomorrow in the Mediterranean region, free of 
colonialist baggage and outdated attitudes; a new era based on the notions of respect 
and dignity, in which the fear and rejection of others give way to the sharing of 
common values. (…)”830.  
However, it is a little unclear what was meant by “colonialist baggage and outdated 
attitudes”. Was it saying, for example, that they hope the postcolonial structures, 
which had been set up after decolonisation, confer favours to the former colonial 
masters which needed to be swept away? This would be consistent. One of the constant 
themes of Alain Juppé’s many speeches was that France needed to dispel the notion 
of having to back authoritarian regimes to prevent something worse.  
In a closing speech at the ‘Arab Spring’ Symposium, Alain Juppé said, “For too long 
we thought that the authoritarian regimes were the only bastions against extremism in 
the Arab world. Too long, we have brandished the Islamic threat as a pretext for 
justifying to an extent turning a blind eye on governments which were flouting 
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freedom and curbing their country’s development”831. If this is what they mean, then 
it could also more broadly be applied to any situation whereby the ancient tendrils of 
colonialism, such as within the murky system of Françafrique, are still manifest. 
Perhaps it could be the end of clientelism in Africa. Of course, if this were indeed what 
was being proposed, there would be a certain irony to Sarkozy achieving it by helping 
remove Gaddafi from power. 
In many ways, this final speech can be seen as something of an attempt by the French 
executive to celebrate its achievements, and France’s exceptionalism. After painting 
the dire situation in which Libyan civilians found themselves, suddenly they are saved. 
“What happened?” asks Fillon. “Gaddafi was banking on the international community 
being powerless. And it must be admitted we nearly descended into an endless cycle 
of appeals and warnings, whose sole consequence was offended speeches. France 
refused to accept this fate.”832 
Indeed, this statement highlights the diplomatic efforts of Sarkozy and Juppé in 
gaining international consensus, as well as providing practical assistance in the short 
term to attempt to alleviate the situation: 
From the beginning of the crisis in Libya, France took the initiative of demanding 
sanctions against the Libyan regime, both at the United Nations and within the European 
Union; of involving the International Criminal Court…; of sending humanitarian aid on 
a large scale to Benghazi hospital and the Tunisia-Libya border; and of helping the 
thousands of refugees fleeing the fighting to go back to their countries of origin, by means 
of an airlift from Tunisia.833 
 
Key to this was the fact that “France fought tirelessly in all the international forums to 
persuade all her Western, Arab and African partners”, pointing particularly to the 
initial Resolution 1970, at the European Council meetings of 11 March and the G8 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Paris834. The statement also argued that essential to the 
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success was the Sarkozy and Juppé’s declarations to the UN to pass Resolution 1973, 
and the Conference held on 19 March to decide how to implement the Resolution. 
They note that it was France who was the first to launch missions into Libya on 19 
March, and that since then they were “deploying more than 20 fighter planes a day, 
their missions planned in consultation with our allies”835. In the first few days, it was 
only France flying aircraft into the no-fly zone, whereas the British and Americans 
were using Tomahawk Cruise missiles fired from ships and submarines from the 
Mediterranean836. However, Fillon ensured to explain that “the Secretaries-General of 
the United Nations and the League of Arab States are notified in advance of actions to 
implement it”837. 
The initial aftermath of the French intervention in Libya was seen as a coup, especially 
considering how France’s initial response to the Arab Spring had been received; 
France had been able to adapt to the situation, and come out of it seemingly as a world 
leader.  
Through its diplomatic efforts, France had been able to secure international consensus 
on the need to intervene in the Libyan conflict so as to seek to prevent Gaddafi’s forces 
overrunning Benghazi, and potentially killing thousands of civilians. 
France had also repaired some of its lost prestige. Inaction in Tunisia had particularly 
cost France, jeopardising the position that France held for itself as a protector of human 
rights and fundamental values. However, through its arguments, France was seen to 
be a global leader again, defending the rights of democratic protestors.  
Whilst France would ultimately lose complete control over the mission, eventually 
having to cede to NATO following pressure from the UK, the US and Turkey838, the 
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immediate effects on France’s rang could still be seen months later; upon their arrival 
in Benghazi in September 2011, Cameron and Sarkozy were both mobbed by crowds 
eager to see and hear the leaders speak. In the crowds, British and French flags could 
be seen waving as the leaders were greeted as heroes839. France had been able to 
effectively re-write its history. Forgotten on the international stage, at least for the 
briefest moment, was France’s support for the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. 
France’s success could be put down to a number of things. There certainly was an 
appetite within the greater international community to respond to the atrocities 
committed by the Gaddafi regime. However, as shown in the next part, this is not 
always enough to secure a successful intervention. More so, the entire conflict here 
was described as a simple expression of democratic will being crushed by a repressive 
regime. There were no complicating entanglements, other than with the nations 
pushing for the intervention (France and the United Kingdom). 
France was able to secure this intervention whilst exhibiting much of its traditional 
posturing and rhetoric, relying on tropes of France’s mission and exceptionalism, in 
adopting missions to defend human rights and democratic freedom. It articulated these 
values in a way which was compatible with the arguments it was positing surrounding 
the need to act in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect norm, being able to 
convince other nations of the validity and urgency of these arguments. 
Despite the international prestige stemming from the intervention, the intervention’s 
impact was insufficient on Sarkozy’s domestic audience to save him from electoral 
defeat in the presidential election. Instead, it would be François Hollande who would 
assume the Presidency, as well as the responsibility of France’s foreign policy. 
Hollande would have his own opportunity to advocate for a military intervention, and 
Part III examines the ways in which this played out differently. 
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Part III President Hollande and 
Intervention in Syria 
Sarkozy’s intervention in Libya during the Arab Spring, whilst popular with the 
French people and the wider international community, was not sufficient to earn him 
the victory in the 2012 election; losing by approximately 1.1 million votes840 to the 
candidate for the Parti Socialiste (PS), François Hollande. 
Hollande had been involved in politics since 1980, having first served as an advisor to 
Jacques Attali and Max Gallo, before conducting several semi-secretive actions at the 
behest of President Mitterrand (1981-95). Between 1997 and 2008, Hollande was 
leader of the Parti Socialiste; and his former partner, Ségolène Royal, had acted as 
Minister for Environment 1992-1993, and stood as a candidate for presidency in 2007 
and for leadership in 2011841. Therefore, Hollande had significant experience 
operating within French political life.  
However, President Hollande’s presidency was beset by a number of missteps and 
gaffes, leading him from one crisis to another. From his election on 15 May 2012, 
Hollande’s popularity steadily declined, resulting in him serving only one term as 
President of the Republic.  
Hollande’s electoral campaign had positioned him as an anti-Sarkozy. Upon his 
arrival, he and the rest of his government took a 30% pay cut842, in a bid to differentiate 
himself from what was perceived as the excesses of the previous regime. Hollande 
also sought to introduce gender equality within the cabinet, including a 50/50 split 
between men and women843. However, whilst these acts, in of themselves, can be seen 
to be relatively laudable, this thesis argues that Hollande’s actions were indicative of 
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a propensity to be seen to be doing the right thing, rather than by actually thinking out 
policy in terms of what was practical, or what would result in the most optimum 
outcome.  
The opening few weeks of Hollande’s presidency, at least in terms of foreign policy, 
were rather successful. During his presidential campaign, Hollande had made 
assertions that he wished to renegotiate the Eurozone fiscal policy, attempting to 
secure additional resources to be pumped into the European economy. The EU had, 
up until this point, been participating in a policy of austerity, which Hollande had felt 
should be reversed. In this endeavour, the President found allies in Italy, Greece, and 
more importantly, the German SPD party. Following the poor showing by the 
Christian Democratic Union in the North-Rhine Westphalia elections in 2012, and 
with the national elections fast approaching in 2013, Angela Merkel was keen to 
encourage a change of emphasis. With the Eurozone seemingly agreeing to a short 
term change in approach, Hollande went to the United States to advise of France’s 
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Amongst other things discussed in these 
meetings, President Obama also stated that the United States wished to see a stimulus 
package in the Eurozone. Of course, what each of these leaders meant by their 
statements was slightly different. However, from the outside, it appeared that Hollande 
had been on the right side of history. 
John Gaffney argues that Hollande attempted to generate for himself a persona of 
being ‘normal’, and that his conduct would be to take a more straight-talking approach 
to the Presidency and the creation of policy844. This persona was crafted to be, as far 
as possible, anti-Sarkozy. He cultivated this persona early into his presidency, 
remaining in his adopted home town of Tulle (where he had been Mayor between 2001 
and 2008) to deliver his first speech as President845. Upon returning from his first 
presidential trip to the United States, Hollande participated in an interview with FR2 
at their studio, rather than summoning interviewers to the Elysée, as had been the 
practice under Sarkozy (though Hollande would later return to this approach). Gaffney 
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notes that during this interview he reiterated his ‘normal’ disposition, but also that “he 
wanted to ‘Faire Simple’, i.e. not just be normal, but do things in a simple, 
straightforward manner”846. However, whilst trying to portray himself as a simple 
man, he was also clear that France was “un grand pays”, which would mean that, as 
the personal representative of France, Hollande would also attract some of its 
grandeur.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, France’s foreign policy during the Fifth Republic has had 
a particular continuity, with the only fundamental differences being whether its policy 
was more Gaullist or Atlanticist. Hollande and the PS had been critical of Sarkozy’s 
decision to finally reintegrate into NATO; however, he would not seek to leave the 
military command structure. As a whole, the PS’ foreign policy did not seek to 
differentiate itself much from the UMP position, and foreign policy had not really 
played a significant part in the 2012 Electoral Campaign.  
As has been shown previously, French foreign policy has largely proceeded along a 
single track, allowing for the President to only apply a certain level of personalisation 
to it. Hollande’s emergence from relative obscurity meant that the public perception 
of Hollande’s foreign policy persona was largely unknown. Therefore, he would need 
to take every opportunity afforded to him to establish his own credentials. 
This section of this thesis looks at how Hollande attempted to use the crisis in Syria to 
stamp his own identity and persona on French foreign policy in such a way as to 
significantly enhance France’s rang amongst the wider international community, and 
by virtue of this also improve his own standing as President. Firstly, we look into the 
circumstances leading up to the conflict. This includes both Hollande’s handling of 
other foreign crises, as well as how the Arab Spring had unfolded up until this point 
(Chapter 6). Chapter 7 then analyses the ways in which Hollande and his cabinet 
described the Syrian issue. It examines their behaviours, language, and how the use of 
particular topoi led to a rift between France and the rest of the international 
community, thereby leaving France ostracised, whilst the United States and Russia 
created their own solution. Ultimately, this is an examination of how the 
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operationalisation of Republican rhetoric can be used ineffectively, not only in 
preventing the desired outcome, but also in alienating allies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
249 
 
Chapter 6 - Preamble to intervention. 
 
In understanding Hollande’s rhetoric and conduct during the Ghouta crisis, it is first 
important to understand how Hollande’s presidency had developed both in terms of 
domestic affairs, and events occurring abroad. Events in both of these spheres add 
important context to help understand why Hollande took the position that he did. 
Therefore, this chapter firstly discusses in more detail Hollande’s domestic progress, 
and how his promising early start began to become undone, as well as describing how 
the projected persona of Hollande as a ‘normal man’ began to crack (6.1). Secondly, 
we set out the circumstances Hollande had inherited in regards to the Arab Spring, as 
well as briefly touching upon the intervention in Mali (6.2). 
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6.1 Hollande, normalcy, and a cracked persona 
 
As has been mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Hollande attempted to 
portray himself as a ‘normal’ man, inhabiting the Presidency. This was built, at least 
in part, to draw himself in contradistinction with Sarkozy. As part of his election 
campaign, Hollande had argued that he would strip out the cult of personality which 
had formed around Sarkozy, and instead make ‘the Presidency’ and France itself the 
focal point. This would also contain a moral element, with Hollande promising a move 
away from the unscrupulous connections and tabloid exposés which had dominated 
the Sarkozy era. Indeed, Hollande was keen to remind others of the supposed lack of 
moral fortitude of Sarkozy, often stooping to basic name calling (such as when he 
described Sarkozy as a “un sale mec”, a low-life or a bad guy847). Therefore, he would 
be the one to return the Presidency to what it should be, separated from drama and 
excess, and for Hollande, the means for achieving it would be by taking a slower, more 
deliberate approach to the Presidency. 
However, the presidency has always been conceptualised as a bombastic role, with the 
President acting as the figurehead of the country. It seemed, therefore, that Hollande 
was advocating that he should take a role which was normally more related to that of 
the Prime Minister. Would Hollande therefore be able to achieve such a significant 
change in the profile of the presidency, and would it be desirable?  
Despite claims of the avoidance of scandal and drama, the first year of Hollande’s 
Presidency saw three separate crises which laid bare the fiction of Hollande as being 
‘normal’, as well as significantly damaging his political capital domestically. Firstly, 
there was Valériegate.  
Following the aforementioned relative successes of Hollande’s first foreign trips, and 
with the PS being in control of the National Assembly and the Senate, Hollande looked 
to be in a relatively strong position. However, what would have initially seemed to 
have been a relatively innocuous tweet, sent by Hollande’s partner, Valérie 
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Trierweiler, placed Hollande and his presidency into the very heart of the type of 
salacious gossip he had promised to avoid.  
The tweet in question involved Trierweiler tweeting her support for the Socialist 
candidate Olivier Filorni in the La Rochelle constituency. Filorni was a dissident 
candidate, who was standing against the official candidate, Ségolène Royal. Prior to 
Hollande’s relationship with Trierweiler, he had been in a relationship with Royal 
from the late nineteen-seventies until 2007, and they shared four children.  
It was well known at the time that the relationship between Trierweiler and Royal 
could be described as frosty. However, it was thought that this was the extent of the 
ill-will between the two women, until this tweet. What emerged thereafter was the 
story of an incredibly jealous woman, who sought to defeat Royal (who she considered 
to be her rival) at every opportunity. This included: lobbying Hollande’s team to 
remove Royal from Hollande’s campaign video highlighting socialism’s 100-year 
history; declaring that Hollande was not to touch, speak, appear with, or kiss at a 
campaign meeting with Royal in Rennes; and when Royal give Hollande a small 
reconciliatory kiss at a celebratory event concerning Hollande’s victory on 6 May, 
Trierwieler strode up to him and said “kiss me on the mouth”848.  
However, a number of factors elevated this event from an insignificant, soap opera 
incident to a more significant challenge to the Hollande Presidency. Firstly, 
Trierweiler presented herself as independent, and was seen by many as the quiet power 
behind the throne (supposedly, she was the one to push Hollande towards running for 
President). Furthermore, she, like Hollande, wanted to carry on and be seen as living 
a ‘normal’, professional life, as opposed to some ‘potiche’, or trophy wife. However, 
by indulging her more base instincts, she had brought herself, and Hollande by 
association, into disrepute. Indeed, she had conducted herself in a manner not too 
dissimilar to Cécilia Albéniz, President Sarkozy’s second wife. Also, like Trierweiler, 
Albéniz too became embroiled in a minor incident at the beginning of Sarkozy’s 
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Presidency, announcing their separation, then divorce, before declaring that she had 
begun dating her former lover, Richard Attias.  
Distancing himself from the style of Sarkozy was a central tenet of Hollande’s 
electoral position. He argued that he would bring about the end of a so-called OK! 
Magazine style presidency. However, within a few short months as leader of the 
nation, he had done that very thing. In his televisual debates with Sarkozy, he explicitly 
said that he would bring back decorum and gravitas to the role. Of particular note was 
the infamous “Moi Président” refrain used on 2 May, where Hollande, in response to 
the question of “what kind of president do you intend to be?”, launched into “a three 
minute tirade” against the Presidency of Sarkozy, and in particular how it had brought 
the office of the presidency into disrepute849. Hollande’s outburst at the time had 
greatly thrown Sarkozy and his team, and had served as a shot in the arm for the 
Hollande campaign. Yet, here Hollande stood, partaking in the same sort of scandal 
as had previously stalled Sarkozy’s presidency. 
This immediately dented Hollande’s domestic popularity, and served to dispel the 
notion of any ‘normalcy’ within this presidency. The obvious charge of hypocrisy 
against Hollande, falling victim to the same vice as Sarkozy, was his inability to 
separate the personal from the professional. Furthermore, criticisms began to emerge 
over the President’s indecisiveness, and particularly his ability to manage crises as 
they arrived. 
Initially, there was the issue of whether Hollande should even involve himself with 
the Parliamentary elections. Hollande had personally contacted Royal to offer her 
support, which seemed to have been the inciting incident to Trierweiler. Whilst their 
personal history, and the fact that as Socialists, their manifestos would naturally 
complement each other’s, Trierweiler’s intervention suddenly had commentators 
asking whether it was appropriate for the President to act in such a “partisan way, 
particularly as he had said he would not (unlike his predecessor…)”850. Obviously, the 
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apparent hypocrisy of Hollande claiming to not get involved in the elections, only to 
U-turn and support his former partner, and then the unsightly public support of Royal’s 
rival led to much public lampooning851. 
The public perception of Trierweiler did not improve in subsequent months; she 
seemed to be shown again and again as a hypocrite, which would go on to drive public 
distrust. In spite of her claims that she wanted to exist mostly independent of the 
Presidency, she would later say that she wanted to be a link between the Presidency 
and the people. Despite asking for privacy from the media, she constantly sought out 
to be at the centre of attention, appearing on magazine covers and giving interviews 
throughout most of early and mid-2012. She would often try to centre herself into a 
story when going on trips abroad; for example, during a visit to Algeria in January 
2013, she told a group of children that she had “fallen in love with the man [Hollande] 
rather than the President”; this was before returning home for a series of events with 
children’s charities, appearing at fashion shows for Yves Saint Laurent and Dior, and 
being seen socialising with the Princess of Monaco. In May, she went on a 
humanitarian trip to Mali, where, as Gaffney notes, she was seen “looking immaculate 
– perfect ‘brushing, high heels – she was photographed and filmed playing African 
drums on a mud floor surrounded by poor women with no shoes at all”852, before 
attending the Cannes Film Festival. With the dissonance between Trierweiler’s words 
and deeds, the public became increasingly distrustful of her, eventually leading to a 
67% disapproval rate. Her unpopularity also began to bleed into Hollande’s 
popularity, or lack thereof. Beyond Valériegate however, Hollande was to fall into 
another crisis, the Cahuzac scandal. 
The Jérôme Cahuzac affair engulfed the Hollande government in early 2013. It 
concerned whether or not the Budget Minister Jérôme Cahuzac had a secret overseas 
bank account, and if he did, whether he should resign. The story had emerged on 4 
December 2012 by Mediapart, claiming that he had a secret Swiss Bank Account. 
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Despite initially denying having one, he later admitted to its existence, and resigned 
on 19 March 2013.  
As mentioned above, Hollande defined his presidential campaign on the basis of a 
moral purity which had been lacking under the previous presidency. However, 
questions began to emerge as to how much Hollande had known about this when 
Cahuzac had been hired. Neither answer to this question would show Hollande in a 
particularly strong light; either he was aware, and was therefore a hypocrite, or he was 
not aware of this fact, and was therefore incompetent. It seemed more likely that the 
latter was the case, however Hollande’s election strategy to draw comparisons 
between himself and Mitterrand were now to be used against him. The press eagerly 
reminded Hollande of this fact, drawing distinction between Hollande’s conduct and 
the authoritative Mitterrand, who would have never allowed one of his own ministers 
to lie to him. These comparisons which had helped him obtain power were now being 
used to lampoon him.  
Hollande’s spring of 2013 did not improve with the release of Carla Bruni-Sarkozy’s 
song Le Pingouin. Hollande had been accused of being dismissive of the outgoing 
presidential couple during his inauguration day, and therefore Bruni-Sarkozy’s song 
concerning a rude and silly penguin was seen to be an allusion to Hollande. As both 
the derision and revelations began to increase, and just before his trip to Morocco, 
Hollande decided to make a rushed announcement that Cahuzac’s lies were 
unforgiveable, and that measures would be introduced to prevent such conduct in the 
future. 
That the declaration had been made in such a dismissive fashion as he left the country 
did not go unmentioned by the media, who all brought back the familiar imagery of 
Hollande as an ostrich sticking his head in the sand. He hurriedly held a short press 
conference before returning from Morocco, but by now the damage had been done. 
Indeed, by 8 April 2013, Hollande was promising reforms which included requiring 
government ministers to declare details of their incomes, assets and tax arrangements. 
This crisis began to override the basic functioning of the government, impeding on 
one of the major platforms of Hollande’s candidacy, being the rejuvenation of the 
French economy. 
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Major pressure came from other political parties. On 3 April 2013, the Finance 
Minister Pierre Moscovici faced questions in the National Assembly relating to his 
knowledge of Cahuzac’s financial arrangements (Moscovici denied knowledge at the 
time, though suspicions remained that this was not the case). The opposition UMP 
argued for a cabinet reshuffle; the National Front argued for a new election; whilst the 
Left Front and the Greens (who were in coalition with the socialists) argued for a new 
constitution. Some of these options were broadly supported, with some polls 
suggesting that 65% of the population wanted Parliament to be dissolved, and others 
suggesting that 60% wanted at least a reshuffle853. The Hollande government had lost 
control of events, and the public saw that this was the case. 
To try and give a sense of the government attempting to reassert its control, ministers 
began to release details of their assets. Those with a lesser asset position were the first 
to declare (though it seemed that they were declaring property value based on when it 
had been purchased, and not its contemporary value). The ministers seemed to not own 
cars, preferring to use ministerial cars or bicycles. The main source of wealth seemed 
to be in the form of property, with there being eight millionaires in the government. 
Despite revealing the extent of the ministers’ personal fortunes, rumours did not abate. 
Indeed, rumours emerged that the treasurer of Hollande’s 2012 presidential campaign, 
and personal friend, Jean-Jacques Augier had accounts for tax-avoidance in the 
Cayman Islands. Laurent Fabius was also included in the rumours too854, and with 
speculation being rife surrounding the entire cabinet, public confidence in the process 
was low855.  
Hollande’s continuous moralising regarding the supposed excesses of the previous 
regime, followed by accusations and suspicions regarding his own cabinet, served to 
build mistrust in Hollande’s intentions, and his ability to carry out said intentions. 
Indeed, one poll showed that 70% thought that politicians spoke too much about 
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morality, and that 55% believed that all politicians were corrupt856. This lack of trust 
could indeed be linked to the 2008 Financial Crisis; France’s economy, like many 
Western nations’, had been significantly harmed, and the policies under Sarkozy had 
not led to the kinds of recovery that the French people thought were reasonable. This 
was one of the conditions which had led to Hollande’s ascension to the Presidency. 
However, this too had been poorly managed over the first eighteen months of 
Hollande’s time in power. 
As aforementioned, Hollande and his government had taken a pay cut to generate the 
idea that they were taking the French economy seriously, and were not above the 
French populace. However, despite this opening salvo, change was slow to arrive. 
Hollande, being the arch-party man, had been able to combine various wings of the 
Parti Socialiste into his cabinet, blending the ‘left’ wing of Arnauld Montebourg and 
Benoît Hamon, with the ‘Aubryists’ of Pascal Lany and Marylise Lebranchu, and 
several of his own allies, such as Michel Sapin and Stéphanie Le Foll. However, in 
having to accommodate a number of different policy positions, measures were slow to 
be formulated and adopted. Other than a handful of small measures (for example, 
slightly increasing the minimum wage), few substantial proposals were set forth.  
The public perception was that measures to help improve the economy would be slow-
arriving due to the need for consultations. Furthermore, fears began to spread that there 
was no long term plan for the economy: for many in the general populace, there was 
a sense of growing danger Peugeot-Citroën had announced eight thousand 
redundancies; unemployment was rising; Air France had also announced five thousand 
job losses. However, in the face of looming crisis, and entering into the summer 
period, Hollande decided to do what most French citizens do at this time of year, and 
go on holiday for three weeks. 
Again, Hollande was keen to differentiate himself in style from his predecessor, and 
decided to do the normal thing. Whilst he took a different tact to Sarkozy in terms of 
holiday planning, eschewing yachts for a simpler beach holiday in Brégançon, this did 
not win himself favours with a French populace who was not necessarily looking for 
a different style of leader, just one who more effectively spoke to their concerns. 
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Therefore, when Hollande and Trierweiler returned from holiday, his popularity had 
already fallen to below 50%.  
Over the first twenty-four months of his Presidency, Hollande seemed to introduce 
very little in terms of new economic policy, instead content to repeal or tweak 
measures introduced by Sarkozy, or marginally increasing tax. Before Hollande stood 
the challenge of revitalising the economy. His government had set a target of reducing 
France’s budget deficit to 3% of GDP by the end of 2013, and make up a shortfall in 
public finances of around €33 billion. Whilst Hollande tried to suggest that the super-
rich and businesses would be the ones to face the brunt of his measures in order to 
meet his targets, Hollande would inevitably have to resort to some form of austerity. 
Hollande had been critical of the Eurozone’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in relation to 
its imposition of austerity. The challenge, therefore, was for Hollande to find a balance 
of achieving his goals without alienating his own constituents. 
In the first two years of his Presidency leading up to the Syrian crisis, Hollande was 
ineffective at implementing any significant economic policies, as well as being unable 
to keep discipline of message in relation to its economic policy. His inability to 
command control over the media narrative has already been shown to have been an 
issue during the Cahuzac affair and the Trierweiler incident; this led to his ever 
decreasing popularity. 
Key to Hollande’s electoral success had been winning over a combination of different 
demographics. Gaffney explains that the Socialists saw themselves as being the party 
of “teachers and social workers and an army of state employees who made up the 
inefficient quarter of France’s divided workforce”857. Hollande’s policies seemed, 
however, to be unpopular with every demographic. As mentioned above, Hollande’s 
plans initially involved raising taxes against the wealthiest in society (for those earning 
over €1 million). However, the highest constitution court in the land was to reject the 
constitutionality of the tax charge858. Hollande would eventually find another way of 
introducing the tax by imposing it against the companies who paid individual salaries 
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over €1 million859. However, beyond this, Hollande offered little to make up the 
shortfall other than tax increases across the broader society. Due to the government’s 
lack of message discipline, it often offered conflicting advice regarding their 
intentions. There was also very little in terms of policies which sought to encourage 
growth; this disquiet led to Hollande’s dwindling public support. 
As mentioned above, one of the important pillars of Hollande’s support was from the 
public sector. The civil service in France is vast, employing twice as many workers as 
Germany. However, there was a widespread view that France’s public service was 
inefficient, and in need of reform860. However, in losing support within other 
demographics, Hollande sought not to alienate this group. Instead, he had pledged an 
increase of sixty thousand teachers, as well as reversing Sarkozy’s policy of hiring 
only one civil servant for every two who retired. 
Indeed, Hollande appeared to have no ‘big ideas’ relating to the problem of the 
economy, either in relation to how to diminish the deficit, or on how to establish 
growth. As has previously been mentioned, Hollande’s collaborative approach, in 
seeking to consult various different factions in his party, led many to assume that 
Hollande had no great strategy. Gaffney notes that in order to step away from the 
hyper-mediatised Sarkozy who would often be seen on the news, Hollande reverted to 
a more old-fashioned approach of having a weekly briefing from the government 
spokesperson Najat Vallaud-Belkacem. However, the President and his team struggled 
to deal with the new climate of 24-hour news and its constant demands for 
governmental reaction861.  
Indeed, Hollande’s more ‘relaxed’ approach here was a liability, leading to a 
government which looked uncoordinated and unresponsive. Gaffney notes that 
throughout 2012, gaffes became commonplace, as often, there would be a lack of 
coordination between the messaging of different ministers, or that often Hollande 
himself would make a proclamation without having consulted anyone else in his 
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government862; this was made most clear in its response to social media. The lack of 
clarity surrounding the new tax measures being brought in in 2012 led to the rise of 
two movements, the ‘Pigeons’ and the ‘Poussins’. A group of small businesses began 
to protest online the potential new measures which were being introduced. Petitions 
were signed which garnered thousands of signatures. When there was a potential threat 
of the protests actually occurring in the real world, the government backed down863. 
The government’s own attempts to use social media were equally flawed. Attempts to 
secure deals with Airbus and Lion Air, and then later deals for the sale of Rafale fighter 
jets to India were advertised greatly, only for them to later have to be played down 
when the sales became less secure. 
Another example where Hollande’s speeches to the media came back to haunt him 
related to the potential closure of Florange blast furnaces in Lorraine. During the 
campaign trail, he had argued that, were he to be elected President, that they would 
stay open. Yet, in November 2012, the government announced their closure. Whilst 
eventually the workers at the furnace were found new jobs, the notion of Hollande 
being someone who could not keep his promises suddenly became a stick with which 
his Presidency could be beaten. 
Therefore, when we reached the crisis in Syria, Hollande’s presidency was already 
under serious attack, with his government having already been affected by a number 
of moderate crises; this had been exacerbated by his administration’s slow reaction, 
which had left him look weak. Furthermore, his inability to produce significant 
measures to respond to the French economic slump had meant that Hollande needed 
something to reinvigorate his Presidency864. Furthermore, we have seen how there was 
a general lack of coordination within Hollande’s cabinet which meant that messaging 
by different ministries would be confused, or sometimes contradictory.  
It was this context, both in terms of the character of Hollande’s administration, and 
the circumstances in which he found himself, that he sought to address the chemical 
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weapons attack in Ghouta. However, before we move in to a detailed analysis of those 
specific events and the conduct of Hollande within them, we first need to contextualise 
both the Arab Spring, and Hollande’s foreign policy up until that point.  
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6.2 Foreign Policy under Hollande 
 
When Hollande became President, a number of issues remained unresolved 
concerning the series of protests and uprisings which had become known as the Arab 
Spring. Protests continued in Egypt following the slow arrival of elections865. In Libya, 
violence had continued despite the defeat of the Gaddafi regime. The anti-Gaddafi 
forces had been made up of a variety of different groupings, whose only common goal 
was the removal of Gaddafi from power. Now, weaponry was freely available, and 
factional enmity had emerged as the varying militias from different cities sought to 
achieve advantage in the vacuum generated by the fall of the old regime. Adding to 
this tension was the emergence of Islamist forces in the East of the country866.  
Of course, the effects of the Arab Spring went far beyond the countries which had 
initially participated in the protests. One such example involved the Northern Mali 
conflict, which also marked the first significant military intervention under the 
Hollande Presidency. Therefore, the first part of this section examines this conflict, as 
well as Hollande’s reaction to it (6.2.1), before moving on to analyse the situation in 
Syria before the Chemical Weapons attack in Ghouta (6.2.2). 
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6.2.1 Conflict in Mali: Prelude to Hollande’s militarism? 
 
The conflict itself has significant historical context, tracing back to Malian 
independence from France and various Tuareg ethnic groups seeking to gain 
autonomy in the Northern Region. The causes of this conflict need not be discussed 
too significantly for the purposes of this thesis, sufficed to say that it came to a head 
on 16 January 2012 with the first attacks breaking out in Ménaka. On the following 
day, attacks also occurred in Aguelhok and Tessalit. Fighting continued between the 
rebels and the government forces, with the rebels capturing Ménaka on 1 February 
2012 following a tactical retreat by government forces. 
The primary rebel faction at this time was the National Movement for the Liberation 
of the Azawad (NMLA). What made them such a threat at this time is that their forces 
had been bolstered by combatants who had previously been fighting for Gaddafi in 
Libya867. Moreover, the power vacuum stemming from the conflict in Libya also 
allowed arms stockpiles to be raided and exported to other countries, including Syria 
and Mali868. Due to this, and the lack of coordination by the government forces, the 
Rebel forces were able to get within 135 kilometres of Timbuktu by 14 March 2012869. 
Continued military defeats and the general mismanagement of the conflict led to 
significant discontent within the army. On 21 March, the Defence Minister Sadio 
Gassama arrived to give a speech to his troops. However, his words were insufficient 
in addressing the grievances of the troops, who instead attacked him. Disruption 
became rife throughout the army, and some soldiers began to attack government 
buildings, and the presidential palace in Bamako870. 
The following morning the army took control of Bamako. Lieutenant Amadou Konare, 
who was taken to be the spokesperson for a new group, the National Committee for 
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the Restoration of Democracy and State (NCRDS), went on television to announce 
that the group had taken power from “the incompetent regime of Amadou Toumani 
Touré”871. Later, Captain Amadou Sanogo announced that he, and the grouping he 
represented, had suspended the constitution and assumed control of the country. 
Reasons put forward for their actions included Touré’s inability to deal with the 
Tuareg insurgency, as well as the lack of resources given to the army to contain the 
insurgency872.  
The coup was generally condemned by the international community, with criticism 
coming from the UN Security Council, the African Union, and the Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), with the later organisation 
threatening to close the borders of surrounding nations and freeze Malian assets if the 
NCRDS were to not surrender power within seventy-two hours873. 
Benefitting from the chaos sown in the capital, the NMLA continued their advance 
southwards to capture towns which had been abandoned by the governmental 
forces874. On 30 March and 31 March 2012, the rebels captured both Kidal in the Kidal 
region875, and Ansongo and Bourem in the Gao region876. Finally, the following day 
rebels attacked and captured Timbuktu with ease877. Content with their progress, the 
rebels would then declare the northern part of the country as independent on 6 April. 
This declaration was, of course, rejected by the African Union and the European 
Union878. 
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However, over the next eight months, conflict continued in the north of the country. 
Divisions began to emerge within the rebel forces, as the NMLA began to fight with 
the Islamist forces in the north. As early as 5 April, the NMLA was forced to step in 
to free Algerian hostages who had been captured by Islamist forces in Gao879. These 
divisions continued to deteriorate, leading to violent clashes and Islamist forces 
capturing the town of Gao. The dominant group in relation to the Islamist forces at the 
time was the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) (though 
other factions did exist). The MOJWA drove the NMLA out of Gao, before moving 
on to capture Kidal880. The successes continued with Douentza on 1 September 2012881 
and Ménaka on 19 November 2012882. They were also able to successfully resist an 
attempt by NMLA forces to recapture Gao three days earlier883. 
It was this rise of Islamist forces which changed the dynamic of the conflict. Firstly, 
the now displaced NMLA began peace talks with the Malian government, with some 
parts of the organisation moving away from the arguments of independence for the 
northern parts of the country. They continued to fight the Islamist forces, eventually 
recapturing Kidal884. However, a much larger development came when both the 
Malian government and ECOWAS called for foreign military intervention; this 
resulted in the UN Security Council passing a French Resolution requesting an 
African-led military force to help fight Islamist forces885. Resolution 2071 requested 
that the Malian government and ECOWAS create a specific plan regarding the kind 
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of military intervention required886. Following the creation of a suitable plan, 
Resolution 2085 was passed. The Resolution authorised the deployment of an African-
led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) of one year887.  
France played a significant role in the Malian conflict, intervening militarily on 11 
January 2013 with Opération Serval888. This timely intervention was seemingly 
sparked by the capture of Konna by Islamist forces the day before, a city which was 
sixty kilometres from Sévaré military airport, and only six hundred kilometres from 
the capital city, Bamako889.  
France’s early intervention in the conflict revolved around providing air support to 
halt the advance of Islamist forces; this included Mirage 2000-D jets operating from 
Chad which struck twelve targets between 11 and 12 January. The effectiveness of 
such attacks was difficult to establish at first, but it was claimed that half a dozen 
armed pick-up trucks and a command centre had been destroyed890. During the first 
two days of its intervention, a French pilot was also killed after his helicopter was 
downed891. 
Following the Malian assault on the city (backed by French troops), initial reports 
indicated that the rebels had been driven from Konna. Indeed, Admiral Edouard 
Guillaud himself indicated that the rebels had been driven northwards following the 
combined military efforts of the Malians and French892. Yet, only a couple of days 
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later, this was proven to be inaccurate893. Furthermore, in reaction to the disruption at 
Konna, the rebels retaliated by capturing the town of Diabaly within a short few 
hours894. 
Over this period, various organisations and nations committed to deploy troops to the 
area. ECOWAS, the UN Security Council and the European Union all began 
preparations895, with the United Kingdom896, Canada897 and other European nations 
also advising that it would be sending airplanes for assistance898.  
However, as January and early February came around, it became increasingly clear 
that conventional combat favoured the French and Malian government forces, with 
their superior resources and support. French troops were reported to have been 
involved in fighting in Diabaly899. On 18 January, the Malian army finally recaptured 
Konna from the rebels900, with them also being driven from Diabaly on the same 
day901. Other cities began to fall to the northwards-advancing Malian and French 
armies, the most substantial being that of Timbuktu. The combined forces arrived the 
city on 27 January 2013; that same day, that army was able to secure the airport, with 
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the rest of the city being recaptured the following day902. In celebration of this most 
recent victory, President Hollande visited the city, where he was greeted as a hero903.  
Following their defeats, the rebel forces were in complete retreat, falling back to the 
Adrar des Ifogas region in North-Eastern Mali904. The rebels altered their approach to 
reflect the changes in their circumstances: instead relying on guerrilla tactics. The 
French forces also adapted their approach, launching Operation Panther on 19 
February905. Whilst France pursued the militants in the North, suicide bombings and 
car bombings shook the towns of Gao906, Kidal907 and Timbuktu908.  
Despite the attacks on urban areas, the French and Malian forces did continue to score 
successes in the field. Firstly, Algerian news sources claimed that on 28 February, one 
of the leaders of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, had died 
in fighting with French and Chadian forces909 (this was later confirmed by DNA 
testing on the body910). Whilst the Islamists had not been completely defeated, much 
of the fighting had now been stopped. As such, the French looked to hand over some 
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of the responsibility to the UN, under an operation which was termed MINUSMA911. 
Eventually, the government and the Tuareg signed a peace deal on 18 June 2013912913. 
In the intervention in Mali, Hollande may have thought that he had found an easy win 
in terms of French policy and public opinion. That is not to say, of course, that this is 
what drove the conflict; the need to combat Jihadist groups is still an important goal 
for Western governments within the context of the Global War on Terror. Hollande 
would have hoped that it may have turned public opinion in his favour, especially 
when considering that his early inaction and the Cahuzac affair had driven his 
popularity downwards.  
And indeed, Hollande did enjoy a slight bump in approval ratings, with a BVA poll 
seeing his approval increase from forty per cent to forty-four per cent in January, with 
the organisation commenting that “his intervention in Mali, largely supported by 
public opinion, has enabled him to counter an image of a lack of authority that had 
begun to become a negative stamp for him”914. 
However, this was to be tempered by two other polls. Firstly, that the intervention 
itself was backed by seventy-five per cent of the French electorate915 and secondly, 
seventy-two per cent of French persons polled felt that Hollande had been ineffective 
in his domestic agenda916. This illustrates what had been alluded to in the previous 
part; namely, that foreign policy matters do not have a great impact on the domestic 
fortunes of presidents. As remarked above, the seemingly successful intervention in 
Libya (as it seemed at the time) was insufficient to earn Sarkozy another term. 
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Hollande’s conduct in Mali had only garnered him a modest bump in his support, as 
such interventions would always be subservient to his domestic progress.  
The public persona Hollande had crafted was one of an ordinary man; as previously 
mentioned, this was in part due to his desire to differentiate himself from Sarkozy, but 
also as a recognition that Hollande is, in many ways, an ordinary person. This was 
something which had not gone unremarked, with a great many column inches being 
dedicated to Hollande’s ordinariness917.  
Hollande’s speech in Timbuktu displayed his more casual approach to diplomacy, 
displaying a level of informality in his approach. It also illustrated his need to try and 
balance previous declarations. In age old tradition for French presidents, Hollande had 
previously announced that France would no longer pursue françafrique918. Therefore, 
Hollande wanted to make clear that France’s intentions were pure: “France stands 
alongside you, not to serve any particular interest – we have none –, to protect this or 
that faction, or in favour of this or that Malian party… No, we stand alongside you for 
the sake of the whole of Mali and for West Africa.”919 
Hollande tried to be clear that he, and France, had no ulterior motive for intervening. 
However, when compared with the speeches of Sarkozy, it is noticeable that the tone 
is quite different. In particular, the tone of the “to protect this or that faction, or in 
favour of this or that Malian party” segment portrayed an informality of speech, as 
though to attempt to seem at the same social level as his audience, as opposed to 
seeming haughty; again, this was a common criticism of Sarkozy. However, in many 
ways such rhetoric lacked the kind of command which was normally expected of the 
President of the Republic. This thesis therefore argues that one change found in the 
rhetoric of Hollande during the Syrian conflict is that it becomes more forceful and 
aggressive, as he begins to try and mould himself into the more prototypical president. 
His language becomes more dominated by allusions to French power and strength, as 
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he attempts to mobilise a more muscular image of the Republic in his attempt to build 
prestige and affirm France’s rang.  
The next section of this thesis explains the specific case of Syria, describing the events 
immediately leading up to and during the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta.  
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6.2.2 The Civil War in Syria 
 
This section provides a brief summary of the protests in Syria which led to the Syrian 
Civil War, as well as the events which led up to chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, 
after which there is a discussion of Hollande as a presidential candidate, and his 
foreign policy experience up to this point. 
The Syrian experience of the Arab Spring is probably its most violent manifestation. 
As of December 2018, the conflict had been raging for around seven years, with more 
than 560,000 killed in the fighting, with over half a million injured and twelve million 
Syrians displaced920. However, it started in a very similar fashion to all of the other 
examples in the Arab Spring, with protests against the underlying economic conditions 
and the lack of certain freedoms. The state cracked down very harshly; in the southern 
city of Derra, some teenagers spray painting revolutionary slogans were arrested and 
tortured. When more protests broke out, they were shot at by security forces921. 
Protesters began arming themselves, some to protect themselves, whilst others sought 
to drive out government forces. 
Groups of protesters, as well as former soldiers, began to group together into brigades 
who began fighting for territory. By 2012, the fighting had reached Damascus and 
Aleppo922. What has made this conflict more complicated, and infinitely more 
damaging, is how the fighting forces are scattered, fighting for different causes. 
Initially, the main force involved was the Free Syrian Army. However, this rebel group 
splintered into smaller groups as the conflict continued.  
Furthermore, the Assad family come from a Shia Alawite minority sect within Syria. 
However, due to their position, many Alawites have benefitted, leading to a sense of 
injustice amongst the Sunni majority. As such, the conflict has taken on a slightly 
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sectarian character (though it is important not to overstate this923). In addition to that, 
other groups have also tried to take advantage of the chaos. Kurdish groups in the 
North and the West have sought to use it as an opportunity to try and break away, 
making a new state. Also, many radical Islamic fundamentalist groups exist, though 
the most famous and influential is, of course, Daesh. There are also the regional 
powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran, who both have their own preferred outcome. Of 
course, there is also Russia’s interest. These disparate groups have created a situation 
where not one group is strong enough to defeat the government, (especially when they 
are fighting amongst themselves), but since there are so many, the government cannot 
defeat them either.  
War crimes abounded, as both the government and the smaller militias became ever 
more desperate and entrenched. The UN has evidence of all sides being complicit in 
the use of torture and rape and the blocking of access to food or water through 
sieges924. 
At many stages of the conflict, all sides have become increasingly desperate. It is 
perhaps for this reason that Chemical Weapons were used in the Ghouta area of 
Damascus on 21 August 2013925. Rockets had been launched into the district, which 
was under rebel control, loaded with Sarin gas. The death toll varies widely depending 
on the source, but the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Development put the number at no fewer than two hundred and eighty one926, with 
estimates from Médécins Sans Frontières putting it around three hundred and fifty 
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five927, with other estimates going as high as one thousand five hundred928. At the 
time, the government claimed that it had been the rebels who had used the weapons, 
whereas the rebels claimed that it was the government forces. Three days before the 
Ghouta attack, a UN Inspectors team had arrived to investigate a different report of 
chemical weapon usage in Khan al-Asal, but in light of the new revelations, Ban Ki 
Moon placed an express request to the Syrian government to allow the team on the 
ground to investigate the new attack.  
It would take until 16 September before the report was released, which confirmed that 
Sarin gas had been used. However, it was careful not to allocate blame anywhere; the 
report simply stated that a war crime had occurred. However, independently of the 
United Nations Report, countries also produced their own reports seeking an 
explanation, as well as the knowledge of who to blame. The French reached their own 
conclusion with their aforementioned report, which concluded that the only actor who 
could possibly have committed the attack was the Syrian regime.  
The report also reasons that the Syrian regime intentionally organised an assault in the 
region using artillery and bombs in order to try and obfuscate their culpability by 
delaying inspectors access and trying to destroy evidence of the attack, including by 
setting an intense fire to try and disperse the sarin chemical into the atmosphere929. 
This chapter has shown the ways in which President Hollande had fallen victim to his 
failure to engage directly with a number of domestic issues, which had led to a 
perception of him being unable to lead. Hollande’s attempts to portray himself as a 
normal “everyman”, in contradistinction to President Sarkozy’s “ultra-Président” had 
backfired, losing him any momentum gained in his election victory. However, he had 
also seen that his intervention in Mali had led to a slight increase in his popularity.  
                                                          
927 Médécins Sans Frontières, ‘Thousands suffering neurotoxic symptoms treated in hospitals 
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The intervention in Mali had been justified under pragmatic terms; Mali had asked for 
assistance and there was a need to prevent Islamist groups taking hold under the Global 
War on Terror. However, Hollande had a new challenge to contend with in terms of a 
chemical weapons attack in a country in which France, and Hollande, had very little 
influence. In the XXIst Ambassador’s conference, President Hollande had already 
stated that France would punish those responsible930. However, how would Hollande 
go about “punishing” those responsible? 
The next chapter shows how President Hollande sought to justify military intervention 
in Syria, as well as examine how he went about trying to convince other parties of the 
need to intervene. 
This thesis shows how Hollande attempted to utilise a more personal and tough 
persona to justify the need for military intervention. It displays how Hollande worked 
to mobilise different elements of the previously described French Republican ideals to 
call for France’s intervention, and in doing so, attempt to reinforce French ideals and 
French exceptionalism through a more muscular and paternalistic approach.  
Ultimately, the next chapter examines how this approach was unsuccessful; that 
relying on an antiquated view of what a French leader should be, based on paternalistic 
instinct and chasing some sense of grandeur, left him inflexible to changing 
circumstances. This would ultimately lead to Russia and the US resolving the crisis 
(albeit temporarily) with very limited input from France.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
930 21st Ambassadors’ Conference – Speech by M. François Hollande, President of the Republic. 
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Chapter 7 - Intervention in Syria 
 
The chemical weapons crisis took place over a period of five weeks, beginning with 
an attack using sarin gas on 21 August 2013 on Ghouta. The attack seemingly 
mobilised Western leaders to re-engage with the Syrian crisis in a far more robust way, 
and none more so than President Hollande.  
President Obama had previously drawn a “red line” over the usage of chemical 
weapons in Syria by the Assad regime, therefore Hollande had assumed that his 
aggressive rhetoric regarding the “punishment” of the Assad regime would be 
supported by his American and British allies. 
However, as France’s rhetoric ramped up, both the United Kingdom and the United 
States began to back down. Firstly, Prime Minister Cameron lost an important vote in 
the Commons, effectively ruling out British involvement. Then, Obama made the 
argument that whilst he was in support of an intervention, he would first seek out the 
support of his congress.  
With hindsight, this was utilised as a delaying tactic by Obama to try and bide his time 
whilst he sought out a diplomatic solution. In a later interview, Obama would tell 
Jeffrey Goldberg that departing from the “Washington playbook” in seeking to avoid 
military confrontation was one of his proudest moments931. 
However, in spite of the indications given out by the Obama administration, the 
Hollande regime continued to push for military interventions in the UN, and during 
the G20 summit. Here, a solution emerged, carefully choreographed to allow the US 
and Russia to de-escalate, and for Syria to seemingly relinquish its chemical weapons 
stockpiles without further intervention from Western powers. However, France had 
been left wholly out of the process, and had still been arguing for military intervention 
the day before. They would later argue that this had been a ruse all along, and that the 
pressure stemming from the threat of an intervention is what led to the compromise 
position. A basic reading of the facts would render this unlikely. However, whether 
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this is true or not, the handling of the situation had been poor, leading to a loss of rang 
for France on the international stage, and placing significant strain on US/French 
relations. 
This chapter examines the justifications President Hollande used to try to gain support 
for military intervention in Syria. It is shown that President Hollande takes a much 
harsher tone in attempting to justify airstrikes, relying on a more muscular 
republicanism, based the idea of France being the gendarme of the world and seeking 
to right the wrongs committed on an international scale. Instead of using Sarkozy’s 
approach of playing up the civilian casualties, Hollande instead wished to make an 
example of Assad. Unfortunately, for Hollande, this tactic did not produce the desired 
effects. Instead, he was left isolated during the negotiations between the US, Russia, 
and Syria.  
In order to fully understand the proposed intervention, four separate elements are 
examined, in a similar approach that was adopted in Part II. Firstly, this chapter looks 
at the ways in which the intervention was justified, again discussing the imagery and 
emotions drawn up to argue that French intervention was necessary (7.1). Secondly, 
the nature of the intervention needs to be examined: what purpose would military 
airstrikes serve, and would this meet the Responsibility to Protect and France’s own 
criteria for military intervention? (7.2). Furthermore, the chapter argues that Hollande 
and France’s rhetoric surrounding the idea of building international consensus 
specifically did not chime with its overly aggressive tone, eventually leading not only 
to a failure to intervene militarily, but also gave the impression that France had been 
left outside of alternative decision making processes (7.3). Finally, we examine the 
ensuing results from this strategy. We examine the events of the G20 summit in 
Russia, the decisions made, as well as how Hollande and his regime attempted to mask 
the embarrassment of the situation by advocating that the resolution for Syria to hand 
over its chemical weapons had been its endgame all along (7.4). 
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7.1 Emotive Argumentation: Appeal to Humanitarianism/Punishment 
 
A number of arguments were mobilised to establish the need for French intervention, 
and these arguments are explored in this section. As mentioned above, the tone taken 
by the Hollande administration was particularly emotive, playing up the devastating 
effects of the chemical weapons attacks. Linked to this sense of outrage was a 
requirement that France be the one to punish the wrongdoers who had committed such 
an atrocity. When events turned away from intervention, the Hollande presidency 
attempted to re-write history by attempting to argue that its rhetoric was merely to 
drive Syria towards a position whereby it would voluntarily surrender its chemical 
weapons. This section charts this development, paying particular attention to the ways 
in which Hollande mobilised the various topoi linked to French Republicanism. 
As mentioned above, the attacks took place on 21 August 2013, six days before the 
Annual Ambassador’s Conference in which the President of the Republic sets out their 
vision for France’s economic and security policy on the international stage. It is not 
surprising then that of the myriad of topics about which Hollande spoke, he chose to 
open with the Chemical Weapons attack in Syria, and what France’s response should 
be. 
Perhaps understandably, Hollande began by referring to the universality of the world’s 
condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, stating that the world was 
“horrified”932. This was a large part of France taking leadership, relying on the topos 
of universality in assuming that its own reaction is shared by the rest of the world. In 
this case, most nations were, naturally, condemning the attacks. In the next paragraph, 
Hollande explained the context; that “using weapons that the Community of Nations 
banned 90 years ago in all of its international agreements is shameful”933. Here, 
Hollande again accentuates the idea that there had been an international consensus on 
acceptable actions, and that a party had breached it, appealing to the topos of history 
by invoking the days of regular chemical warfare during the First World War. Such a 
                                                          
932 Speech by M. Francois Hollande, President of the President for the 21st Ambassadors’ Conference, 
Paris, 27 August 2013 https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article4855  
933 Ibid. 
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breach of international law would therefore demand an answer. But whom had been 
the one to breach these conventions? 
Here Hollande took a bold stance, stating that “everything leads us to believe that it 
was the regime that committed this despicable act, which condemns it once and for all 
in the eyes of the world”934. Suspicions fell upon Assad’s regime as being the most 
likely party to have both the reasons and capability to launch such an attack, and this 
had been echoed by both President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron935.  However, 
unlike the governments of individual nations, international organisations such as the 
United Nations had to be more careful in ascribing guilt, waiting for their own 
investigation to be conducted. UN investigators were already in country investigating 
accusations of a previous usage of chemical weapons when the attack in Ghouta 
occurred. Despite UN demands, it took several days to agree a ceasefire to enable 
investigators on site to examine whether chemical weapons had been used936. 
Next, Hollande was keen to point out that the conflict had much wider ranging security 
interests which needed to be considered. Indeed, beyond the death toll, Hollande 
linked it to violence in the region, “with attacks in Lebanon, the flow of refugees into 
Jordan and Turkey, and the unleashing of deadly violence in Iraq”937. This linked the 
single usage of chemical weapons to a larger problem, one which would need to be 
addressed to prevent further problems emerging on a global stage. Here, the topos of 
burden emerged, suggesting that the international community should intervene to 
resolve such problems. 
This call to action for France intensified when he went on to say that the “chemical 
massacre in Damascus cannot remain without a response… France stands ready to 
punish those who took the appalling decision to gas innocent people”938. Here, France 
took a rather stark stance in seeking to “punish” those responsible; we also see a more 
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emotional response to events, one which invited the listener to view France as some 
sort of avenging force, seeking to act as the gendarme of the world.  
Punishment could have taken many different forms; for example France could have 
supported further sanctions (though considerable sanctions had already been levied 
against the Syrian regime at this point). However, earlier statements by Foreign 
Minister Laurent Fabius suggested that such punishment would be more militaristic, 
indicating that “if it's true [the chemical weapon attack], the position of France is that 
there needs to be a reaction… That reaction can take the form of force”939. 
As shown throughout this section, the human rights and humanitarian arguments for 
intervention formed a strong part of Hollande’s justifications. And yet, this point forms 
a relatively small part of his speech, being relegated towards the end, placed between 
the discussion of Tax Avoidance and potential partnerships with China, India, Japan, 
Brazil, South Africa, and Russia. In the coming days, Hollande played up France’s 
role as a defender against human rights abuses (though not as much as other themes; 
as discussed later). Yet, this theme still only as four lines dedicated to it.  
The first statement followed on from the previous paragraph in discussing the 
frankness required when speaking of other countries, stating that “I [Hollande] have a 
duty to express everywhere our commitment to respect for human rights”940. This 
section mostly targeted Russia, placing emphasis on “combating homophobia, which 
is taking on worrying proportions”941. However, Hollande did appeal to France’s 
history in stating that “France prides itself in defending them [human rights] when 
they are flouted”942. Whilst this did reference back to France’s revolutionary history 
and the DDHC, the same emphasis was not placed on its historical significance in the 
same way as Sarkozy had done when describing France’s apparent call to action in 
Libya. Throughout this speech, it would seem that the human rights abuse and 
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atrocities were defined in more general ways, referring more to international norms, 
than by locating it within France’s own history.  
In his Joint Declaration with the President of the Syrian National Coalition Al-Assi al 
Jarba943, Hollande endeavoured to show that whilst the chemical weapons attack had 
been a significant escalation, it was only the most recent in a long line of terrible acts. 
Hollande referred to the pain and suffering the Syrian people have had to endure. 
However, he was rather vague as to the events or specific atrocities, other than the fact 
that there have been over 100,000 deaths since the beginning of the conflict. The intent 
of Hollande’s segment of the Declaration dealt more with France’s initial reaction to 
the war, as well as arguing for an international response. It argued that cooperation is 
needed to resolve such an issue, but also that the international community at large 
should assume some responsibility for the way in which events had played out. 
Instead, it is left (perhaps for the verisimilitude) to President Al-Assi Al Jarba to 
present the horror of the events. Obviously, the intention of his presence was to seek 
assistance from the international community to, at the very least, stop the regime’s 
usage of chemical weapons. However, it seemed more likely that they were hoping for 
military assistance to overthrow Assad, in the model of the intervention of Libya.  
Therefore, Al-Assi Al Jarba utilised extremely emotive language. For example, his 
initial paragraph after thanking France for its friendship: “a week ago these truly heroic 
people suffered through a terrible bombardment, a terrible massacre with chemical 
weapons committed by this criminal regime”944.  
The idea of criminality continued, with him stating that “this crime must not remain 
unpunished. It is necessary that there is a force to dissuade this criminal regime…”945 
The phrase of the crime will not remain unpunished continues later, where he argued 
that “Punishment will be imposed in this criminal, on its death machine and on those 
who used these weapons”946. Al-Assi Al Jarba continued by condemning both the 
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specific use of chemical weapons in this instance, and, more broadly, the usage of 
chemical weapons in any context947. 
Most of the statement referred to the perpetrators of the attack, rather than the victims. 
However, he did speak of the more than “1,400 martyrs” who died, as well as the 
“thousands more who were injured”948. The attacks were also referred to as “Crimes 
against humanity”949; it was interesting to note that they decided to focus more 
explicitly on the Assad regime and the attacks themselves, rather than the civilian 
casualties. Perhaps it was considered that the act itself would be a greater driver of 
international action, rather than a purely humanitarian argument. 
The tenor of Hollande’s general response to the usage of chemical weapons did not 
evolve much in his interview with Le Monde on 31 August 2013. Indeed, Hollande 
used phrases like “crimes against humanity”, or once describing the attacks as 
“horrifying”950. However, the usage of these terms was done in a more technical sense; 
as a matter of fact, rather than as an attempt to draw an emotional response from a 
potentially sympathetic audience. Here, Hollande seemed to rely more on the acts as 
triggers for international law, rather than as atrocities. This could be, in part, a direct 
response to Sarkozy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Hollande sought to 
differentiate himself from l’hyper-président in many ways; perhaps this was an 
attempt to seem more statesmanlike, as opposed to Sarkozy’s more emotive language.  
At the end of the interview, Hollande was asked whether he believed that another 
intervention would have public support. He responded, arguing that this would not 
really be a consideration, taking for granted the support of the French public as being 
against the usage of chemical weapons, and understanding that it was France’s role to 
halt it in any way possible. He mentioned as well that when he intervened in Mali, the 
French were not completely aware of the breadth of terrorism in the Sahel, but now 
they understood that French troops were sent to assist a friend in need, and were proud. 
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He therefore drew parallels between Mali and Syria, as well as relying on the topos of 
fraternité as it was France’s responsibility to aid another who seeks help.  
This is also said of the parliament. He mentioned earlier in the interview that he 
supported the intervention in Libya, and that he was convening a special session in the 
National Assembly and Senate to debate the issues in Syria951. Ultimately, the 
authority to use the armed forces lies with the President (but for the caveats mentioned 
in Part I), therefore such a session would be most useful to help Hollande provide 
further justifications for the need to intervene. 
In opening the debate on the situation in Syria, Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault 
spoke of the importance of setting forth the facts of the situation in Syria in front of 
not just the ruling party, but also that of the opposition952. Ayrault also talked about 
elected representatives being able to see the variables which had led the President and 
his government to the policy upon which they have decided. Here, Ayrault was 
drawing the contradistinction between the Syrian regime and the French Republic; 
differentiating the transparency, consensus building, and ultimately liberty found in 
the French Republic as opposed to the dictatorship of Syria. As mentioned above, the 
purpose of this debate in the National Assembly and Senate was largely a means for 
Hollande to publically display his republican credentials, performing and reaffirming 
the French identity for all to see. 
Again, Ayrault’s opening reflected a rather factual recounting of events, with minor 
flavours of emotion. He explained how the meeting of members of parliament takes 
place at a significant point. He clarified how it was Assad who committed an 
“unforgiveable” act in using chemical weapons against his own population. He also 
went into detail about how the UN had confirmed that chemical weapons had been 
used, but that France’s own intelligence, formed from the evidence they had collected, 
pointed the blame at the Syrian regime. Finally, this act could not go without 
response953.  
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Ayrault clearly set out what was at stake: firstly, to prevent Assad from using chemical 
weapons against his own people in the future, and secondly to send a wider message 
“to those who would seek to imitate this act in the future”954. This was sold as a 
security consideration for France as well as other nations, within the context of the 
fight against weapons of mass destruction. 
Throughout this section, the topos of danger is consistently brought up; the idea being 
that those who flout international law and are not duly reprimanded continue to do so, 
creating ever greater issues and becoming even bolder in their contravention of 
international laws and norms. In order to prevent such continuation, France, and the 
international community at large, must react accordingly. 
At the conclusion of his statement, Ayrault drew attention to the fact that not only was 
this debate unique, but also that the constitution itself did not require a vote to even 
take place. This was therefore presented as Hollande seeking additional consensus out 
of respect for the norms of democracy, as well as wanting to take an opportunity for 
the government to transparently discuss its logic. Ayrault explained that, ultimately, a 
vote would not occur unless the President allows it, but that as an international decision 
had not been taken, there was no need to hold one at the time. Here, Hollande was 
presented as being magnanimous in holding a debate in the National Assembly and 
Senate, whilst also re-affirming the notion that it was he, as President, who still 
maintained the final power as to whether France would use its military. 
In doing this, Hollande was able to make allusions towards respecting democratic 
institutions, whilst also re-affirming the Presidency’s supremacy in this regard. In 
many ways, this could be seen as a demonstration of the effectiveness of the French 
Republican model. It also indicated the President’s confidence regarding the authority 
of the office over foreign policy, knowing that there would be little opposition. This 
was also helped as there was no specific decision which needed to be taken as a 
response had yet to be formulated. 
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Justification for military intervention came the same day with France’s report into the 
usage of chemical weapons955. Since it was produced by intelligence services, the 
general tone was sombre and factual, containing details of Syria’s pre-existing 
chemical weapons stocks, as well as describing how these types of weapons had been 
utilised previously during the conflict. It also speculated regarding what the potential 
reasons behind the attacks may have been, as well as laying the blame at the Assad 
regime’s door.  
The report did spend significant time describing the particular horror of the attacks, 
concentrating not only on the scale and demographics of the casualties, but also the 
unique horrors of the types of chemical weapons used. It described how analysis of 
the video footage revealed a minimum of 281 deaths, of which in one hospital it was 
reported that “half of the victims were women and children and, in 50% of the cases, 
death was instantaneous”956. However, the team who produced the report’s own 
impact modelling predicted the casualty list to be much higher, agreeing with reports 
by several different sources957. 
Presented to the reader is a description of the symptoms of the chemical agent used:  
“the death symptoms (to include generalized convulsions, nausea, vomiting, moisis, 
foaming from the nose and mouth, dyspnea, suffocation, loss of consciousness) are 
clinical signs of poisoning due to the use of chemical agents… the observation of many 
low-age children suffering violent symptoms (convulsion among others), on eight 
different sites), lead to the conclusions that a falsification or manipulation by the 
opposition is highly improbable”958.  
 
This was a truly horrific attack, and the report generated did not flinch from this fact. 
It was the scale of the attack which led many nations to feel the need to intervene. It 
is important to remind the reader at this point that this thesis is not attempting to argue 
that Hollande invented a crisis as a means of giving himself and France an opportunity 
to take a leadership position on the international stage, but rather seized upon an 
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opportunity which was created by the Syrian conflict to attempt to push for 
intervention and try to resolve one of the larger humanitarian disasters of the time. It 
is not in the attempt, but rather in the execution which, whilst understandable given 
the terrible events of Syria, forced France into an inflexible stance which was 
overtaken by changing attitudes in France’s allies. 
The debate in the National Assembly and Senate concerning the attacks continued into 
the following day. Laurent Fabius, in his declaration during the debate, became by far 
the most emotive orator of the French executive when dealing with this issue. As has 
been shown above, Hollande and Ayrault referenced the casualties of the conflict, but 
Fabius spent significantly more time describing the unique horror of the events, to 
really stir emotions. His opening sentence describes how “in the early hours of 21 
August, a few kilometres from the centre of Damascus, nearly 1,500 civilians, 
including hundreds of children, died, asphyxiated, in their sleep. Murdered by the 
Syrian regime, in what is, in the early part of this century, the most massive and most 
terrifying use of chemical weapons”959. 
Fabius drew the horror from the events and spoke of the videos taken by those involved 
in the attacks such as the doctors and victims, paying tribute to them that despite their 
fear, there were “also aware of their duty to inform the world of the horror of what had 
just occurred”960. Fabius spoke also of the “victims’ agony” and the “rows of 
children’s corpses”961. 
This intensified focus on the victims and how they suffered could be seen as a reaction 
to Western leaders’ increased reluctance to involve themselves in potential military 
action in Syria. The United States had already decided to delay its planned intervention 
by seeking approval from a hostile congress. Therefore, focussing on the victims could 
be seen to have been a way of creating a link on an emotional level between the various 
countries’ representatives, their respective populations, and the Syrian people in 
opposition-held territory.  
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After discussing the evidence France holds laying the blame at the Syrian regime’s 
feet, Fabius then presented a choice for those listening to his speech: allow events to 
play out as they were, or intervene to prevent the situation from getting any worse. It 
was at this point that the concept of punishment re-emerged, along with a discussion 
of Assad himself. Fabius referred to the “terrible message” which would be sent to 
Assad if the international community were not to intervene, effectively granting tacit 
approval of his actions. The Foreign Minister quoted Assad when he described 
“liquidating” his opposition962.  
Assad became the focal point of the crime, as it is “Bashar al-Assad [who] has violated 
his obligations under the 1925 Protocol… he has flouted international humanitarian 
law by carrying out indiscriminate attacks… he has committed a war crime. He has 
committed what the UN Secretary-General described as a crime against humanity”963 
(emphasis added). The conflict became more personalised, Fabius admitted, saying 
that “we want to see the departure of Mr Bashar al-Assad, who doesn’t hesitate to 
directly threaten our country and who even believes he can intimidate the national 
representatives”964. However, Fabius argued that a show of strength now could have 
brought Assad to a political settlement which, he inferred, would hopefully lead to the 
victory of the moderate Syrian opposition965.  
Fabius again made appeal to the past, relying on the topos of history, specifically 
referring to the First World War and the West’s own experiences with chemical 
warfare. He argued that in not acting to prevent further use of such weapons, and 
especially since such weapons had been banned, would constitute an “appalling step 
backwards”966. Fabius here also relied on the topos of universality, as there was an 
assumption that the nations who would be involved in such a military action (the US 
and Western European countries), would react well to this argument due to their shared 
history in recognising the appalling nature of chemical weapons during the First World 
War, and their subsequent collective efforts to ban such weapons’ utilisation with the 
Geneva Protocol 1925. He also created responsibility again by assuming that Assad 
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would do this again, therefore any inaction in stopping Assad from using chemical 
weapons would inherently implicate the international community. 
In responding to questions raised during the debate in the National Assembly, Prime 
Minister Ayrault and Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian did not deal as 
explicitly with the plight of the Syrian people, nor the “punishment” of Assad. Instead, 
there was a more sober appraisal of the facts in terms of the events which transpired. 
Only after laying out all of the facts was it conceded that it was a “large scale attack 
which killed hundreds of civilians and was carried out by a regime pursuing its work 
of terror and of liquidating its people – as Bashar al-Assad said in a recent 
interview”967. 
Here Assad’s own words were used against him to suggest that he was callous, that 
the deployment of chemical weapons was a means to an end and that he was, at best, 
indifferent to the suffering of his people. Such a leader constituted a threat, not only 
to his own people, but also to the larger international community. It was for this reason 
that the international community needed to intervene, lest Assad grow emboldened. 
This idea is explored in more detail in the next part. 
Inherent within the arguments featured in this first part are the topoi of threat/danger, 
and of humanitarianism, being inextricably linked in this scenario. The threats are 
numerous, being Assad against his population, or the wider international norms, be 
they agreements not to attack civilians, or limitations on the usage of chemical 
weapons. Assad’s attitude and willingness to breach international law to gain an upper 
hand clearly breaches the topoi of humanitarianism. Such an action therefore demands 
a response which addresses the wrongdoing. However, what kind of action would be 
required? The next section examines how a suitable response was articulated, with 
particular reference to the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect. 
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7.2 The Responsibility to Protect: France as driver of international norms 
 
As has been stated in previous chapters, this section of the thesis examines the ways 
in which France sought to appeal to the international community using the previously 
established norms of the Responsibility to Protect. Here, it is shown that France would 
lean heavily on this justification, as well as presenting itself as the self-appointed 
champion of the doctrine. This part of the thesis also explains how France’s military 
action and general foreign and military policy, as well as its specific focus on the use 
of airstrikes for the aforementioned “punishment”, would serve as a showcase not only 
for France’s humanitarian credentials, but also of its independence and power 
projection. 
As mentioned above, this thesis does not judge the efficacy of Hollande against the 
achievements of Sarkozy. Indeed, this thesis acknowledges that the argument to 
intervene militarily in Syria was more challenging due to the involvement of Russia. 
Beyond Russia’s strategic interests in Tartus, Russia is also of a position which tends 
to resist international interference in other states. Russia had given its approval 
(although tacitly) for the intervention in Libya. However, the conduct of France, the 
US, and the UK in pursuing goals beyond what had been strictly authorised by the UN 
Resolution had led Putin to look dimly upon that intervention968. This would mean 
that achieving Security Council approval was always going to be nearly impossible.  
In his speech at the 21st Ambassadors’ Conference, Hollande marked out three 
principles which would drive their foreign policy. Firstly, he spoke of the importance 
of France’s “Independence”969. Here, however, we get a very particular 
conceptualisation of independence, as it was held in conjunction with France’s 
international commitments. He stated that “Independence, which leads us every 
moment to decide, in full sovereignty while being loyal to our alliances, to European 
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solidarity and to our bilateral agreements. It’s this freedom that makes France useful 
to the world and to peace”970.  
Such a statement suggested that France holds a special place within the international 
order; somewhere it has carved out a path, within the tangle of treaties and accords, 
which allows it to act in ways in which it can help protect the international order using 
its own discretion. Indeed, the benefits of such an approach were explained where 
Hollande opined that “this is the best way of ensuring borders are respected, disputes 
are settled and collective security prevails”. France, as conceptualised in this 
statement, was therefore best placed to be making the decisions as to what action is 
taken to achieve peace. This conceptualisation of France’s place in the world order fits 
neatly within the conceptualisation of grandeur as promoted by de Gaulle. 
This point was also raised in his final principle for French foreign policy, that of 
“dialogue”971. However, at the centre of this dialogue should have been France, as it 
“wants to be a bridge between continents and avoid what some peope [sic] have called 
the clash of civilisations. It wants to be a “landmark power” – i.e. a nation that speaks 
beyond its interests alone”972. This, of course, attempted to present France as an 
altruistic power, seeking to act in the best interests of the world, even if it did not 
necessarily serve France’s agenda. However, as was argued by Paul-Marie de la 
Gorce, international peace was considered by France as one of its national interests973. 
For France, an international power with diplomatic and trading relationships around 
the world, attaining peace in the swiftest way possible was often in the country’s best 
interests.  
In addition to discussing French Foreign Policy, Hollande spent a significant amount 
of time discussing international law and international norms. Specifically, he referred 
to the need for it to “evolve with the times”974. The one particular development of 
recent times which Hollande decided to mention here is the “Responsibility to 
Protect”. Here, he drew attention to the fact that international law could not remain 
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static as “a pretext for allowing large-scale massacres to be perpetrated”, which is why 
he “recognize[s] the principle of “the responsibility to protect” civilians”975. Hollande 
set out his vision of international law as being something which should, in cases of 
large-scale massacres, be interventionist in nature.  
Interventionism in this manner does not necessarily mean the use of military force, as 
Article 138 of the 2005 Resolution introducing the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
stated the responsibility to protect populations from crimes against humanity “through 
[any] appropriate and necessary means”976. This, of course, can include dialogue, 
which was the final principle which Hollande mentioned as being important to French 
foreign policy977. However, in speaking of dialogue, it was unclear whether this 
approach truly reflected the situation in Syria, especially when considering Hollande’s 
threats of “punishment”. Of course, these could only be threats, or namely attempts to 
coerce the Assad regime into compliance. However, as the crisis continued, it appeared 
less and less that this was the French President’s actual plan. This argument is 
strengthened of course by the next section in Hollande’s speech, which referred to the 
importance of France’s military capabilities. He argued that in order for France to be 
able to enact its foreign policy principles, it would need to have had the ability to act, 
depending on “firstly its diplomacy, but also its military capabilities”978. As 
conceptualised here, these two principles would work hand in hand; however, the 
rhetoric and arguments emerging in the initial aftermath of the chemical weapons 
attack certainly indicated that the latter was more important in this instance than the 
former. 
This was certainly supported in Hollande’s Joint Declaration with Al-Assi Al Jarba 
two days later979. In Hollande’s section of the declaration, he discussed more generally 
that a response was needed from the international community. He argued that a two-
pronged approach was required, by which he meant that if there were the spectre of 
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necessary force present (and specifically the army), then a diplomatic solution could 
emerge980. Al-Assi Al Jabra assumed a similar position, arguing that to dissuade the 
regime from using chemical weapons, then it would be necessary for there to be an 
established international force, led by the French981. Prima facie, it would seem that 
he was making a similar argument to Hollande earlier. However, with repeated 
references to the different forces, be they “international” or “UN”, in addition to the 
arguments that the Assad regime should be punished in some way, it was far more 
likely that Al-Assi Al Jabra had in mind a more direct confrontation with Assad.  
However, one must keep in mind throughout this analysis, the conditions required to 
effectively trigger the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: one must have the right 
intention, it must be the last resort, the means being utilised must be proportional, and 
that there must be reasonable prospects that the action decided upon would actually 
resolve the crisis, and the action was likely to produce better results than inaction982. 
President Al-Assi Al Jarba sought to make the argument that because of the nature of 
Assad’s conduct, via the use of chemical weapons in clear breach of international 
treaties, that collective action must be taken. The right intention was therefore 
established, especially as the request came from someone who was considered to be 
the spokesperson of Syrians, and that he was requesting multilateral support. 
Furthermore, Hollande was keen to discuss in his declaration the support France had 
offered, and was again offering, making available not only its political aid, but also its 
humanitarian aid983. 
However, despite this support offered by France the conflict had already lasted a year 
and killed 100,000 people984. Therefore an intervention beyond humanitarian aid 
would be required to prevent such a massive number of casualities. However, what 
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these previous two statements lacked was any detail surrounding what kind of 
intervention would be proposed beyond general threats. 
Some details began to emerge in Hollande’s interview with Le Monde on 31 August 
2013. At this point, Hollande had received sufficient information to be able to lay the 
blame solely at the feet of the Assad regime. When asked whether the French 
authorities had sufficient evidence to prove whether chemical weapons had been used, 
Hollande responded by saying that it was not a question of whether they had been 
used, but by whom985. Hollande argued that the opposition forces did not have the 
capability to launch such chemical weapons as all of the stocks were controlled by the 
Assad regime. Furthermore, the site of the attack was of great strategic importance to 
the regime, and it had acted quickly to remove any traces from the location. Therefore, 
this made it the most likely culprit of the attacks986. 
When asked about the legality of any military action, Hollande pointed out that a 
chemical weapons attack would breach the Protocol of 1925, and that Ban Ki-moon 
himself had already stated that such an attack would constitute a crime against 
humanity. All that remained at this point was a decision from the international 
community.  
Here, we saw a little more detail as to what the purpose of a military intervention 
would be. When asked about what the aim of a war would be, he clarified that war 
was not what was being proposed, but rather some form of sanction against the Assad 
regime to dissuade further use of chemical weapons. That action needed to be taken in 
order to show the Syrian government that the international community would not 
tolerate the use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the suggestion was made that the 
situation had become worse specifically because the Security Council had not taken a 
decision to step in earlier987. Indeed, Hollande argued that by not stepping in now, 
there would be further casualties, both within, and without Syria as the usage of such 
weapons would become more normalised988. 
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The fourth condition of there being reasonable prospects of the intervention 
succeeding includes an element which addresses the fact that the action must likely 
result in a better situation than inaction. In appealing to the history of the events, 
Hollande suggested that this was already the case. This also doubles as an argument 
that military action was indeed a last resort, as previous actions resulted in continued 
use of chemical weapons. However, the strength of this argument is dubious, 
especially as the international response to the Syrian conflict was one of relative 
inaction. Furthermore, as time would show, not all non-military options had been 
considered, and it was this fact, amongst other things, which would result in a non-
military resolution, at least in the short term.  
Specifically, Hollande once again argued that the Security Council would need to call 
for action, and that there would need to be support from the Arab League (who had 
been the ones to bring the attacks to the attention of the international community), and 
from other European nations able to render assistance. Therefore, the “right intention 
clause” gains greater assurances with the level of support such an operation would 
require.  
What was not included in this interview, however, was the argument that the response 
would be proportional as the actual response had not been formulated. France at this 
point was remaining rather vague in terms of actually what specific action would be 
taken, instead relying on vague threats of intervention. Hollande had ruled out more 
widespread regime change, arguing that he would not support an international 
intervention which sought to “liberate” Syria or enact regime change, but rather 
something would have to be done to prevent further attacks against the country’s 
population989.  
The declaration by Prime Minister Ayrault on 3 September 2013 announcing that a 
debate should be held in the National Assembly and Senate regarding the situation in 
Syria added little specificity to France’s plans in relation to the type of intervention it 
was seeking990. Instead, Prime Minister Ayrault articulated that the government felt it 
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was important that it should make available the evidence and reasoning behind its 
recent policy towards Syria991. 
However, the context of this debate in regards to events around the world was very 
important; on 30 August 2013, the Cameron government in the United Kingdom had 
just been defeated by the Opposition, effectively ruling out the United Kingdom’s 
involvement in any military action992. The following day, Obama had decided to make 
an abrupt turn and seek congressional approval, against the advice of many of his 
advisors. At the time, it seemed a gamble as he faced a Republican Congress, with no 
guarantee of winning a vote993. Congress was not due to sit until 9 September, which 
in many ways could be interpreted as the Obama administration re-assessing the 
landscape following the defeat in the British Commons. 
However, whilst this stopped the clock for the US, France interpreted this as a means 
to continue to push for an intervention. In many ways, the debate in the National 
Assembly and Senate could be interpreted as more than just an aspect of performative 
Republicanism, but as a show of support from the French parliament to the US to 
continue pushing for military intervention.  
It was then surprising how subdued Ayrault’s opening statement was in relation for 
the need for military intervention. In many ways, it reflected the more ordinary 
approach taken by Hollande as President, disposing of more bombastic rhetoric for a 
more level-headed, pragmatic approach. 
Another interesting point raised from this is that the particular nature of what military 
action was to be taken was still not mentioned in the speech. Throughout his statement, 
Ayrault used euphemistic phrasing, such as requiring a “response”, or “sanctioning” 
the use of chemical weapons994. This was particularly strange when France’s actions 
indicated that it was already planning on airstrikes just before the US decided to ask 
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congress. France had spy planes concentrated on the coast of Cyprus, and Rafale 
fighter jets loaded with missiles. Indeed, Hollande planned to release a report to justify 
its intervention (which is examined shortly)995. However, none of this was mentioned 
in Ayrault’s discussion on the crisis in Syria.  
Ayrault’s justification for the need for some form of intervention did not really evolve 
from the arguments previously articulated by Hollande. However, Ayrault did focus 
on an element of the criteria of Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and that is of the 
proportionality of the event. Ayrault reiterated Hollande’s argument that an 
intervention would only serve the purpose of dissuading the regime from using 
chemical weapons again. Ayrault stated that an intervention would need to be “firm 
and proportionate which aims to neither overthrow the regime, nor liberate Syria”996. 
He clearly indicated that the French government was still of the opinion that the Syrian 
crisis could be resolved by a political solution997. This established the clear limitations 
of France’s intentions, and prioritising a specific target helped to support the 
legitimacy of the intervention. However, much more detail regarding what France 
would intend to do would be required to truly fulfil the requirement. 
The same day that Ayrault opened the debate on intervention, the French 
administration also released its report on the chemical weapons attack998. This report 
used evidence the French Security services had collected to explain what had 
happened, and laid the blame at the feet of the Assad regime. The report served little 
purpose in terms of the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect beyond further 
accentuating the “right intention” aspect, drawing a clear line between previous uses 
of chemical weapons by the regime to the attack in Ghouta, making the argument that 
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this was becoming a consistent threat to the Syrian population. Therefore, any 
intervention would necessarily have had the right intention.  
The following day, the debate in the National Assembly continued on. The Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, Prime Minister Ayrault and Minister of Defence 
Jean-Yves Le Drian all gave speeches. With the report having been released a day 
earlier, discussion regarding the implementation of measures against the Syrian 
government became more concrete. Fabius reiterated many of the key points raised in 
the Security report, that chemical weapons had been used on multiple occasions during 
the Syrian conflict, including on 21 August against a civilian population comprised of 
women and children, that it was the government forces who had used the weapons as 
part of a strategy to recapture the city, and that they had conspired to use artillery to 
destroy all evidence999.  
Fabius argued that the UN’s own investigation was not designed to assign blame, but 
rather to just confirm that chemical weapons had been used. However, various national 
and supranational organisations were found to agree with France, including their 
“American, British, German and Turkish partners”, in addition to the Arab League, all 
arguing that it was the Syrian regime who were ultimately responsible for the 
attack1000. 
Fabius argued that the choice before the international community was simple: either 
act or ignore the situation. Here, we see one of the rare allusions to the fact that military 
intervention was required as peaceful options had proved ineffective: “Can we make 
do with condemning them, and with calling on the international community to wake 
up, so that peace negotiations that have not been forthcoming finally begin?”1001  
Fabius drew a distinction between this specific event, and the wider conflict. For the 
conflict at large, he stated that France’s policy was to seek a political settlement. 
However, in response to the chemical weapon attack, the international community had 
to act to prevent future attacks of its ilk, not only by the Syrian regime, but also by 
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Iran and North Korea1002. Fabius went further, arguing that a military intervention now 
would help pave the way towards a political resolution to the conflict, as such tactics 
would no longer be available to Assad1003. 
Fabius maintained the legitimacy of intervention due to the Syrian regime’s breach of 
the 1925 Chemical Weapons Protocol, as well as of the Geneva Convention. 
Furthermore, Syrian authorities intentionally retarded attempts to achieve peaceful 
settlement by delaying and refusing the presence of human rights and chemical 
weapons monitors, as well as impeding the provision of humanitarian aid.  
Also, in an unusual move for France, he stated that whilst authorisation from the 
Security Council would be “preferable”, it was not mandatory. This was in a direct 
response to the continued use of the veto by Russia and China, who had thrice blocked 
measures designed to resolve the Syrian crisis, and had also had a hand in stopping 
France’s draft resolution to address the conflict1004. Therefore, France could argue that 
this was indeed a last resort as all diplomatic attempts to resolve the situation had been 
blocked by other members of the Security Council. 
Next in the speech came the proposal; the phrase “firm and proportionate” again 
emerged to describe what the response should have been. Fabius himself described the 
action as being “considered and collective… A one-off response with meaningful but 
targeted objectives”1005. Clear limitations were placed on the action, that “there is no 
question of sending in ground troops. There is no question of launching military 
operations to overthrow the regime”1006. As mentioned previously, the purpose for 
these debates was as much for the international community and France’s allies as it 
was for France itself. As such, this debate could be seen as reinforcing the point for 
America that any intervention would be a short term endeavour.  
Fabius acknowledged that it was France’s desire to be rid of Assad, whom he argued 
would readily threaten France. However, the real objective at this time was solely to 
deter the Assad regime from using chemical weapons again. Fabius directly addressed 
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criticisms of acting that it could make the situation worse by stating that “doing 
nothing in the face of the Syrian people’s suffering plays into the hands of the 
extremists. Ensuring that the Syrian regime’s crimes do not go unpunished is, on the 
contrary, a way for our democracies to support the moderate Syrian opposition”1007. 
Indeed, the argument referred to by Hollande and Ayrault was more explicitly stated 
by Fabius, and addresses the fourth point regarding the Responsibility to Protect, 
namely that there must always be a reasonable chance of the action succeeding, and it 
must not likely make the situation worse.  
Fabius therefore was far more focused in his arguments; seeking to demonstrate in 
more detail how the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine arguments applied to the 
current circumstances, effectively leading to the conclusion that a French-led 
intervention was the only way of moving forward. Fabius articulated these arguments 
in the clearest and most concise manner of any of the government’s foreign policy 
spokespersons.  
These arguments for intervention were again reiterated by Prime Minister Ayrault and 
Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian during the same 4 September 2013 debate. 
They argued that an intervention would serve two objectives: “on the one hand, the 
objective is to punish the use of chemical agents by Bashar al-Assad against civilians 
and, on the other hand, to deter him from continuing and restore the ban on the use of 
weapons of mass destruction”1008. They argued that defining the intervention against 
these objectives allowed it to be a “firm, significant, targeted and proportionate 
response to the violation of an essential norm of international law”1009. Explicitly ruled 
out was ground intervention. Furthermore, the assault would have a purely retaliatory 
aim and there would be “strict collateral damage limitation”1010. The aim here would 
be to justify, not show, that the scope would be limited, and therefore proportional, 
but also that there would be no further engagement required. This was why the ideas 
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of a no-fly zone or humanitarian corridor were also rejected as they would require 
continued presence1011.   
This could be seen as an attempt to win over American support to the idea of a very 
limited engagement. In seeking to limit civilian casualties, this served not only to 
appease the international community at large, but also to argue that such an 
intervention would not make the situation any worse.  
This part has looked at the various ways in which the French administration sought to 
explain how the action they were proposing, retaliatory strikes in order to prevent 
Assad’s further usage of chemical weapons, would conform to the norm of the 
Responsibility to Protect. We have also seen how the argument for how the strikes 
themselves would occur, with limited scope and duration, was also aimed at 
persuading the US to follow through with the intervention. These arguments rely 
heavily on the topoi of cooperation, of fraternité, and of burden. France must act 
pragmatically in order to support the population for fear of the situation getting worse, 
and the use of chemical weapons becoming banalised. Furthermore, the only way that 
such an endeavour (aimed at preventing a worsening of the situation) could succeed 
was for multiple countries to work together. Only then would it be truly successful. 
Furthermore, it was France’s duty to intervene not only because it was able to do so, 
but also because it had a moral responsibility to do so in order to protect the civilian 
population from the atrocity of chemical warfare. 
The next section explores France’s efforts in building international consensus and 
France taking its supposedly rightful place within the international order. Specifically, 
it shows how France views itself as being naturally positioned to engage with such 
issues due to its history and culture, before the final section examines how such 
arguments were viewed by other nations. 
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7.3 International Consensus and the Rhetoric of French exceptionalism 
 
As mentioned above, the purpose of President Hollande’s speech at the Ambassador’s 
Conference was to set out the vision for France’s foreign policy moving forward. 
However, it also served as an opportunity for the President to promote and celebrate 
the actions they, and the country, had taken. In this instance, it linked both the topos 
of responsibility with the idea of French exceptionalism. Hollande explained that 
“during the past year, France has acted”1012. Hollande explained that France “led” by 
holding the Friends of Syria Conference in 2012, as well as being the first nation to 
recognise the Syrian National Coalition as Syria’s representative. Hollande also stated 
that France had “promptly provided humanitarian and material assistance to the 
opposition so that it could carry on with its fight”1013.  Later, Hollande once again 
singled out France as being the one who should act, as “it is our responsibility to seek 
the most appropriate response to the Syrian regime’s atrocities”1014.  
However, just as previous French foreign policy dictated, France strove to act as part 
of an international response. Indeed, the statement demanded that the international 
community take collective action to respond to the crisis. It suggested that the 
“international community cannot fail to react to the use of chemical weapons”1015. The 
implication here was that the international community would lose some of its 
legitimacy if it did not act to resolve the crisis. Internationalism, and the act of working 
with international partners, is often central to France’s legitimisation of its actions on 
the international scale. For French foreign policy, it is often important to be seen to be 
working with others at the head of an international coalition. Here, Hollande noted 
that that he had been holding “numerous consultations with our – particularly 
American and European – allies, as well as our Arab partners, to consider all the 
options”1016. Being at the head of such a coalition and driving its actions is a way of 
ensuring the understanding of France’s rang as one of the world’s most influential 
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powers. This was, of course, both served by, and a responsibility resulting from, being 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
However, in approaching these possibilities, military options were certainly at the top 
of their minds, whereby Hollande had decided to “increase our military support for the 
Syrian National Coalition”1017. Ultimately, Hollande ended the section relating to 
Syria with a sentence which indicated what France’s tone during the crisis would be, 
“only through this firmness will we see a political solution prevail one day in 
Syria”1018. Clearly, France’s idea of a political solution in this situation was to be the 
surrender of the Assad regime, and France was willing to intervene to bring this about. 
Important to the idea of international intervention was the idea of consent; that the 
country’s representatives were allowing other states to conduct themselves on their 
sovereign soil. Of course, the Responsibility to Protect norm does have ways around 
this general rule, allowing the Security Council to authorise the use of force. However, 
it is always useful to be able to show that the actions potentially being undertaken are 
supported by those in the region. At the beginning of his Ambassadors’ Conference 
speech, Hollande referred to the numerous consultations held with American and 
European allies, Arab partners, and the Syrian National Coalition. With the US and 
European allies, Hollande was drawing attention to the growing consensus in the 
Western world relating to the events occurring in Syria. When referring to Arab 
partners and the Syrian National Council, Hollande was suggesting that furthermore 
they were seeking cooperation, that the relevant parties involved were working 
together to resolve the issue. This suggested that any solution found would be 
following the consultations of relevant parties, and by association, presumably their 
permission. Hollande therefore could infer consensus in his decision, even if there 
potentially was not any.  
In the next section of his speech, Hollande discussed more broadly the foreign policy 
his administration would be pursuing. He tried to suggest that the foreign policy being 
formulated by himself and Laurent Fabius was somehow different from that adopted 
by Sarkozy (though as shown throughout this chapter, this is not really the case).  
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Throughout this thesis I have described how an important feature of France’s foreign 
policy is the idea of rang, and that France holds a responsibility in the world due to its 
status as an influential power and permanent member of the Security Council. This is 
brought up in his opening line: “For France to live up to its responsibility is the goal 
and the pride of the foreign policy I have been conducting with Laurent Fabius since 
my election”1019. Here, Hollande was relying on what is found to be a more personal 
approach, anthropomorphising the policy. Speaking of pride and responsibility 
accentuates the fact that Hollande was attempting to conjure in the mind of the listener 
a notion of French exceptionalism; that it was only right that France play a role on the 
global stage, that it was both France’s duty, and its joy to serve. 
This was only natural, of course, for France. When describing France’s Foreign Policy 
principles, Hollande argued that France “wants to be a “landmark” power. Here was 
perhaps the clearest indication of France’s desire to enhance and confirm its rang. In 
this context, Hollande was describing how France wished to be a “bridge between the 
continents”1020, acting as a power-broker and peace maker on the international stage. 
This, of course, was done because France wants to be “a nation that speaks beyond its 
interests alone”. Whilst it may not necessarily hold the military power of the United 
States, Russia, or even China, France could be influential in other ways, such as using 
its diplomatic ties to act as peace-maker. This is a role befitting a permanent member 
of the Security Council, and affirms France’s position amongst the great powers.  
Dialogue is an important tool in France’s arsenal in terms of international diplomacy. 
However, Hollande admitted that its military is equally important to allow it to be 
effective. Indeed, he stated that its principles “depends on [France] having the means 
to act: firstly its diplomacy, but also its military capabilities”, which give it a special 
role further strengthened by its status as a permanent member of the Security 
Council”1021. Here we see France as being defined as being “special” because of its 
ability to use diplomatic and military means to achieve its goals, which are further 
enhanced by its membership of the UN Security Council.  
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As explained in previous chapters, France takes its role on the Security Council very 
seriously, both as a mark of prestige, as well as a means of increasing its influence on 
the world. Yet, Hollande felt it was important that France be seen to be pulling its 
weight. At the time of this speech, and as explained in Chapter 6, France was still in 
the midst of an economic downturn. However, in this speech, Hollande acknowledged 
that whilst cuts may need to be made elsewhere in other departments, “France must 
ensure that its defence tool remains reliable”1022. Why? Hollande reasoned that “it’s 
the essential condition for preserving our credibility and deciding on an intervention 
whenever our country deems it necessary, in the framework of international law”. 
Again, we see reference to France operating within international norms when acting 
militarily; one would be forgiven for thinking that this would be taken for granted. 
However, Hollande wanted to accentuate this point. He linked France’s rang with its 
ability to maintain its military and having the ability to intervene militarily anywhere 
in the world. Credibility is seen as an important asset when operating in the 
international community, and for Hollande the ability to use France’s military 
resources abroad is vital in maintaining this credibility. Perhaps one could also 
consider this within his domestic context considering his lack of credibility at home 
following the numerous scandals and falling approval figures mentioned in the 
previous chapter. It was important for Hollande then to prove that he too had 
credibility.  
The concept of French intervention in the international order was an important theme 
throughout the Ambassadors’ Conference Speech. Beyond the situation in Syria, 
Hollande had discussed climate change, Mali, trade, and human rights (though only 
briefly). At the speech’s resolution, Hollande summed up the quandary when 
discussing France’s responsibility: “There are times when this responsibility is tough: 
do we commit France or not? Do we act or not? Do we take decisions or not? Do we 
intervene or let things take their course?”1023  
In making a decision, however, Hollande placed himself at the centre of the decision-
making process, drawing parallels from himself to previous presidents. “This question 
                                                          
1022 Ibid. 
1023 Ibid 
304 
 
has been put to the Head of State at specific moments in our country’s history”1024. 
Hollande did not name-check the Presidents in particular, but one must assume that he 
was referring to leaders such as de Gaulle. Hollande acknowledged that within the 
next few days another such decision would need to be made. 
Hollande’s final substantive paragraph continued his rhetorical questions: “Do we act 
or not? Do we get involved or leave it to others?”1025 Hollande answered, setting out 
what was ultimately his vision for France under his presidency: “France has decided 
to exercise its responsibility everywhere, for itself and for world stability”1026. France 
under Hollande is therefore argued to be essential for world stability, that there was a 
responsibility for France to lend its talents and resources for the betterment of the 
international order. Hollande was continuing what he established as his country’s 
legacy of stepping up when it has been required.  
Part of “stepping up”, as has been discussed previously, is pursuing dialogue. This 
included building relationships with the Syrian National Coalition, the group which 
was widely considered at the time to represent the official opposition to the Syrian 
regime. On 29 August, Hollande issued a joint statement with Ahmad Al-Assi Al 
Jarba, President of the Syrian National Coalition. Hollande accentuated the 
connections between the two individuals, as well as the SNC and France, by reminding 
those listening that this was the second time that he had welcomed the organisation to 
France1027.  
Furthermore, Hollande was also keen to reaffirm France’s support of the SNC, whom 
it argued was the sole representative of the Syrian population, an opinion which was 
shared by a large part of the international community1028. Hollande also strongly 
emphasised the political and humanitarian assistance France had provided, as well as 
the support it had offered to other Gulf countries, thereby showing its willingness to 
                                                          
1024 Ibid. 
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 Joint Declaration of Mr Francois Hollande, President of the French Republic, and Ahmad Al-Assi 
Al Jarba, President of the Syrian National Coalition, on the Situation in Syria, Paris, 29 August 2013 
http://discourse.vie-publique.fr/notices/137001987.html [accessed 27/05/2019] 
1028 Ibid. 
305 
 
work with regional actors and utilise its own resources on the other side of the world 
in the interests of international humanitarianism.  
Beyond this, Hollande demanded that the chemical weapons attack which had 
occurred required an appropriate reaction from the international community. Indeed, 
Hollande argued that a solution could only be found if the international community 
would be able to come together and offer a political solution, as being the only 
alternative to a military one. This would require the international community to draw 
a sharp line that the usage of chemical weapons was an unacceptable escalation in the 
conflict1029.  
These thoughts were echoed by President Al-Assi Al Jarba, who thanked the French 
President for both his personal position and the position of his government in 
supporting the SNC. This sentiment even extended to the French people, whom had 
displayed “sympathy and compassion”1030. The solution to the current crisis from Mr 
Al-Assi Al Jarbi’s perspective was to create an international force to dissuade the 
Syrian regime from using chemical weapons. Whilst the SNC President was keen to 
thank both the United States and the United Kingdom, he felt that it should be the 
French at the head of any force1031. 
At this point, the Syrian conflict had been raging for over two years. Hollande 
acknowledged himself that the international community had been unable to find a 
response to “the Syrian Question”1032. However, he felt confident that the utilisation 
of chemical weapons was sufficient to change their approach.  
When asked what country would be involved in an intervention, Hollande accentuated 
that first the Security Council would need to authorise an action, at which point a 
coalition would form, preferably as large as possible1033. For Hollande, the cornerstone 
would be based around the Arab League, who had been the one to initially condemn 
the attack and alert the international community. European nations would lend their 
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support too; however he acknowledged that few countries had the capacity to impose 
sanctions in “the appropriate means”1034. France, naturally, remained ready to take its 
part, though Hollande advised that it would decide as to its specific role following 
discussion with its allies. At this point, however, the United Kingdom had already 
ruled out any military intervention in Syria. Despite this, Hollande argued that this 
would not affect France’s decision, and indeed indicated that he had had an “extensive 
exchange with Barack Obama”1035. 
This interview with Le Monde took a far more pragmatic approach than Hollande’s 
previous proclamations. It is also interesting to note that whilst there was discussion 
concerning working within the international system, Hollande did not play up France’s 
role as he had done previously. Gone then were the strong proclamations that France 
was leading the way to drive action against the Syrian regime. Instead, France was 
portrayed as just awaiting direction from the Security Council, at which point it would 
dutifully fulfil its requests. Indeed, when pressed on whether France was too 
frequently resorting to interventionism, especially looking at the two in Libya and 
Mali with a potential third in two years in Syria, Hollande responded that all three had 
their own unique context, but that France would accept its responsibilities “in the name 
of its values and its principles”1036. Specifically, in the case of Syria, it would await 
the wider response of the international community to the attacks1037.  
Hollande did not completely dismiss France’s actions up until this point. When asked 
what the aims of a war would be, Hollande discussed how they were pursuing some 
form of sanction, rather than protracted conflict or invasion. Hollande justified 
France’s role in trying to resolve the conflict via other means. He discussed briefly 
how France took the initiative in organising a meeting of the “Friends of Syria” in 
2012, as well as recognising the Syrian National Council as representing the Syrian 
people. Hollande also spoke more generally of the material and humanitarian aid, as 
well as the more recent military aid it was providing some of the rebel factions. This 
appeals to a historic topos of threat, as well as the topos of history. Here, Hollande 
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argued that previous actions had been insufficient in resolving the crisis, and that 
beyond this, not taking stronger action had led to this escalation. 
France’s leadership would become more essential as allies began to have their doubts 
over the intervention. France was prepared to act on 31 August 2013. However, after 
the United Kingdom had ruled out intervention, and President Obama had decided to 
go to Congress to seek approval to intervene, France had to make a strong argument 
to justify an intervention’s necessity. Part of this was for the French government to 
call for its own debate to illustrate the legislature’s support for the international 
community to take action. 
In his statement opening the debate, Prime Minister Ayrault began by establishing the 
facts of the case: there had been a chemical weapons attack in Syria. Specifically, the 
United Nations had agreed that this is the case, but had not assigned blame. However, 
French intelligence had been able to ascertain with some certainty that it was Assad 
who had been the one to use these weapons, and that there needed to be a response1038.  
Here we see how French intelligence was leading the way, providing greater insight 
into the attacks than the international community had been able to provide. France’s 
intelligence work enabled Ayrault to argue with some confidence that it was Assad 
who had used chemical weapons against its population. In order to prevent future 
attacks of this nature, Ayrault maintained that the international community had to 
intervene, and that it was directly linked to both France, and the rest of the international 
community’s collective security.  
After talking about what broadly should be done, Ayrault specified what France’s aims 
were, and more specifically, were not. As mentioned above, the Responsibility to 
Protect norm required that there be specific aims to the action, and that the means be 
proportional. Ayrault was clear then that France did not intend to overthrow Assad, 
and that they wanted a political resolution. This, in many ways, could also be seen as 
an attempt to allay the fears of Obama and the American administration, who were 
seemingly getting cold feet regarding a military intervention.  
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Ayrault explicitly stated that France would not act alone, but rather would build a 
coalition of other nations to act. At the head of this task, one finds Hollande. Here we 
see a more active Hollande at the spearhead of a French attempt to build consensus. 
This is what Hollande had been attempting to do throughout the entire crisis according 
to Ayrault, casting the President as a diplomat. Of course, this also establishes that if 
an intervention was indeed going to take place, then it would be France’s and, by 
reflection, Hollande’s victory. Why would France do this? Ayrault said that it is 
because, “France defends the respect of international law”1039. Here we can interpret 
this statement to refer not only to the ban on the use of chemical weapons, but also the 
enforcement of the Responsibility to Protect.  
The same day as the debate, France also released its report into the chemical weapons 
attack. This report opened by stating that the majority of the intelligence within has 
been drawn from French sources, though it did integrate “some complementary 
elements received through cooperation with our closest partners” 1040.  
However, the focus of this report went beyond just establishing the facts of that attack. 
Whilst that was, of course, the primary purpose, the report also served to accentuate 
the primacy of French intelligence services in this matter, thereby justifying France’s 
apparent leadership in calling for intervention.  
After explaining the historic capabilities of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, 
the report explained the role French intelligence services and French researchers 
played in establishing what had happened. Here, we see that it was French competent 
services who obtained biomedical, environmental and material evidence from 
previous attacks in Saraqeb and Jobar, thereby confirming the use of sarin1041.  
However, French intelligence claimed to have information beyond just the causes of 
death for the victims and the basic chronology of events at the scene, but also could 
place the blame on the Syrian government and speak to their aims. They claimed that 
the way in which the chemical weapons were used was consistent with military tactics 
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utilised by the Syrian regime, and also consistent with intelligence from “several of 
our partners” concerning “specific preparations in the days just before August 21”1042. 
They also referred to “several sources mention[ing] the use of artillery rockets, 
different from those of the best known ammunition stock (missiles and bombs). Our 
technical analyses confirm that the rest of the rockets observed on that occasion… 
allow the use of chemical agents”1043. 
French intelligence also had evidence that the Assad regime “feared a wider attack 
from the opposition on Damascus at the moment”1044. Indeed, the targets seemed to 
have been picked explicitly to soften rebel positions. Additionally, the French were 
certain that the attack had been committed by the regime because the opposition 
groups did not have the expertise, nor the experience to use such weaponry.  
This report represented the reason for France’s argument to intervene militarily. It is 
important to note that this was the earliest report on the attacks which laid the blame 
in this much detail. France was keen to be the first to issue a report which would give 
credence to their approach in being at the forefront of this issue. 
On the following day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made the case for intervention 
before the National Assembly. As aforesaid, Fabius’ speech was by far the most 
bombastic in relation to style, as well as the most effective in bringing the various 
themes previously espoused by Hollande and Ayrault. After relaying the events in 
rather emotive terms, Fabius discusses the conclusions France had been able to draw 
following its own investigation. France, Fabius said, was of the opinion that the attacks 
in Ghouta were committed by the regime, that the regime had previously used 
chemical weapons in Saraqib and Jobar, and that the regime had conspired to hide 
evidence of its usage of these weapons with significantly concentrated bombardment 
of the city. Therefore, the regime “bears full responsibility”, and more importantly, 
“we [France] share this certainty with our American, British, German, and Turkish 
partners”1045. 
                                                          
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Ibid. 
1044 Ibid. 
1045 Syria/government declaration and debate at the National Assembly and Senate – Speech by 
Laurent Fabius Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Senate, 4 September 2013 
https://uk.ambafrance.org/Laurent-Fabius-explains-reasons [accessed 04/06/2019] 
310 
 
As it was France who first produced a detailed report purporting to evidence the Syrian 
regime’s crimes, it could argue that the international community was falling into line 
with its own conclusions. The strength of these findings went undisputed in the 
Foreign Minister’s statement, as he asked rhetorically “given these indisputable facts, 
what should we choose: action or resignation?”1046 
Fabius placed France at the centre of attempts to drive resolution to the Syrian conflict; 
that France were the first to recognise the Syrian National Coalition, they “offer it our 
[France’s] support to respond to the humanitarian emergency, to promote a political 
solution. And we tirelessly pursued our contacts with our European partners, our allies, 
the countries of the region, Russia and China, to seek solutions to this tragedy”1047. 
France here sought to somewhat implicate the international community in the recent 
events by suggesting that France had been the one seeking solutions which had been 
duly ignored by the community at large.  
However, Fabius argued that the chemical weapons attack represented a tipping point, 
which indicated that not just the fate of Syria but also international peace and security 
at large were at risk. This risk was twofold: firstly, the listener was invited to consider 
the effect inaction would have in emboldening regimes such as Iran or North Korea, 
and secondly Fabius argued that a diplomatic solution to the conflict would only be 
possible if the Assad regime could not use chemical weapons to win the war1048. 
Therefore, Fabius stated that Hollande had “chosen to take action: legitimate, 
collective and considered action”1049 which gave the international community a chance 
to resolve the situation. However, the international community here was to be 
interpreted more broadly than just the UN. Fabius acknowledged that “explicit 
authorization of the Security Council would be preferable. But, here again, let’s be 
realistic. Russia and China have blocked any response to the Syrian tragedy for two 
and a half years now… the seriousness of the threat associated with the use of chemical 
weapons compels us to take action”1050. 
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As previously discussed, France had been prepared to launch airstrikes against the 
Syrian regime on 31 August 2013 in conjunction with the US before Obama had 
decided to go to Congress. Therefore, France could be viewed as being perfectly 
content in acting without a UN Security Council declaration.  
Hindsight would prove that Obama was not keen on engaging in a military solution, 
despite his previous “red line” advising that there would be repercussions for 
continued usage of chemical weapons. However, Hollande did not read this as being 
the situation, and therefore still tried to convince the US to intervene with France. 
Fabius confirmed that “France will not act alone and will combine its efforts with 
those other partners, beginning with the United States of America, with which it has 
always aligned itself at critical moments when the cause was just”1051. This was to 
invoke America’s own image of being a supporter of international norms relating to 
weapons of mass destruction. France attempted to build a kindred spirit between the 
two nations, as well as create a wider expectation that it was only right that the US 
intervene. 
France justified its use of force here merely as a way of coercing Assad to the 
negotiating table, at which point the conflict could be brought to an end. France 
therefore conceptualised this as a means to a political solution, one which would be 
led by France, as “France will continue to take the lead in promoting a political 
solution”1052. 
In his conclusion, this idea was discussed again as we find reference to France’s 
burden in relation to the international order. In summing up the stakes, “doing nothing 
is not an option, in any case not for France. By not responding, we allow Bashar al-
Assad to continue his atrocities… Together with its partners, France will therefore 
assume its responsibilities”1053. France once again casted itself in the role of gendarme 
of the international community, taking on a role bestowed upon it by its own history 
and traditions.  
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These traditions, as they were, were once again referred to in the government statement 
and debate stated by Ayrault and Jean-Yves Le Drian during the debate. In concluding 
the need for intervention, and specifically one led by France, it was said that:  
France decides for itself, because it has military and intelligence capabilities that few 
countries have. It has special responsibilities in the international arena, and a certain view 
of how the international order is respected and of what is called effective multilateralism. 
It also has duties in terms of national security, which give it a responsibility to 
intervene1054. 
 
France was therefore conceptualised as a nation which had a responsibility to the 
international community, that because of its assets and capabilities (which they note 
few countries have to the extent of France), it was best placed to do so. Discussing 
matters, such as the protection of international norms, was seen as a natural part of the 
French political discourse because of France’s aforementioned “responsibility to 
intervene”1055, as would be its assumption of a leadership role within the international 
community. 
 
The idea that foreign policy and military intervention was necessary, and necessitated 
a strong show of French unity, was raised by Fabius during his statement, in saying 
that “the government is convinced that the gravity of this moment calls for 
transparency and republican dialogue”1056. Here, the republican dialogue refers to the 
debate in the National Assembly and Senate which was currently taking place, and the 
expectation would be for the Assembly Members and Senators to unify behind the 
government’s policy to emphasise France’s consensus, thereby highlighting its 
solidarity with the Syrian people in line with France’s own values. 
 
Fabius argued that by stepping in militarily and preventing further chemical weapon 
attacks, France could help the moderate Syrian opposition succeed over the more 
extreme alternatives. In doing so, they “will be true to our values, on which France’s 
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commitment throughout the world is based. Indeed, France has a special 
responsibility. It’s an opportunity and a duty which contribute to the greatness of our 
country. Let’s be united in order to be true to this vocation”1057. In seeking to support 
the democratic aspirations of the Syrian opposition, and support civilians against 
chemical weapons attacks by their own government, France could be seen as its truest 
and best self. During this debate, Fabius called upon others to make this a reality by 
supporting the government’s plan and producing a uniform response to the crisis.  
 
This section has looked at the assumptions contained within the rhetoric of Hollande’s 
executive in dealing with this crisis concerning what France’s role is, and what it 
should be. We see how France attempts to position itself as a world leader, as well as 
a problem solver, how it is inherent to the French Republican character to step in to 
protect international norms and laws, especially when dealing with chemical weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction. 
France imagines its reactions, and its solutions will be universally shared. Due to its 
history and culture, as well as its status as a large power, it is well suited to finding 
solutions to international crises, and implementing them. This appeal to history is of 
course a common technique, and can be powerful in mobilising domestic forces in 
supporting a policy.  
However, France’s attempts to represent itself as a natural leader in this field are not 
necessarily borne out in reality. The next section of this chapter addresses the actual 
reaction to France’s rhetoric, to show how the rest of the international community 
reacted, and how France, in turn, sought to rewrite the history of the previous three to 
four weeks to seem that it had achieved everything it had wanted, in a way that it had 
wanted. 
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7.4 The G20 Resolution: rewriting recent history 
 
On Monday 9 September 2013, a brief opportunity emerged following an apparent 
‘slip up’ from US Secretary of State John Kerry. When asked what it would take to 
head off airstrikes, Kerry responded by stating that Syria would need to relinquish all 
their chemical weapons1058. Within hours, Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister 
announced that he had called on the Syrian leadership to “not only agree on placing 
chemical weapons storage sites under international control, but also on its subsequent 
destruction and fully joining the treaty on prohibition of chemical weapons"1059. 
Up until this very moment, Hollande had remained optimistic regarding the potential 
of US-backed military intervention. During the G20 conference, Hollande continued 
to lobby for Obama’s support, with the two meeting on 6 September for 45 minutes. 
During this conversation, President Obama was supposedly non-committal, advising 
that the situation was “difficult” regarding obtaining Congressional support, and when 
asked when they could potentially organise a new date for the strikes, Obama replied 
that they should “let our chiefs of staff work together”1060. Furthermore, John Kerry, 
as late as 7 September, seemed supportive of interventions, arguing that “this is truly 
our Munich! It’s the moment to choose responsibility over appeasement”1061. 
However, two days later, Kerry made his seemingly off-the-cuff remark, completely 
changing the landscape. 
The following day, Laurent Fabius gave a press conference in response to the new 
agreement being formed1062. In the statement, Fabius reiterated France’s goals: to 
punish those responsible for the attack and to create a deterrence against them doing 
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it again. Fabius was cautiously optimistic, but also wary, as he “didn’t want it to be 
used as a diversionary tactic”1063.  
In the press conference, Fabius also warned that “we won’t let ourselves be dragged 
into delaying tactics, so we must have rapid results. France wants to act in good faith 
to ensure that a firm, specific and verifiable response to the Syrian chemical threat can 
finally be found, with the two objectives we’ve had from the outset – punishment and 
deterrence – and still the same method: well-considered firmness”1064. France had been 
losing control of the situation on the international stage since the British vote had ruled 
the United Kingdom out of airstrike action. However, France could not be seen to 
climb down themselves, and therefore had to maintain their ‘firm’ persona.  
France had placed itself in an awkward position regarding the opposition forces in 
Syria. As Hollande had been keen to remind listeners, France was the first nation to 
recognise the Syrian National Council, and as such, had formed close bonds. 
Therefore, France would not want to appear too allied to this new US and Russian 
proposal for fear of alienating Gulf countries or the Syrian opposition1065. Despite this, 
Hollande needed to acknowledge now that military intervention seemed highly 
unlikely at this time.1066. 
As it would appear that military strikes were off the table, France had to find a new 
way of retaining a semblance of influence on the process. In his statement, Fabius 
disclosed that he and Hollande wanted to “take the initiative” and propose a draft 
Resolution for the purposes of this agreement. This Resolution would:  
1) Condemn the Syrian regime for the 21 August attack in Ghouta 
2) Force the Assad regime to reveal details regarding its full chemical weapons 
programme 
3) Put in place mechanisms which ensure the inspection and monitoring of the 
agreement by the International Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
4) Detail the “serious consequences” for non-compliance with the resolution 
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5) Take the perpetrators of the 21 August attacks through the international 
criminal justice system.1067 
This would seem like an embarrassing climb down for the Hollande regime, after 
appearing to be so ‘gung-ho’ in relation to its declarations over the Syrian conflict. 
Publically, however, Hollande had a very different interpretation of how events had 
played out. On 15 September, François Hollande went on TF1 to have an interview 
with Claire Chazal.  
In this interview, President Hollande recontextualises France’s role in the crisis. 
Chazal opened the interview by discussing generally the events in Syria. Hollande 
acknowledged the nature of the disaster, referring to the 120,000 deaths, half of the 
population being displaced and 2 million refugees. However, even within this 
“procession of horror” the attacks of 21 August stand out; he referred to it as a 
“chemical massacre”1068. It was the unique nature of this attack which drove Hollande 
to feel the need to intervene. He described how such a breach of international law, as 
well as conventions which ban the usage of chemical weapons, demanded a response 
from Hollande and France on principle. The appropriate response, according to 
Hollande, would therefore be the threat of airstrikes by France, the US, and, for a time, 
the United Kingdom1069. 
Chazal challenged Hollande over his usage of the word “punishment”, asking whether 
he regretted using it. Hollande justified his calling for Assad’s punishment as he 
believed that it led to the international community’s reaction. Hollande argued that 
had he not taken such a strong position, Assad may have continued gassing his own 
population. Hollande maintained that the pressure France and the United States had 
exerted in calling for the regime’s punishment persuaded Russia of the need to step in 
and convince the Syrian regime to seek out compromise in this matter1070. 
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Chazal challenged the specific importance of France in obtaining this compromise, as 
the terms would be fully negotiated in a meeting in Geneva, and the French had not 
been invited. Hollande side-stepped the point somewhat, arguing that the accord being 
drafted in Geneva, whilst important, was but one of many steps required to get to 
where they need to go. Hollande accentuated the importance that France was not alone 
in this, that international issues required an international response. Whilst the 
Americans and Russians were, at the time, discussing measures in Geneva, he would 
be meeting with John Kerry, William Hague and Laurent Fabius (the Foreign 
Ministers for the US, UK and France respectively) in the coming days to discuss the 
UN Resolution to enshrine the agreement1071. Throughout this interview, Hollande 
stood his ground that only once a UN Resolution had been passed should the deal be 
seen as concrete. It is of course important to enshrine any agreement in international 
law to ensure later compliance. However, with the negotiations being conducted 
between Russia, the US, and Syria, little room was left for France to play a role here. 
Therefore, any potential means of retaining France’s rang in this situation was to help 
progress the Resolution. 
Chazal and Hollande then moved the discussion onto the practicalities of the 
Resolution itself. Specifically, Chazal brought up the difficulties in verifying that all 
of Syria’s chemical weapons sites had been disclosed, and that they had all been 
destroyed. Hollande spoke of a deadline of the first week of January 2014, which he 
acknowledged was ambitious. Hollande argued that in order to ensure that the 
Resolution is followed, it would need to include certain sanctions. When asked 
whether sanctions could involve airstrikes, Hollande advised that it would be for the 
Security Council to decide what would be appropriate1072.  
In questioning the trustworthiness of the Putin regime, Hollande was able to argue that 
Russia’s involvement was actually a good thing. He reminded the viewer of Russia 
and China’s obstinacy in the Security Council, vetoing previous attempts to regulate 
the conflict. However, now that they had intervened, they too could act as guarantors 
that the Syrian regime fulfils its obligations. This could therefore be seen as a win for 
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Hollande, as his argument that the threats of “punishment” were what had brought this 
issue to its current conclusion seemingly vindicated his position1073.  
The final few questions regarding the Syrian conflict concerned France’s general 
conduct during this conflict, as well as discussing the efficacy of military 
interventions. Chazal noted the issue of increased refugee flows generated by the 
conflict and whether airstrikes would be effective in resolving the crisis. Hollande 
acknowledged that the drawn-out conflicts in Iraq (in which the French had not sent 
troops) and Afghanistan had added doubt in the public’s minds as to the effectiveness 
of military intervention. Chazal also added the Arab Spring as an example where 
military intervention had its limits; a point which Hollande acknowledged in stating 
that the Libyan intervention had not played out in the way the French had expected. 
As a counterpoint, however, Hollande pointed out that he had withdrawn French 
troops from Afghanistan, and that he considered the Malian intervention to have been 
successful. He addressed arguments that perhaps France should not intervene in affairs 
which were not its own, but for Hollande, these were indeed “our affair! The security 
of France is my responsibility”1074. Now that France had gained some success through 
its threats, it was only right that it pushed on to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.  
Hollande was asked whether he was surprised by Prime Minister Cameron and 
President Obama going to their respective Parliaments; he dodged the question 
somewhat, by replying that it was purely an institutional question, but that the French 
President had sufficient power to make those types of decision himself. When asked 
on whether he had thought of going to Parliament, Hollande responded by stating that 
they were no longer in a position which would require him to do so, though the military 
option must always remain available.  
Specifically, the military option remains within the Presidency itself. When summing 
up the Syrian question, Hollande personalised the authority of the Presidency over the 
army. He thanked the army for giving effect to his decisions in Mali and Syria. Indeed, 
the role of the president is “to choose the option, in the name of all Frenchmen, which 
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appears to be the best”1075. It had been noted by Gaffney1076 that this was a direct 
reference to de Gaulle’s Memoires. In this case, the threat of military intervention was 
what Hollande considered to be the most effective solution, that the credibility of a 
military option was what makes diplomacy possible1077. Indeed, in this specific 
example, the threat itself had led to “a solution which France and the world had hoped 
for, which is a diplomatic solution”1078. 
Obviously, Hollande in this interview was keen to portray himself, and France, as 
being equally important as the other major powers at this time, and that the situation 
had played out as he had already planned. However, the facts of the situation did not 
bear this out. Effectively, Hollande’s argument was that the talk of “punishment” was 
only ever intended to coerce Syria to the negotiating table. Yet, it was clear from 
evidence which had emerged in the interim that France was preparing to launch its 
attacks on Syria on 31 August 20131079.  
Also, Hollande’s inability to read the situation in relation to Obama’s reticence to 
intervene must also be noted. Hollande had convinced himself that airstrikes were still 
a likely outcome. However, many in Paris were unsure as to how to interpret John 
Kerry’s seemingly impromptu declaration; a Defence Minister advisor felt that the US 
administration had duped the French, but others in the Elysée thought that it had indeed 
been improvised1080. However, it would seem that the plan had actually stemmed from 
conversations between Israeli and Russian officials; the Israelis proposed the plan to 
Russian officials as a means of avoiding military intervention, and after the Russians 
had indicated their interest, it was brought to the Americans1081.  
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Furthermore, despite the arguments otherwise by Hollande, had France still been 
playing a key role in the resolution of the situation, then Hollande or senior figures 
from the administration would have been present in the Geneva talks. Instead, France 
would have to settle with proposing the Resolution to the Security Council. Therefore, 
the final work being analysed for this thesis relates to excerpts from Laurent Fabius’ 
speech in New York on 27 September 20131082.  
The speech followed the successful passage of Resolution 2118 (2013)1083. Fabius 
came across as semi-triumphant at the top, proclaiming that “this evening, amid the 
Syrian tragedy, the Security Council has at last lived up to its name… The Resolution 
we’ve just adopted meets the three requirements set by the French President and me 
at the beginning of this week”1084. These being: that the security council recognised 
chemical weapons as a threat to international peace and security, and as such, the 
Security Council would be acting as guarantor for the chemical disarmament; the 
resolution held that whomever is responsible for such crimes would go to court; and 
finally, measures under Chapter VI of the UN Charter would be used against the Assad 
regime if they failed to meet their new obligations1085. 
Fabius, however, tempered this optimism with a warning: “This resolution is not a 
point of arrival”1086. This warning echoed Hollande’s statement in the previous 
interview. Doubts existed as to the trustworthiness of the Syrian regime, but according 
to the Resolution, measures also existed to ensure that compliance was kept. It was for 
the Security Council to decide whether Syria’s cooperation had been “unconditional” 
and “transparent”1087. However, Fabius was keen to note that “France, like all of us, 
will be careful to ensure this”1088. 
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The second half of Fabius’ statement looked to the future of the international 
community’s engagement with the Syrian conflict. He acknowledged that whilst the 
current Resolution could resolve the chemical weapons issue, prolonged conflict 
increased the humanitarian crisis inflicted upon everyday civilians. Much of the 
discourse espoused by both Fabius and Hollande pointed to the lack of coordination 
and willingness to deal with the conflict within the international community, picking 
out Russia and China as being particularly guilty of this fact. Therefore, Fabius 
announced that “France wants to take advantage of this unity finally obtained at the 
Council in order, with you, to move the political process forward, which alone will 
enable the fighting to be stopped and peace to be restored”1089. The vehicle for this 
political progress would be the Geneva II meetings, which would hopefully bring 
together representatives of the Syrian National Coalition and the Assad administration. 
Fabius concluded his statement with one, final emotive appeal. Once again 
recognising the importance of the Resolution passed, Fabius also stated that the 
Security Council must go further, “shoulder[ing] its responsibilities in full”1090. He 
invited all listeners to “think only of the Syrian people and their agony, which must be 
stopped as quickly as possible. This will be the position of France, which will remain 
firm and consistent, providing its total support to the search of peace”1091. 
But how are we to appraise the efforts of France during this period? Did it achieve its 
aims? As of June 2019, the Syrian conflict continues to rage on. It is estimated that 
570,000 people have died in Syrian territory in the last eight years1092. Peace talks have 
been insufficient in stopping the cataclysmic loss of life.  
Furthermore, despite apparently fulfilling their obligations, chemical weapons were 
not completely removed from the warzone. Indeed, in direct contradiction of the 
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Chemical Weapons Convention signed by Syria in 2013, chlorine had been 
weaponised for an attack in Douma in April 20181093.  
However, problems with the agreement could be seen back when it was signed. In his 
press conference on 10 September, Laurent Fabius made a series of five proposals 
which France would be asking to be included in the Resolution1094. However, they 
would not all make their way into the implemented Resolution. Specifically, the 
measure holding the Syrian regime to account for the 21 August chemical weapons 
attack is nowhere to be seen, instead being replaced with a more general condemnation 
of the usage of chemical weapons in the country1095.  
Indeed, Fabius had almost put the process in jeopardy holding onto France’s desire to 
punish Syria by demanding that there be a reference to war crimes in the draft of the 
agreement. Vladimir Putin responded by threatening to cease the process if Syria were 
threatened like that again. A new draft was swiftly drawn up, and Fabius took it to 
Moscow personally to have it agreed. It included an agreement that Syria sign up, from 
14 October 2013, to the Chemical Weapons Convention1096. 
There were also other potentially unintended consequences of the drafting of the 
Resolution. Some interpreted the requirement for the Assad government to ensure 
compliance for the next year as implicitly having to keep Assad in power, or at the 
very least not actively seek to remove him1097. Again, Hollande had stated that whilst 
he was in favour of removing Assad, France would continue to pursue a political 
settlement to remove Assad. This would effectively require the opposition forces to 
push him into a position to seek peace. France openly admitted to providing support 
to the Free Syrian Army, and may have been looking to use the massive threat to 
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civilians as an excuse to render assistance, as it had done in Libya. However, the 
Resolution effectively legitimises the rest of the Assad regime’s conduct in the war.  
Therefore, how successful could one consider Hollande to be during this crisis? On 
one hand, France’s intervention did result in the red line regarding chemical weapons 
being upheld, even if Hollande was not able to play the role he had intended. This 
however requires an interpretation of events based solely on Hollande’s representation 
that his aim was indeed to peacefully enforce the international community’s norms 
relating to chemical weapons. It is submitted that on the basis of the facts, this does 
not seem likely. 
Indeed, this must be interpreted as a grand failure on the part of Hollande. Clinging so 
long to notions of ‘punishment’ and ‘firmness’, and Hollande’s inability to read the 
inflexibility of Russia’s position, and the reticence of the US to engage in an 
intervention, resulted in France playing a minimal role in the resolution of the crisis.  
Hollande’s argument that the threats were only to drive Syria towards negotiations and 
compliance with international law fails on the fact that Hollande had planned to launch 
airstrikes 31 August without UN Security Council approval1098. Hollande’s subsequent 
conduct, it is argued, was to attempt to get the US to support the use of airstrikes.  
Another failure of Hollande’s was in relation to his argumentation. Unlike Sarkozy, 
Hollande did not articulate the case for R2P particularly strongly. It is possible that 
Hollande did indeed realise that Russia would never support a Resolution through the 
Security Council, and therefore focused solely on convincing the US of military 
intervention’s value (the UK had of course already been ruled out following the 
Commons Vote in Parliament). However, even accounting for this, the fact that 
Hollande’s arguments were tailored to a narrow reasoning, characterised mostly by 
France’s relationship to the situation rather than the Syrian populace’s needs, means 
that even if this had been his intention, it would have been unlikely that it would have 
ever been successful. 
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Conclusion 
As was mentioned in the introduction, this thesis had as its aim: to discover how 
France’s rhetorical framing justifying of military intervention in Libya and Syria 
affected the build-up and outcomes of French and International actions in these two 
examples. At its core, this research wanted to establish how, if at all, the discourse 
generated by significant figures can dictate the success or failure of international 
intervention. 
The examples of Libya and Syria were chosen in part because they provided suitably 
similar circumstances to establish whether patterns would emerge in the discursive 
practice of French administrations. Both situations involved conflicts stemming from 
and arguments referencing the protests of the Arab Spring. Both also involved 
proposed airstrikes to protect civilian populations from the violent acts of their 
respective states. 
Differences also exist between these two examples. Firstly, the two examples take 
place two years apart, with different Presidents from different political parties leading 
the charge. This, however, is not considered a limitation for the purposes of this 
research, as it allows a comparative analysis of foreign policy and international 
intervention discourse generation across two different examples in a more controlled 
manner. 
However, the situations themselves also contained subtle and not so subtle differences. 
As is explained in Part II, Libya is a North African country with strong trading links 
to Italy and France, but relatively few interests with other nations1099. Therefore, were 
France to act against Libya, they were unlikely to be too disruptive to any other 
Security Council member, and to those who may have been slightly disrupted, such as 
the US, a quick resolution to the fighting would probably be worth the risk. Syria, on 
the other hand, is different. Russia has a key strategic interest in Syria with its lease on 
a naval base in Tartus, giving Russia readily available access to the Mediterranean Sea 
it would not otherwise have. It is therefore logical to assume that Russia has a good 
working relationship with the current leader President Assad, and would therefore be 
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reluctant to allow activities which could lead to regime change, jeopardising their 
access to an important resource. 
However, this again does not to prove to be too much of a challenge. This thesis, in 
concluding as to the relative efficacy of Sarkozy and Hollande’s rhetoric regarding 
military intervention, has taken into account the relative difficulties, and judges each 
situation on its own merits. 
A direct comparison of result between the two examples would be of limited value due 
to the differences in geo-political circumstances. Instead, a comparison is drawn on 
the similarities and differences in the arguments proposed by Sarkozy and Hollande, 
as well as their relative success. The next point to discuss is how this thesis obtained 
and evaluated the arguments of these respective administrations. 
The methodology utilised was Wodak’s Discourse-Historical Approach from the 
Critical Discourse Analysis School. The key benefit of using this methodology is the 
ability to analyse argumentation schemes via the use of topoi. The topoi, to reiterate 
Reisigl and Wodak, “can be described as parts of argumentation that belong to 
obligator, either explicit of inferable, premises”1100. When the listener hears or reads a 
certain topoi, other elements of the argument are also inferred. The topoi used for any 
given piece of research are often a combination of already established versions, and 
ones explicitly designed based on the specific historical or cultural context. 
Therefore, this thesis is, at its heart, an examination of the ways in which prospective 
policies and activities are communicated to ensure the greatest chance of obtaining the 
desired result, which in this case is either the peaceful return to international human 
rights norms, or legitimately mandated military intervention. 
This thesis chose, as the basis of its topoi, various aspects of French Republican 
identity, including Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité, and the concept of grandeur. 
Furthermore, the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine was also included because 
arguments for the interventions in both Libya and Syria were formulated along these 
lines. 
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Relating to the specific raw data, this thesis examines eleven speeches/documents in 
relation to the Libyan crisis, and ten speeches/documents regarding the Syrian crisis. 
As much as possible, the documents were chosen to cover different periods throughout 
their respective crises to see how arguments or approaches may have changed in 
relation to changing circumstances. 
Next is a brief summary of the findings of my thesis. Regarding the situation in Libya 
first, the protests following the self-immolation of Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi 
in Tunisia seemingly caught the Sarkozy administration by surprise, to the extent that 
a number of gaffes were made regarding the support of the Tunisian leader Ben Ali, 
who shortly thereafter fled the country. Therefore, the Libyan situation represented an 
opportunity for Sarkozy to re-write its history as it were in relation to France’s 
commitment to human rights and humanitarianism, and specifically its support of the 
democratic movements which came to be known as the ‘Arab Spring’. 
And indeed, this is exactly how it was perceived at the time. Sarkozy was able to 
successfully make the argument that an international response was required. 
Specifically, France, and its allies, were able to successfully convince the Security 
Council to pass a Resolution which would allow France, the UK and the US (later to 
be replaced by NATO) to impose a no-fly zone and prevent Gaddafi’s air force free 
reign to attack civilians in Benghazi and other rebel-held cities. Indeed, shortly 
following the intervention Sarkozy and Cameron were considered heroes in Libya, 
after successfully orchestrating an intervention which likely saved thousands of 
civilians’ lives. 
There are a number of reasons why France was successful in helping organise, pass 
and implement Resolution 1973. There was, of course, some desire within the 
international community to prevent the death of civilians in this situation, especially 
as the fatalities in the conflict began to increase. As aforementioned, fewer countries 
willing or able to block the passage of this resolution were involved in the diplomacy. 
However, this thesis also argues that Sarkozy was able to successfully marry together 
certain elements of French Republicanism with the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
in such a way as to produce a compelling and coherent argument. 
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Specifically, Sarkozy was able to adequately argue that the imposition of a no-fly zone 
over Libya would meet the four criteria for R2P (right intention; reasonable chance of 
success; proportional; and is last resort), whilst also describing the plight of the Libyan 
population and events in terms compatible with French Republicanism, and 
specifically utilising the principles of Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. Sarkozy was able 
to make a positive case for intervention regarding the potential hopes and aspirations 
of a civilian population reaching out towards democracy. He was able to argue for the 
kinship of these individuals, and build sympathy for their plight. 
Sarkozy was able to do this despite his and France’s well known relations with the 
Colonel and the country, and France’s support of the former Tunisian leader Ben Ali. 
As explained in Chapter 4, as well as Chapter 1.4, Sarkozy’s strength was not in 
Foreign Policy, which practitioners at the time felt was too improvised and chaotic. 
This thesis finds nothing to dispute that. And yet, Sarkozy was able to demonstrate 
France’s grandeur and increase its rang, at least for a time.  
Despite the international prestige however, it was not sufficient to save Sarkozy in the 
following Presidential election. Following that campaign, it would be François 
Hollande who would assume the Presidency, and it would be he who would face a 
similar trial. 
Part III of this thesis therefore analysed the approach taken by Hollande to argue for 
the necessity of military intervention in Syria following a chemical weapons attack in 
Ghouta on 21 August 2013. 
Early on, President Hollande declared that “France stands ready to punish those who 
took the appalling decision to gas innocent people”1101. How this punishment would 
come about was the next question. The United States had proposed the use of airstrikes 
as a deterrent against those who would use chemical weapons. This idea was supported 
by both France and the United Kingdom. Whilst France would not need permission 
from its Parliament to launch such a strike, the United Kingdom would. And so, Prime 
Minister Cameron set up a debate in Parliament on 29 August 2011 on the issue of 
whether the United Kingdom would intervene if the UN were to find that the Syrian 
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government was responsible. In a surprising turn of events, the government’s measure 
was rejected, by a majority of 285-2721102. However, responding to a question from 
Le Monde, President Hollande said that the British Parliament’s vote would not affect 
his decision as to whether to punish or not1103.  
America took a slightly different approach to the circumstances; after seemingly being 
willing to go forth with airstrikes without a vote on the morning of 31 August, Obama 
changed his mind shortly after seeing the results from the British Parliament vote. This 
had caught the French off guard, as they had been preparing their planes for a strike at 
the time1104. It would later become apparent that Obama had been seeking to bide time 
trying to come up with a different solution, as the congressional vote would not occur 
until 9 September1105.  
However, during this period Hollande was seemingly under the belief that the 
argument for military intervention could still be won, and that he could convince 
Obama to push ahead with the airstrikes with France. It is submitted that this was 
Hollande’s only option due to the threat of the Russian veto in the UN Security 
Council. 
The arguments mobilised by Hollande in support of air strikes struck a slightly 
different tone. Rather than playing towards the humanitarian tragedy of the events 
(although this argument did feature in his rhetoric, it was not as prominent as it was 
under Sarkozy), Hollande focused more on the breach of international norms in 
utilising chemical weapons. This line of attack placed more emphasis on the need to 
prevent Assad using chemical weapons again, and that only a show of force would 
                                                          
1102, Syria Crisis, Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action, BBC, 30 August 2013 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783 [accessed 30/09/2017] 
1103 Reuters/JPost Staff ‘France says it could take military action in Syria without Britain’, The 
Jerusalem Post, 30 August 2013 http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/France-says-it-could-take-
military-action-in-Syria-without-Britain-324778 [accessed 30/09/2017] 
1104 Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, ‘Beyond the Red Line: The United States, France, and 
Chemical Weapons in the Syrian War, 2013-2018’, Fondation pour la Recherhe Stratégique April 
2018 No 06/2018 https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/publications/recherches-et-
documents/2018/201806.pdf pp.16-17 
1105 Mark Lander and Jonathan Weisman, ‘ Obama delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russia Plan’, The 
New York Times, 10 September 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-
chemical-arsenal.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=0 [accessed 30/09/2017] 
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suffice to dissuade him. Therefore, his regime needed to be punished (surgical 
airstrikes were the most popular and feasible option). 
However, these arguments were to have no sway on President Obama. During the G20 
Summit during which time another solution ‘emerged’. In what is now known to have 
been a carefully staged ruse, John Kerry threw out the idea that airstrikes could be 
prevented if the Syrians were to willingly hand over all of their chemical weapons1106. 
A short few hours later, the Russians called on the Syrians to hand over their 
weapons1107.  
Between 12 and 14 September, the framework for a US/Russian deal surrounding the 
renunciation of Syria’s Chemical Weapons stock continued1108. Afterwards, a 
timetable had been agreed listing the tasks which Syria had to complete.  
President Hollande himself spoke very little of the subject during these negotiations, 
presumably as France had been side-lined due to their inability to see the terrain 
change before them. Hollande would finally reappear to do an interview with TF1 
once a deal had been arranged1109. France was given the role of proposing the Security 
Council Resolution, though this also almost ended in disaster when Fabius demanded 
that there be reference to war crimes within the Resolution. Russia strongly protested, 
and Fabius was forced to personally go to Moscow to approve the wording.1110. 
François Hollande later claimed that the purpose of the threat of military intervention 
was only a tool to force an agreement such as the one which was eventually reached. 
However, the facts would suggest that this was not the case, and instead the entire 
management of the situation had been a complete failure. 
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1107 Ibid. 
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As mentioned earlier, the likelihood of Hollande being able to get punitive airstrikes 
authorised by the UN Security Council was almost non-existent. Furthermore, the 
likelihood of Obama following through with unilateral airstrikes at the time also 
seemed quite slim. However, the reason that Hollande’s handling of the situation is 
argued to be a failure is less to do with the failure to obtain his objective, but rather 
the manner in which France lost any leadership role within the process. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1.1, grandeur is a Gaullist idea. Whilst de Gaulle did not 
provide a specific definition of the term, it is generally understood to describe the idea 
of France being a leader, a nation which is respected, as it ought to be. This concept is 
linked to France’s rang, her position in the international order. This is relevant because 
Hollande’s actions in the short term damaged France’s prestige, thereby detrimentally 
affecting France’s position in the global order. After seeking to lead the way in dealing 
with a crime against humanity, France had been excluded from the conversations 
regarding the solution of this problem.  
This thesis finds the articulation of Hollande’s policy as being part of the problem. It 
is true that Hollande’s position in of itself was problematic, especially when 
considering the relative positions of Russia, the US, and the UK. However, Hollande 
articulating his arguments predominately in terms of punishment meant other 
arguments based on different criteria seemed insincere. For example, Hollande used 
some arguments around the topoi of R2P. However, with Hollande advocating 
punitive measures, the concept of France having the “right intention” with its airstrikes 
seemed insincere.  
Therefore, what conclusions can be drawn more generally from these two examples? 
A key difference between the two leaders again relates to the articulation of their ideas 
and its interaction with grandeur. Sarkozy, in advocating for intervention, sought to 
place the victims, real or potential, at the centre of his argument. He represented them 
as wanting the same things as the French, or for that matter any democrat: the 
argument that France, the UK, the US, and the international community at large had a 
duty to help cultivate these aspirations. In successfully passing the Resolution in the 
Security Council after becoming the ‘face’ of the issue meant that France’s grandeur 
was implicitly recognised. 
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This is drawn in sharp contrast with Hollande, whose arguments advocating for 
punishment cast France in the role of an enforcer, a gendarme of the world. The ego-
centricity of the way these arguments were advocated made it seem that the airstrikes 
would be all about France and its grandeur. In making the crisis about France’s 
response, it not only lessened the likelihood of any intervention gaining support from 
other parties, it also meant that if airstrikes failed to go ahead then France’s rang would 
also be damaged. 
The aim of this thesis was to examine how rhetorical framing by France affected the 
outcomes in the 2011 Libyan and 2013 Syrian crises. In using the Discourse-Historical 
Approach, this thesis provides a unique way of analysing discursive practices in 
relation to the history and culture from which the discourse comes. This thesis shows 
that such a practice can reveal the inherent meanings found within language. 
This thesis evidently adds significant value to the literature surrounding the 
interventions in Libya and Syria by providing a lens through which France’s actions 
within this period can easily be understood. This thesis also provides one of the few 
comparative studies between the two similar situations. It also provides value relating 
to the understanding of the usage of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in the cases 
of Libya and Syria. 
This thesis also opens up new avenues relating to a more general understanding of the 
effectiveness and implementation of Responsibility to Protect. As a doctrine, it 
contains many caveats and rules as to when it can be used. The Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine requires Security Council approval before any proposal can be 
implemented. Therefore, diplomacy and negotiations will often be necessary if a state 
believes that its criteria has been met. One of the contributions this thesis makes to the 
literature, as well as a providing a potential future avenue for research, is that it 
provides a framework through which these kinds of debates can be understood. The 
strength of this methodology is the flexibility it allows to develop topoi which allow 
for a greater understanding of a particular event or discourse.  
More generally, this thesis gives examples of the kinds of arguments which can be 
most effective in justifying the doctrine’s applicability, as well as ones which are less 
effective.  
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One of the limitations of this thesis regards the extent to which certain factors can be 
proven to be significant over others. This thesis took at its core the role France played 
in the events leading up to interventions in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2013. Of course, 
France was not the only actor involved, and based on the scope of this thesis it is 
difficult to establish the total extent to which France drove events as opposed to the 
Unites States or the United Kingdom.  
It is therefore viable to take this research further in this specific field and examine 
either the Libyan or Syrian intervention taking into account the multiple parties and 
their unique historical contexts. This also can provide a fuller understanding of the 
ways in which arguments from different cultural contexts interact with one another.  
However, within the context of this thesis, it has been shown that the arguments made 
by President Sarkozy helped justify the necessity for a no-fly zone over Libya, and 
that the arguments made by President Hollande were insufficient in justifying the use 
of punitive airstrikes in Syria. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that the ways in 
which arguments are made do matter. 
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Appendix 1: Speeches concerning the intervention in Libya, 
made by President Sarkozy and Alain Juppé, Francois 
Fillon and Gérard Longuet 
1. Situation in Libya – Communiqué issued by the Presidency of the Republic. Paris, 
21 February 2011 
https://uk.ambafrance.org/President-Sarkozy-calls-for,18667  
President Sarkozy condemns the unacceptable use of force against Libyans, 
who are simply exercising their fundamental right to freedom of assembly and 
expression. 
He extends his condolences to the bereaved and expresses his sympathy to the 
injured. 
President Sarkozy calls for an immediate halt to the violence and for a political 
solution in order to respond to the Libyan people’s aspiration to democracy and 
freedom./. 
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2. Statement issued by President Sarkozy at the Council of Ministers meeting.  
Paris, February 23, 2011  
https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article2176      
The continuing brutal and bloody crackdown against Libyan civilians is 
horrifying. France and the French people are following these events with shock 
and compassion. Such use of force against one’s own people is contemptible. 
The UN Security Council and Secretary-General, the League of Arab States, 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference and almost all States in the world 
have denounced these unacceptable actions. 
France again calls for an immediate end to the violence in Libya and urges the 
leaders of that country to immediately engage in political dialogue to put an 
end to the ongoing tragedy. 
The international community cannot stand by in the face of these massive 
human rights violations. 
I am asking the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to propose to our 
European Union partners that we swiftly adopt concrete sanctions to ensure that 
all those involved in the ongoing violence are aware they must accept the 
consequences of their actions. These measures relate, among other things, to 
the possibility of bringing them to justice, prohibiting access to EU territory 
and monitoring financial transactions. 
In addition, I would like us to consider suspending economic, commercial and 
financial relations with Libya until further notice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
337 
 
3. Security Council - Libya - Statement by Mr. Gérard Araud, Permanent 
Representative of France to the United Nations 26 February 2011  
https://onu.delegfrance.org/26-February-2011-Security-Council  
Permanent Representative of Libya made to this Council a moving appeal for 
assistance. France welcomes the fact that the Council has today unanimously 
and forcefully responded to that appeal.  
In the face of the continued brutal and bloody repression and the threatening 
statements made by the Libyan leadership, the Security Council has reiterated 
its demand for an immediate stop to the use of force against the civilian 
population. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights said, and as recalled 
in resolution 1970 (2011), crimes against humanity may be being committed in 
Libya. That is why we have decided to refer the matter to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court so that he can initiate an investigation and so that 
the Court might judge thee principals responsible for crimes. Today, faced with 
the atrocities we have seen, impunity is no longer an option. The International 
Criminal Court in this matter once again finds justification for its existence.  
We have also decided to impose an embargo on arms — the arms that President 
Al-Qadhafi has chosen to turn against his own people. We have, finally, 
decided to sanction the individuals who are at the head of a regime that has 
chosen to commit atrocities.  
The text, unanimously adopted today, recalls the responsibility of each State to 
protect its own population and of the international community to intervene 
when States fail in their duty. We hope that the responsible parties of the 
Libyan regime will hear the message of the international community and put an 
end to the unacceptable violence committed against their own people, who 
have the right to democracy, freedom and justice.  
A wind of liberty has arisen south of the Mediterranean. The Security Council 
had to meet this date with history on the side of the Libyan people. That is the 
historic significance of the vote this evening — a vote that we hope will open, 
beyond Libya, a new era for the international community as a whole. 
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4. Interview given by Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and European 
Affairs, to “TF1” (excerpts) 1 March 2011 
https://uk.ambafrance.org/Alain-Juppe-discusses-Libya-crisis  
FRANCE/LIBYA/REFUGEES 
Q. – As we’ve seen in our special correspondents’ reports, the situation is very 
critical on the Tunisian border, overwhelmed by the floods of foreign refugees. 
What does France intend doing to help Tunisia? 
THE MINISTER – We’ve already acted to avert a humanitarian catastrophe – 
in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. 
Q. – You’re talking about the two planes sent to Cairo? 
THE MINISTER – On the decision of the Prime Minister, we sent two planes, 
which are due to deliver several tonnes of medical equipment, and medical staff 
to help the Cyrenaica region. Moreover, we’re in the process of looking at how 
the French Navy could also come to the aid of the Egyptians fleeing Libya and 
those turning up at the Tunisian border. Here, we have the possibility of 
helping them return to their country of origin, i.e. Egypt. 
MILITARY OPTIONS 
As regards the military intervention being talked about at the moment, it’s 
worth thinking long and hard about this, quite simply because I don’t know 
how the Arabs on the street, how Arab people throughout the Mediterranean 
would react if NATO forces were seen landing on southern Mediterranean soil. 
Let’s think carefully about it; I believe it could be extremely counter-
productive. And when you’ve embarked on a military operation, you’ve then 
got to plan for its consequences. 
Before getting to that stage, we’re trying to increase pressure to bring down 
Gaddafi, and he’s going to be brought down. He’ll be brought down because 
he’s already very isolated in Tripoli. He’s lost control of the greater part of 
Libyan territory. 
The threat in particular – which was for the first time held up by the United 
Nations Security Council – to bring him before the International Criminal 
Court may, I believe, get people thinking. 
Q. – That’s France’s position. As is clearly understood, the United States has 
another option: the US military is deploying its forces all around Libya. Does 
France agree and will she do the same? 
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THE MINISTER – I don’t believe we can say that. The Americans are moving 
their ships; they haven’t decided to intervene militarily. And for us, there’s a 
rule… 
Q. – The White House is preparing for an emergency situation. 
THE MINISTER – Yes, but that doesn’t mean it’s decided to intervene 
militarily. In any case, there’s a very strict rule for us: it’s the United Nations 
Security Council that has the legitimacy to decide about peace or war, because 
intervening means waging war. 
NO-FLY ZONE 
Q. – Does that mean France would veto an armed intervention? 
THE MINISTER – I didn’t say that. We must discuss it and see, also, how the 
situation is going to develop. We’re being sent reports that aren’t verified. We 
were told, for example, that planes sent by Gaddafi had bombed the crowd. 
Apparently that’s not exactly true. 
So we must see how the situation develops. Depending on that, we’ll adapt. No 
option is definitively ruled out, particularly the idea of imposing a no-fly zone. 
Q. – Is France in favour of that option? 
THE MINISTER – We’re in favour of it being studied, of course. 
Q. – But it requires pre-emptive action, as stressed by the Americans, who 
point out that the anti-aircraft defences would have to be destroyed. 
THE MINISTER – Again, in the framework of a United Nations Security 
Council resolution. 
UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN’S ROLE 
Q. – You’ve insisted a great deal on the relaunch of the Union for the 
Mediterranean. In what way could this moribund organization help resolve the 
situation? 
THE MINISTER – It’s a visionary idea. It’s clear that today a large part of our 
destiny is going to be played out on either side of the Mediterranean. 
Obviously, President Sarkozy’s original initiative must be completely 
reviewed, because a whole series of revolutions are currently taking place, 
revolutions that nobody anticipated: no foreign ministry, no government, no 
international relations expert… So it’s tremendously promising and I, for my 
part, hope with all my heart that the Arab peoples succeed in this transition 
towards democracy. 
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So we must restructure the Union for the Mediterranean while remaining open 
to these governments and peoples. I can tell you that my first trip outside the 
European Union and France, of course, will be to Egypt next weekend. I’ll go 
there to show clearly that France is very mindful of what’s happening over 
there. (…). 
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5. Statements by Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and European 
Affairs, at his joint press conference with William Hague, First Secretary of State, 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 3 March 2011 
https://uk.ambafrance.org/Alain-Juppe-s-statements-in-Paris  
 
THE MINISTER – Ladies and gentlemen, I’m delighted to welcome William 
Hague, my British counterpart, to Paris today. 
Since my appointment we’ve spoken on the telephone, and I’d like to thank 
William Hague for making the trip to Paris. He knew I had a very busy 
schedule in the coming days, because I’m going to travel to Egypt. I thank him 
again very warmly for coming to me. 
As you know, this is a very positive period for the bilateral relationship 
between the United Kingdom and France, with the historic turning-point of our 
31st summit last November and, in particular, the signature of the UK-France 
Defence Treaty, which I worked on a bit when I was at a nearby ministry only a 
few days ago. 
LIBYA/REFUGEES/SANCTIONS/NO-FLY ZONE 
Today we devoted the bulk of our meeting to the situation in Libya and, more 
generally, the south of the Mediterranean, because our heads of State and 
government, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron, asked us to 
prepare together the European Council of 11 March, which will be devoted to 
these issues. 
We reached agreement quickly and with no difficulty, because we utterly 
condemn the attitude of Colonel Gaddafi, who has discredited himself by using 
violence against his people. 
So we’re very clearly demanding that he go. 
We then exchanged views on the humanitarian aid that should be provided to 
all those suffering from the current situation in Libya, particularly the refugees 
who are hurrying to the Tunisian border or hoping to return to Egypt. We also 
envisaged stepping up the pressure that must be exerted on the Gaddafi regime 
to get him to step down – pressure of an economic and financial nature, of 
course. We also agree about thinking and even acting to plan a no-fly zone over 
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Libya, if the threat Gaddafi is making to use force against the Libyan people 
materializes in the coming days. 
EU/MEDITERRANEAN 
In the framework of preparations for the forthcoming summit, we also 
emphasized the necessity of more effectively coordinating the immigration 
policies of the countries north of the Mediterranean, with the aim, of course, of 
rebalancing economic development between the north and south of our shared 
sea, to enable all those in the south to enjoy the freedom, employment, work 
and wellbeing they expect in their countries. 
Finally, we also discussed the idea of relaunching the policy of cooperation 
between the north and the south – in other words, restructuring the Union for 
the Mediterranean, which we realize is a more necessary idea than ever, by 
integrating it into the European Union’s overall Neighbourhood Policy. 
That’s what I wanted to say – very quickly and simply – while thanking 
William again for his presence here in Paris. 
NATO/NO-FLY ZONE 
Q. – This question is for both ministers. Do you agree with the warning by the 
American Secretary of Defence that there’s been too much loose talk about 
possible military measures in Libya? Given that establishing a no-fly zone 
would have to begin with air raids on Libya, do you really think this is 
reasonable, after what happened in Iraq? 
THE MINISTER – The Gaddafi regime’s threat to bomb the civilian 
population in the cities is unacceptable, and its implementation would be 
criminal. So we have to prevent such a development. That’s why France has 
approved NATO’s planning project for a no-fly zone in Libya. We’re open to 
this idea; we’re working with our partners on this point. Regarding the 
conditions for establishing this no-fly zone, we’ll take the decision when the 
situation is clearer than it is at present. We don’t think it can solely be a matter 
of intervention by a few Western countries. We absolutely need the 
governments of the region and other participants to take part in such an 
operation. So William and I have the same viewpoint on this subject, as you 
can see, whether it be during NATO meetings in Brussels or in our discussion 
today. 
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VENEZUELA/MEDIATION OFFER 
Q. – President Chavez has proposed his good offices to try to defuse the crisis. 
Do you see any chance of success in this proposal? What’s your reaction to it? 
THE MINISTER – For the moment, I can see nothing [in it]. Perhaps William 
can see more… To expand on my answer, I’d say that a head of State who 
orders crowds to be fired on and threatens to go and bomb civilian populations 
has, for us, lost all legitimacy to exercise power, and what we demand is that he 
go. 
I remind you that, a few years ago, the United Nations adopted a new concept, 
namely the responsibility to protect: governments must protect populations 
against war crimes, and when they don’t do it the international community has 
grounds to take their place. That’s where we are today, so obviously no 
mediation aimed at enabling Colonel Gaddafi to remain in power is welcome. 
UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Q. – You’ve just been talking about relaunching the Union for the 
Mediterranean process. We know that up to now, the major obstacle has been 
the Palestinian problem. Would France and Britain be ready today and very 
soon to recognize the Palestinian State unilaterally, as the Palestinians are 
asking, before September? Second question, if you will allow me: very soon 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is going to issue indictments. The Lebanese 
majority is refusing to cooperate with the tribunal. How are you going to deal 
with this? My question goes to France, who sponsored the resolution, and also 
to Britain. 
THE MINISTER – On the Union for the Mediterranean, as I’ve said several 
times over the past few days, we mustn’t abandon this initiative just because 
it’s been at a standstill over the past two years, since it was launched in 2008. 
We know the reason for this standstill: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
revolution, the revolutions taking place today to the south of our shared sea are 
one more reason to relaunch this initiative, and this is what we’re going to try 
to do by restructuring the Union for the Mediterranean, by linking it perhaps 
better than has been the case in the past to the European Union Neighbourhood 
Policy, and I’m pleased to see that France and Britain see eye to eye on this 
objective. 
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To answer your question more specifically, we want the next European Council 
to vigorously call for the peace process to restart and the dialogue between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority to get going again. At this stage we don’t 
think a unilateral decision to recognize the Palestinian State will achieve this. I 
think we’ve got to favour dialogue as the solution, but this dialogue has to get 
under way and for this we’re determined to bring all pressure to bear. On the 
situation in Lebanon, France wants – as she’s very clearly said – the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon to be able to go on doing its job and pursue the 
investigations which have already been carried out – we’ve said this clearly to 
the Lebanese authorities – and we’ll decide our position on the basis of that 
decision. 
LIBYA/NATO MILITARY ACTION 
Q. – Do you envisage military action in Libya and if so, in what form? 
THE MINISTER – I’ve already answered that question. France, as far as she’s 
concerned, doesn’t think in the current context that a military intervention of 
the NATO powers would be well received in the southern Mediterranean. It 
could be counter-productive. That said, given the threats being brandished by 
Colonel Gaddafi, we have to get ready to act and this is why we’ve given our 
agreement to planning for a no-fly zone above Libya. 
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6. Libya – Reply given by Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and 
European Affairs, to a question in the National Assembly 6 March 2011 
https://uk.ambafrance.org/Alain-Juppe-on-international  
 
Mme Martinez, I share your concern about the situation in Libya. By cracking 
down with unacceptable brutality on the movements hostile to him, Colonel 
Gaddafi has lost all legitimacy: he must go. 
I remind you that France was one of the first powers to tell him this so clearly. 
We then worked at the United Nations and in Brussels to ensure swift and 
robust sanctions were imposed. I find it hard to understand why there’s such a 
lot of clamour over the situation in Libya; it escapes me… It concerns the lives 
and deaths of thousands of people! 
So we worked at the United Nations and in Brussels to ensure swift and robust 
sanctions were imposed. We also mobilized major humanitarian aid with our 
partners: two French convoys have already arrived in Benghazi, and we’re 
taking part in the airlift that is enabling Egyptians to be taken back to their 
country of origin. A French ship is also available at the Tunisian border to 
contribute to this. 
It’s now a question of stopping the bloody crackdown being pursued by 
Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. France has taken a very clear position: NATO isn’t 
the right organization to do it. We need a United Nations mandate. We’re 
prepared to intervene, with others, to protect the people by blocking Gaddafi 
from using his aircraft. Finally, it’s necessary to do so in full coordination with 
the Arab League and the African Union. That’s what we’re working on. 
At the European Council on Friday, which will be devoted exclusively to the 
situation in Libya and south of the Mediterranean, France will make strong 
proposals. 
During my visit to Egypt, my conviction that France has a specific role to play 
was strengthened: people are waiting for her. And we’ll accept our 
responsibilities. 
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7. Conférence de presse de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, 
notamment sur la position de l'Union européenne face à la situation politique et 
humanitaire en Libye, à Bruxelles le 11 mars 2011. 
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/117000613.html   
Personnalité, fonction : SARKOZY Nicolas.  
FRANCE. Président de la République 
Circonstances : Conseil européen extraordinaire sur la situation en Libye et en 
Méditerranée, à Bruxelles (Belgiquie) le 11 mars 2011 
ti :  
LE PRESIDENT - Mesdames et Messieurs, bonjour. C'était un Conseil 
européen, en tout cas pour sa première partie, d'une très grande importance. La 
France avait souhaité cette réunion du Conseil européen afin que la réaction de 
l'Europe soit à la hauteur des événements historiques qui se déroulent en ce 
moment même dans un certain nombre de pays d'Afrique du Nord et du Golfe. 
La conviction qui est la nôtre, est qu'il s'agit d'un mouvement historique qu'il 
convient de saluer. Des peuples arabes exigent à leur tour la démocratie, le 
progrès social et la croissance économique. Ce mouvement historique, notre 
conviction, c'est qu'il ne s'arrêtera pas, qu'il impactera l'ensemble des pays 
selon un rythme qui leur appartient de décider et que l'Europe, qui partage avec 
ces pays une zone géographique - la Méditerranée -, se doit d'être à la hauteur 
de l'événement. D'abord, parce que les valeurs qui sont mises en avant 
aujourd'hui par les peuples arabes sont des valeurs que les nations européennes 
ont fait leurs, il y a déjà bien longtemps. Deuxièmement, parce que nous 
sommes des voisins géographiques et nous sommes donc au premier rang 
impactés et concernés par la réussite de ces révolutions arabes. Et c'est ce qui 
avait fait que la France a demandé la réunion de ce Conseil européen. 
Indépendamment de ce contexte, le Conseil européen s'est penché d'abord sur 
la question libyenne. Les décisions que nous avons prises sont donc les 
suivantes : le Conseil européen est unanime pour demander le départ du colonel 
KADHAFI et de ses séides, le Conseil précisant qu'en aucun cas, le colonel 
KADHAFI ne peut être reconnu comme un interlocuteur du Conseil européen. 
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C'est un point majeur qui fait l'unanimité : M. KADHAFI n'est pas un 
interlocuteur pour l'Europe. 
Le Conseil européen a décidé - je cite les mots de mémoire - de saluer et 
d'encourager le Conseil national de transition, basé à Benghazi, qu'il considère 
désormais comme un interlocuteur politique. Donc, le premier temps du 
raisonnement : M. KADHAFI n'est plus un interlocuteur, il doit partir. 
Deuxième temps du raisonnement : le Conseil national de transition basé à 
Benghazi est, pour le Conseil européen, l'interlocuteur politique. Son action est 
saluée et encouragée. Que deviendra le Conseil et est-ce qu'il évoluera ? C'est 
aux Libyens naturellement d'en décider, pas à nous. Mais il était très important, 
notamment pour la France, que soit reconnu le statut d'interlocuteur politique à 
ce Conseil national de transition pour éviter un risque de « somalisation », 
c'est-à-dire d'un pays dont on dirait : « le dirigeant actuel n'est plus un 
interlocuteur, mais il n'y a plus d'interlocuteur ». Donc l'interlocuteur politique, 
c'est le Conseil national de transition. C'est la deuxième décision. 
Troisième décision : le Conseil décide que l'Union européenne permettra 
l'accès des agences et des opérateurs humanitaires à des zones humanitaires, 
dont nous n'avons pas précisé où elles seraient, pour traiter la question des 
déplacés. Dans un premier temps, certainement en Tunisie et en Egypte. Mais 
nous souhaitons qu'assez rapidement ces zones humanitaires puissent exister en 
Libye, qu'elles soient protégées pour gérer la question des dizaines de milliers 
de personnes déplacées et qu'il y ait dans ces zones humanitaires des moyens 
sanitaires, des écoles, de façon à pouvoir accueillir ces populations déplacées. 
Le Conseil européen, par ailleurs, exprime sa profonde inquiétude au sujet des 
attaques, y compris aériennes, contre des civils libyens non violents. Le Conseil 
européen, pour protéger la population civile, ses Etats membres, examinera - le 
Conseil examinera, les Etats membres examineront - toutes les options 
nécessaires, pourvu qu'il y ait un besoin démontrable d'une action, une claire 
base juridique des Nations Unies et le soutien régional - je veux dire la Ligue 
arabe. C'est dans le texte du Conseil européen. 
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Le Conseil européen a décidé, sur proposition de la France, de proposer 
l'organisation dans les prochaines semaines, très rapidement, d'un Sommet 
tripartite Ligue arabe - Union africaine - Union européenne pour évoquer 
l'ensemble de la situation, et notamment pour parler de la refondation 
nécessaire de l'Union pour la Méditerranée. 
Le Conseil européen a également décidé la convocation sans délai d'un Conseil 
JAI, c'est-à-dire d'un Conseil des ministres de l'Intérieur pour concerter la 
politique migratoire au niveau de l'Europe et renforcer les moyens de Frontex. 
Les ministres de l'Intérieur européens devront d'ailleurs prendre contact avec 
leurs homologues de l'autre côté de la Méditerranée pour voir comment on peut 
organiser la maîtrise des flux migratoires, d'un côté et de l'autre de la 
Méditerranée. 
Mesdames et Messieurs, j'en terminerai en vous disant que, par ailleurs, le 
Conseil européen a souhaité saluer, comme il se doit, le très important discours 
du Roi du Maroc proposant une transformation constitutionnelle de son pays 
pour faire évoluer encore un peu plus loin le Maroc vers une monarchie 
constitutionnelle et une démocratie. Le Conseil a tenu à saluer cette démarche 
historique, spontanée et volontaire, comme étant particulièrement exemplaire. 
Mesdames et Messieurs, j'ai le texte en anglais, je ne lis même pas le texte en 
français. Je vais devoir retourner maintenant, pour un deuxième Sommet que la 
France avait demandé - Sommet de la zone euro -, parler de la gouvernance 
économique de la zone euro. Je dois y retourner à 17h30 mais d'ici là, bien sûr, 
si vous avez des questions, je m'y prêterai bien volontiers. 
QUESTION - Est-ce que les autres pays du Conseil européen ont décidé 
d'envoyer une représentation diplomatique, comme la France, auprès du 
Conseil national de transition ? 
LE PRESIDENT - Non. Il faut que je sois très précis, parce qu'il y a eu de 
longs débats. Vous comprenez bien que la situation est mouvante dans un 
certain nombre de pays, notamment en Libye. Il a fallu harmoniser les positions 
de vingt-sept personnes. Tout le monde considère que M. KADHAFI n'est plus 
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un interlocuteur. Tout le monde considère qu'il ne peut plus être quelqu'un avec 
qui on discute. Tout le monde considère que le Conseil national de transition, 
par ailleurs, est un interlocuteur politique, qui doit être salué et encouragé. Cela 
veut dire que ceux qui veulent le reconnaître comme tel - ce qu'a fait la France, 
ce qu'a fait le Parlement européen, puisque j'ai entendu le président du 
Parlement européen, qui a d'ailleurs salué la France comme pays leader pour 
avoir reconnu l'opposition libyenne. D'autres pays considèrent que l'on doit 
discuter politiquement avec ce Conseil, que c'est parfaitement nécessaire, mais 
préfèrent attendre un petit peu que sa composition soit stabilisée. Mais pour 
tous, l'expression, c'est saluer et encourager ce Conseil, et le considérer comme 
un interlocuteur politique. Pour moi, c'est très clair. C'est un interlocuteur 
politique. C'est avec eux que l'on discute et je crois que, d'ailleurs, de ce point 
de vue, la décision prise par le Parlement européen est sans ambiguïté. J'ajoute : 
quel est l'autre choix ? 
QUESTION - Monsieur le Président, quel accueil a reçu la proposition franco-
britannique d'actions ciblées et purement défensives en Libye en cas 
d'utilisation d'armes chimiques ou d'utilisation de l'aviation de l'armée du 
colonel KADHAFI contre les civils ? 
LE PRESIDENT - Je tiens à rappeler que, même si c'est la partie - ce que je 
comprends - qui vous intéresse, la proposition franco-britannique, à ma 
connaissance, comportait six points. Vous ne parlez que d'un, puisque la 
proposition franco-britannique consistait à dire que : le Conseil de transition, 
c'est un interlocuteur politique ; il faut des zones humanitaires ; M. KADHAFI 
doit partir ; il doit y avoir un Sommet tripartite. C'était l'ensemble. 
Sur cette question, il n'y a pas, en Europe, ceux qui sont partisans d'une option 
militaire et ceux qui sont partisans d'une option politique. Tout le monde est 
partisan d'une option politique et diplomatique. J'avais eu l'occasion, moi-
même, au départ, de dire toutes mes réserves sur une action de l'OTAN et de 
souligner toute la complexité d'une no-fly-zone sur un territoire - la Libye - qui 
est grosso modo grand comme trois fois la France, et les moyens que cela 
mettait en œuvre. Donc, l'option militaire massive, comme l'a très bien dit 
d'ailleurs le ministre d'Etat, Alain JUPPE - à qui je tiens à rendre hommage 
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pour son déplacement en Egypte et pour la réunion qu'il a tenue hier avec les 
ministres des Affaires étrangères sur ce sujet - ; donc, la position de la France 
n'a jamais été d'une option militaire au sol, d'une option militaire de l'OTAN, et 
a toujours été réservée sur la no-fly-zone, même si nous n'avons pas décidé de 
fermer cette option. 
Mais la question qui se pose à un certain nombre de pays, dont les Britanniques 
et nous, c'est : qu'est-ce qui se passe si des populations pacifiques civiles en 
train de manifester, sans violence et pacifiquement, sont la cible des quelques 
avions de M. KADHAFI, en l'occurrence les MIG ou de quelques hélicoptères 
qui tirent sur la foule ? Et la question que nous avons posée avec M. 
CAMERON, c'est : à ce moment-là, doit-on regarder les images ou doit-on 
réagir ? C'est la raison pour laquelle, M. JUPPE et moi-même, nous avons parlé 
d'opérations possibles, strictement défensives, ciblées sur quelques objectifs 
militaires au cas où des populations civiles sans défense se verraient massacrer 
par une action militaire massive sur eux. 
Nous avons posé un certain nombre de conditions : un mandat des Nations 
Unies - du Conseil de Sécurité -, le soutien des partenaires - nous visions 
naturellement la Ligue arabe et par ailleurs les autorités libyennes que nous 
reconnaissons comme des interlocuteurs politiques - et bien sûr des agressions 
massives, par des moyens militaires, sur des populations désarmées non 
violentes et civiles. C'est dans ce cadre-là que se pose la question. Et nous 
sommes très satisfaits, M. CAMERON et moi, que le texte du Conseil européen 
exprime sa profonde inquiétude au sujet des attaques aériennes et indique que 
pour protéger la population civile, les Etats membres examineront, je cite, 
toutes les options nécessaires. 
Et vous comprenez bien que toutes les options nécessaires examinées par les 
Etats européens dans ce cas ne sont pas que des options diplomatiques. En 
posant des verrous : un besoin démontrable - ce que je vous indiquais : des 
avions de chasse militaires qui frapperaient une foule de manifestants sans 
défense -, une claire base juridique - une décision des Nations Unies -, et le 
soutien régional - le soutien régional, ce sont les autorités politiques que nous 
considérons en Libye et la Ligue arabe, personne ne le souhaite, mais il est clair 
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que l'Europe envoie un signal et n'a pas voulu exclure cette option. Je crois 
qu'en vous disant cela, j'ai résumé l'état d'esprit du Conseil où personne n'est 
favorable à une option militaire. Personne ne l'envisage de façon massive, 
terrestre. 
Lors de mon entretien avec les autorités du Conseil national de transition libyen 
- nos interlocuteurs politiques désormais -, eux-mêmes m'ont dit combien serait 
maladroite une intervention étrangère que nous n'envisageons nullement. Mais 
il y a un « mais », c'est le cas de figure précis où des attaques systématiques 
seraient engagées contre des populations civiles qui seraient massacrées par des 
moyens militaires. 
QUESTION - Monsieur le Président, est-ce qu'il y a le temps de poursuivre les 
voies internationales - donc les Nations Unies, la Ligue arabe, l'Union africaine 
- ou est-ce qu'à votre avis, à un certain moment il faudra prendre aussi une 
décision européenne ou d'un certain groupe de pays européens ? 
LE PRESIDENT - La délibération est claire, il faut une claire base juridique 
pour intervenir ; un mandat des Nations Unies, c'est nécessaire, c'est préférable 
et nous le souhaitons. S'il n'y a pas ce mandat et qu'il y a une demande 
régionale et libyenne, nous verrons à ce moment-là. Mais vous comprenez 
quand même que la réunion du Conseil européen était très attendue en Libye, 
elle est très regardée par les différents peuples arabes. Si nous avions décidé 
d'exclure toute autre option aujourd'hui, quel signal aurions-nous envoyé ? Cela 
ne veut pas dire qu'on veut, cela ne veut pas dire qu'on souhaite. Mais enfin, 
l'Europe, c'est le grand voisin, nous avons la Méditerranée en partage. Les 
peuples arabes ont décidé de se battre pour leur liberté et pour la démocratie. 
Notre devoir, c'est de répondre à cette aspiration. Alors, bien sûr, le processus 
n'est pas abouti. Notre conviction à nous, Français, c'est que ce processus 
impactera petit à petit, d'une manière ou d'une autre, l'ensemble des Etats de la 
région, qu'on n'est qu'au début d'un processus dont nul ne sait dans quel sens 
cela va aller et comment cela va se terminer. Mais au moins le Conseil 
européen, avec ses décisions et en proposant, à la demande de la France, un 
sommet tripartite, se comporte en partenaire régional de premier plan. 
Souvenons-nous, dans d'autres crises - je pense à la Bosnie - d'autres sujets, 
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vous-mêmes et vos confrères à l'époque aviez pointé du doigt l'absence de 
réaction de l'Europe, son absence totale, enfin plutôt son suivisme dans certains 
cas, alors même qu'il s'agissait de notre région. Mais je ne peux pas vous dire 
comment cela va se terminer ou comment cela va aller, mais la décision du 
Conseil européen me semble être une décision très forte. Cela ne veut pas dire 
qu'il n'y a pas des différences de sensibilité, naturellement. 
QUESTION - Monsieur le Président, une précision : le mandat de l'ONU est-il 
nécessaire ou est-il seulement préférable ? C'est le premier point. Deuxième 
point : dans la mesure où toutes les conditions que vous avez évoquées sont 
réunies, est-ce que la France et la Grande-Bretagne seraient disposées à engager 
leurs seules forces militaires dans ces actions très précises ou bien 
demanderaient-elles le concours d'autres forces comme celles des États-Unis 
par exemple ? 
LE PRESIDENT - Je ne souhaite pas aller plus loin là-dessus. Il y a trois 
conditions : des faits incontestables, une résolution des Nations Unies, le 
soutien régional. Nous verrons, c'est un cadre qui a été fixé et je crois que ce 
cadre est satisfaisant, qu'il envoie un message à tous ceux qui doivent le 
recevoir et permet de dire que l'Europe assume et prend ses responsabilités. 
Qu'aurait-on dit si l'Europe décidait, avant même d'y réfléchir, de renoncer à 
toutes les options ? Il y a un cadre qui est fixé, maintenant il faut faire vivre ce 
cadre. Il y aura bien d'autres événements, les choses vont très vite comme vous 
le savez ; vous l'avez vu en Tunisie, vous l'avez vu en Égypte, on le constate 
aujourd'hui en Libye. C'est ce cadre et je veux m'en tenir à ce cadre. Chacun, 
me semble-t-il, a fait un pas l'un vers l'autre et s'il y avait eu des malentendus, 
ils ont pu être levés. 
Je comprends d'ailleurs la sensibilité d'un certain nombre de nos partenaires 
européens des pays d'Europe de l'Est. Eux-mêmes ont le souvenir des processus 
de transition où d'anciens ministres associés au pouvoir précédent ont joué un 
rôle au début de la transition qui n'était pas le rôle à la fin de la transition. Et 
eux-mêmes - ce que je peux parfaitement comprendre -, quand il s'agit de 
discuter avec tel ou tel qui a été ministre de M. KADHAFI, se disent : « est-ce 
que c'est le bon interlocuteur ? ». Ce n'est pas absurde de raisonner comme 
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cela. Mais nous leur avons fait valoir que ces gens qui ont travaillé avec M. 
KADHAFI aujourd'hui, ils risquent leur vie, ce n'est pas rien, et ils ont engagé 
un processus démocratique. Est-ce que ces gens-là seront à la fin du processus 
démocratique libyen ? Je n'en sais rien ; d'ailleurs, ce n'est pas à moi d'en 
décider, je ne suis pas libyen. Mais ils risquent leur vie ces gens, ils sont 
sincères. Et quel autre choix avons-nous ? Pour discuter avec qui ? Vous voyez, 
ce ne sont pas tant des problèmes politiques, ce sont aussi des problèmes de 
sensibilité. Enfin, si vous prenez d'autres révolutions comme la Révolution des 
Oeillets au Portugal : avant d'être la démocratie que nous connaissons, il y a eu 
des étapes - enfin, pour ceux qui se sont intéressés à cette révolution au 
Portugal -, cela n'a pas été tout de suite des démocrates absolus, il y a eu des 
gens qui ont été dans les premières équipes qui avaient collaboré avec la 
dictature de M. SALAZAR. Et je pourrais prendre d'autres exemples : vous 
regardez en Tunisie, le Premier ministre actuel a été un proche de M. 
BOURGUIBA. Comment faire autrement ? Je ne voudrais pas citer des pays - 
enfin il y a la Pologne. Il n'y a pas un pays, me semble-t-il, qui soit passé d'une 
situation de dictature à une situation de démocratie parfaite, avec des gens qui, 
dans le cadre de la démocratie, tout d'un coup sont sortis de nulle part alors 
qu'ils n'avaient exercé aucune responsabilité avant ! Je ne sais pas si je me fais 
comprendre, mais ce serait parfaitement impossible de dire : « vous avez 
travaillé avec M. KADHAFI, donc on ne peut pas travailler avec vous ». S'ils 
prennent la responsabilité - ils risquent leur vie - de créer un mouvement 
démocratique en Libye, bien sûr qu'ils ont travaillé dans le cadre d'un système, 
comment pouvaient-ils faire autrement par ailleurs ? Est-ce qu'ils seront à 
l'arrivée du processus démocratique dans quelques mois ou dans quelques 
années ? Nul ne le sait. Mais les refuser par principe ? Nous, on les 
considérerait donc comme des interlocuteurs politiques non crédibles, mais eux 
en Libye, seraient vécus comme des opposants suffisamment crédibles pour 
risquer leur vie. Dites-moi quelle situation ! Voilà le choix que nous avons fait 
et voilà la raison pour laquelle la France - le Parlement européen aussi - a 
décidé de reconnaître ces gens. J'ajoute qu'il faut les encourager. Qu'est-ce 
qu'on veut : les pousser à la division ? Qu'il y ait dans chaque ville un nouveau 
conseil ? On favoriserait qui à ce moment-là ? Je crois que c'est sage de faire 
comme cela. J'ajoute que j'ai trouvé des gens assez raisonnables, en tout cas 
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ceux avec qui j'ai discuté. Le Président du Parlement européen me faisait la 
même remarque ; et je sais que le Président VAN ROMPUY va les rencontrer 
et que Mme Cathy ASHTON les a rencontrés aussi. 
QUESTION - Monsieur le Président, vous évoquez les transitions 
démocratiques en cours dans la région, notamment en Tunisie et en Égypte où 
elles ont lieu. La situation est loin d'être stable. A ce propos, est-ce que la 
réponse de l'Europe vous semble à la hauteur, sur la base des discussions que 
vous avez pu avoir aujourd'hui sur le document de la Commission européenne 
et du Service d'action extérieure ? 
LE PRESIDENT - Pour vous répondre franchement, je pense qu'on n'est qu'au 
début d'un processus qui va nous engager à aller beaucoup plus loin, 
incontestablement, mais qui nous amène à attendre aussi, enfin, à respecter ces 
révolutions arabes. C'est à eux de conduire ces révolutions et à mener leur 
processus, ce n'est pas à nous de définir ce dont ils ont besoin. Alors ce qui est 
sûr, c'est que nous aurons l'occasion de refonder l'Union pour la Méditerranée 
qui est plus nécessaire que jamais. Il faut pour cela que nous ayons en face des 
interlocuteurs avec qui nous puissions, nous, construire cette relation. J'ai voulu 
ne pas me précipiter, s'agissant d'un grand pays ami comme la Tunisie et 
s'agissant d'un autre très grand pays ami comme l'Égypte. Pourquoi ? Ceux qui 
m'appelaient à me précipiter dans la conférence de reconstruction de la Tunisie, 
qui avait été annoncée par le Premier ministre GHANNOUCHI qui a dû 
démissionner à la suite d'un vaste mouvement de foule, qu'aurait-on dit ? Quant 
à l'Égypte, le ministre d'État, Alain JUPPE, a fait un voyage très réussi là-bas ; 
le Premier ministre David CAMERON y avait été avant et y avait rencontré un 
Premier ministre égyptien qui a changé deux jours après. Donc, certainement, 
on devra aller plus loin, réinventer un certain nombre de mécanismes pour les 
aider. Mais attendons qu'eux-mêmes stabilisent un peu leur système 
démocratique. Je pense que c'est une très bonne nouvelle également que, sur la 
gestion des flux migratoires, nous décidions de zones humanitaires en Afrique 
du nord pour gérer les populations déplacées ; que nous ayons décidé la réunion 
sans délai du Conseil des ministres européens de l'Intérieur pour poser une 
politique européenne de l'immigration, la décision de rencontrer les ministres 
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de l'Intérieur d'Afrique du Nord pour gérer ceci ensemble. Il va de soi qu'y 
compris sur les politiques migratoires, il faudra tenir compte du fait que ces 
pays devenant des démocraties, le statut de réfugié politique n'a plus la même 
nature. Je prends un exemple : nous avons accueilli sur notre territoire une 
grande partie des opposants politiques de M. BEN ALI parce qu'ils avaient un 
statut de réfugié politique. Aujourd'hui, la Tunisie est une démocratie, les 
choses ne se posent pas de la même manière. Mais pour les étudiants, il va 
falloir qu'on les aide à former leur jeunesse. C'est donc tout l'ensemble qui, 
dans les mois qui viennent, va être amené à être repensé et sans doute 
réorganisé. 
QUESTION - Monsieur le Président, petite question : vous avez parlé d'armes 
chimiques ce matin, est-ce que vous avez des éléments qui attestent d'un usage 
probable ou possible d'armes chimiques par Monsieur KADHAFI ? Deuxième 
question : quand je vois ce qui ce passe, il faut des faits tangibles pour vous 
permettre éventuellement d'intervenir ; donc, qu'est-ce qui fait que l'on puisse 
intervenir avant que l'irréparable ou qu'un crime particulièrement gênant sur 
des civils soit commis ? Et, troisième solution : si M. KADHAFI gagne sur le 
terrain, comment on s'en sort ? Est-ce qu'on n'a pas une situation - j'allais dire à 
l'irakienne - à l'ancienne ? 
LE PRESIDENT - Vous avez fait un lapsus amusant qui en dit long sur votre 
tempérament, vous parlez de troisième solution. Parfois, il m'arrive de penser 
que vous voudriez bien cette place et que vous me verriez bien à la vôtre. J'ai 
compris que c'est des questions que vous me posiez, donc parfait. Sur 
l'opportunité de frappes défensives et ciblées, je me suis exprimé en détail, je 
ne peux en dire plus. Sur les cas chimiques, je n'ai pas d'informations précises. 
Mais chacun sait que M. KADHAFI - d'ailleurs c'était apporté à son crédit à 
l'époque - s'est séparé de son stock d'armes nucléaires, en tout cas de réserve et 
de processus à l'époque. C'était d'ailleurs apporté à son crédit, je l'avais 
souligné moi-même. Le fait qu'il puisse y avoir ou pas des armes chimiques, je 
n'ai pas d'informations précises ; mais enfin, disons que certains des acteurs se 
posent la question. Vous me dites : qu'est-ce qu'il se passe si M. KADHAFI 
l'emporte ? Justement, c'est une solution que nous n'envisageons pas 
356 
 
politiquement, puisque pour nous, il n'est plus un interlocuteur. Et justement, 
tout ce que nous faisons, c'est de nature à encourager tous ces Libyens qui 
veulent une démocratie et qui doivent pouvoir s'appuyer sur un soutien 
politique économique sans faille de l'Europe. On ne peut pas considérer que le 
fait que M. KADHAFI reste en place soit autre chose qu'une très mauvaise 
nouvelle pour l'ensemble des pays de la région qu'elle signale. Mais je vous l'ai 
dit de la même façon - sans comparer les situations - en Côte d'Ivoire. Depuis le 
début, la France se bat pour que soit reconnue l'élection, validée par les Nations 
Unies, du Président OUATTARA, parce que ce n'est pas que de la Côte 
d'Ivoire dont il s'agit, c'est de l'ensemble de l'Afrique. Pourquoi faire des 
élections, si, lorsque que l'on fait des élections, le président élu n'est pas le 
président en place ? Et là, il y a une révolution qui s'est mise en place, des gens 
courageusement qui disent : « nous aussi nous voulons la démocratie ». On doit 
agir pour les aider, ce serait une catastrophe si ce n'était pas le cas. 
QUESTION - Je voulais savoir comme vous nous expliquez que, s'il y a un 
massacre, vous aimeriez que l'Europe puisse anticiper dès maintenant ce qu'elle 
est prête à faire, vous privilégiez des actions ciblées, vous l'avez dit, alors est-
ce que c'est une nouvelle... 
LE PRESIDENT - Enfin, vous pensez qu'il n'y a que cela qui est important. 
Non, non, je ne vous le reproche pas, mais... 
QUESTION - Cela nous pose des questions, c'est normal. Mais je me 
demandais si c'était une nouvelle doctrine diplomatique de la France, c'est-à-
dire si, en Jordanie, au Yémen, au Koweït, toutes les manifestations contre les 
pouvoirs en place tournent mal, s'il y a des répressions, est-ce que la France est 
amenée comme cela à proposer à chaque fois des attaques ciblées ? 
LE PRESIDENT - Excusez-moi, excusez-moi. Le président MOUBARAK est 
parti ou a été renversé à la suite de manifestations de masse, je n'ai jamais vu 
l'aviation égyptienne frapper les manifestants. Il y a eu des brutalités, il y a des 
affrontements, mais on est resté dans le cadre de violences que je qualifierais - 
pardon de l'expression - de civiles. Enfin, ce n'est sans doute pas la bonne 
expression, je m'en excuse auprès de vous. Mais je veux dire que c'était brutal, 
357 
 
il y a eu de la brutalité, il y a eu des violences, il y a eu des manifestants 
blessés, sans doute il y a eu des morts, mais enfin, cela n'a rien à voir avec des 
moyens armés, militaires, aériens que l'on envoie contre des gens qui 
manifestent. En Tunisie, il y a eu des manifestants, il y a eu des brutalités, il y a 
eu des morts, mais le Président BEN ALI est parti. Justement, d'ailleurs en 
Égypte comme en Tunisie, parce que l'armée a refusé de faire feu sur la foule 
dans son immense majorité, c'est bien cela qui s'est passé. En Tunisie comme 
en Égypte, il y aurait pu avoir cette tentation mais l'armée a dit : « nous ne 
tirerons pas sur la foule ». Mais, est-ce que c'est ce qui s'est passé en Libye ? 
On ne peut pas dire que tout se ressemble, on ne peut pas dire que tout se vaut, 
on ne peut pas dire que toutes les situations sont égales. Ce n'est pas parce que 
c'est l'Afrique du Nord, ce n'est pas parce que ce sont des populations arabes 
qui veulent se libérer d'une forme de dictature, ce n'est pas du tout la même 
chose ? Je veux dire que les conditions de la répression, de la brutalité, ne sont 
du tout les mêmes. Si en Libye, le chef de l'armée libyenne ou des dirigeants de 
l'armée, des militaires disaient : « nous ne tirerons pas sur la foule », nous 
sommes dans un autre cas de figure. Jamais personne n'a envisagé de faire des 
actions militaires ciblées, défensives en Tunisie ou en Égypte. Cela ne s'est 
même pas posé. Donc ce n'est pas du tout - excusez-moi, mais je me suis sans 
doute mal exprimé -, mais ce n'est pas du tout un changement diplomatique que 
nous envisageons, c'est une adaptation à une situation tout à faire particulière 
que l'on n'a absolument connue nulle part. Peut être, le seul endroit où l'on a 
connu une mobilisation d'un État, c'était en Iran dans les conditions que l'on 
connaît et, encore une fois, je n'ai pas vu à ce moment là l'armée, l'aviation 
lancées pour ce que l'on sait. Donc, il n'y a aucun changement diplomatique, 
une nouvelle doctrine. Je suis opposé à une intervention militaire d'ensemble. 
J'ai été, je crois, l'un des premiers à dire ma réserve sur l'intervention de 
l'OTAN qui est une organisation militaire. Mais, entre refuser une intervention 
militaire et laisser des gens massacrés par des avions de chasse alors qu'ils 
manifestent, il y a peut-être à réfléchir sur ce que l'on fait, si les Nations Unies 
sont d'accord, si la Ligue arabe est d'accord, s'il y a un mandat et si ces faits 
sont avérés. Pardon, mais vous ne pouvez pas comparer ce qui se passe en 
Libye aujourd'hui et ce qui s'est passé en Tunisie. Vous pouvez le comparer 
politiquement si vous voulez, mais vous ne pouvez pas comparer la répression, 
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qui n'a rien à voir. Il y a des actes de guerre en Libye. Je ne pense pas qu'il y ait 
eu des actes de guerre en Égypte ou des actes de guerre en Tunisie. Il y a eu 
une révolution politique avec des violences, naturellement, mais là on est dans 
des villes bombardées, des terminaux pétroliers bombardés, cela n'a rien à voir 
! 
QUESTION - Est-ce qu'on peut, Monsieur le Président, puisque cela va se 
terminer très tard, est-ce qu'on peut anticiper par une question sur la réunion 
qui va suivre maintenant ? Parce que ça va finir très tard après. 
LE PRESIDENT - Je suis désolé pour votre nuit de sommeil, mais il n'y a pas 
de raison que vous dormiez plus que moi ! Écoutez, je ne veux surtout pas être 
désagréable avec vous, je ne veux pas mélanger des choses, parce que j'ai bien 
réfléchi à la situation qui nous occupe en Afrique du Nord, c'est historique. Je 
sais bien qu'on emploie le mot historique à tout bout de champ et cela méritait 
qu'on fasse un Conseil européen spécifique sur le sujet. Ce n'était pas évident, 
nombre de mes partenaires ne le pensaient pas. Ils pensaient qu'une réunion des 
ministres des Affaires étrangères suffisait. J'ai dit ce que je pensais de l'action 
d'Alain JUPPE, avec qui nous travaillons main dans la main, mais je ne veux 
pas mélanger l'importance des décisions qu'on va prendre toute à l'heure, les 17 
membres de la zone euro et ce qu'on vient de décider là. Tant de fois dans le 
passé j'ai regretté que l'Europe n'exprime pas une voix politique, un chemin 
politique clair, qu'à partir du moment où elle accepte de le faire avec les 
hésitations, les ambigüités que je reconnais bien volontiers - la situation n'est 
pas simple -, c'est quand même une bonne nouvelle, c'est l'Europe qui est en 
première ligne et c'est l'Europe qui doit assumer ce choix politique. Bien sûr il 
faut en parler avec nos amis, nos alliés Américains, naturellement ; mais nous 
sommes les premiers concernés. C'est quand même extraordinairement 
important. 
Alors, je viens parler de cette question-là parce que c'est le sujet, on en a parlé 
pendant six heures. Je ne veux pas parler d'autre chose, même si le 
gouvernement économique, le pacte de convergence et de compétitivité, c'est 
absolument important, mais ce soir. 
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QUESTION - Sur les zones humanitaires est-ce que vous pouvez nous préciser 
ce que vous entendez par zones humanitaires et qui va le faire ? Est-ce que 
vous avez demandé à quelqu'un de le faire ? 
LE PRESIDENT - D'abord, on s'est mis d'accord sur le principe de zones 
humanitaires parce que - je le dis à nos compatriotes - si on veut que ces 
révolutions arabes ne provoquent pas de peur, il faut qu'avec franchise nous 
parlions de la question des flux migratoires. Il y a des populations déplacées. 
On peut considérer qu'il y a 200 000 personnes - je ne parle pas d'immigrés - 
200 000 personnes déplacées entre l'Égypte, la Libye, la Tunisie. Si on ne traite 
pas l'accueil de ces personnes déplacées dans des conditions humaines et 
décentes, quelle va être la tentation de ces personnes déplacées ? Elles n'auront 
pas le choix : c'est de traverser la Méditerranée. Or, nous ne pouvons pas les 
accueillir dans ces conditions-là. Donc, il faut organiser des zones 
humanitaires. Dans notre esprit ces zones devraient être gérées par les Nations 
Unies. Alors, est-ce que c'est le HCR, l'Office des Migrations ? Je ne sais pas, 
mais par les Nations Unies. L'Europe devrait bien sûr participer à son 
financement, à son organisation, ce qui est la seule façon de gérer 
tranquillement la question des flux migratoires. Puis, les ministres de l'Intérieur 
européens et d'Afrique du nord vont se réunir pour voir ce dont ils ont besoin. 
Mais naturellement, la politique migratoire doit évoluer et doit être maîtrisée 
des deux côtés. Nous devons continuer à accueillir leurs étudiants, les hommes 
d'affaires, et ils doivent accepter de donner des laissez-passer consulaires pour 
les immigrés en situation irrégulière qui n'ont pas de papiers et qui ont vocation 
à retourner dans leur pays. Donc, on va essayer de le gérer ensemble. Profitons 
de cette crise pour poser les bases, non seulement d'une politique d'immigration 
européenne, mais d'une politique d'immigration concertée entre pays de départ 
et pays d'arrivée. Et donc, les Nations Unies me sembleraient la meilleure façon 
; et avec cela on peut gérer ces flux migratoires. Sinon, on aura la 
multiplication de Lampedusa et personne ne peut le souhaiter, personne. Donc, 
il faut organiser des zones humanitaires décentes, avec des écoles pour les 
enfants, avec des moyens sanitaires de manière à maîtriser cela. Et pour moi, 
les Nations Unies sont le mieux à même de le faire. Alors il y aura d'autres 
questions : qui protège ces zones humanitaires ? La France peut avoir des 
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propositions à faire et en fera sans doute. Mais dans le cadre de ce Conseil 
européen, je préfère qu'on s'en tienne au principe et après, step by step, étape 
par étape, on construira ce projet. On ne pouvait pas tout résoudre aujourd'hui. 
 
Merci beaucoup. 
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8. Hearing of Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, 
before the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee (excerpts)  
Paris, March 15, 2011  
https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article2244  
 
ARAB DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS 
(…) 
I now want to mention the Mediterranean’s southern shore. The Jasmine 
Revolution in Tunisia and 25 January in Egypt paved the way for a series of 
unprecedented upheavals that one of my G8 counterparts had no hesitation in 
comparing with the fall of the Berlin Wall. We were very much criticized for 
not foreseeing them; but if prospective studies exist, so do retrospective 
studies; perhaps diplomacy belongs to the latter category. 
These events have multiple causes. The first is the questioning of the 
legitimacy of authoritarian Arab political regimes – republics or monarchies – 
particularly by emerging, educated, modern middle classes who want to play a 
greater role in political life and are expressing their desire for freedom. In 
Tunisia, efforts made for years to raise education levels aroused keen political 
awareness among young people, who at the same time couldn’t find any jobs. 
The second reason relates to the erosion of power – with certain regimes having 
lasted several decades – and people’s sense of frustration with a monopoly of 
wealth, with corruption and the daily bullying meted out by the security forces. 
Then there are the economic and social problems, like unemployment and the 
rise in commodity prices, particularly food – all phenomena linked to the global 
economic crisis of the past two years. 
Finally we should mention the amplifying role of the media : the channel Al-
Jazeera and, on the Internet, social networks like Facebook, on which one of 
the members of the 25 January coordination group I met in Tahrir Square was 
also an expert. 
These factors are common to all the countries in the region stretching from 
Morocco to Iran; they carry in them, through the protest movements they 
unleashed, immense hope of change for the whole region. This new “Arab 
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spring” mustn’t frighten us. For too long, we thought authoritarian regimes 
were the only bulwarks against extremism in Arab societies. In Tunisia and 
Egypt, the people swept that cliché aside by very maturely expressing their 
hope for democracy. 
In Egypt, the authorities responded in a responsible way, without giving in to 
the temptation of violence: the army is now guiding the transition in 
cooperation with the representatives from Liberation Square, Tahrir Square, 
whom I met during my visit to Cairo on 6 March. Several problems remain, 
however: the electoral timetable, but also the hopes raised among the 
population, who are awaiting the benefits of the revolution – in other words, 
wage rises and social benefits. But the economic system in Egypt is grinding to 
a halt: the hotel occupancy rate has fallen to 10% or 15%, and several hundred 
thousand [Egyptian] refugees, who had been sending money, have returned 
from Libya or are going to do so. This situation only increases our duty to help. 
In Morocco, the King delivered a brave and visionary speech, which I want to 
welcome: he’s the first person, to my knowledge, to put forward the idea of a 
constitutional monarchy, which could serve as an example. This reform should 
be drawn up in consultation with the political parties and civil society. 
MIGRATION/UNION FOR THE 
MEDITERRANEAN/INVESTMENT/MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
We must take this new scenario into account in our approach to the southern 
Mediterranean region, not in order to teach lessons or export our standards but 
in order to support our partners in their democratic transition, in a spirit of trust, 
friendship and openness. It’s also a question of encouraging the emergence of a 
stable and prosperous region, by helping the countries concerned to resolve 
their economic and social difficulties: it’s not only our responsibility, it’s also 
in our interest. It’s totally illusory to want to control migration by building 
walls: others have tried to do so, with the result we’re aware of at the Mexican 
border. Even if we must show great vigilance on illegal immigration in the 
immediate future, the only solution in the longer term is to reduce the 
developmental inequalities between North and South. 
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It’s in this spirit that we must also restructure the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM). Even if this initiative has come up against several obstacles, beginning 
with the deadlock in the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, 
current events show it was visionary. So we’re going to relaunch it, 
remembering on the one hand that it relies on a balanced partnership between 
North and South and on the other that it consists in developing concrete 
projects, whether it be in solar energy, the cleaning up of the Mediterranean or 
the Mediterranean Office for Youth, which will make it possible to organize the 
flow of students. 
In the immediate future, and to respond to the urgency of the situation, we can 
rely on the existing tools, like the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment 
and Partnership (FEMIP) or the European Investment Bank (EIB), for which 
the European Council last week decided to raise the ceiling of its intervention 
mandates in the Mediterranean. To go further, France is proposing to create a 
real Mediterranean investment facility, relying particularly on the FEMIP. 
We must also continue our efforts to support the peace process. The Palestinian 
people’s hopes are no less legitimate than those of other peoples in the region: 
we must respond to them by working to establish a democratic, viable and 
lasting Palestinian State living in peace and security alongside the State of 
Israel. This aim is today agreed by everyone. The status quo is untenable. A 
new scenario has arisen around Israel: we must persuade our partners in the 
Quartet of this, in order to make progress on defining the parameters of a final 
status agreement. The year 2011 must be that of the recognition of a Palestinian 
State, in accordance with the road map we set ourselves: all the G8 partners 
share this feeling, even if our American friends do so with a few nuances. 
LIBYA 
Finally, we must be sure to adapt the broad lines of our action to the specific 
characteristics of each country. The urgent thing is clearly Libya, our main 
concern being to protect the civilian population. The issue is obviously very 
sensitive, insofar as the balance of power between the Tripoli regime and the 
opposition based in Benghazi is in the process of evolving. Without wishing to 
dwell on the recent past, I can’t resist the urge to recall that France was the first 
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country, along with Britain, to say Colonel Gaddafi must be prevented from 
using violence to try to restore his authority. It’s possible, because military 
planes can take off from few airports; moreover, although Libya has purchased 
perhaps about 400 fighter planes in the past 40 years, it’s not true – as some of 
our partners have maintained – that they’re all operational: fewer than about 20 
are, and barely more helicopters. France didn’t uphold the idea of a no-fly zone 
– difficult over such a vast territory – but rather, on the basis of a UN Security 
Council resolution, targeted strikes on military positions, because it’s air 
bombardments that enabled Colonel Gaddafi to upset the power balance with 
the rebel movement. Some of our partners, chief among them my German 
counterpart, opposed any use of force. As for Russia, she was hardly 
enthusiastic, and the United States took a long time to define her position. 
What can we do in the face of the advance of Colonel Gaddafi’s troops?  
I had a lot of trouble securing agreement among the participants in the G8, 
which, while not being a decision-making body, nevertheless brings together 
four members of the Security Council. A consensus was reached for the latter 
to adopt, as soon as possible, measures aimed at exerting sufficient pressure on 
Colonel Gaddafi: the idea of a no-fly zone is one of them, even though certain 
members are hostile to it; for our part, we consider it obsolete. The second 
point of agreement was the necessary involvement of the Arab countries. To 
enter Libya under the NATO banner would be the best way of turning Arab 
opinion against us. The Arab League called for a no-fly zone, but our Russian 
friends pointed out that this declaration was a little ambiguous and 
accompanied by reservations; as for the African Union, it doesn’t take entirely 
the same line. President Sarkozy is working to organize a summit between the 
European Union, the African Union and the Arab League. (…)./. 
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9. Security Council - Libya - Statement by Mr Alain Juppé, ministre d’Etat, Minister of 
Foreign and European Affairs (UN Translation) 17 March 2011  
https://onu.delegfrance.org/17-March-2011-Security-Council  
 
Allow me first to thank you, Sir, for your warm words of welcome, which I 
deeply appreciated.  
The world is experiencing one of the great revolutions that change the course of 
history. From North Africa to the Persian Gulf, the Arab people clamour to 
breathe the air of liberty and democracy.  
From the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the events of 25 January in Egypt, 
great hope arose and democratic transition was launched in a spirit of maturity 
and responsibility.  
In Morocco, King Mohammed VI announced in a courageous and visionary 
speech the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.  
This new Arab spring is good news, I am certain, for all of us. Our duty and 
interest require us to support these developments with confidence and 
availability — not to teach lessons or set examples, but to help each people to 
build its own future.  
In Libya, alas, for a number of weeks the will of the people has been crushed 
by the murderous repression led by Colonel Al-Qadhafi’s regime against his 
own people.  
That is why the General Assembly, pursuant to the 25 February request of the 
Human Rights Council, suspended Libya from that Council. That is why the 
Security Council determined on 26 February that "the widespread and 
systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against 
the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity" (resolution 
1970 (2011)).  
In its resolution 1970 (2011), which was adopted unanimously, the Security 
Council recalled the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect the Libyan 
people and at the same time demanded an immediate end to the violence. It 
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expressed the hope that those responsible for these crimes will be brought 
before the International 
Criminal Court and referred the matter to the Prosecutor. It imposed sanctions 
on Colonel Al-Qadhafi, members of his family and his accomplices. Finally, it 
imposed an embargo on arms destined for Libya.  
These measures have not been sufficient. Throughout the country, violence 
against the civilian population has only increased. 
 
Given this intolerable provocation, the international community has reacted in 
near unanimity. 
— The European Union did so at the extraordinary meeting of the European 
Council on 11 March. 
— The Group of Eight countries did so in Paris on Tuesday. 
— Regional organizations have also expressed themselves forcefully. First and 
foremost, the League of Arab States called on the Security Council in its 12 
March resolution to establish a no-fly zone. I also wish to commend the 
commitment of the African Union, which has called for an end to the violence 
against civilians.  
Despite these calls for peace, the situation in Libya today is more alarming than 
ever. As I speak, Colonel Al-Qadhafi’s troops pursue their violent conquest of 
liberated cities and territories. We must not give free rein to warmongers; we 
must not abandon civilian populations, the victims of brutal repression, to their 
fate; we must not allow the rule of law and international morality to be 
trampled underfoot.  
For this reason, France sought to contribute its utmost to the international 
momentum by working alongside the United Kingdom, the United States and 
others to prepare the draft resolution before the Council.  
The draft resolution provides the Council with the means to protect the civilian 
populations in Libya. 
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— First by establishing a no-fly zone and by authorizing the members of the 
Arab League and those Member States that so wish to take the measures 
necessary to implement its provisions. 
— Furthermore, it authorizes these same States to take all measures necessary, 
over and above the no-fly zone, to protect civilians and territories, including 
Benghazi, which are under the threat of attack by Colonel Al-Qadhafi’s forces. 
— Lastly, it strengthens the sanctions that have been adopted against the 
regime, including implementing the arms embargo, freezing the assets of 
authorities in Tripoli and prohibiting flights by Libyan airlines.  
France solemnly calls on all members of the Security Council to support this 
initiative and to adopt the draft resolution. If it is adopted, we are prepared to 
act with Member States — in particular Arab States — that wish to do so.  
We do not have much time left. It is a matter of days, perhaps even hours. 
Every hour and day that goes by means a further clampdown and repression for 
the freedom-loving civilian population, in particular the people of Benghazi. 
Every hour and day that goes by increases the burden of responsibility on our 
shoulders.  
If we are careful not to act too late, the Security Council will have the 
distinction of having ensured that in Libya law prevails over force, democracy 
over dictatorship and freedom over oppression. 
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Sarkozy, President of the Republic Paris, March 19, 2011  
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Ladies and gentlemen, 
Today the leaders of the League of Arab States and the European Union and 
representatives of the United States and Canada gathered in Paris at a meeting 
jointly chaired by France and the United Nations Secretary-General. Together, 
we decided to ensure the implementation of the United Nations Security 
Council resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire and a complete end to 
violence against civilians in Libya. 
The participants met to implement all the necessary means, particularly military 
ones, to enforce the United Nations Security Council decisions.  
That is why, in agreement with our partners, our air forces will counter any 
aggression by Colonel Gaddafi’s aircraft against the people of Benghazi. Our 
aircraft are already preventing air attacks on the city. Other French aircraft 
stand ready to intervene against any armoured vehicles that threaten unarmed 
civilians. 
Yesterday, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Arab countries 
issued the following warning to Colonel Gaddafi and the forces he is using: if 
there is no immediate ceasefire and a withdrawal of the forces that have 
attacked civilian populations in recent weeks, our countries will use military 
means. This warning was reaffirmed by all participants at the summit that has 
just ended. 
Colonel Gaddafi has completely disregarded this warning. Over the past few 
hours, his forces have intensified their deadly offensives. 
Arab peoples have chosen to free themselves from the servitude to which they 
have felt bound for far too long. These revolutions have given rise to immense 
hope in the hearts of all those who share the values of democracy and human 
rights. But they are not without danger. The future of these Arab peoples 
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belongs to them. In the midst of the difficulties and trials of all kinds that they 
must face, these Arab peoples need our help and support. It is our duty. 
In Libya, peaceful civilians who are demanding nothing more than the right to 
decide their future for themselves are in mortal danger. We have a duty to 
answer their anguished plea. The future of Libya belongs to the Libyans. We do 
not want to make decisions for them.  
Their fight for freedom is theirs. If we intervene alongside Arab countries, it is 
not to impose a final outcome on the Libyan people but in the name of 
universal conscience, which cannot tolerate such crimes. 
Today, we are intervening in Libya, under a mandate of the United Nations 
Security Council, with our partners and in particular our Arab partners. We are 
doing so to protect civilians from the murderous madness of a regime which, in 
killing its own people, has lost all legitimacy. 
We are intervening to enable the Libyan people to choose their own destiny. 
They cannot be deprived of their rights through violence and terror.  
There is still time for Colonel Gaddafi to avoid the worst by meeting all the 
international community’s demands, immediately and without reservations. 
The door of diplomacy will be re-opened once the attacks cease. 
Our determination is total. 
I say this solemnly. Everyone must now shoulder their responsibilities. It is a 
grave decision that we have had to take. Alongside her Arab, European and 
North American partners, France is determined to assume her role in history./. 
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11. Intervention by the armed forces to implement UNSCR 1973 – Government 
statement in the National Assembly – Speeches by François Fillon, Prime Minister; 
Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs; and Gérard 
Longuet, Minister for Defence and Veterans (excerpts) Paris, March 22, 2011  
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LIBYA CRISIS/BACKGROUND 
(…) 
Early in the afternoon of Saturday 19 March, the French air force went into 
action over Libya. In accordance with Article 35, paragraph two of our 
Constitution, it is my honour to inform the National Assembly of the reasons 
for and the conditions of our engagement. 
Since the start of this year, 2011, a wind of democracy and freedom has been 
blowing through the Arab world. The Tunisian people, then the Egyptian 
people, have expelled their leaders and abolished the authoritarian regimes in 
place since decolonization. 
Libya entered into the same process. 
We all hoped its outcome would be happy and swift; unfortunately, the Gaddafi 
regime decided to drown in blood the revolt that threatened it. In the space of 
two weeks, the Libyan people’s hopes turned into a nightmare. 
Last Thursday, Benghazi – the last bastion of freedom in Libya – seemed 
condemned to fall into the hands of the troops loyal to Gaddafi. 
The revolution seemed to be living through its final hours. Two days later, hope 
was reborn in Benghazi. They waved French flags and they waved the flags of 
another Libya, with its dreams of democracy and modernity. 
What happened? 
Gaddafi was banking on the international community being powerless. And it 
must be admitted we nearly descended into an endless cycle of appeals and 
warnings, whose sole consequence was offended speeches. France refused to 
accept this fate. 
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FRENCH DIPLOMACY 
President Sarkozy chose to act, and along with Alain Juppé – whose 
determination I want to welcome – he was able to persuade the United Nations 
Security Council to refuse the unacceptable. 
On Saturday, at France’s initiative, a Summit for the Support of the Libyan 
People was held in Paris, to secure the swift implementation of UNSCR 1973. 
Ladies and gentlemen deputies, the use of armed force in an internal conflict in 
an Arab country whose tribal structures still carry great weight is a grave 
decision. Some wonder about its chances of success. Let me say risks always 
exists. But wouldn’t the moral and political doubt be more profound and 
devastating if we’d done nothing? Wouldn’t we be burdened by a huge sense of 
guilt if – through caution and weakness – we’d stood by and witnessed the 
repression of an unarmed people? (…) 
From the beginning of the crisis in Libya, France took the initiative of 
demanding sanctions against the Libyan regime, both at the United Nations and 
within the European Union; of involving the International Criminal Court, to 
which a crisis has for the first time been unanimously referred by the Security 
Council, for acts which may constitute crimes against humanity; of sending 
humanitarian aid on a large scale to Benghazi hospital and the Tunisia-Libya 
border; and of helping the thousands of refugees fleeing the fighting to go back 
to their countries of origin, by means of an airlift from Tunisia. 
France fought tirelessly in all the international forums to persuade all her 
Western, Arab and African partners; at the United Nations Security Council, 
which adopted an initial resolution as early as 26 February; at the European 
Council of 11 March, under the impetus of Nicolas Sarkozy and David 
Cameron; and at the G8 foreign ministers’ meeting in Paris on 14 and 15 
March. (…) 
Unfortunately all these urgent appeals from the international community, all 
these warnings, all these sanctions did not weaken the Libyan regime’s cold 
resolve. Consequently, the use of force became the only solution. (…) 
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The call by the Arab League has provided us with backing from the countries 
of the region. We have a solid legal basis in the adoption of UNSCR 1973, in 
support of which President Sarkozy made a solemn appeal the day before the 
vote, with Alain Juppé playing a key role by travelling to New York to uphold 
it. It was a collective effort, and it took concrete shape in Paris on Saturday 
afternoon with the presence of 22 leaders of European, North American and 
Arab countries and international and regional organizations, who reaffirmed 
their determination to act on the basis of this resolution. (…) 
NATURE AND GOALS OF MILITARY ACTION  
It’s about protecting the Libyan population while explicitly ruling out the 
dispatch of an occupation force on the ground. It’s about establishing a no-fly 
zone. It’s about implementing the arms embargo. And it’s about fleshing out 
the sanctions regime already set out in UNSCR 1970. 
The message from the international community is unequivocal: an immediate 
end to the violence, the Libyan armed forces’ withdrawal from all the areas 
they have entered by force, their return to barracks, and full access to 
humanitarian assistance. 
By depriving the Gaddafi regime of its military superiority, we want to offer 
the Libyan people a chance to regain their confidence, define a political 
strategy and decide their future, because, ladies and gentlemen deputies, it’s not 
our role to replace them. (…) 
On Saturday 19 March, at the end of the Paris summit, President Sarkozy 
decided to launch the first missions. Some 20 air force fighter planes, refuelling 
planes, radar surveillance and electronic warfare planes then conducted an 
operation over the Benghazi region, both to halt the advance of Colonel 
Gaddafi’s forces and to start establishing a no-fly zone. (…) 
France is deploying more than 20 fighter planes a day, their missions planned 
in consultation with our allies. Since this morning, the carrier battle group has 
been in operation off the Libyan coast. The Rafales, Super Etendards and navy 
radar planes will henceforth be deployed from the aircraft carrier Charles de 
Gaulle. 
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The no-fly zone is in place. As UNSCR 1973 envisages, the aim of our air 
force’s action is indeed a total cessation of the violence and of all attacks and 
atrocities against the Libyan civilian population. And proof of it is that on 
Sunday, when our fighter planes failed to detect any Libyan units attacking the 
civilian population, they did not make use of their weapons. (…) 
So we’re implementing the whole of, and nothing but, UNSCR 1973. And I 
remind you that the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League 
of Arab States are notified in advance of actions to implement it. (…) 
France hopes a new era will begin tomorrow in the Mediterranean region, free 
of colonialist baggage and outdated attitudes; a new era based on the notions of 
respect and dignity, in which the fear and rejection of others give way to the 
sharing of common values. (…) 
At a time when France is engaged militarily, when our armed forces are 
bravely fulfilling their mission, I know, ladies and gentlemen deputies, that I 
can count on your sense of national unity. 
In Benghazi the tricolore flag has been raised, and this gesture compels us to 
accept our duty. As I stand here I know you, the nation’s representatives, are 
concerned to uphold a certain idea of France and liberty. Today there is neither 
Right nor Left, there is only the Republic, which commits itself from the heart, 
courageously but also with clarity and moment./. 
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Appendix 2: Speeches and Interviews with Francois 
Hollande and Jean-Marc Ayrault and Laurent Fabius 
1. 21st Ambassadors’ Conference – Speech by M. Francois Hollande, President 
of the Republic, Paris, August 27, 2013: 
https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article4855  
SYRIA/CHEMICAL ATTACKS/RESPONSE 
As I speak to you, the world is horrified at the revelation of the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. 
Everything leads us to believe that it was the regime that committed this 
despicable act, which condemns it once and for all in the eyes of the world. 
Indeed, using weapons that the Community of Nations banned 90 years ago in 
all of its international agreements is shameful. 
Need I remind you that this conflict has already left more than 100,000 dead? 
And that it is now spreading throughout the region, with attacks in Lebanon, 
the flow of refugees into Jordan and Turkey, and the unleashing of deadly 
violence in Iraq? This civil war is now threatening world peace. 
During the past year, France has acted. It led the effort to hold the Friends of 
Syria conference that took place in Paris in July 2012. Last September, it was 
the first to recognize the [Syrian] National Coalition as legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people. And it promptly provided humanitarian and 
material assistance to the opposition so that it could carry on with its fight. 
Today, it is our responsibility to seek the most appropriate response to the 
Syrian regime’s atrocities, once the major part of the United Nations 
investigation has been completed. 
The chemical massacre in Damascus cannot remain without a response. The 
international community cannot fail to react to the use of chemical weapons. 
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France stands ready to punish those who took the appalling decision to gas 
innocent people. 
In recent days, I have held numerous consultations with our – particularly 
American and European – allies, as well as our Arab partners, to consider all 
the options. Tomorrow I shall be holding a Defence Council meeting, and 
Parliament will be informed of the situation as soon as possible. 
Furthermore, I have decided to increase our military support for the Syrian 
National Coalition, while upholding our European commitments. 
Only through this firmness will we see a political solution prevail one day in 
Syria. 
FRANCE/FOREIGN POLICY 
For France to live up to its responsibility is the goal and the pride of the foreign 
policy I have been conducting with Laurent Fabius since my election. 
It is based on three major principles: 
Independence, which leads us every moment to decide, in full sovereignty, 
while being loyal to our alliances, to European solidarity and to our bilateral 
agreements. It’s this freedom that makes France useful to the world and to 
peace. 
Respect for international law. 
This is the best way of ensuring borders are respected, disputes are settled and 
collective security prevails. 
But international law must evolve with the times. It cannot be a pretext for 
allowing large-scale massacres to be perpetrated. This is why I recognize the 
principle of “the responsibility to protect” civilians, which the United Nations 
General Assembly voted for in 2005. 
377 
 
Finally, the requirement for dialogue, because France wants to be a bridge 
between the continents and avoid what some peope have called the clash of 
civilizations. It wants to be a “landmark power” – i.e. a nation that speaks 
beyond its interests alone. 
FRANCE/MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
In order to be effective, these principles depend on [France] having the means 
to act: firstly its diplomacy, but also its military capabilities, which give it a 
special role further strengthened by its status as a permanent member of the 
Security Council. 
So France must ensure that its defence tool remains reliable. The next military 
estimates bill, inspired by the work of the White Paper on Defence, will 
guarantee this. It will maintain defence budget funding for the coming five 
years, including in this very difficult period for our public finances. But it’s the 
essential condition for preserving our credibility and deciding on an 
intervention whenever our country deems it necessary, in the framework of 
international law. 
MALI/DRC/CAR/AFRICAN SECURITY 
This was the case in Mali on 11 January – not to usurp the Africans’ role, but to 
act with them… 
Seven French soldiers died in Operation Serval; dozens of others were 
wounded. I want to pay tribute to their sacrifice and, more broadly, to our 
forces, who enabled Malian territory to be liberated and a presidential election 
to be organized; I welcome the way it went ahead. It gave strong legitimacy to 
its new President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. 
In eight months, from January to July, we thus succeeded in driving away the 
terrorists, making Mali secure and starting the political transition. Rarely has an 
operation in recent years managed to achieve its goals in so short a time. 
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France will now reduce its military presence, but will continue to support Mali 
in the challenges lying ahead of it: restoring the state, improving governance, 
guaranteeing security and successfully working for development, and show 
extreme vigilance, because violent groups – both terrorists and traffickers – are 
seeking to establish themselves wherever states can no longer control their 
territories, and wherever regional cooperation isn’t working. 
We can see it in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the number of 
atrocities – of which women and children are the first victims – is increasing. 
That’s why we got the United Nations to put an intervention brigade in place in 
the Kivus. And today Monusco in Goma has the responsibility of opposing the 
armed groups destabilizing the region. 
Likewise, action in the Central African Republic is overdue. The country is on 
the brink of “Somalization”. I’ve met the NGOs working there. They’re doing 
an admirable job. The assessment is damning: 60,000 children are in danger of 
dying of malnutrition, and 1.5 million out of 5 million inhabitants have been 
displaced. 
I call on the African Union and the Security Council to deal with this situation. 
France will help them do so. 
But I remind you now: it’s above all for the Africans to ensure their security. 
That’s the purpose of the Elysée summit to be held in December, eight months 
after the African Union decided to create a crisis response capability, and six 
months after the meeting on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, at which 
actions were undertaken against piracy. 
Europe will be represented at the Paris summit, because we must respond 
together to the African countries’ requests for training, support and equipment 
of their armed forces, because that continent has a bright future. It must be able 
to control its destiny by itself. France will stand alongside it, without seeking 
anything for itself. 
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TUNISIA/EGYPT/MEDITERRANEAN 
France’s responsibility is also to support the Arab countries in their difficult 
transitions. 
I recalled in Tunis that no religion was incompatible with the exercise of 
democracy and that Islam could provide new proof of this once individual 
freedoms, equality between women and men, and pluralism were respected. 
So France is showing solidarity with the Tunisian people to enable them to 
regain their voice through the swift organization of elections as indisputable as 
those of 2011. 
That’s one more reason to condemn the perpetrators of the violence targeting 
political activists in Tunisia, which is being used deliberately to endanger the 
democratic process. 
In the name of these same values, we call on the Egyptian authorities to restore 
law and order as quickly as possible and move towards new elections with all 
players in society. France is willing to contribute, with others, to mediation. It 
makes this proposal without any intention to interfere, and with the sole 
concern to be effective. 
I’d like to broaden my remarks by offering new prospects of cooperation to the 
countries in the region. I suggested to Malta at the 5+5 summit that we build 
together a Mediterranean of projects. We can’t remain limited to the short-lived 
initiatives of recent years. I call for new, less ambitious but more concrete 
partnerships. 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
But I am well aware that nothing solid can be achieved until the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is resolved. 
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France’s position is unwavering. The foundations for achieving a just and 
enduring solution are well known. They are based on the coexistence of two 
viable states that recognize each other across secure borders. 
I supported Palestine’s admission to the United Nations as a non-member 
observer state. But no vote can take the place of direct discussions. 
That is why I welcome the resumption of talks, resolutely encouraged by the 
US administration. Make no mistake: this is one of the last opportunities to 
conclude a peace agreement. 
It must not be squandered. Together with its European partners, France stands 
ready to play its full role with the Israelis and Palestinians, in consultation with 
its Arab partners. 
That is what I will be saying in Israel and Palestine this autumn. 
IRAN/NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
But another issue threatens peace in the region. It is the Iranian nuclear 
programme, as long as it serves a military purpose. Thus far, negotiations have 
failed. I want to believe that the election of President Rouhani could change the 
equation. 
For Iran is paying the price of sanctions and isolation. And that price will grow 
if nothing changes. 
That great country must choose transparency and full compliance with its 
international obligations. 
I therefore await concrete, prompt, verifiable and verified gestures. 
But time is running out. With Iran equipping itself with the resources for what 
is unacceptable, the threat is growing. And the countdown has already begun. 
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Hence the urgency of negotiations in the E3+3 format. They must swiftly lead 
to progress. 
FRANCE/GLOBAL 
ROLE/TRADE/COMPETITION/INVESTMENT/TOURISM 
So on all the challenges, conflicts and crises, France is making its voice heard. 
Not for the sake of itself, its influence and interests, but for the sake of its idea 
of the world’s equilibrium and of its own responsibility. 
Its responsibility is also to fully address planetary changes. 
There are now dozens of new powers. In 20 years, the emerging countries’ 
share of global GDP has gone from 36% to 50%. The largest ones have already 
reached technological levels comparable to the developed countries. They have 
considerable currency reserves. 
Huge middle clases[sic] are developing there. It’s predicted that the urban 
population will be more than four billion strong in 10 years’ time, half of it in 
Asia. That’s an economic challenge, but it’s also a considerable opportunity for 
our companies, academics and creative professionals. 
I have confidence in France’s ability to face up to this competition. 
It must still take the right decisions, adapt its policies and modernize its 
economy. I’ve embarked on those reforms. 
The target I’ve set is to return to equilibrium in our non-energy trade balance 
by 2017. 
All the state’s tools must be actively used. Our embassies and consulates, the 
economic services abroad, Ubifrance, Coface, the Invest in France Agency: 
they must all work together with a single aim – to support our companies in 
conquering new markets. 
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Export financing instruments must also be improved: it’s unacceptable for 
major French industrial bidders to be penalized against their competitors for 
lack of financial support. The government is working on this. 
SMEs must be one of the priorities of economic diplomacy. Whenever a major 
contract is won, French subcontractors, component manufacturers and suppliers 
must also gain access to the markets. I ask you, ladies and gentlemen 
ambassadors, to ensure this happens. 
Concurrently, our country must attract more investors, entrepreneurs, 
researchers and students. Every facility will be granted, including in terms of 
issuing visas. 
Tourism must be elevated to a great national cause, which means improving 
reception facilities in airports, stepping up security and increasing 
infrastructure and supply levels. France is already the world’s leading tourist 
destination; its aim is to achieve the highest tourism receipts of all the 
European countries. 
FRANCE/CULTURE/FRENCH NATIONALS 
ABROAD/FRANCOPHONY 
It’s not a question of the economy on the one hand and influence on the other. 
Everything plays a role in France’s presence in the world: 
That’s the case with our academic policy. France hosts 48,000 international 
researchers and 300,000 foreign students: we must do more. That’s the role of 
Campus France, whose mission is to direct a greater number of promising 
students to our universities and grandes écoles (1). 
Our cultural network is also a lever for asserting France as a brand, promoting 
our creative professionals and architects, and making our way of life an 
aspiration for the emerging middle classes. 
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An active diplomacy is also a diplomacy focused on French nationals abroad. 
Hélène Conway is working on that. The number of our compatriots living 
outside our borders has doubled in 15 years. We have more than two million of 
them, and they take part in the economic, cultural and social life of their 
countries of residence. Pursuing part of one’s professional career in another 
country is becoming ever more commonplace. It’s a change our diplomacy 
must adapt to – in order both to support our fellow citizens and to make the 
most of their presence. 
France projects itself abroad through its language. The Francophone world 
accounts for 15% of global wealth. That’s a tremendous asset – in Africa, 
which will have 600 million French speakers in 2050, but also in Asia and 
America, where our language is being used more, and in all the forums where 
decisions are taken, because in order for tomorrow’s world to be thought of in 
French, it must speak it. That’s the mission I’ve entrusted to Yamina 
Benguigui. 
FRANCE/CHINA/INDIA/JAPAN/BRAZIL/SOUTH AFRICA/RUSSIA 
France is a universal nation. It is destined to establish genuine partnerships with 
major countries. 
With China, I’d like the 50th anniversary of the restoration of our diplomatic 
relations to be the opportunity to continue our cooperation on energy, including 
civil nuclear energy, but also to restore our trade balance. 
The Chinese Prime Minister told me politely that China does not intend to have 
a trade surplus with France. 
I replied to him, equally courteously, that France doesn’t intend to have a 
structural deficit with China, either. We undoubtedly have some way to go to 
reach a balance, but also to welcome more Chinese investors to France. 
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I don’t want to raise new fears here, but when we have the opportunity to have 
capital invested in France, including in our industry, I don’t want to reject it. 
Just as we support the investment made abroad from France – because it’s a 
way of gaining access to markets and competing for positions –, so we must 
accept that there be industrial investments by emerging countries in France. For 
many years there’s been a very large gap between French investments abroad 
and foreign investments in France – even though France is one of the countries 
with the most inward investment by foreign countries providing their capital. 
With India, the world’s largest democracy, I want to broaden further our 
economic relations, defence cooperation and cultural exchanges. 
With Japan, the state visit I paid in June was the opportunity to resume our 
exceptional partnership with the world’s third-largest economy, which has put 
growth at the heart of its agenda. 
With Brazil – which is going to host major international events –, France has 
special affinities. I’ll have the opportunity to bear witness to this by going there 
before the end of the year. 
With South Africa, the close dialogue between our two countries on the 
continent’s security is particularly invaluable, because it enables us to end the 
rift between English-speaking and French-speaking Africa. 
Finally, I’d like to mention Russia. We know what unites us – history, the 
economy, culture – but also what divides us, and that frankness enables us to 
move forward. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
For I have a duty to express everywhere our commitment to respect for human 
rights. 
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France prides itself in defending them when they are flouted, and in recalling 
the demand for dignity, equality between men and women, but also for 
combating homophobia, which is taking on worrying proportions. 
TAX AVOIDANCE/ECONOMIC IMBALANCES 
France’s responsibility is to help the world be better governed. What are our 
goals? 
Firstly, to continue the fight against tax avoidance. Major progress was made at 
the G8 on exchanging economic information, lifting banking secrecy and 
combating aggressive tax optimization. I expect the G20 summit in St 
Petersburg next week to build on all these advances. 
Secondly, reducing global imbalances. There must be greater coordination 
between the major economies’ policies, in the governance bodies: at the IMF, 
the World Bank, the G8 and the G20. The growth of some can’t be achieved to 
the detriment of others. In the same spirit, it’s essential for currencies to reflect 
the real state of economies. 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Lastly, to reach a climate agreement. 
We can’t recognize global warming and stand idly by. 
That will be the point of the 2015 Conference, which will take place in France 
– because we suggested holding the conference. 
In order to be successful, we have to reconcile two requirements: the aspiration 
for development, especially in the poorest countries, and the need to keep 
global warming within sustainable levels. 
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Our approach will therefore depend on the voluntary contributions of states, 
assessed on the basis of reliable and transparent criteria, and on a global 
agreement that will be binding on all countries, in line with the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibility”. 
France intends to set an example through its own energy transition and by 
upholding its European commitments. It has already initiated a process of 
persuasion. 
That’s the task I have entrusted to Nicolas Hulot. 
I have confidence in our ability to get past the failure of Copenhagen. 
President Obama made a strong commitment to the issue of global warming, 
and my exchanges with the Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian leaders, as well as 
with the African heads of state, confirm my view that it is possible to achieve a 
compromise. 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCING/GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, 
TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA 
This is also true for ensuring development financing. 
France is the world’s fourth-largest donor. I made the commitment to overhaul 
the framework of this policy, which represents over €9 billion a year. This is 
the purpose of the bill on our development policy, championed by Pascal 
Canfin. 
France’s action will focus on the poorest countries and will plan to bring 
together all the development players, particularly local authorities, NGOs and 
businesses. 
I have also asked for our contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria to be maintained at its current level. 
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EUROPE/ECONOMIC PROGRESS 
Ladies and gentlemen ambassadors, 
It is France’s responsibility to take the initiative in Europe. 
Progress has been made over the past year: 
The Euro Area’s integrity has been safeguarded. Greece has been rescued, not 
without pain. 
Stability and solidarity mechanisms have been introduced. The ECB played its 
part in this. 
The fiscal compact has been ratified. 
Banking union has got under way. 
Growth has been put back at the heart of the agenda. 
Youth employment became our shared priority. France will, incidentally, be 
hosting a second European conference on this topic in November. 
So many advances that few imagined possible in the space of a year. 
Today, Europe is emerging from recession. Everything which can boost 
economic activity and create jobs must be speeded up and encouraged. We 
won’t manage this unless Europe reorders its priorities. 
FUTURE OF EUROPE/FRENCH 
PROPOSALS/EUROGROUP/ENERGY/DEFENCE/“DIFFERENTIATE
D EUROPE” 
My proposals are threefold: simplify, move forward, clarify. 
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Simplify, with a stabilized Eurogroup presidency, the establishment of an 
economic government for the Euro Area, and harmonization of fiscal and social 
rules, particularly the minimum wage. 
Move forward. This means fleshing out the European project in at least three 
areas: first, energy. I’m arguing for an energy community which ensures 
interconnecting networks, security of supply and climate protection. Secondly, 
digital technology. In October I would like Europe to define its own rules to 
protect private data and the technology it needs on its soil. 
Finally, defence. I want, at the December European Council, to give impetus to 
a European industry, implement structural programmes and move towards 
Defence Europe. 
Clarify. It is time to draw conclusions from the different relations member 
countries maintain with the European Union. I respect the choices of those who 
want to leave things as they are and even of those who might decide to stand on 
the sidelines. But I above all intend to go further with the countries which have 
decided to forge ahead. It’s our project of mutually-supportive integration in a 
“differentiated Europe” where there would be distinct paces, content and even 
decision-making rules, whilst keeping the union of all [member states] as an 
area of freedom, democracy and solidarity. 
GERMAN PRESIDENT’S VISIT TO FRANCE 
On all these issues and thus on this initiative, France intends to act in harmony 
with Germany, because our two countries are indissociable. Irrespective of the 
government, irrespective of the majority, we are duty-bound to promote 
Europe’s future. Next week, I shall be welcoming President Gauck to France 
on a state visit. 
He wants to go to several symbolic places: to Paris, of course, where the bulk 
of the visit will take place; to Marseille, to give the city encouragement and 
also pay tribute to its cultural renaissance; and finally to Oradour-sur-Glane, to 
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convey the message – the only one that truly matters: forget nothing and be 
able, at the same time, to build the future together. 
It will further demonstrate the strength of this friendship. This friendship has 
the characteristic of not overly focusing on the two countries which decided on 
it, but of being at the exclusive service of the European idea. 
FUTURE OF EUROPE 
Immediately after the German elections, I would like France and Germany to 
retake the initiative, as our two countries have been able to do at each stage of 
the European enterprise. 
For all these reasons – and I’m not forgetting the appointment of the new 
European Parliament – the year ahead will be decisive for Europe’s future. 
Do I have to oversimplify almost to the point of caricature? Either Europe is 
able to draw up a project for itself again, or slowly but surely it will undergo a 
process of disintegration and declining in status, which will not just be fatal for 
Europe – which has been the great human adventure of the past 70 years – but 
will harm the whole world, because Europe is a benchmark, a framework, even 
an example of regional cooperation. 
FRENCH DIPLOMACY 
Ladies and gentlemen ambassadors, 
You carry France’s message. This is both a responsibility and an honour. 
During my many visits, I have noted the quality of our diplomatic tool and of 
all those civilian and military staff contributing to it. Laurent Fabius would 
quite rightly like to develop it. It isn’t a question of “change for change’s sake”, 
it’s a question of being able to take up the world’s challenges and react to its 
changes. 
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France must be active everywhere – that’s your mission and ours too. 
Active in finding political solutions to tensions which flare up, 
Active in backing peoples’ aspirations, 
in supporting the poorest countries, 
in promoting essential regulation, 
in forging partnerships with the emerging countries, 
finally, active in exercising our responsibility. 
There are times when this responsibility is tough: do we commit France or not? 
Do we act or not? Do we take decisions or not? Do we intervene or let things 
take their course? This question has been put to the Head of State at specific 
moments in our country’s history. Once again, the question is back or is going 
to be back in the next few days. 
Do we act or not? Do we get involved or leave it to others? France has decided 
to exercise its responsibility everywhere, for itself and for world stability. 
Thank you./. 
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2. Joint Declaration of Mr Francois Hollande, President of the French Republic, and 
Ahmad Al-Assi Al Jarba, President of the Syrian National Coalition, on the Situation 
in Syria. Paris 29 August 2013 
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/137001987.html  
 
LE PRESIDENT - « Mesdames, Messieurs. J’ai accueilli, pour la deuxième 
fois d’ailleurs, le président de la Coalition nationale syrienne et j’ai renouvelé 
le plein soutien de la France à l’opposition qui est la seule représentante à nos 
yeux et d’ailleurs aux yeux d’une grande partie de la communauté 
internationale du peuple syrien. Je l’ai reçu dans un moment particulièrement 
tragique avec le massacre chimique qui s’est produit le 21 août et qui appelle la 
réaction appropriée de la communauté internationale. 
Et je lui ai dit, une nouvelle fois, que la France apporterait toute son aide, son 
aide politique, son soutien, comme nous le faisons depuis des mois, mais 
également son aide humanitaire, matérielle et que nous utiliserons également 
l’appui que nous avons dans les pays du Golfe pour qu’il y ait justement cette 
organisation. 
Enfin, je suis conscient de ce que vit le peuple syrien, de ses souffrances, de ses 
douleurs. 100 000 morts depuis le début de ce conflit. Tout doit être fait pour 
une solution politique mais elle ne viendra que si, justement, la coalition est 
capable d’apparaître comme une alternative avec la force nécessaire, 
notamment de son armée. 
Et nous n’y parviendrons que si la communauté internationale est capable de 
marquer un coup d’arrêt par rapport à cette escalade de violence dont le 
massacre chimique n’est qu’une illustration. 
Merci. 
M. Ahmad AL-ASSI AL-JARBA - « Nous venons d’avoir une réunion avec le 
président de la République française, qui est une grand ami du peuple syrien, 
pour la deuxième fois en moins d’un mois, dans des circonstances 
exceptionnelles et très délicates pour le peuple syrien. Ce peuple vraiment 
héroïque qui vient de subir un bombardement terrible, un massacre terrible par 
des armes chimiques, commis par ce régime criminel il y a une semaine. 
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Il y a plus de 1 400 martyrs suite à cette attaque, des milliers de blessés qui ont 
été victimes de ce crime à l’arme chimique. Nous avons parlé avec le président 
de la République, nous avons remercié le Président pour la position de la 
République française, ses positions personnelles, les positions du 
Gouvernement français et également la sympathie et la compassion dont a fait 
preuve le peuple français après ce crime contre l’humanité. 
Ce crime ne doit pas rester impuni. Il faut qu’il y ait une force pour dissuader 
ce régime criminel, une force internationale, une force onusienne, une force 
organisée par les amis du peuple syrien et à leur tête, la République française. 
Je voudrais également remercier nos alliés, les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni. 
Je voudrais m’adresser au peuple syrien pour dire à notre peuple, à nos familles 
qui sont sur place : ce crime ne restera pas impuni. La punition sera infligée à 
ce criminel, à sa machine de mort et à ceux qui ont utilisé ces armes. Nous 
condamnons les armes chimiques sous toutes leurs formes. Nous n’acceptons 
pas que ces armes soient utilisées contre notre peuple ou contre d’autres 
peuples. Je répète : nous condamnons l’utilisation des armes chimiques. 
Je voudrais, Monsieur le Président, encore une fois vous remercier, remercier le 
peuple français pour cette position humaniste qui a été la sienne. Merci. » 
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3. Interview between President Francois Hollande and Le Monde 
Le Monde 31 August 2013 
https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/08/30/francois-hollande-au-
monde-il-ne-s-agit-pas-de-renverser-le-dictateur-syrien_3468865_3210.html  
 
 Le président de la République, François Hollande, a répondu aux questions des 
journalistes du Monde, jeudi 29 août à l'Elysée. 
La France détient-elle la preuve de l'emploi d'armes chimiques le 21 août à 
Damas ? 
La question n'est plus de savoir si des armes chimiques ont été utilisées le 21 
août dans la banlieue de Damas. C'est un fait établi. Même les autorités 
syriennes ne le nient plus. Non, la question, c'est de connaître les auteurs de cet 
acte effroyable. La France dispose d'un faisceau d'indices qui vont dans le sens 
de la responsabilité du régime. D'abord, plusieurs agressions chimiques avaient 
déjà eu lieu en Syrie. Mais celle du 21 août, par son ampleur et ses effets, 
marque un changement de nature. Or, il est avéré que l'opposition ne détient 
aucune de ces armes, alors que tous les stocks sont contrôlés par Bachar Al-
Assad. Ensuite, le quartier frappé ne l'a pas été par hasard, ni par inadvertance : 
c'est une zone-clé pour le contrôle par le régime des voies de communication 
vers Damas. Enfin, tout a été fait dans les heures qui ont suivi ces exactions 
pour en effacer les traces par des bombardements dont on est sûr de l'origine. 
Quelle serait la légalité d'une action militaire ? 
Le protocole de 1925 interdit l'usage des armes chimiques. Gazer une 
population constitue, comme Ban Ki-moon l'a dit lui-même, un crime contre 
l'humanité. C'est pourquoi l'ONU est saisie. Et qu'une mission d'inspection a été 
envoyée sur place. Mais il est à craindre que, quelle que soit l'évidence, le 
Conseil de sécurité ne soit empêché de prendre la résolution nécessaire pour 
une action. Il est bloqué depuis deux ans sur la question syrienne. 
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Et s'il demeure bloqué ? 
Le massacre chimique de Damas ne peut ni ne doit rester impuni. Sinon ce 
serait prendre le risque d'une escalade qui banaliserait l'usage de ces armes et 
menacerait d'autres pays. Je ne suis pas favorable à une intervention 
internationale qui viserait à "libérer" la Syrie ou à renverser le dictateur, mais 
j'estime qu'un coup d'arrêt doit être porté à un régime qui commet l'irréparable 
sur sa population. 
Quels sont les buts de guerre ? 
Je ne parlerais pas d'une guerre, mais de la sanction d'une violation 
monstrueuse des droits de la personne humaine. Elle aura valeur de dissuasion. 
Ne pas agir, ce serait laisser faire. La guerre civile en Syrie dure depuis trop 
longtemps. Elle a fait 100 000 morts. La France a pris très tôt des initiatives. 
Elle a réuni à l'été 2012 les "Amis de la Syrie" et reconnu la Coalition nationale 
comme seule représentante légitime du peuple syrien. Elle lui a apporté son 
soutien politique, puis des aides matérielles et humanitaires et, plus récemment, 
des moyens militaires dans le respect de nos engagements européens. 
Aujourd'hui, une étape dans l'horreur a été franchie. Et c'est la riposte, et non 
l'inertie, qui imposera une solution politique. 
Quelle forme peut prendre l'intervention ? 
Toutes les options sont sur la table. La France veut une action proportionnée et 
ferme contre le régime de Damas. 
Quels pays seraient amenés à intervenir ? 
Si le Conseil de sécurité est empêché d'agir, une coalition se formera. Elle 
devra être la plus large possible. Elle s'appuiera sur la Ligue arabe, qui a 
condamné le crime et a alerté la communauté internationale. Elle aura le 
soutien des Européens. Mais il y a peu de pays qui ont les capacités d'infliger 
une sanction par des moyens appropriés. La France en fait partie. Elle y est 
prête. Elle décidera de sa position en étroite liaison avec ses alliés. 
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Le premier Parlement consulté – celui du Royaume-Uni – a refusé le 
principe d'une opération en Syrie. Peut-on agir sans nos alliés traditionnels 
britanniques ? 
Oui. Chaque pays est souverain pour participer ou non à une opération. Cela 
vaut pour le Royaume-Uni comme pour la France. J'aurai ce vendredi un 
échange approfondi avec Barack Obama. 
En quoi ce choix diffère-t-il de ce qui a pu être reproché aux 
néoconservateurs américains en matière d'intervention armée ? 
En Irak, l'intervention s'est faite alors même qu'aucune preuve n'avait été 
apportée quant à l'existence d'armes de destruction massive. En Syrie, hélas, les 
armes chimiques ont été utilisées. En fait, l'opération en Irak visait à renverser 
le régime. Rien de tel pour la riposte envisagée en Syrie. La France, depuis le 
début de la guerre civile, a obstinément recherché une solution politique. Ce 
qui a changé, depuis le 21 août, c'est le massacre chimique. C'est une ligne 
rouge définie il y a un an qui a été franchie indéniablement. 
Libye, Mali, Syrie… La France ne prend-elle pas le risque de multiplier les 
recours à l'interventionnisme ? 
En 2011, j'avais approuvé l'engagement de la France en Libye. Mais j'ai 
regretté que ses conséquences n'aient pas été maîtrisées. En janvier 2013, j'ai 
pris la décision d'une intervention au Mali. Je constate qu'elle a été efficace, 
coordonnée avec les Africains et menée dans un délai court. Elle a permis de 
déboucher sur des élections libres et incontestables. Pour la Syrie, je veillerai à 
ce que la réponse de la communauté internationale fasse cesser l'escalade de la 
violence. Chaque situation est différente. Pour chacune d'entre elles, la France 
prend ses responsabilités au nom de ses valeurs et de ses principes. 
Comment gérer la relation avec la Russie au lendemain des frappes ? 
La Russie refuse d'admettre que le régime ait pu commettre cette abomination, 
tant elle craint qu'en cas d'effondrement de Bachar Al-Assad, ce soit le chaos. 
Je veux donc la convaincre que le pire, c'est la situation actuelle. C'est elle qui 
396 
 
favorise la montée des groupes djihadistes. J'ai toujours dit au président Poutine 
que je ne remettais nullement en cause les liens privilégiés que son pays 
entretient depuis longtemps avec la Syrie. Et l'intérêt de la Russie serait de 
parvenir au plus tôt à une solution politique. 
Êtes-vous assuré du soutien de l'opinion publique ? 
Quand j'ai décidé d'envoyer nos forces armées au Mali, les Français n'étaient 
pas encore pleinement conscients de l'ampleur du terrorisme au Sahel. 
Aujourd'hui, ils sont fiers que nos armées aient libéré un pays ami. Ce que je 
leur dois en toutes circonstances, c'est la vérité sur les engagements de la 
France, leur bien-fondé, sans occulter les menaces sur notre propre sécurité. Il 
n'est pas question d'entraîner notre pays dans une aventure. Mais quel est le 
plus grand danger : punir un pays qui a utilisé l'arme chimique ou laisser faire 
un clan aux abois qui peut avoir la tentation de recommencer ? L'arme 
chimique est un danger pour l'humanité. 
Excluez-vous des frappes avant que le Parlement ait pu se prononcer ? 
J'exclus de prendre une décision avant de disposer de tous les éléments qui la 
justifieraient. J'ai convoqué le Parlement mercredi en session extraordinaire, il 
débattra de la situation en Syrie. Et si j'ai engagé la France, le gouvernement 
l'informera des moyens et des objectifs poursuivis conformément à l'article 35 
de la Constitution. 
Vous excluez une intervention avant le départ des inspecteurs de Syrie ? 
Oui. 
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4. Déclaration du Premier ministre, M. Jean-Marc Ayrault 03 septembre 2013 
http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-
doc/FranceDiplomatie/PDF/bafr2013-09-03.pdf  
 
Mesdames, Messieurs, J'ai tenu à l'instant une réunion destinée à informer les 
principaux responsables de la majorité comme de l'opposition de l'Assemblée 
nationale et du Sénat sur la situation en Syrie. 
 
Cette information du Parlement est indispensable. En effet, les élus de la nation 
doivent pouvoir accéder aux éléments qui justifient les positions que le 
président de la République et le gouvernement ont adoptées ces derniers jours 
sur la situation en Syrie et les réactions qu'elle appelle de la France. 
 
Cette réunion s'est déroulée dans un climat d'une particulière gravité. 
 
Le 21 août dernier le régime de Bachar Al-Assad a commis l'irréparable en 
employant à grande échelle l'arme chimique contre sa propre population. Cet 
acte, plus personne n'en nie la réalité, ce que devraient confirmer les 
inspecteurs des Nations unies et les éléments que nous avons recueillis 
permettent d'en imputer la responsabilité au régime. Cet acte, 
il ne peut rester sans réponse. 
 
L'enjeu c'est d'éviter que Bachar Al-Assad n'utilise à nouveau l'arme chimique 
contre son peuple. L'enjeu, c'est d'envoyer un message à tous ceux qui seraient 
tentés de l'imiter à l'avenir. Il y a donc un enjeu pour la sécurité collective, pour 
notre propre sécurité dans un contexte où les armes de destruction massive 
constituent déjà un défi majeur au Moyen-Orient comme dans d'autres régions 
du monde. 
 
La France est donc déterminée à sanctionner l'usage de l'arme chimique par le 
régime de Bachar Al-Assad et de le dissuader d'y recourir à nouveau par une 
action ferme et proportionnée qui ne visera ni à renverser ce régime, ni à libérer 
la Syrie. Nous sommes en effet convaincus qu'il n'y aura en Syrie qu'une 
solution politique. 
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L'information du Parlement se poursuivra à l'occasion de la session 
extraordinaire que le président de la République a convoquée dès mercredi. J'ai 
souhaité que ce débat puisse avoir lieu dans un climat de responsabilité, de 
gravité, à un moment délicat où les intérêts supérieurs de la France sont en jeu. 
Il n'est pas question pour la France d'agir seule. 
 
Le président de la République continue son travail de persuasion pour réunir, 
dans les meilleurs délais, une coalition. La France doit se rassembler autour de 
cet objectif, car la France défend le respect du droit international. 
 
J'ai aussi appelé au respect des équilibres institutionnels découlant de notre 
Constitution. C'est au président de la République qu'il appartient de décider si 
un vote, que notre Constitution n'exige pas, doit avoir lieu. Mercredi il y aura 
un débat sans vote car en toute hypothèse, la décision ultime ne pourra être 
prise par le président de la République 
que lorsque sera constituée cette coalition, seule à même de conduire une action 
pour adresser ce message de fermeté: il n'est plus possible d'utiliser l'arme 
chimique en Syrie par le dictateur Bachar Al-Assad contre son propre peuple. 
 
Je vous remercie./. 
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5. Syria/Syrian chemical programme – National executive summary of 
declassified intelligence¹ Paris, 3 September 2013 (Eng translation by French 
Defence Ministry) 
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Syrian_Chemical_Programme.p
df  
Cases of previous use of chemical agents by the Syrian regime  
Chemical attack launched by the regime on Aug 21  
This document has been produced through declassified intelligence mostly 
drawn from French-only sources. It includes a thorough technical analysis 
performed on open sources by our intelligence and technical services. It 
integrates, finally, some complementary elements received through cooperation 
with our closest partners.  
Syria detains one of the world’s most important operational chemical weapons 
stockpile, accumulated within the framework of a long-standing and diversified 
programme, which has been monitored for a long time by French and partner 
intelligence services. This programme is one of the main threats in terms of 
weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Countering the threat stemming 
from WMD proliferation is a key objective for our defence, as stated again in 
the recent French White paper on defence and national security.  
In combats against the opposition, President Assad’s regime has already used 
such weapons, including sarin, in limited attacks against the population, in 
particular in April 2013. The analysis of information we have now gathered 
leads us to consider that, on August 21, 2013, the Syrian regime has launched 
an attack on some suburbs of Damascus that were being held by the opposition 
forces, using together conventional means and a large amount of chemical 
agents.  
 
1 – The Syrian chemical programme  
Syria has long been equipped with a massive chemical arsenal, together with 
many related delivery systems. The Syrian regime acknowledged as much on 
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July 23, 2012 through its Foreign Affairs spokesperson, who confirmed that: 
”these different weapons [chemical and non-conventional] are stockpiled and 
secured under the supervision of the armed forces”. Syria is not part to the 1993 
Convention on Chemical Weapons Ban, which 189 Nations have signed and 
ratified.  
The Syrian chemical programme started in the 1970’s by the import of 
chemical munitions. In the 1980’s, Damascus started acquiring the materials, 
products and knowledge necessary to set up an autonomous and massive 
production capacity in that field.  
Nature of the Syrian chemical arsenal  
With above 1000 ton of chemical agents and precursor chemicals, Damascus 
has one of Syria/chemical weapons the most important operational stockpile in 
the world, without any perspective of programmed destruction in the absence 
of a Syrian willingness to join the CCWB.  
 
The Syrian arsenal is particularly massive and diversified. It includes: 
 ‐ Several hundreds of tons of sulfur mustard, stockpiled in its final form,  
‐ Several tens of tons of VX. VX is the most toxic among the known chemical 
warfare agents,  
‐ Several hundreds of tons of sarin, representing the bulk of the arsenal.  
 
Sarin and VX are neurotoxic organophosphorous compounds which are partly 
stocked in a binary manner, i.e. kept as two distinct chemical products, called 
precursor chemicals, which are mixed just before use. Such a technique and 
related processes reveal a high level of know-how in the chemical weapons 
technology by the Syrian regime.  
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Syrian scientists have also worked on nitrogen mustard, a first generation 
vesicant agent, as well as neurotoxic organophosphorus compounds with 
toxicity level higher than sarin.  
 
Means of delivery  
Damascus is in a position to deliver its chemical weapons through a vast range 
of several thousand launchers:  
‐ Scud C missiles, with a range of 500 km, capable of delivering sulfur 
mustard, sarin or VX,  
‐ Scud B missiles, capable of delivering sarin or VX at a 300 km range,  
‐ M600 missiles, with a range between 250 and 300 km. They too can deliver 
the three already mentioned toxic agents.  
‐ SS21 missiles, adapted to carry the three mentioned chemical warfare agents, 
at a limited range (70 km).  
‐ Air launched bombs with a payload of sarin. Depending on the model, they 
can deliver between 100 and 300 litres of toxic agent,  
‐ Artillery rockets, particularly 302 and 320 mm, aimed at delivering sulfur 
mustard, sarin or VX at a shorter range (50 km and under).  
Some missiles are able to deliver several hundred litres of toxic agents.  
Activities monitored for several years on Syrian test sites indicate that new 
dispersal mechanisms are being studied. Since the beginning of the conflict, our 
intelligence confirms the use by the regime of ammunitions carrying a lesser 
volume of chemical agents, adapted to a tactical use, more focused and local.  
Capability to deliver chemical agents by Syrian vectors  
SCUD C: VX – Sarin – Yperite – Range: 500 km  
SCUD B: VX – Sarin – Range: 300 km  
M600: VX – Sarin – Yperite – Range: 250-300 km  
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SS21: VX – Sarin – Yperite – Range: 70 km  
Bomb: Sarin  
Rockets: VX – Sarin – Yperite – Range: 50 km  
Other tactical munitions: Sarin – Range: below 50 km.  
We cannot exclude that such tests may also have been conducted with other 
categories of chemicals diverted from their civilian use and used at lethal doses.  
 
2 – Chemical attacks previously lead by the Syrian regime  
Cases have been documented in the recent months of the use of chemical 
agents by the Syrian regime in attacks against some areas controlled by the 
opposition, with an objective of seizing territory or inspiring terror. By doing 
so the regime has violated the commitments under the Geneva Protocol of 
1925, which it has signed in 1968, concerning the prohibition of use at war of 
suffocating gas, toxic or similar weapons as well as biological weapons.  
 
French competent services have obtained samples either biomedical (blood, 
urine), environmental (ground) or material (munitions debris), taken on victims 
or on the sites during the attacks in Saraqeb (Apri 29, 2013) and Jobar (mid-
April 2013). Our analyses have confirmed the use of sarin.  
 
On April 29, we know that the Syrian regime lead an attack against Saraqeb, 
located 30 km South-East of Idleb. An [sic] helicopter flying high over the 
town dropped over its western part small munitions spreading white smoke. 
Some twenty persons were intoxicated and taken to local hospitals, where 
medical agents were intoxicated by transferred contamination. The analyses 
have confirmed the use of sarin.  
 
Mid-April, forty people were intoxicated and evacuated from the eastern 
suburbs of Damascus, in the city of Jobar. The analysis of biomedical samples 
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taken from victims of this attack and performed in conditions verified by our 
services, have also confirmed the use of sarin.  
 
These confirmed use of sarin by Syrian forces have demonstrated that the 
Bachar El Assad regime is adapting its tactics and the munitions in its 
stockpiles to a terror use against civilian population.  
 
These previous events and the simultaneous and massive use of chemical 
agents during the night of August 21, 2013 on the Eastern suburbs of Damascus 
confirm that the Syrian regime has deliberately crossed a step. Our intelligence 
services also have information, from national sources, leading to think that 
other such actions might again be undertaken.  
 
3 – Massive and coordinated use of chemical agents against civilians on 
21s[sic] August 
 Based on a methodical technical analysis of 47 original video tapes of the 
August 21 events, a first counting of the victims, area by area, has been carried 
out. Based on just this set of videos, no less than 281 death casualties have been 
recorded, located in the East Ghouta (Ain Tarma, Douma, Erbin, Jobar, Kfar 
Batna, Qas Alaa, Zamalka) and West Ghouta (Mudamiyat Sham).  
 
Our own intelligence confirms that, in the Douma hospital, half of the victims 
were women and children and, in 50% of the cases, death was instantaneous. 
The doctors conclude that a high concentration of toxic agent was used.  
 
Other independent assessments, produced for instance by the NGO “Doctors 
without borders” mention at least 355 deaths. Several technical numberings, 
from different sources, assess the final toll at approximately 1500 deaths. Work 
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carried out by our specialists, by extrapolating an impact model of a chemical 
attack on the population of the mentioned sites, is consistent with these figures.  
 
Beyond the fact that the victims do not show wounds, the death symptoms (to 
include generalized convulsions, nausea, vomiting, miosis, foaming from the 
nose and mouth, dyspnea, suffocation, loss of consciousness) are clinical signs 
of a poisoning due to the use of chemical agents. Confirmed cases of cross-
contamination of medical assistants have been reported by several sources.  
 
The observation of many low-age children suffering violent symptoms 
(convulsion among others), on eight different sites, lead to the conclusion that a 
falsification or manipulation by the opposition is highly improbable. These 
observations, as well as the multiple video sources and testimonies, exclude 
any possible falsification by the opposition.  
 
The massive inflow to different hospitals of contaminated people within a very 
short delay, the number of victims and the fact that they were coming from 
different distinct areas, confirmed by the analyses on the total of information 
we could gather, characterize the effects of an attack led with high lethality 
chemical agents; they confirm that a coordinated and massive attack was 
launched during the night of August 21, 2013.  
 
4 – The 21 August attack can only have been ordered and lead by the regime  
The combined attack lead on August 21 corresponds to a classical tactical 
pattern (artillery preparation, then ground offensive) and the use of chemical 
agents was integrated in a tactical maneuver consistent, on a military level, 
with the Syrian armed forces’ doctrine. Reliable intelligence from several of 
our partners mentions specific preparations in the days just before August 21.  
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Conventional air and artillery bombardments took place between 3 and 4 am on 
the Ghouta East. In parallel, the locations of Zamalka, Kafr Batna and Ayn 
Tarma were reached by chemical attacks. At 6 am, a ground offensive was 
launched by the regime against these cities.  
 
Several sources mention the use of artillery rockets, different from those of the 
best known ammunition stock (missiles and bombs). Our technical analyses 
confirm that the rest of rockets observed on that occasion, as for some previous 
and local operations, allow the use of chemical agents.  
 
The regime then lead important air and ground strikes on the attacked areas. It 
made efforts to delay the arrival of inspectors over several days. These 
elements confirm a clear willingness to destroy any evidence a posteriori. 
Furthermore, the military set off fires, aiming apparently at purifying the 
atmosphere thanks to the air movement generated by the intense heat.  
 
Our intelligence confirms that the regime feared a wider attack from the 
opposition on Damascus at that moment. Our assessment is that the regime was 
trying by this attack to loosen the grip and to secure sites strategic to control of 
the capital. For example, the area of Moadamiyé is located close to the Mezzeh 
military airfield, which houses the barracks of the Air Force intelligence.  
 
Anyhow it is clear, by examining the targets of the attack, than only the regime 
itself could have targeted positions that were so strategic for the opposition.  
 
Finally, we consider that the Syrian opposition does not have the capacity to 
lead an operation of that size with chemical agents. No group belonging to the 
Syrian opposition has, at this stage, the capacity to stock and use these agents, 
and even more in proportions comparable to what was used on the night of 
August, 21 in Damascus. These groups have neither the experience, nor the 
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know-how to implement them, particularly through vectors as those that were 
used during the August 21 attack. ¹Source of English translation: French 
Defence Ministry. 
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6. Syria/government declaration and debate at the National Assembly and Senate - 
Speech by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Senate 
Paris, 4 September 2013  
https://uk.ambafrance.org/Laurent-Fabius-explains-reasons  
Mr President, 
Ministers, 
Senators, 
In the early hours of 21 August, a few kilometers from the centre of Damascus, 
nearly 1,500 civilians, including hundreds of children, died, asphyxiated, in 
their sleep. Murdered by the Syrian regime, in what is, in the early part of this 
century, the most massive and most terrifying use of chemical weapons. 
 
Each one of us was able to find out about these events immediately after the 
tragedy, through dozens of videos. Videos shot by doctors, neighbours, 
relatives, who were not only terrified but also aware of their duty to inform the 
world of the horror of what had just occurred. 
Each one of us could see the appalling images of the victims’ agony, the rows 
of children’s corpses. There was not a drop of blood on those corpses, not a 
wound. Only the silent death by gas, whose use that night is no longer being 
denied by anyone. 
 
Beyond those terrifying images, what do we know with certainty? 
 
On Monday, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister 
Delegate for Relations with Parliament and I met the Presidents of the National 
Assembly and the Senate, the relevant committee heads and the leaders of the 
political parties of those two bodies to provide information on this subject to 
our national representatives. The government is convinced that the gravity of 
this moment calls for transparency and republican dialogue. 
We are certain of the scale of the death toll, which could reach up to 1,500 
victims. This has been confirmed by independent assessments such as the one 
carried out by Médecins sans Frontières. By analysing the videos, which we 
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have had authenticated, our own personnel has concluded that all the victims 
were located in neighbourhoods controlled by the opposition.  
 
All the symptoms observed are consistent with poisoning by chemical agents. 
We have evidence in our possession, and in our allies’ possession, indicating 
that sarin gas was used. 
We are certain that Syria has one of the largest chemical weapons stockpiles in 
the world: more than 1,000 tonnes of chemical warfare agents and dozens of 
delivery systems. 
We are certain that the Syrian regime has already used chemical weapons on 
several occasions in recent months, on a much more limited scale, with the aim 
of recapturing areas held by the opposition and spreading terror there. We have 
recovered and analysed samples that have confirmed the use of toxic gas in 
Saraqib and Jobar. This information has been transmitted to the United Nations. 
 
We are certain that this attack is part of an offensive to recapture a key area that 
serves as a gateway to Damascus. Preparations were already under way in 
previous days, including the movement of chemical agents from the regime’s 
main storage facilities. After the attack, we are also certain that there were 
intense bombardments to attempt to erase the evidence. 
And finally, we are certain that the opposition does not have the capability to 
conduct such a large-scale operation. No rebel group has the necessary 
quantities of chemical agents, the delivery systems or the know-how to carry 
out such an attack. 
 
It is therefore certain: there was indeed a massive chemical attack on 21 
August, in the Ghouta plain, for which the Syrian regime bears full 
responsibility. 
 
We share this certainty with our American, British, German and Turkish 
partners. The Arab League itself confirmed it during its ministerial meeting on 
Sunday, saying the regime was responsible. 
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It is not the mission of the UN investigators to assign responsibility. Those 
investigators will only be able to confirm the use of chemical weapons. 
 
Given these indisputable facts, what should we choose: action or resignation? 
Can we make do with condemning them, and with calling on the international 
community to wake up, so that peace negotiations that have not been 
forthcoming finally begin? 
 
Ladies and gentlemen senators, President Hollande offered a clear response to 
these questions, one in line with France’s mobilization since the beginning of 
the Syrian crisis. We were the first to recognize the Syrian National Coalition, 
to offer it our support, to respond to the humanitarian emergency, to promote a 
political solution. And we tirelessly pursued our contacts with our European 
partners, our allies, the countries of the region, Russia and China, to seek 
solutions to this tragedy. 
 
Not to respond would be to allow the large-scale use of chemical weapons to 
go unpunished. 
Not to respond would be to send Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian people a 
terrible message: that chemical weapons can be used again tomorrow against 
Damascus, against Aleppo, perhaps on an even larger scale. 
 
Not to respond would be to endanger the peace and security of the entire 
region, and beyond that, our own security. For – we must ask – what would it 
do to the credibility of our international commitments when it comes to halting 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons? 
What message would we be sending other regimes, such as Iran or North 
Korea? 
 
That message would unfortunately be very clear: you may go ahead; possessing 
these weapons gives you impunity and the divisions within the international 
community protect you. 
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Not responding, finally, would mean closing the door to a political solution to 
the Syrian conflict. Yes, the solution to the Syrian crisis will be political and 
not military. But let’s face up to reality: if we don’t put a stop to such acts by 
the regime, there will be no political solution. Why would Bashar al-Assad 
negotiate when he believes he can “liquidate” – that is his own word, which he 
repeated in writing early this week – “liquidate” his opposition, notably by 
using weapons that sow terror and death? 
 
For all of these reasons, the French President has chosen to take action: 
legitimate, collective and considered action. 
 
Legitimate, first of all, because the Syrian regime has violated its international 
obligations on a massive scale. By using chemical weapons, Bashar al-Assad 
has violated his obligations under the 1925 Protocol, which prohibits their use 
and which Syria ratified in 1968. He has flouted international humanitarian law 
by carrying out indiscriminate attacks, which are banned under the Geneva 
Conventions. He has committed a war crime. He has committed what the UN 
Secretary-General described as a crime against humanity. 
 
In addition to these violations, the Syrian regime has continuously refused to 
cooperate with the international community. By blocking access to the 
International Commission of Inquiry to monitor human rights. By refusing for 
five months to allow chemical weapons inspectors to be present. By dismissing 
the various attempts to broker a ceasefire. By increasing the number of 
obstacles to humanitarian action in Syria. 
 
Of course, the explicit authorization of the Security Council would be 
preferable. But, here again, let’s be realistic. Russia and China have blocked 
any response to the Syrian tragedy for two and a half years now, including by 
exercising their veto three times. Our attempt a week ago to propose a draft 
resolution authorizing a strong response to the chemical attack on 21 August 
was also stopped dead in its tracks. 
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The seriousness of the threat associated with the use of chemical weapons 
compels us to take action. 
 
The action we’re proposing is considered and collective. President Hollande 
stated that it should be – I quote – “firm and proportionate.” A one-off response 
with meaningful but targeted objectives. There is no question of sending in 
ground troops. There is no question of launching military operations to 
overthrow the regime. 
 
Of course, we want to see the departure of Mr Bashar al-Assad, who doesn’t 
hesitate to directly threaten our country and who even believes he can 
intimidate the national representatives. Yes, we want to see his departure within 
the framework of a political solution. France will continue to take the lead in 
promoting a political solution. 
Our message is clear: the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. We want to 
both punish and deter, to respond to this atrocity in order to prevent it from 
happening again. We also want to show Bashar al-Assad that he has no other 
option than to negotiate. 
 
Some tell us that a response would further complicate the situation. But, again, 
I appeal to your clear-sightedness. The destabilization of the countries of the 
region, which are dealing with the influx of more than two million refugees is a 
reality. Doing nothing in the face of the Syrian people’s suffering plays into the 
hands of the extremists. Ensuring that the Syrian regime’s crimes do not go 
unpunished is, on the contrary, a way for our democracies to support the 
moderate Syrian opposition. 
 
By doing this we will be true to our values, on which France’s commitment 
throughout the world is based. Indeed, France has a special responsibility. It’s 
an opportunity and a duty which contribute to the greatness of our country. 
Let’s be united in order to be true to this vocation. 
 
France will not act alone and will combine its efforts with those of other 
partners, beginning with the United States of America, with which it has 
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always aligned itself at critical moments when the cause was just. We are also 
counting on the support of the Europeans and the countries of the region, 
notably within the Arab League. President Hollande is continuing his efforts of 
persuasion in order to bring together the broadest possible coalition of support. 
The G20 summit beginning in St Petersburg tomorrow will provide such an 
opportunity. 
 
Mr President, 
Ministers, 
Senators, 
 
Next year we will commemorate the centenary of the First World War, which 
marked the first extensive use of poisonous gases as a combat weapon. A 
century later, while chemical weapons have been banned under international 
law, we cannot accept an appalling step backwards. 
 
In these grave circumstances, the national representatives must be informed. 
That’s why we pledge to continue keeping you informed over the next few days 
of changes in the situation, while respecting the institutional balance arising 
from our Constitution. In any event, the final decision can be taken only by 
President Hollande once the coalition has been formed, which is the only way 
to establish the conditions for action. 
Senators, in the face of barbarity, doing nothing is not an option, in any case 
not for France. By not responding, we allow Bashar al-Assad to continue his 
atrocities, encourage the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, 
leave Syria and the entire region to fall into chaos and give in to threats. 
Together with its partners, France will therefore assume its responsibilities./. 
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7. Government statement and debate in the National Assembly and Senate – 
Speeches by M. Jean-Marc Ayrault, Prime Minister, and M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, 
Minister of Defence (excerpts) Paris, 4 September 2013 
https://uk.ambafrance.org/Defence-Minister-calls-for-end-to  
 
(…) 
THE MINISTER – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen deputies, 
I’d like to answer two major questions that have been raised during this debate. 
 
Syria/chemical attack/evidence/Assad’s responsibility 
The first is the following: are we sure that the 21 August attack was chemical? 
Yes, it was chemical. The nature of the chemical agent used doesn’t matter 
much – although, as the President has said, several pieces of information show 
us and our partners that sarin was used. All the information declassified both by 
our and our partners’ services strongly demonstrates the use of chemical 
weapons during the attack, whether they be sarin, yperite, VX or other products 
like incapacitants for civilian use deployed at high doses, and even cocktails – 
that’s the most plausible theory. Moreover, nobody is denying it today – not 
even Bashar al-Assad. 
 
In this regard, let me add that the United Nations’ Sellström mission will say 
nothing except this, because its mandate is to ascertain the use of chemical 
weapons – which everyone now acknowledges – and not to say who ordered 
the attack. 
 
The second question relates to Bashar al-Assad’s responsibility. He is held 
accountable for eight fundamental, cumulative reasons which I’m going to set 
out. 
 
The first reason is that Bashar al-Assad’s regime has stockpiled more than 
1,000 tonnes of chemical agents and has deployed the necessary delivery 
systems for their use. It used them, remember, during the events in April in 
Saraqib and Jobar. We were able to indicate then, thanks to samples then 
passed on to the United Nations, that it was sarin gas. 
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Secondly, we have information showing that specific preparations were carried 
out by the regime in the days preceding 21 August. By specific preparations, I 
mean steps intended for a chemical intervention. 
 
Thirdly, the reconstruction of the military sequence of events in the 21 August 
attack, of which the Prime Minister informed your representatives on Monday 
evening, shows that many shots were fired from districts controlled by the 
regime towards the districts in the Ghouta, which is in the hands of the 
opposition. 
 
Fourthly, the operational sequence of events and the attack’s complexity – 
which, in my opinion, isn’t talked about enough – reveal a perfectly 
coordinated military operation in line with the tactics of the Syrian defence 
staff. Before the chemical attack, there was aerial and artillery preparation. In 
parallel with these military actions, the chemical attack was carried out from 
3.00 a.m. onwards. A ground offensive was launched onto the same sites from 
6.00 a.m. onwards. Then, still in the same place, there were further intense 
aerial and artillery bombardments. So there’s a technical consistency there, a 
large-scale and well-coordinated military action. 
 
Fifthly, the regime subsequently did everything to destroy evidence of its 
involvement in the operation, either by bombarding the sites already hit or by 
starting fires to eliminate the traces and cause the gases to evaporate. 
 
Sixth, the scale of the chemical attack is such, and the targets so numerous, that 
only the regime had the means to engage in such an intervention. 
 
Seventh, neither we nor our partners nor our respective services have ever had 
the slightest evidence of the Syrian opposition possessing – let alone using – 
chemical agents, especially in such quantities. 
 
Eighth, the attack launched makes great strategic sense for the Damascus 
regime, because it was facing an imminent offensive by the opposition in 
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sensitive districts, particularly eastern and western Ghouta, where Damascus’s 
two airports are situated. 
 
Yes, ladies and gentlemen deputies, it was a large-scale attack which killed 
hundreds of civilians and was carried out by a regime pursuing its work of 
terror and of liquidating its people – as Bashar al-Assad said in a recent 
interview. 
 
I now come to the political-military objectives of the intervention. M. Borloo 
referred to a tactical concept of no-fly zones and even of a humanitarian 
corridor. I’d like to say to him that in order to take such an initiative, we would 
need a huge number of aircraft, long term. This would amount to committing to 
a war on a long-term basis, without resolving the problem of the use of 
chemical weapons. It would mark the beginning of a conflict and a long-lasting 
war. I take the liberty of making this strictly military observation to him. I say 
this without any aggression, with the sole desire to clarify things for the 
nation’s elected representatives. 
 
Syria/Lebanon 
I’d also like to tell him that we share his concern about Lebanon. Today, that 
country is being hit hard by the consequences of the Syrian crisis, both on the 
humanitarian and security fronts, as shown by the influx of refugees and the 
increase in security incidents inside the country and at the borders, in Tripoli 
and the Bekaa valley. We too are very committed to Lebanon’s sovereignty. 
We support the policy of dissociation – the term used by President Suleiman – 
and call on all the political forces to abide by it. 
 
Moreover, I’d like to remind M. Borloo that on 10 July, on France’s initiative, 
there was a unanimous statement from the Security Council highlighting the 
imperative of Lebanon’s dissociation and of guaranteeing its political identity. 
That said, we share the security concern and, as you can well imagine, we’ve 
already adopted measures to protect our nationals and the French forces in 
southern Lebanon. 
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Intervention/objectives 
As regards the political-military objectives, I’d like to add this: these objectives 
are perfectly clear and defined. 
 
As the President said, our response has two major strategic objectives, both 
linked to Bashar al-Assad’s breaking of a taboo: that of using chemical 
weapons against his people. On the one hand, the objective is to punish the use 
of chemical agents by Bashar al-Assad against civilians and, on the other hand, 
to deter him from continuing and restore the ban on the use of weapons of mass 
destruction. These two objectives must allow us to define a firm, significant, 
targeted and proportionate response to the violation of an essential norm of 
international law. They are paramount in the military planning, which is 
governed by three principles in particular: no ground intervention, retaliatory 
action against Syrian capabilities and strict collateral damage limitation. The 
response will halt the escalation of violence the regime is engaged in and thus 
allow the mentality of impunity to be broken, which is today hindering the 
essential political solution. The aim of the response I’ve just described is not to 
overthrow the Syrian regime but to change the political dynamic by ending the 
mentality of impunity. 
 
A regime convinced of being able to win militarily by using weapons of mass 
destruction with impunity has no reason to come and negotiate a political exit. 
Incidentally, in his statement to Le Figaro yesterday, Bashar al-Assad doesn’t 
say anything different. 
Ladies and gentlemen deputies, France decides for itself, because it has military 
and intelligence capabilities that few countries have. It has specific 
responsibilities in the international arena, and a certain view of how the 
international order is respected and of what is called effective multilateralism. 
It also has duties in terms of national security, which give it the responsibility 
to intervene. (…)./. 
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8. Introductory remarks by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
during his press conference Paris, September 10, 2013  
https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article4879  
 
Since the Damascus chemical massacre on 21 August, we’ve constantly 
pursued two objectives: punishment of those responsible and deterrence, so that 
they can’t do it again. Our considered, firm approach has allowed us to get 
support from a growing number of states and influence certain positions. 
Yesterday, the Russian Foreign Minister took a step in this direction, calling for 
– I quote – “the Syrian authorities not only to agree to put their chemical 
weapons stockpile under international control and then have it destroyed, but 
also to become a full member of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons”. 
 
This position has today been supported, among others, by China. 
 
We welcome this new position with interest, but also with caution. We don’t 
want it to be used as a diversionary tactic. This is why, after discussing it with 
the President, we have decided to take the initiative. 
 
So France will present a resolution to this effect to the United Nations Security 
Council, and the procedure will be begun this very day. The text will be 
examined and, if need be, amended by our partners and by the Security 
Council. 
 
Very specifically, France will today propose to its Security Council partners a 
draft resolution under Chapter VII aimed at making its ideas an immediate 
reality. What ideas? 
 
418 
 
 Firstly, condemning the 21 August massacre committed by the Syrian 
regime; 
 Secondly, demanding that the regime immediately shed full light on its 
chemical weapons programme, place it under international control and allow it 
to be dismantled; 
 Thirdly, putting in place a full mechanism for the inspection and monitoring 
of its obligations, under the aegis of the international Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 
 Fourthly, providing for extremely serious consequences in the event of Syria 
violating its obligations; 
 Fifthly, finally, punishing the perpetrators of the 21 August chemical 
massacre in the international criminal justice system. 
 
It’s on the acceptance of these specific conditions that we’ll judge the 
credibility of the intentions expressed yesterday. The Syrian people have 
suffered too much; we won’t let ourselves be dragged into delaying tactics, so 
we must have rapid results. France wants to act in good faith to ensure that a 
firm, specific and verifiable response to the Syrian chemical threat can finally 
be found, with the two objectives we’ve had from the outset – punishment and 
deterrence – and still the same method: well-considered firmness. (…)./. 
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9. Interview between Mr Francois Hollande and TF1 on the situation in Syria, 
and on government policy, 15 September 2013 (Extracts)  
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/137002098.html  
Personnalité, fonction : HOLLANDE François.  
FRANCE. Président de la République 
ti : CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Bonsoir Monsieur le Président. 
LE PRESIDENT 
Bonsoir Claire CHAZAL. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Merci de nous recevoir ici à l’Hôtel de Marigny, l’annexe de l’Elysée, ouvert 
exceptionnellement, on l’a dit, pour ces Journées du patrimoine. 
Merci de nous réserver votre première intervention sur le dossier de la Syrie et 
votre parole sur ce point est très attendue. 
Vous vous exprimerez aussi à l’issue d’une semaine très importante qui a vu la 
présentation du budget 2014 dans ses grandes lignes et puis aussi une semaine 
au cours de laquelle les Français ont reçu leur feuille d’impôt. 
Vous savez que sur ce thème, il y a beaucoup de questions, d’inquiétude, voire 
de colère ; nous consacrerons à ce thème, la deuxième moitié de notre entretien. 
La Syrie tout d’abord donc. Les dernières tractations diplomatiques à Genève 
entre les Américains et les Russes ont débouché sur un accord portant sur le 
démantèlement des stocks d’armes chimiques syriens avec même la possibilité 
d’user de la force si Damas n’obtempère pas ; la Chine approuve. Le régime de 
Damas s’affiche aussi satisfait aujourd’hui. Est-ce que cet accord vous agrée ? 
Est-ce que vous êtes heureux de cet accord ? 
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LE PRESIDENT 
D’abord merci d’avoir accepté cet entretien. Il est attendu par les Français car 
la Syrie, c’est la tragédie la plus grave du début du 21e siècle. 
120.000 morts. La moitié de la population est déplacée : deux millions de 
réfugiés. Et puis le 21 août, dans ce cortège d’horreur, il y a eu un massacre 
chimique. 1.500 civils, femmes, hommes, enfants, qui ont été tués à travers 
l’utilisation de gaz. Et donc la première question comme Président de la 
République, que j’ai eue à régler, pas simplement autour de ma conscience 
mais de l’idée que je me fais de la France et de ma responsabilité, c’est qu’une 
réaction était nécessaire, que ce drame n’avait que trop duré et qu’il prenait un 
tour, à travers les armes chimiques, qui ne pouvait plus être accepté parce que 
c’était une violation du droit international, de la plus vieille de nos conventions 
qui proscrit les armes chimiques. Alors nous avons donc menacé d’utiliser la 
force à travers des frappes ; pas simplement la France, les Etats-Unis et à un 
moment le Royaume-Uni. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Vous avez même dit : il faut punir Bachar EL-ASSAD. Vous ne regrettez pas 
aujourd’hui ce terme, compte tenu de l’évolution de la situation ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
Justement, s’il n’y avait pas eu de réaction, alors qu’est-ce qui se serait passé ? 
Bachar EL-ASSAD aurait donc continué à gazer la population ? 
Bachar EL-ASSAD niait même jusqu’à récemment, il y a quelques jours, qu’il 
avait des armes chimiques ; aujourd’hui, il en fait l’aveu. 
Les Russes soutenaient Bachar EL-ASSAD et considéraient qu’il n’y avait rien 
à faire, en tout cas pas une punition. La pression que la France a exercée – pas 
simplement la France, les Etats-Unis – la pression qui a été donc suffisamment 
forte, a convaincu la Russie, POUTINE, de prendre une initiative. Tant mieux. 
Cette initiative a permis d’avoir un accord, là, ces derniers jours. 
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CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Mais la France n’était pas présente à Genève. Est-ce que vous avez regretté 
l’absence de la France ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
Alors d’abord qu’est-ce qu’on doit penser de cet accord ? Je considère que c’est 
une étape importante. Mais ce n’est pas le point d’arrivée. Donc la France n’est 
pas seule, elle n’a jamais été seule. On me dit : vous êtes avec les Etats-Unis 
d’OBAMA. Quel crime y aurait-il d’être avec le président OBAMA sur cette 
question des droits essentiels de la personne humaine et de notre sécurité ? 
Quand des armes chimiques sont utilisées, ce n’est pas simplement dans un 
pays, dans une région, ça peut être partout. Donc la France a considéré que ce 
qui avait été noué entre les Américains et les Russes ces derniers jours, c’est 
une étape importante. Qu’est-ce que je vais faire demain ? Je vais recevoir le 
ministre KERRY, des Affaires étrangères, qu’on appelle le Secrétaire d’Etat 
américain et le ministre des Affaires étrangères britanniques, avec Laurent 
FABIUS. Et nous allons mettre en forme la prochaine résolution du Conseil de 
sécurité qui va prendre l’accord et le traduire. 
De quelle manière ? Un, de faire en sorte que les vérifications sur place 
puissent être faites… 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Vous savez que c’est très difficile… 
LE PRESIDENT 
C’est très difficile, donc ça mérite effectivement que nous y passions un certain 
nombre de temps pour être sûrs que les 50 sites soient bien identifiés. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Beaucoup disent qu’il est presque illusoire de demander à la fois le 
recensement et puis la destruction de ces stocks d’armes… 
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LE PRESIDENT 
Après il y a la destruction. Un calendrier a été fixé, sans doute est-il un peu 
ambitieux, mais enfin on ne va pas se plaindre… 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Certains parlent de dix ans… 
LE PRESIDENT 
Oui. Là, il est dit premier semestre 2014… 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
C’est très très court… 
LE PRESIDENT 
C’est très court. Donc il faut bien intégrer la menace de sanctions si l’accord et 
le résultat de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité n’étaient pas traduits. 
Donc nous devons faire en sorte qu’il y ait la possibilité d’une sanction s’il n’y 
a pas application. Mais il y a une étape importante qui maintenant doit être 
suivie de cette résolution devant le Conseil de sécurité, de cette possibilité de 
sanction en cas de manquement du côté syrien et il y a autre chose qui va se 
produire lundi, c’est le rapport des inspecteurs de l’ONU, afin de savoir s’il y a 
bien eu utilisation d’armes chimiques et cela aura quelques conséquences sur le 
processus. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Alors on va revenir à ces preuves évidemment, qui sont très importantes ; 
quand vous dites « sanctions », qu’est-ce que ça veut dire Monsieur le 
Président ? Des frappes ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
Jusque-là, les Etats-Unis, et la France disaient que puisque le Conseil de 
sécurité était débloqué, nous étions prêts à envisager des frappes pour faire 
bouger la Syrie et faire évoluer la diplomatie russe. 
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Convenons que cette stratégie a porté puisque nous en sommes arrivés au point 
où maintenant la menace de sanctions n’est plus portée par des pays mais 
pourrait l’être par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
… Qui pourrait dire… prononcer, le mot « frappes ciblées »… 
LE PRESIDENT 
Il prononcera en tout cas le mot « sanctions » puisque c’est dans ce cadre-là 
que les Russes et les Américains ont convenu de situer maintenant l’inspection, 
la destruction des armes chimiques en Syrie. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Est-ce que ce n’est pas une façon pour Vladimir POUTINE de gagner du temps 
? Est-ce qu’aujourd’hui on peut faire confiance – la question est peut-être 
brutale – à Vladimir POUTINE ? Au fond, les frappes sont différées… 
LE PRESIDENT 
On ne peut pas à la fois nous dire : « allez vers les Russes » parce que cela peut 
être une occasion de sortie de cette crise et en même temps « vous ne pouvez 
pas faire confiance aux Russes » ! La meilleure façon de nous faire confiance 
mutuellement, c'est de passer devant le Conseil de sécurité. Jusque-là, les 
Russes – pas simplement les Russes d’ailleurs, les Chinois aussi – bloquaient le 
Conseil de sécurité ; les Russes avaient posé trois fois leur veto depuis le début 
de la crise syrienne ; cette fois-ci, puisqu’ils sont partie prenante de cet accord, 
ils pourront être aussi juges de son application et de son exécution et donc 
partie prenante d’une éventuelle sanction si le Conseil de sécurité en jugeait 
ainsi, faute de participation des Syriens – Quand je dis des Syriens, je dis 
régime syrien – parce qu’il faut bien voir que Bachar EL-ASSAD n’est pas le 
représentant de la Syrie. Pour nous, pour la France, les représentants de la 
Syrie, c’est l’opposition démocratique, ce ne sont pas les djihadistes non plus 
parce que finalement les djihadistes, les islamiques radicaux et le régime de 
Bachar EL-ASSAD se donnent la main, les uns pour justifier leur maintien au 
pouvoir – Bachar EL-ASSAD – les autres pour justifier de leur installation en 
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Syrie. Il faut arrêter ce conflit. Et donc la prochaine étape après le Conseil de 
Sécurité qui va se mettre sur la question des armes chimiques… 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Et la France pourrait être à l’initiative et rédiger cette résolution ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
Oui, nous allons dès demain y travailler avec les ministres des Affaires 
étrangères américain et britannique, puis ensuite Laurent FABIUS se rendra en 
Russie pour rencontrer son homologue pour terminer ce processus et nous 
pourrions faire voter cette résolution avant la fin de la semaine. Est-ce que nous 
en aurions pour autant terminé ? Il y a toujours ces violences, il y a toujours 
cette guerre en Syrie. Donc la prochaine étape, cela doit être de trouver la 
solution politique à la crise syrienne et cela nous pourrions le faire si chacun est 
conscient de la gravité de la situation mais aussi de l’opportunité qui nous est 
donnée. Nous pourrions le faire dès l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies à 
la fin du mois de septembre. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Et vous-même, Président français, vous souhaitez le départ de Bachar EL-
ASSAD ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
Je l’ai toujours dit, mais la meilleure des façons de l’obtenir, c’est d’avoir cet 
accord politique et d’être sûr que ceux qui vont être chargés de la transition 
soient des démocrates car il ne s’agit pas d’installer ceux que nous avons 
combattus au Mali ou il y a quelques mois en Lybie. Donc faisons attention de 
ne pas installer ceux que nous considérons comme aussi dangereux que Bachar 
EL-ASSAD, puisque tous les deux, Bachar EL-ASSAD et les djihadistes, sont 
des massacreurs. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Il y a le problème des réfugiés aussi, Monsieur le Président. Est-ce que la 
France compte en accueillir, des réfugiés de Syrie, puisqu’on sait que la 
population fuit par milliers… par dizaines de milliers le pays. 
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LE PRESIDENT 
J’ai cité ce drame : deux millions de réfugiés, qui créent une situation 
épouvantable en Jordanie, au Liban, en Turquie, autant de pays amis qui se 
trouvent déstabilisés – je pense notamment au Liban et à la Jordanie, parce que 
ce sont des pays fragiles compte tenu de l’importance des réfugiés. A partir de 
ce constat, oui, nous devons prendre notre part mais si j’ai voulu une solution 
politique, si j’ai voulu faire pression sur le régime syrien, c’est bien pour arrêter 
cet engrenage parce que ce serait quand même un paradoxe si on laissait faire 
et, en même temps, si on était amené à accueillir des réfugiés en toujours plus 
grand nombre ! Je m’y refuse. Moi, je veux une solution et je dois dire que les 
Français se sont beaucoup interrogés, je les comprends… 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Ils ont même rejeté l’idée de frappes… 
LE PRESIDENT 
Oui… après l’exemple irakien où la France n’était pas allée et heureusement ! 
Après cette guerre en Afghanistan qui a duré onze ans… 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Et tous les printemps arabes qui évidemment montrent les limites… 
LE PRESIDENT 
J’ai d’ailleurs moi-même retiré les forces françaises d’Afghanistan… Et puis la 
Libye qui n’a pas donné tous les résultats escomptés. Même si, au Mali, nous 
pouvons être fiers d’une opération pleinement réussie. Donc je comprends les 
Français qui cherchent une autre solution et qui peuvent se dire « c’est bien loin 
et ce n’est pas notre affaire ». Si, c’est notre affaire ! La sécurité de la France, 
c’est ma responsabilité. Donc c’est vrai que je veux que nous puissions – 
maintenant que nous avons réussi parce que nous devons être fiers de ce que 
nous avons fait, la pression que nous avons exercée, avec les Etats-Unis, elle a 
payé ! – donc à nous maintenant de chercher la solution politique à ce conflit. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Mais vous n’avez pas été, si on reprend la genèse très rapidement bien sûr, 
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vous n’avez pas été surpris par les décisions et de David CAMERON et de 
Barack OBAMA de consulter le Parlement et au fond j’allais dire de lâcher un 
peu la France… 
LE PRESIDENT 
Chacun a ses institutions ; en France, vous savez que le président de la 
République a des prérogatives, cela nous rend plus prompts, plus forts… 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Vous n’avez pas pensé vous aussi à consulter le Parlement ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
Bien sûr, je suis soucieux de ce que peut représenter le Parlement, de ce qu’il 
peut aussi prononcer. Mais je n’ai pas eu à le consulter puisqu’aujourd’hui nous 
sommes dans une phase qui nous permet d’envisager sérieusement une issue 
diplomatique et politique. Mais je l’indique, pour être tout à fait clair devant 
vous : l’option militaire doit demeurer, sinon il n’y aura pas la contrainte. Je 
souhaite qu’elle soit d’ailleurs exercée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations 
Unies. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Avant de passer bien sûr au volet économique qui est très important, un mot 
des otages. Trois ans que quatre otages français sont retenus au Mali ; deux 
otages – nos confrères d’EUROPE 1 – en Syrie. Est-ce que vous avez des 
preuves de vie d’Edouard ELIAS et Didier FRANCOIS ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
Oui, nous avons des preuves. Mais ils sont retenus. Et je pense aussi à nos 
otages du Mali. Nous avons des preuves, mais ils sont retenus. Et les quatre 
otages qu’on appelle d’Arlit, le sont depuis trois ans presque jour pour jour. Je 
mesure ce que cela représente pour les familles, je les ai reçues plusieurs fois, 
je connais leur douleur, leur impatience qui devient même maintenant 
insupportable, et je peux leur dire, je dois leur dire que nous faisons tout pour 
aller les chercher mais en faisant en sorte que les contacts que nous prenons 
puissent aboutir. C’est trop long. Si j’avais pu le faire dès à présent, je serais 
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heureux de pouvoir vous le confier aujourd’hui, mais je fais en sorte que nous 
puissions saisir toutes les opportunités qui se présenteront aussi bien pour le 
Mali que pour la Syrie. 
CLAIRE CHAZAL 
Un tout dernier mot peut-être, Monsieur le Président, sur la Syrie : l’opération 
au Mali avait montré l’efficacité de l’armée française. Aujourd’hui, cette 
opération en Syrie a été plus chaotique ou en tout cas il y a eu des annonces, 
des reculs des Américains. Ce sont des moments très difficiles dans l’exercice 
d’un pouvoir présidentiel. Est-ce qu’au fond cet épisode syrien, vous ne le 
regrettez pas ou en tout cas vous ne vous êtes pas senti mal à l’aise à certains 
moments ? 
LE PRESIDENT 
D’abord je veux exprimer toute ma reconnaissance à l’armée française, 
admirable force qui a été capable de rendre à ce pays du Mali sa souveraineté – 
je vais y aller dans quelques jours et ce sera l’occasion de saluer toute 
l’opération, du début où j’ai pris la décision, jusqu’à la fin, l’élection 
présidentielle. Le nouveau Président a été installé et j’irai à sa rencontre la 
semaine prochaine. Saluer aussi l’armée française qui était prête à organiser les 
frappes, à les mettre en œuvre dès que j’en aurais pris la décision. Son rôle 
n’est pas de décider. Son rôle, c’est de permettre au président de la République, 
au nom de tous les Français, de prendre l’option qui paraît la meilleure. Nous 
n’avons pas pris cette option. Finalement la menace de frappe, l’efficacité des 
frappes, car elles auraient été tout à fait pertinentes et graduées, proportionnées 
et nous n’aurions pas eu à survoler le territoire syrien, c’est vous dire la qualité 
de notre armée ; mais le fait que cette menace ait existé a permis d’arriver à la 
solution politique. Donc il n’y a pas de diplomatie possible s’il n’y a pas aussi 
une crédibilité militaire. La France est une nation souveraine. Moi je ne 
dépends pas de quelque pays que ce soit. Pas pour le Mali, pas pour la Syrie, 
j’engage la France ou je ne l’engage pas quand je considère que ce sont nos 
intérêts essentiels qui sont en cause. Et là, comme nous n’avons pas engagé 
cette force, nous l’avons utilisée dans sa menace même, pour arriver à la 
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solution que les Français souhaitaient, que le monde souhaitait, c'est-à-dire une 
solution diplomatique. 
(…) 
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10. Speech by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs (excerpts)  
New York, September 27, 2013  
https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article4939  
This evening, amid the Syrian tragedy, the Security Council has at last lived up 
to its name. (…) 
 
The resolution we’ve just adopted meets the three requirements set by the 
French President and me at the beginning of this week, which may go down in 
history – whether it concerns Syria or Iran – as the international week of 
rapprochement. 
 
This resolution describes the use of chemical weapons as a threat to 
international peace and security. The Security Council will therefore be able to 
take up this matter at any time. It will be the guarantor of chemical 
disarmament. 
 
Moreover, the resolution states clearly that those responsible for such crimes 
will have to answer in court for their actions. 
 
Finally, the resolution also provides – as agreed in Geneva by our American 
and Russian colleagues, who worked hard to that end – for measures to be 
taken under Chapter VI of the [UN] Charter in the event of the Damascus 
regime failing to comply with its obligations. (…) 
 
This resolution is not a point of arrival: it’s only a first step. Unfortunately we 
can’t take at its word a regime which only recently was denying it possessed 
such weapons. So the UN and the OCPW [Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons] must, without delay, carry out their joint mission. The 
timetable set in the decision adopted in The Hague today must be honoured. 
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Syria’s cooperation must be unconditional, and the transparency total. The 
Security Council, regularly informed, will be the judge of this. It will, if 
necessary, take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure this goal is 
achieved. In short, this resolution must not only be voted for, it must be 
implemented. France, like all of us, will be careful to ensure this. (…) 
However positive this resolution may be, the repression and the humanitarian 
disaster in Syria are tragically continuing. Our responsibility is to act to put an 
end to them. 
 
France wants to take advantage of this unity finally obtained at the Council in 
order, with you, to move the political process forward, which alone will enable 
the fighting to be stopped and peace to be restored. We must prepare the 
Geneva 2 meeting, in the framework defined by the Geneva 1 agreement, 
which provides for the transfer of executive powers to a transitional body. 
Along with the United Nations Secretary-General and his envoy, whom I 
congratulate on and thank for their work, the five permanent members of the 
Security Council have a special responsibility to shoulder in order to achieve 
this, as has been done particularly on the chemical side. 
Yesterday, along with the representatives of very many states, I chaired a 
meeting with the Chair of the Syrian National Coalition, Mr Al-Jarba. He 
confirmed that he’s ready to send a delegation to negotiate at Geneva 2. For 
their part, the Damascus regime’s supporters will have to assure us of a similar 
commitment. 
 
I know that the Secretary-General and his envoy will take the initiative to make 
swift progress to this effect, as we said at the meeting of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council that has just been held, with a positive result 
and a date for Geneva 2. France will back these efforts. (…) 
 
We know that despite its clear usefulness, a resolution alone will not save 
Syria. That’s why the Security Council will have to shoulder its responsibilities 
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in full. Over the coming weeks, we’ll have to think only of the Syrian people 
and their agony, which must be stopped as quickly as possible. This will be the 
position of France, which will remain firm and consistent, providing its total 
support to the search for peace. Thank you./. 
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